David Constantine
- Published in print:
- 1988
- Published Online:
- October 2011
- ISBN:
- 9780198157885
- eISBN:
- 9780191673238
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198157885.003.0014
- Subject:
- Literature, European Literature, Poetry
Friedrich Hölderlin's biography, his figurative life, may be better known than his poems. He is syntactically difficult sometimes too, and moves in his poetic thinking through unapparent connections. ...
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Friedrich Hölderlin's biography, his figurative life, may be better known than his poems. He is syntactically difficult sometimes too, and moves in his poetic thinking through unapparent connections. Then the sheer length of many of his best poems is off-putting, which is why the Diotima poems written in Frankfurt and Homburg are a good place to begin. The purity of his poetry and the urgency of his demands, if they do not wholly engage one, may actually be wearisome or repellent. His critique of wrong living is exact and ungainsayable. His political hopes and disappointment look more and more representative. He was a deeply religious poet, whose fundamental tenet is nevertheless absence and the threat of meaninglessness. He had a Romantic hope that the mind and the poetic imagination might make meaning; and the Romantic dread of solipsism. His poetics are a theory of perpetual onward movement, and his poems realize it.Less
Friedrich Hölderlin's biography, his figurative life, may be better known than his poems. He is syntactically difficult sometimes too, and moves in his poetic thinking through unapparent connections. Then the sheer length of many of his best poems is off-putting, which is why the Diotima poems written in Frankfurt and Homburg are a good place to begin. The purity of his poetry and the urgency of his demands, if they do not wholly engage one, may actually be wearisome or repellent. His critique of wrong living is exact and ungainsayable. His political hopes and disappointment look more and more representative. He was a deeply religious poet, whose fundamental tenet is nevertheless absence and the threat of meaninglessness. He had a Romantic hope that the mind and the poetic imagination might make meaning; and the Romantic dread of solipsism. His poetics are a theory of perpetual onward movement, and his poems realize it.
Robert Stevens
- Published in print:
- 2007
- Published Online:
- January 2009
- ISBN:
- 9780199211609
- eISBN:
- 9780191705946
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199211609.003.0001
- Subject:
- Law, Law of Obligations
A commonly held misconception is that the law of torts is concerned with defining those cases where one party may be held liable to compensate another for the loss he has caused through his fault. In ...
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A commonly held misconception is that the law of torts is concerned with defining those cases where one party may be held liable to compensate another for the loss he has caused through his fault. In fact the infringement of rights, not the infliction of loss, is the gist of the law of torts. In judicial decisions and academic writing, injuria and damnum, the wrong and its consequences, the right and the loss, are frequently conflated together. We have a law of torts, not a law of tort, just as we have a law of wrongs, not a law of wrong. This work seeks to demonstrate the importance and truth of conceiving of torts in this two-tiered way.Less
A commonly held misconception is that the law of torts is concerned with defining those cases where one party may be held liable to compensate another for the loss he has caused through his fault. In fact the infringement of rights, not the infliction of loss, is the gist of the law of torts. In judicial decisions and academic writing, injuria and damnum, the wrong and its consequences, the right and the loss, are frequently conflated together. We have a law of torts, not a law of tort, just as we have a law of wrongs, not a law of wrong. This work seeks to demonstrate the importance and truth of conceiving of torts in this two-tiered way.
Christian Illies
- Published in print:
- 2003
- Published Online:
- October 2011
- ISBN:
- 9780198238324
- eISBN:
- 9780191679612
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198238324.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Moral Philosophy
Transcendental arguments have gained a lot of attention over the past twenty years, mainly in the field of theoretical reason. Yet few scholars have looked at their relevance to practical reason. ...
