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The key questions in the seventh chapter of the book are related to the changes in the social basis of support for the parties in the British political spectrum in the period 1979–1997 and whether these changes can be described as processes of class dealignment or class realignment. The authors conclude that, from 1979–1997 there has been continuity in the Conservatives’ social basis of support and that almost all variations in Conservative support (apart from the regional one) took the form of swings that affected all social groups alike. There was also continuity in the image of the Conservative party in terms of the groups it represented—in 1997, the Conservatives continued to be seen as a highly sectional party concerned with the interests of the social groups that constituted its traditional core. This was not the case with the Labour party—in 1997, New Labour had very substantially reduced its sectional character, was no longer distinctively associated with any particular social group, and it had successfully become a catchall party. There was a change not only in the image of New Labour but also in the character of Labour's voters—under Tony Blair New Labour's moves towards the centre, involved larger than expected electoral gains in the salariat than among Labour's traditional sources of support in the working class. However, despite these changes Heath, Jowell, and Curtice conclude that even under New Labour the usual pattern of party support continued—it was simply muted. This gives support to the thesis of class realignment according to which the changes in the social bases of party support are due to particular groups shifting their support from one party towards a different one and not due to a blurring of class boundaries and a weakening of the social cleavages (class dealignment).

This chapter explores the role of the spare-time agent, from the watch club organizer of the late 19th century through to the working housewife and mother a century later. By the end of the 1930s, mail order retailing had begun to deal directly with the women who held the purse strings in working-class families. Agency mail order only became a significant retail phenomenon when it tapped into the rhythms of working-class women's lives. This was made possible by the creation of systems that allowed for simple credit transactions, founded upon the payment of small weekly sums out of the limited disposable income available in the majority of early 20th-century households. Equally important, the catalogues and payments were administrated by family, friends, or neighbours, who were approachable and understood both the needs and credit limitations of their customers.

This chapter focuses on explanations of the apparent Conservatism amongst the East End working class. In many ways, this has meant a simplified emphasis upon factors possibly acting to dilute the expression of the ‘existing’ political tendencies of the working class. But clearly the evidence does show, on a number of occasions, that voting abstention seems to have distorted an underlying majority progressivism amongst the more prosperous working class in some areas. The smaller number of poorer working-class voters seems on occasion to have seized upon ‘scandal’ to randomly, but actively, reject middle-class candidates of whatever party, with political results that are difficult to measure.

This chapter examines how the social science infrastructure explored the changing character of popular identities in Great Britain during the post-war period. It argues against epochalist accounts that see any simple changes in popular identities and shows the persistence of enduring themes in working-class value which include emphasis on practical skill. The chapter also describes how the middle classes avoided overt forms of cultural elitism and became more confident in their assertion of meritocratic and technocratic values.

The central hypothesis tested in this chapter is that Labour's traditional constituency in the working class did not respond with enthusiasm to New Labour's apparent lack of concern with their interests and may have shown some reluctance to turn out and vote for the party. The authors emphasize the smallness of the changes that occurred in the patterns of abstention and strength of partisanship in 1997, but nevertheless, they find some strong hints from the data presented in the chapter that New Labour's move to the centre was, albeit in a rather modest way, responsible for muted enthusiasm among the party's traditional supporters. The analysis also suggests that the changes were specific to Labour and were not part of a general trend towards civic disengagement or political cynicism. The authors discuss the short‐term and the long‐term electoral consequences of these changes—the loss of Labour votes that this muted enthusiasm entailed would have been more than compensated by the extra votes won from the new recruits to Labour in the middle classes. In the longer term, however, this could lead to increased apathy and disengagement among the disadvantaged sectors of society and to a gradual rise in class non‐voting.

This chapter examines the emergence of the so-called technical identity in Great Britain in 1954. It argues that the changing relations between the middle and working classes encouraged amongst the former both a rejection of the gentlemanly embrace, which was seen to be out of keeping with the meritocratic tenor of post-war Britain, and a new interest in rational planning, which was to prove receptive to the social sciences. The chapter contends that the social sciences were shaped by a managerial concern, strongly indebted to cultures of war, mobilization, and demobilization, and suggests that the social sciences did not merely respond to a changing external environment but are themselves implicated in new forms of governmentality, regulation, and social imaginary.

