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Continental Realism and Its Discontents$
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Marie-Eve Morin

Print publication date: 2017

Print ISBN-13: 9781474421140

Published to University Press Scholarship Online: May 2018

DOI: 10.3366/edinburgh/9781474421140.001.0001

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date: 28 May 2020

Being (with) Objects

Being (with) Objects

Chapter:
(p.116) Chapter 6 Being (with) Objects
Source:
Continental Realism and Its Discontents
Author(s):

Anna Mudde

Publisher:
Edinburgh University Press
DOI:10.3366/edinburgh/9781474421140.003.0007

This chapter explores some of the ambivalent potential of Graham Harman’s object-oriented ontology for thinking about human beings as objects and about being with human beings as objects. In particular, it employs feminist phenomenological theories of objectification, such as those of Beauvoir, Young, and Bartky, as both already object-oriented and as already contesting the idealist tendencies opposed by Harman. Objectification often produces ‘double-consciousness’, and objectified human beings inhabit a site of ontological duality, often knowing themselves as objects for others. The chapter suggests that the absence of these analyses in object-oriented ontology constitutes an important oversight since such work not only draws attention to object relations among human beings but also points to ways of understanding human relations with non-human objects.

Keywords:   Graham Harman, Simone de Beauvoir, Iris Marion Young, Sandra Lee Bartky feminist phenomenology, objectification, double-consciousness, object-oriented ontology

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