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Transcendental arguments have gained a lot of attention over the past twenty years, mainly in the field of theoretical reason. Yet few scholars have looked at their relevance to practical reason. This book argues that although this methodological avenue is not yet well-paved, transcendental arguments have great potential in ethics, as they promise rational justification of normative judgements. There are two main types of transcendental argument that have been developed for this purpose in recent years. One is based on an analysis of the implications of agency (mainly by Alan Gewirth), the other on an analysis of reason as a discursive process with normative presuppositions (Karl-Otto Apel and other continental philosophers, but also Onora O'Neill). This book finds that these arguments have severe limitations, and argues that practical reason should involve a different analysis: judgement formation must be analysed as a form of agency. Once this starting point is secured, by showing that it cannot rationally be denied, then two things can be transcendentally inferred: first, that there exists a categorical demand upon agents to arrive at true judgements, and second, that we must respect freedom of agency in general. Here our ordinary notions of right and wrong find secure ground.Less
Transcendental arguments have gained a lot of attention over the past twenty years, mainly in the field of theoretical reason. Yet few scholars have looked at their relevance to practical reason. This book argues that although this methodological avenue is not yet well-paved, transcendental arguments have great potential in ethics, as they promise rational justification of normative judgements. There are two main types of transcendental argument that have been developed for this purpose in recent years. One is based on an analysis of the implications of agency (mainly by Alan Gewirth), the other on an analysis of reason as a discursive process with normative presuppositions (Karl-Otto Apel and other continental philosophers, but also Onora O'Neill). This book finds that these arguments have severe limitations, and argues that practical reason should involve a different analysis: judgement formation must be analysed as a form of agency. Once this starting point is secured, by showing that it cannot rationally be denied, then two things can be transcendentally inferred: first, that there exists a categorical demand upon agents to arrive at true judgements, and second, that we must respect freedom of agency in general. Here our ordinary notions of right and wrong find secure ground.
Peter Unger
- Published in print:
- 1996
- Published Online:
- November 2003
- ISBN:
- 9780195108590
- eISBN:
- 9780199868261
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0195108590.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Moral Philosophy
That our unexamined moral intuitions often lead us to commend conduct that is seriously wrong and to condemn conduct that is not wrong indicates the extent to which these intuitions clash with our ...
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That our unexamined moral intuitions often lead us to commend conduct that is seriously wrong and to condemn conduct that is not wrong indicates the extent to which these intuitions clash with our Basic Moral Values. The view known as Liberationism, which holds that moral intuitions are often unreflective of basic values, contrasts with the more common view known as Preservationism, which maintains that our moral intuitions accord with our basic moral values. This book explores the inconsistencies in the Preservationist position by highlighting disparities in the responses that our intuitions generate for relevantly similar moral cases. These misleading responses are generated by psychological tendencies, such as projective separating and protophysical thinking, that distort the features of moral problems. In distorting our responses, the Preservationist position allows us to think erroneously that it is not difficult for well‐off people to lead a morally good life in a world in which serious suffering may easily be reduced. In fact, a moral life is extremely costly for well‐off people given how much we efficiently may do to alleviate the distant serious suffering of others.Less
That our unexamined moral intuitions often lead us to commend conduct that is seriously wrong and to condemn conduct that is not wrong indicates the extent to which these intuitions clash with our Basic Moral Values. The view known as Liberationism, which holds that moral intuitions are often unreflective of basic values, contrasts with the more common view known as Preservationism, which maintains that our moral intuitions accord with our basic moral values. This book explores the inconsistencies in the Preservationist position by highlighting disparities in the responses that our intuitions generate for relevantly similar moral cases. These misleading responses are generated by psychological tendencies, such as projective separating and protophysical thinking, that distort the features of moral problems. In distorting our responses, the Preservationist position allows us to think erroneously that it is not difficult for well‐off people to lead a morally good life in a world in which serious suffering may easily be reduced. In fact, a moral life is extremely costly for well‐off people given how much we efficiently may do to alleviate the distant serious suffering of others.
Roger Crisp
- Published in print:
- 2006
- Published Online:
- January 2007
- ISBN:
- 9780199290338
- eISBN:
- 9780191710476
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199290338.003.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Moral Philosophy
The book opens with the suggestion that a fundamental question in philosophical normative ethics concerns what each of us has reason to do. That leads one immediately into the issue of whether we ...
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The book opens with the suggestion that a fundamental question in philosophical normative ethics concerns what each of us has reason to do. That leads one immediately into the issue of whether we have moral reasons to act, in the sense of ultimate or non-derivative reasons the correct description of which makes ineliminable use of the moral concepts: right, wrong, good, bad, virtuous, kind, cruel, and so on. This chapter draws an analogy between morality and law as social phenomena, and argues that there is a strong case for thinking that morality in itself provides no such reasons, though there may well be derivative reasons for doing what some actual morality or other prescribes. If this is right, then the correct theory of reasons for action should be stated without using the moral concepts.Less
The book opens with the suggestion that a fundamental question in philosophical normative ethics concerns what each of us has reason to do. That leads one immediately into the issue of whether we have moral reasons to act, in the sense of ultimate or non-derivative reasons the correct description of which makes ineliminable use of the moral concepts: right, wrong, good, bad, virtuous, kind, cruel, and so on. This chapter draws an analogy between morality and law as social phenomena, and argues that there is a strong case for thinking that morality in itself provides no such reasons, though there may well be derivative reasons for doing what some actual morality or other prescribes. If this is right, then the correct theory of reasons for action should be stated without using the moral concepts.