The progressive vote in some areas of the East End often fell well short of its potential. But of course voter abstention by itself could not deliver a seat to an opponent. The Conservatives still collected a large number of votes in these areas. The arguments above do not deny that factors such as an interest in ‘sectional’ benefits, and the impact of a range of political issues, could gather working class support for Conservatives in the East End. It is difficult to determine the precise effect of any such individual concerns. This chapter suggests that it remains more important to look at the overall milieu of voters in understanding their motivations, and that the ‘occupational’ assumptions made by many historians regarding politics in the East End have been much too simple.

The working-class family was a subject of recurrent concern through the 19th century. Seen by contemporaries as one of the essential building blocks of a morally healthy society, it had been subject to fundamental stresses as a consequence of the structural changes associated with industrialisation. This was thought to have weakened kinship ties and a separation of gender roles which discouraged close attachments between husband and wife. An alternative view is that, far from undermining the kinship tie, the separation of home and work under industrial capitalism had the effect of consolidating family relationships. Family unity rested on a sense of mutual dependence, enforced by recurrent crises. This chapter examines the standard of living attained by working class families in Britain during the years 1880-1930, focusing on the coal and cotton industries in Lancashire. The experience of women as wives and mothers is considered.

The social changes that occurred in Britain in the half-century from 1880 appeared to be registered most graphically through elections. A political system formerly structured around the vertical ties of religion and locality came to be replaced by one in which party allegiance was primarily determined by class. This shift is usually discussed in terms of the eclipse of a broadly progressive, pan-class Liberalism by a Labour Party committed to articulating the interests of the organised working class. This chapter explores electoral politics in the coal and cotton industries in Lancashire, testing the more influential arguments against the evidence garnered from Bolton and Wigan. Labour’s growth up to the outbreak of war in 1914 is considered, along with the impact of war and its aftermath, culminating in the restoration of conventional party politics in 1922. The extent to which Labour’s advance in the 1920s can be attributed to the adoption of neighbourhood-based welfarist politics is also examined.

This chapter has two aims. The first is to do what the proponents of the conventional wisdom about workers never do, namely, test their ideas using actual data on U.S. politics. The second is to begin answering this book's larger research question: Why are working-class people virtually absent from American political institutions? The chapter begins by identifying the stage in the candidate entry process that screens working-class people out. Along the way, it also tests two common ideas about the underrepresentation of workers, namely, that workers seldom hold office because they are not fit to govern and because voters prefer affluent candidates. The chapter shows that these ideas do not hold water: workers are not underrepresented in public office because they are less qualified or because voters dislike them, they are underrepresented because they just do not run in the first place.

This chapter explores the personal or micro-level factors that discourage qualified workers from running for public office. Using surveys of citizens, candidates, and political party leaders, it shows that workers are less likely to run for public office because they do not have the free time or the economic security to do so, and because they are seldom encouraged by political and civic leaders. These factors differ from what people often hear: for instance, it is not just the high monetary costs of campaigns that discourage workers (those costs deter workers and professionals alike, actually), it is the high personal costs associated with campaigning—burdens like taking time off work and losing out on income during the race—that seem to make running for elected office impossible for many qualified workers.

This introductory chapter begins with a brief description of the focus of the book, which is the poor of the East End of London. The East End is defined as the area covered by the post-1900 London boroughs of Stepney, Poplar, Bethnal Green, and Shoreditch. It then discusses occupations and forms of employment in the East End, the politics of the London working class, and local government elections.

This chapter uses what has been learned about America's cash ceiling in the previous chapters to sort through the various reform proposals that observers have floated throughout the years. Some are essentially pipe dreams: they would work, but they are completely infeasible (like quotas for working-class politicians or replacing democratic elections in the United States with government by lottery). Others are long shots, ideas that would probably help, but would take decades to execute and would require massive changes to American society. The interventions that seem to have the most promise are reforms that specifically target working-class people and directly address the resource and recruitment gaps that elections naturally create—reforms like political scholarships, seed money programs, and candidate training programs.