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The main changes in the multilateral world‐trading system since and including the GATT Uruguay Round in 1994 are summarized, and the most urgent reforms needed to keep the system going are highlighted. The roots of the changes that have occurred are traced to the transformation of the trading system initiated in the Uruguay Round, in which the new issues of intellectual property and services were included; however, the spread of Internet use in the mid‐1990s has been equally important. In addition, there are ongoing changes in the climate of ideas that raise questions about the neoclassical model at the core of economics and trade policy. It is argued that if the rules‐based system is to endure, coping with these changes will require structural reform not only of the WTO (GATT's replacement) but also of the post‐war international architecture.

Although the WTO continued what the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) has started, WTO differed from GATT in the following features: the single undertaking in negotiated multilateral trade agreements, panel decisions and their binding nature, and stricter requirements for new members. While the WTO was created to expand membership in the world trading system, to extend trade liberalization, and to strengthen the members' commitment, these modifications have posed problems in the negotiating process which are referred to as “institutional friction”. As it was observed that developing countries had a significant role yet reaped disappointing results in such arrangements, the failures of the Doha Round are said to have been rooted on the Uruguay Round—the trade negotiation setup that is said to have been the most ambitious.

The chapter concludes by summarizing the case for a focused WTO dedicated to trade liberalization, with recommendations for improving the world trading system and rejuvenating the political coalition for trade in the face of globalization and nontrade issues. The WTO provides a framework for capturing trade benefits, which can serve as the foundation not only for economic growth and greater prosperity, but also for a more unified world economy. These benefits, in turn, may contribute to greater political stability, progress on human rights and labor standards, and efforts to secure a sustainable global environment.

The worries over preferential trade agreements (PTAs) have increased dramatically in the past two decades as PTAs have proliferated. This chapter discusses the consequences of complexity of the resulting trade regime. The Vinerian concerns about the trade diversion that a PTA can cause have yielded by now to “systemic” concerns about PTAs. The systemic problem from discriminatory trade liberalization under PTAs arises in two ways. The trade-unrelated issues are reported. It is hard to speculate the consequences of PTAs with equanimity.

It is important to first understand that few lay people and policy makers can appreciate the critical difference between preferential trade agreements (PTAs) and genuine multilateral, nondiscriminatory trade liberalization in order to fully understand the many reasons why PTAs have now turned into a pandemic and a pox on the world trading system. While the First Regionalism was certainly influenced by the European Community's first steps and the program of further steps toward full integration, its main impulse was altogether different. This regionalism struggled, and the Second Regionalism was a howling success from the early 1990s. The many elements that have contributed to the remarkable and deplorable turnaround that marks the Second Regionalism are described.

This chapter addresses the use of the WTO waiver as an instrument for reconciling human rights protection with the international law of the world trade system. The specific context of the waiver for the Kimberley Process Scheme is used. After a short introduction to the diamond trading system, the first section continues with informational background on several of the wars in Africa in which diamond trading by rebel militias has been prevalent and detrimental to the civilian population. The second section describes the Kimberley Process Scheme for the Certification of Rough Diamonds. The third section addresses the trade and human rights problem and the Kimberley Process's ‘solution’ of securing a waiver of Participants' WTO obligations.

This book examines some of the defects and needs for reform in the current world trading system, which focuses on the World Trade Organization (WTO). The subtitle of this book — Legitimacy, Efficiency, and Democratic Governance — is very descriptive of the intent of the book's author and director, Professor Petersmann, and his view of the endeavour. This book is the result of three international conferences on Preparing the Doha Development Round. In each of these conferences, leading academics presented papers on the various subjects of the Doha Development Round of the WTO entailing stimulating discussions among WTO ambassadors, other practitioners from developed and less-developed WTO member countries, economists, political scientists, and legal academics. This volume examines some important institutional questions, such as the ‘political legitimacy’ of the WTO system. It looks particularly at the degree to which the system protects consumer welfare, and how that goal of the system could be evaluated.

Trade and the environment’s institutional dynamics are the main focus of the chapter. The chapter discusses the multilateral environmental agreements’ (MEAs) relationship with the world trade system and their influence on each other’s work, along with the evolvement of interlocking structures from the international institution’s interaction. It analyzes the institutional interaction’s causal mechanism micro-concept and the interlocking governance structure’s macro-concept in detail. The disruptive interaction between the World Trade Organization and MEAs leading to division of labor among the institutions is examined. The evolvement of a coherent interlocking governance structure is seen in trade and the environment’s institutional complex, which would limit the adverse interaction between the component institutions.

The United States has played an essential role in driving the agenda for the world trading system since World War II. An important component of that agenda has been the liberalization of government procurement, with the first plurilateral agreement signed in 1979 as part of the Tokyo Round. Since then, procurement has become a staple of other trade agreements, both in the WTO and in bilateral and regional pacts. This chapter outlines the government procurement commitments the United States has sought from its trading partners and the commitments which the US made in return, with a particular focus on how these positions have evolved over time.