David Owens
- Published in print:
- 2012
- Published Online:
- January 2013
- ISBN:
- 9780199691500
- eISBN:
- 9780191744938
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199691500.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Moral Philosophy
This book affirms the value of obligations and of rights, of forgiveness, of consent and refusal, of promise and request. These are all instruments by which we exercise control over our normative ...
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This book affirms the value of obligations and of rights, of forgiveness, of consent and refusal, of promise and request. These are all instruments by which we exercise control over our normative environment. Philosophers from Hume to Scanlon have supposed that when we make promises, give our consent, etc. our real interest is in controlling (or being able to anticipate) what people will actually do and that our interest in rights and obligations is a by-product of this more fundamental interest. In fact, we value for its own sake the ability to decide who is obliged to do what, to determine when blame is appropriate, to settle whether an act wrongs us. This book describes how we control the rights and obligations of ourselves and of those around us. We do so by making friends and thereby creating the rights and obligations of friendship. We do so by making promises and so binding ourselves to perform. We do so by consenting to medical treatment and thereby giving the doctor the right to go ahead. The normative character of our world matters to us on its own account. To make sense of promise, consent, friendship, and other related phenomena we must acknowledge that normative interests are amongst our fundamental interests. We must also rethink the psychology of human agency and the nature of social convention.Less
This book affirms the value of obligations and of rights, of forgiveness, of consent and refusal, of promise and request. These are all instruments by which we exercise control over our normative environment. Philosophers from Hume to Scanlon have supposed that when we make promises, give our consent, etc. our real interest is in controlling (or being able to anticipate) what people will actually do and that our interest in rights and obligations is a by-product of this more fundamental interest. In fact, we value for its own sake the ability to decide who is obliged to do what, to determine when blame is appropriate, to settle whether an act wrongs us. This book describes how we control the rights and obligations of ourselves and of those around us. We do so by making friends and thereby creating the rights and obligations of friendship. We do so by making promises and so binding ourselves to perform. We do so by consenting to medical treatment and thereby giving the doctor the right to go ahead. The normative character of our world matters to us on its own account. To make sense of promise, consent, friendship, and other related phenomena we must acknowledge that normative interests are amongst our fundamental interests. We must also rethink the psychology of human agency and the nature of social convention.
Christopher Hood
- Published in print:
- 2000
- Published Online:
- November 2003
- ISBN:
- 9780198297659
- eISBN:
- 9780191599484
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0198297653.003.0010
- Subject:
- Political Science, Comparative Politics
Returns to the general question of what sort of science public management is or can be and how cultural theory can contribute to that science. Concludes by taking stock of the cultural‐theory ...
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Returns to the general question of what sort of science public management is or can be and how cultural theory can contribute to that science. Concludes by taking stock of the cultural‐theory approach as a framework for analysing public management, surveying its strengths and weaknesses. It does not claim there are no problems with the approach—on the contrary, there are major gaps and ambiguities and some of the underlying logic needs attention, but in spite of such weaknesses, the claim is that a cultural‐theory framework has much to contribute to a way of thinking about the art of the state that is neither sham science nor mere craft. To assess the cultural‐theory approach, this concluding chapter discusses three sorts of objections to the cultural‐theory framework as a way of analysing public management. One possible line of criticism might be called the ‘nursery toys’ objection—the claim that cultural theory is too simple for sophisticated analysis and is therefore better suited for the elementary stages of understanding than for advanced or professional analysis; a second possible line of criticism might be called the ‘soft science’ objection—the claim that, whatever its level of sophistication or applicability to management, the theory is, even on its own terms, limited, ambiguous, and perhaps even unfalsifiable; a third line of criticism might be called the ‘wrong tool’ objection—i.e. the claim that cultural theory, however sophisticated, cannot be an adequate basis for a theory of management, because ultimately it has little to say about the central what‐to‐do questions of organization that management and managers need to be concerned with—and by this view, it is the wrong tool for the job.Less
Returns to the general question of what sort of science public management is or can be and how cultural theory can contribute to that science. Concludes by taking stock of the cultural‐theory approach as a framework for analysing public management, surveying its strengths and weaknesses. It does not claim there are no problems with the approach—on the contrary, there are major gaps and ambiguities and some of the underlying logic needs attention, but in spite of such weaknesses, the claim is that a cultural‐theory framework has much to contribute to a way of thinking about the art of the state that is neither sham science nor mere craft. To assess the cultural‐theory approach, this concluding chapter discusses three sorts of objections to the cultural‐theory framework as a way of analysing public management. One possible line of criticism might be called the ‘nursery toys’ objection—the claim that cultural theory is too simple for sophisticated analysis and is therefore better suited for the elementary stages of understanding than for advanced or professional analysis; a second possible line of criticism might be called the ‘soft science’ objection—the claim that, whatever its level of sophistication or applicability to management, the theory is, even on its own terms, limited, ambiguous, and perhaps even unfalsifiable; a third line of criticism might be called the ‘wrong tool’ objection—i.e. the claim that cultural theory, however sophisticated, cannot be an adequate basis for a theory of management, because ultimately it has little to say about the central what‐to‐do questions of organization that management and managers need to be concerned with—and by this view, it is the wrong tool for the job.
