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Value and the Weight of Practical Reasons

Joseph Raz

in Weighing Reasons

Published in print:
2016
Published Online:
March 2016
ISBN:
9780199315192
eISBN:
9780190245580
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199315192.003.0007
Subject:
Philosophy, Moral Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology

Assuming that the value of options (actions, activities, or omissions) constitutes the proximate reason for pursuing them, this chapter considers whether we have reason to promote or maximise value. ... More


Democratizing Humeanism

Kate Manne

in Weighing Reasons

Published in print:
2016
Published Online:
March 2016
ISBN:
9780199315192
eISBN:
9780190245580
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199315192.003.0006
Subject:
Philosophy, Moral Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology

This chapter discusses Humean or desire-based theories of reasons, and sketches a novel “Democratic” alternative to a standard, agent-centered Humean view. According to Democratic Humeanism, any ... More


Is There a Reason to Keep a Promise?

Joseph Raz

in Philosophical Foundations of Contract Law

Published in print:
2014
Published Online:
March 2015
ISBN:
9780198713012
eISBN:
9780191781414
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198713012.003.0004
Subject:
Law, Philosophy of Law, Law of Obligations

If promises are binding there must be a reason to do as one promised. The chapter is motivated by belief that there is a difficulty in explaining what that reason is. It arises because the reasons ... More


The Evidentialist Response

Berislav Marušić

in Evidence and Agency: Norms of Belief for Promising and Resolving

Published in print:
2015
Published Online:
October 2015
ISBN:
9780198714040
eISBN:
9780191782497
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198714040.003.0006
Subject:
Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology, Moral Philosophy

This chapter considers and rejects the Evidentialist Response. According to this response, which is suggested by David Velleman, we should not promise or resolve to do something if we have evidence ... More


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