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Making AI IntelligiblePhilosophical Foundations$
Making AI Intelligible: Philosophical Foundations

Herman Cappelen and Josh Dever

Print publication date: 2021

Print ISBN-13: 9780192894724

Published to University Press Scholarship Online: May 2021

DOI: 10.1093/oso/9780192894724.001.0001

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date: 28 May 2022

(p.173) Index

(p.173) Index

Source:
Making AI Intelligible
Publisher:
Oxford University Press

For the benefit of digital users, indexed terms that span two pages (e.g., 52–53) may, on occasion, appear on only one of those pages.

ACT-THEORETIC VIEW OF PROPOSITIONS 118–121
ADVERSERIAL PERTURBATIONS 160–162
achievements of contemporary 13–14
and consciousness 24–25
difference to calculator 42–43
difference to humans 70–72
described as content bearers in academic and popular work 51–52
dynamic goals of 140–148
meaningfulness of outputs 4–5, 36–38
need of explainability 19, 162–166
training 7, 88–90, 110–111
sketch of working of 5–8
ALFRED (dismissive sceptic) 28, 31, 51, 53, 157
ALVAREZ, Maria 163 n.2, 165 n.3
ANCHORING
For AI 87–88
Kripkean 84 see also baptism, externalism
ANTHROPOCENTRIC ABSTRACTION 53–54, 69–72
Of mental files 109–111
Of anchoring 87–88
Of assertion 128–129
Sweet spot 70, 72, 87, 156 see also metasemantics
ARMSTRONG, D.M. 55 n.4
ARRIVAL (movie) 16 n.6
ASSERTION
norms of 134 see also propositions, predication
AUDI, Robert 163 n.2
AXELROD, Vadim 63 n.2
BARD, Nolan 51
BIAS
of AI systems 3 n.1
BLACK BOX
of human mind 12, 71–72
nature of AI systems 71–72
BOSTROM, Nick 3 n.1, 17–18
BRANDOM, Robert 134
BRENTANO, Franz 56, 57 n.6
BRIER SCORE 92–97
BRINGSJORD, Selmer 57–58
BROWN, Jessica 133
BUCKNER, Cameron 3 n.1, 57–58
BURGE, Tyler 57–58, 58 n.7, 82–83, 148–152, 155
CAPPELEN, Herman 57 n.6, 133–135
CAUSAL THEORY OF REFERENCE see externalism, Kripke, communicative chain, causal source
COMMUNICATIVE CHAIN 84–85
CAUSAL SOURCE 111
CAUSAL DESCRIPTIVISM 85
CHALMERS 85, 139, 148–150, 152–155
CHINESE ROOM ARGUMENT 24–25
CICERO 108
CLARK, Andy 139, 148–150, 152–155
COHNITZ, Daniel 75 n.5
CONSCIOUSNESS 24–25
(p.174) CONTENT
anthropocentric nature of existing theories 67–72
Fregean view of 119
in ‘old-school’ AI theorizing 21–24
externalist nature of AI 69–72
reasons for attributing to AI 35–40, 48, 51–52 see also names, predicates, predication, metasemantics, externalism
CRANE, Tim 57 n.6
DANCY, Jonathan 163 n.2
DAVIDSON, Donald 16–17, 76–77, 126–127
DESCRIPTIVISM 76–78, 85, 105–106 see also reference, names
DEVER, Josh 57 n.6
DONNELLAN, Keith 57 n.6
DOOM 13–14
DRETSKE, Fred 57 n.6
EMPIRICISM 3 n.1, 57–58
EPISTEMICALLY REWARDING RELATIONS 108–111 See also mental files
EVANS, Gareth 57 n.6, 106, 110–115
EXISTENTIAL RISK 17–18
EXPLAINABILITY OF AI 25–27, 162–166
EXTENDED MIND HYPOTHESIS 58 n.7, 139
EXTERNALISM 59 see also metasemantics, content
FACEBOOK 8
FELDMAN, Richard 78 n.6
FLAXMAN, Seth 25
FLORIDI, Luciano 3 n.1, 57–58
FODOR, Jerry 57 n.6, 127
GOLDBERG, Sanford 133
GOODFELLOW, Ian 5 n.2
GOODMAN, Bryce 25
GOOGLE 13–14, 33
GOVINDARAJULU, Naveen Sundar 57–58
GRAY, Aidan 106–107, 110
HANKS, Peter 119–121, 132–133
HAWTHORNE, John 57 n.6
HENDRICKS, Lisa Anne 26 n.7
HUANG, Sandy 52
INFORMATION
AI as only processing 36–40 see also No-content-just-evidence View
dominant source in mental files 110–115
INTERNALISM 75 n.5
and symbolic AI 65–67
and extended mind 151–152
INTERPRETATION 78 n.6
knowledge-maximising (meta-meta-semantics) 75–79
KAMINSKI, Margot 25
KROON, Frederick 85
LEM, Stanislaw 16–17
LEWIS, David 85
LOCKWOOD, Michael 106
LOOMIS, Eric 37–38
LOOSE TALK 36–38, 53–54
MACHINE LEARNING see AI
MARCUS, Ruth Barcan 148–149
MELE, Al 163 n.2
MENTAL FILE FRAMEWORK 105–108 see also reference, names, externalism, metasemantics, aboutness
METASEMANTICS 56–58
pluralism 82 n.1
de-anthropocentrized 59
anthropocentric 67–72 see also content
META-META-SEMANTICS 72–75, 75 n.5, 110, 113
interpreter-knowledge-maximising 75–79
MILLER, Tim 26 n.7, 57–58
MILLIKAN, Ruth 57 n.6, 148–149
MINECRAFT 13–14
(p.175) MUELLER, Shane 26 n.7
MULLIGAN, Kevin 55 n.4
NEANDER, Karen 57 n.6
NEURAL NETWORK see AI
NO-CONTENT-JUST-EVIDENCE VIEW 157–158
NOZICK, Robert 32–33
NYHOLM, Sven 3 n.1
PAEZ, Andrés 26 n.7
PAPINEAU, David 126–127
PERCEPTION 77–78, 108–110
PUTNAM, Hilary 148–152
PREDICATES 81–102
PROPOSITIONS 117–121 see also: predication, assertion
PYTHON 60
RAHIMI, Ali 33–35
RAWLS, John 32–33
RAZ, Joseph 163 n.2
RECANATI, Francois 57 n.6, 108–109
REFERENCE 103–16
reference preservation 98–102
reference shifts 111–116 see also aboutness, names, Kripke
REPRESENTATION 54–56 see also aboutness, content, externalism, names
RESCORLA, Michael 22
RIBEIRO, Marco 26 n.7
RUSSELL, Bertrand 57 n.6
SALMON, Nathan 85
SCANLON, Tim 163 n.2
SCHIEBINGER, Londa 3 n.1
SCHUBBACH, Arno 57–58
SEARLE, John 24–25
SELF-DRIVING CARS 3 n.1, 13–14, 41, 44–47
SHEA, Nicholas 57–58
SMIDS, Jilles 3 n.1
SOAMES, Scott 85, 119–121, 123, 132–133
STRAWSON, P.F 57 n.6
SWAMPMAN 126–127
TELEOFUNCTIONALISM 123–125
TURNIP (reference shift example) 111–112
TWO-DIMENSIONAL SEMANTICS 85
WILLIAMS, J. Robert G. 78 n.6
WILLIAMSON, Timothy 75–78, 110
WORD2VEC 13–14