Matt Matravers
- Published in print:
- 2000
- Published Online:
- November 2003
- ISBN:
- 9780198295730
- eISBN:
- 9780191599828
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0198295731.003.0010
- Subject:
- Political Science, Political Theory
Having established the nature of the moral community, this chapter examines the part played in that community by punishment. The right to punish is shown to be justified as intrinsic to morality ...
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Having established the nature of the moral community, this chapter examines the part played in that community by punishment. The right to punish is shown to be justified as intrinsic to morality itself. Punishment is shown to secure the conditions of moral flourishing, to communicate to the offender the wrongs that he has done to his victim and to the community, and it tries in so doing, to reinforce in the offender his commitment to morality. Punishment is thus shown to be needed for its consequences, but also to be of an offender for an offence.Less
Having established the nature of the moral community, this chapter examines the part played in that community by punishment. The right to punish is shown to be justified as intrinsic to morality itself. Punishment is shown to secure the conditions of moral flourishing, to communicate to the offender the wrongs that he has done to his victim and to the community, and it tries in so doing, to reinforce in the offender his commitment to morality. Punishment is thus shown to be needed for its consequences, but also to be of an offender for an offence.
Paul Borgman
- Published in print:
- 2008
- Published Online:
- May 2008
- ISBN:
- 9780195331608
- eISBN:
- 9780199868001
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195331608.003.0002
- Subject:
- Religion, Biblical Studies
Israel's second king, David, will commit what looks like far greater wrong than anything done by God's first choice, King Saul. But David proves much the superior leader. Why might God have given up ...
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Israel's second king, David, will commit what looks like far greater wrong than anything done by God's first choice, King Saul. But David proves much the superior leader. Why might God have given up so quickly on Saul, and what does this intimate about God's reversal of choices, for David? Possible answers begin to emerge with the narrator's presentation of Saul's three anointings and paralleled wrongdoing, the latter sandwiching a picture of Jonathan, of everything good that Saul isn't. With Saul we find an anatomy of failure that goes beyond mere wrongdoing. Something within Saul is tragically lacking, a flaw that will prove definitive as a contrast with David. Brought into a unifying vision by this and other patterns are “blocks” of material considered quite disparate by many biblical scholars.Less
Israel's second king, David, will commit what looks like far greater wrong than anything done by God's first choice, King Saul. But David proves much the superior leader. Why might God have given up so quickly on Saul, and what does this intimate about God's reversal of choices, for David? Possible answers begin to emerge with the narrator's presentation of Saul's three anointings and paralleled wrongdoing, the latter sandwiching a picture of Jonathan, of everything good that Saul isn't. With Saul we find an anatomy of failure that goes beyond mere wrongdoing. Something within Saul is tragically lacking, a flaw that will prove definitive as a contrast with David. Brought into a unifying vision by this and other patterns are “blocks” of material considered quite disparate by many biblical scholars.
Donald Black
- Published in print:
- 2011
- Published Online:
- May 2012
- ISBN:
- 9780199737147
- eISBN:
- 9780199944002
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199737147.001.0001
- Subject:
- Sociology, Social Theory
Conflict is ubiquitous and inevitable, but people generally dislike it and try to prevent or avoid it as much as possible. So why do clashes of right and wrong occur? And why are some more serious ...
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Conflict is ubiquitous and inevitable, but people generally dislike it and try to prevent or avoid it as much as possible. So why do clashes of right and wrong occur? And why are some more serious than others? This book presents a new theory of conflict that provides answers to these and many other questions. The heart of the theory is a completely new concept of social time. The book claims that the root cause of conflict is the movement of social time, including relational, vertical, and cultural time—changes in intimacy, inequality, and diversity. The theory of moral time reveals the causes of conflict in all human relationships, from marital and other close relationships to those between strangers, ethnic groups, and entire societies. Moreover, the theory explains the origins and clash of right and wrong not only in modern societies but across the world and across history, from conflict concerning sexual behavior such as rape, adultery, and homosexuality, to bad manners and dislike in everyday life, theft and other crime, racism, anti-Semitism, anti-Americanism, witchcraft accusations, warfare, heresy, obscenity, creativity, and insanity. The book concludes by explaining the evolution of conflict and morality across human history, from the tribal to the modern age. It also provides surprising insights into the postmodern emergence of the right to happiness and the expanding rights of humans and non-humans across the world. The book offers an incisive, powerful, and radically new understanding of human conflict—a fundamental and inescapable feature of social life.Less
Conflict is ubiquitous and inevitable, but people generally dislike it and try to prevent or avoid it as much as possible. So why do clashes of right and wrong occur? And why are some more serious than others? This book presents a new theory of conflict that provides answers to these and many other questions. The heart of the theory is a completely new concept of social time. The book claims that the root cause of conflict is the movement of social time, including relational, vertical, and cultural time—changes in intimacy, inequality, and diversity. The theory of moral time reveals the causes of conflict in all human relationships, from marital and other close relationships to those between strangers, ethnic groups, and entire societies. Moreover, the theory explains the origins and clash of right and wrong not only in modern societies but across the world and across history, from conflict concerning sexual behavior such as rape, adultery, and homosexuality, to bad manners and dislike in everyday life, theft and other crime, racism, anti-Semitism, anti-Americanism, witchcraft accusations, warfare, heresy, obscenity, creativity, and insanity. The book concludes by explaining the evolution of conflict and morality across human history, from the tribal to the modern age. It also provides surprising insights into the postmodern emergence of the right to happiness and the expanding rights of humans and non-humans across the world. The book offers an incisive, powerful, and radically new understanding of human conflict—a fundamental and inescapable feature of social life.
Kenneth Hamilton
- Published in print:
- 2007
- Published Online:
- May 2008
- ISBN:
- 9780195178265
- eISBN:
- 9780199870035
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195178265.003.0003
- Subject:
- Music, Theory, Analysis, Composition
This chapter traces the changing concert etiquette, affecting both performers and audiences, from the 19th- to the 20th-centuries. Particular topics discussed are fluctuating fashions in applause, in ...
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This chapter traces the changing concert etiquette, affecting both performers and audiences, from the 19th- to the 20th-centuries. Particular topics discussed are fluctuating fashions in applause, in audience reaction, in the requirement for memorization, and in the attitude to inaccuracies and wrong notes.Less
This chapter traces the changing concert etiquette, affecting both performers and audiences, from the 19th- to the 20th-centuries. Particular topics discussed are fluctuating fashions in applause, in audience reaction, in the requirement for memorization, and in the attitude to inaccuracies and wrong notes.
Eric Descheemaeker
- Published in print:
- 2009
- Published Online:
- September 2009
- ISBN:
- 9780199562794
- eISBN:
- 9780191705533
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199562794.003.0001
- Subject:
- Law, Comparative Law, Law of Obligations
The civilian tradition, as exemplified by Justinian's Institutes and the French Civil Code, has generally divided its law of civil wrongs into two categories, wrongs ‘proper’ and ‘quasi-wrongs’. ...
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The civilian tradition, as exemplified by Justinian's Institutes and the French Civil Code, has generally divided its law of civil wrongs into two categories, wrongs ‘proper’ and ‘quasi-wrongs’. Nowhere, however, does it state unambiguously the rationale, or even the content, of this dichotomy. The common law, on the other hand, has only ever had, in spite of some procedural divisions, one class of civil wrongs. From this observation, two questions arise, which will form the subject-matter of the book: How and why did the civilian tradition split up its law of wrongs, and what did it make of this division? What, if anything, could the common law learn from the civilian experience on this point?Less
The civilian tradition, as exemplified by Justinian's Institutes and the French Civil Code, has generally divided its law of civil wrongs into two categories, wrongs ‘proper’ and ‘quasi-wrongs’. Nowhere, however, does it state unambiguously the rationale, or even the content, of this dichotomy. The common law, on the other hand, has only ever had, in spite of some procedural divisions, one class of civil wrongs. From this observation, two questions arise, which will form the subject-matter of the book: How and why did the civilian tradition split up its law of wrongs, and what did it make of this division? What, if anything, could the common law learn from the civilian experience on this point?
Eric Descheemaeker
- Published in print:
- 2009
- Published Online:
- September 2009
- ISBN:
- 9780199562794
- eISBN:
- 9780191705533
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199562794.003.0002
- Subject:
- Law, Comparative Law, Law of Obligations
This chapter concerns itself with the identification of the subject-matter of the book, wrongs and the law of wrongs. Regarding the former, the definition offered of a wrong (or civil wrong) is that ...
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This chapter concerns itself with the identification of the subject-matter of the book, wrongs and the law of wrongs. Regarding the former, the definition offered of a wrong (or civil wrong) is that it is the violation of a right, and therefore a breach of duty. The relationship between the concepts of ‘duty’, ‘right’, and ‘wrong’ is explored; as are the notion of an ‘interest’, and the alternative analytical framework followed in particular by Nils Jansen. Concerning the delineation of the law of wrongs, this chapter explains why, in order to maintain a stable field of enquiry across jurisdictional divides, the book will exclude breach of contract and public law from its scope.Less
This chapter concerns itself with the identification of the subject-matter of the book, wrongs and the law of wrongs. Regarding the former, the definition offered of a wrong (or civil wrong) is that it is the violation of a right, and therefore a breach of duty. The relationship between the concepts of ‘duty’, ‘right’, and ‘wrong’ is explored; as are the notion of an ‘interest’, and the alternative analytical framework followed in particular by Nils Jansen. Concerning the delineation of the law of wrongs, this chapter explains why, in order to maintain a stable field of enquiry across jurisdictional divides, the book will exclude breach of contract and public law from its scope.
Alan Brudner
- Published in print:
- 2009
- Published Online:
- September 2009
- ISBN:
- 9780199207251
- eISBN:
- 9780191705502
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199207251.003.0002
- Subject:
- Law, Philosophy of Law, Criminal Law and Criminology
This chapter sets out and defends a version of retributivism that the book calls legal retributivism, and shows how it is untouched by the criticisms directed by consequentialists against moral ...
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This chapter sets out and defends a version of retributivism that the book calls legal retributivism, and shows how it is untouched by the criticisms directed by consequentialists against moral retributivism — the view that punishment is justified as giving the wicked their just deserts. The chapter begins by setting out the basic features of the penal justice paradigm ordered to the protection of the agent's formal liberty to act on ends it chooses: the equal dignity of agents, the independence of wronging from harming, the absence of liability for failing to benefit, and the independence of culpability from evil. It then describes the conceptions of wrongdoing and of criminal wrongdoing belonging to this paradigm. It explicates the nonconsequentialist and nonmoral justification of punishment uniquely connected to this framework and defends this way of justifying punishment as the only one consistent with the inviolability of the person. Finally, it describes the limitations of the formalist paradigm to which legal retributivism belongs.Less
This chapter sets out and defends a version of retributivism that the book calls legal retributivism, and shows how it is untouched by the criticisms directed by consequentialists against moral retributivism — the view that punishment is justified as giving the wicked their just deserts. The chapter begins by setting out the basic features of the penal justice paradigm ordered to the protection of the agent's formal liberty to act on ends it chooses: the equal dignity of agents, the independence of wronging from harming, the absence of liability for failing to benefit, and the independence of culpability from evil. It then describes the conceptions of wrongdoing and of criminal wrongdoing belonging to this paradigm. It explicates the nonconsequentialist and nonmoral justification of punishment uniquely connected to this framework and defends this way of justifying punishment as the only one consistent with the inviolability of the person. Finally, it describes the limitations of the formalist paradigm to which legal retributivism belongs.
Mark C. Murphy
- Published in print:
- 2010
- Published Online:
- January 2011
- ISBN:
- 9780199576739
- eISBN:
- 9780191595165
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199576739.003.0015
- Subject:
- Religion, Philosophy of Religion
Suppose that one aimed to call into question the moral goodness of the God of the Old Testament by appeal to God's command to destroy Jericho (Joshua 6: 16–21). In this chapter it is argued that the ...
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Suppose that one aimed to call into question the moral goodness of the God of the Old Testament by appeal to God's command to destroy Jericho (Joshua 6: 16–21). In this chapter it is argued that the only plausible way to do so would be to show that by issuing that command God acted wrongly with respect to the Jerichoites in issuing that command, and it is argued that the only way to show that God so acted wrongly with respect to the Jerichoites is to show that God's issuing that command wronged the Jerichoites, for reasons brought forward by defenders of skeptical theism. It is then shown that we have good reason to think that, by nature, it is not possible for God to wrong the Jerichoites, for God and humans do not naturally share a dikaiological order.Less
Suppose that one aimed to call into question the moral goodness of the God of the Old Testament by appeal to God's command to destroy Jericho (Joshua 6: 16–21). In this chapter it is argued that the only plausible way to do so would be to show that by issuing that command God acted wrongly with respect to the Jerichoites in issuing that command, and it is argued that the only way to show that God so acted wrongly with respect to the Jerichoites is to show that God's issuing that command wronged the Jerichoites, for reasons brought forward by defenders of skeptical theism. It is then shown that we have good reason to think that, by nature, it is not possible for God to wrong the Jerichoites, for God and humans do not naturally share a dikaiological order.
Miranda Seymour
- Published in print:
- 2004
- Published Online:
- January 2012
- ISBN:
- 9780197263181
- eISBN:
- 9780191734595
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- British Academy
- DOI:
- 10.5871/bacad/9780197263181.003.0015
- Subject:
- Literature, Criticism/Theory
Humans who are governed by emotional states have the capacity to establish, develop, and retain different interpretations of the people familiar to them. Hence it is the part of the biographer to ...
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Humans who are governed by emotional states have the capacity to establish, develop, and retain different interpretations of the people familiar to them. Hence it is the part of the biographer to examine these untethered interpretations and create from them a portrait that will be identifiable from all angles. A biography cannot present a life in the unclear and multi-faceted form that is its familiar and daily form. A biography in this sense is therefore an illusion. This chapter discusses the challenge of shaping biographies. In it, possible flaws of the biographical genre, including the invasion of privacy to the delivery of truths to one's life story, are considered. The chapter also discusses the standard rules governing the biographer's manner of using confidential information or documents. Particular focus is on the ethics of biography, the rights and the wrongs of presentation of those to whom death affords little protection.Less
Humans who are governed by emotional states have the capacity to establish, develop, and retain different interpretations of the people familiar to them. Hence it is the part of the biographer to examine these untethered interpretations and create from them a portrait that will be identifiable from all angles. A biography cannot present a life in the unclear and multi-faceted form that is its familiar and daily form. A biography in this sense is therefore an illusion. This chapter discusses the challenge of shaping biographies. In it, possible flaws of the biographical genre, including the invasion of privacy to the delivery of truths to one's life story, are considered. The chapter also discusses the standard rules governing the biographer's manner of using confidential information or documents. Particular focus is on the ethics of biography, the rights and the wrongs of presentation of those to whom death affords little protection.
Mark Schroeder
- Published in print:
- 2007
- Published Online:
- January 2008
- ISBN:
- 9780199299508
- eISBN:
- 9780191714917
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199299508.003.0002
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Political Philosophy
This chapter begins the substantive exploration of the commitments of the Humean Theory of Reasons by investigating what we mean when we say that Ronnie has his reason because of his desire. The No ...
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This chapter begins the substantive exploration of the commitments of the Humean Theory of Reasons by investigating what we mean when we say that Ronnie has his reason because of his desire. The No Background Conditions view is proposed, according to which desires can't explain reasons without being part of them. It is shown that the No Background Conditions view plays a key role in a sophisticated version of the claim that the Humean Theory is committed to making good reasoning out to be Objectionably Self-Regarding, and in a further objection to the effect that it locates the explanation of reasons in the Wrong Place. Hypotheticalism's view about the background conditions on reasons is introduced, and arguments for the No Background Conditions view are diagnosed and dismissed.Less
This chapter begins the substantive exploration of the commitments of the Humean Theory of Reasons by investigating what we mean when we say that Ronnie has his reason because of his desire. The No Background Conditions view is proposed, according to which desires can't explain reasons without being part of them. It is shown that the No Background Conditions view plays a key role in a sophisticated version of the claim that the Humean Theory is committed to making good reasoning out to be Objectionably Self-Regarding, and in a further objection to the effect that it locates the explanation of reasons in the Wrong Place. Hypotheticalism's view about the background conditions on reasons is introduced, and arguments for the No Background Conditions view are diagnosed and dismissed.
Bruce Langtry
- Published in print:
- 2008
- Published Online:
- September 2008
- ISBN:
- 9780199238798
- eISBN:
- 9780191716485
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199238798.003.0007
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Moral Philosophy, Philosophy of Religion
This chapter identifies truths in virtue of which God is justified in ensuring or allowing that human beings undergo a lot of suffering, and frequently choose and act in morally wrong ways. If God ...
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This chapter identifies truths in virtue of which God is justified in ensuring or allowing that human beings undergo a lot of suffering, and frequently choose and act in morally wrong ways. If God were morally required to ensure that there is little or no evil, then rational creatures would have low degrees of freedom and moral responsibility for each other's well‐being, and the absence of evil would be independent of individuals' distinctive personal traits. The chapter is neutral between compatibilism and libertarianism.Less
This chapter identifies truths in virtue of which God is justified in ensuring or allowing that human beings undergo a lot of suffering, and frequently choose and act in morally wrong ways. If God were morally required to ensure that there is little or no evil, then rational creatures would have low degrees of freedom and moral responsibility for each other's well‐being, and the absence of evil would be independent of individuals' distinctive personal traits. The chapter is neutral between compatibilism and libertarianism.
Ned Schantz
- Published in print:
- 2008
- Published Online:
- September 2008
- ISBN:
- 9780195335910
- eISBN:
- 9780199868902
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195335910.003.0006
- Subject:
- Literature, Film, Media, and Cultural Studies, Women's Literature
This chapter pursues the problem of coincidence on the telephone in its greatest cinematic example—Sorry, Wrong Number—all the way to the ambivalent dream of telepathy, a major fantasy of novelistic ...
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This chapter pursues the problem of coincidence on the telephone in its greatest cinematic example—Sorry, Wrong Number—all the way to the ambivalent dream of telepathy, a major fantasy of novelistic culture and troubling concern for film. Telepathy then structures a sustained comparison between film and the novel in terms of access to characters’ minds, a comparison developed in an extended reading of Shadow of a Doubt. Hitchcock’s film finally represents a turning away from telepathy and female knowledge—the double—edged legacy of the novel—toward a cinema of female mobility and speed.Less
This chapter pursues the problem of coincidence on the telephone in its greatest cinematic example—Sorry, Wrong Number—all the way to the ambivalent dream of telepathy, a major fantasy of novelistic culture and troubling concern for film. Telepathy then structures a sustained comparison between film and the novel in terms of access to characters’ minds, a comparison developed in an extended reading of Shadow of a Doubt. Hitchcock’s film finally represents a turning away from telepathy and female knowledge—the double—edged legacy of the novel—toward a cinema of female mobility and speed.
Douglas Husak
- Published in print:
- 2007
- Published Online:
- January 2008
- ISBN:
- 9780195328714
- eISBN:
- 9780199869947
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195328714.003.0003
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Moral Philosophy
The internal constraints introduced in chapter two are supplemented by three external constraints derived from a political account of the conditions under which the state may infringe the important ...
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The internal constraints introduced in chapter two are supplemented by three external constraints derived from a political account of the conditions under which the state may infringe the important rights implicated by punishment: a criminal offense is unjustified unless the government has a substantial interest in enacting it; the statute must directly advance the government's purpose; and the law must be no more extensive than necessary to achieve its objective. These three constraints are defended, embellished, and applied to a handful of controversial examples, including laws designed to serve expressive functions, statutes with a paternalistic rationale, and drug and gun controls. To implement these constraints effectively, legal philosophers need an analysis of public wrongs, empirical data, and a theory of the objectives the state may legitimately pursue. The final section argues that many crimes designed to prevent risk will fail to satisfy these constraints, largely because they are overinclusive.Less
The internal constraints introduced in chapter two are supplemented by three external constraints derived from a political account of the conditions under which the state may infringe the important rights implicated by punishment: a criminal offense is unjustified unless the government has a substantial interest in enacting it; the statute must directly advance the government's purpose; and the law must be no more extensive than necessary to achieve its objective. These three constraints are defended, embellished, and applied to a handful of controversial examples, including laws designed to serve expressive functions, statutes with a paternalistic rationale, and drug and gun controls. To implement these constraints effectively, legal philosophers need an analysis of public wrongs, empirical data, and a theory of the objectives the state may legitimately pursue. The final section argues that many crimes designed to prevent risk will fail to satisfy these constraints, largely because they are overinclusive.
