Ingrid Wassenaar
- Published in print:
- 2000
- Published Online:
- October 2011
- ISBN:
- 9780198160045
- eISBN:
- 9780191673757
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198160045.001.0001
- Subject:
- Literature, European Literature, 20th-century Literature and Modernism
A la recherche du temps perdu occupies an undisputed place in the unfolding intellectual history of the ‘moi’ in France. There is, however, a general tendency in writing on this novel to ...
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A la recherche du temps perdu occupies an undisputed place in the unfolding intellectual history of the ‘moi’ in France. There is, however, a general tendency in writing on this novel to celebrate the wonders of the moi sensible uncritically. This effaces all that is morally dubious or frankly experimental about Proust’s account of selfhood. It denies the rigour with which Proust tries to understand exactly why it is so difficult to explain one’s own actions to another. The great party scenes, for example, or the countless digressions, read like manuals on how acts of self-justification take place. Proust, however, is not merely interested in some kind of taxonomy of excuses, hypocrisy, disingenuousness, and Schadenfreude. He wants to know why self-justification tends to be interpreted as indicative of moral or psychological weakness. He asks himself whether self-justification informs isolated moments of everyday existence or whether it endures in an overall conception of self that lasts an individual’s lifetime. He investigates whether it dictates the functioning of an entire social group. Can we decide, he asks, whether justifying one’s self should be written off as morally repugnant, or taken seriously as evidence of moral probity?Less
A la recherche du temps perdu occupies an undisputed place in the unfolding intellectual history of the ‘moi’ in France. There is, however, a general tendency in writing on this novel to celebrate the wonders of the moi sensible uncritically. This effaces all that is morally dubious or frankly experimental about Proust’s account of selfhood. It denies the rigour with which Proust tries to understand exactly why it is so difficult to explain one’s own actions to another. The great party scenes, for example, or the countless digressions, read like manuals on how acts of self-justification take place. Proust, however, is not merely interested in some kind of taxonomy of excuses, hypocrisy, disingenuousness, and Schadenfreude. He wants to know why self-justification tends to be interpreted as indicative of moral or psychological weakness. He asks himself whether self-justification informs isolated moments of everyday existence or whether it endures in an overall conception of self that lasts an individual’s lifetime. He investigates whether it dictates the functioning of an entire social group. Can we decide, he asks, whether justifying one’s self should be written off as morally repugnant, or taken seriously as evidence of moral probity?
Richard Holton
- Published in print:
- 2009
- Published Online:
- September 2009
- ISBN:
- 9780199214570
- eISBN:
- 9780191706547
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199214570.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Moral Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind
This book provides a unified account of the will, pulling together a diverse range of phenomena that have typically been treated separately: intention, resolution, choice, weakness and strength of ...
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This book provides a unified account of the will, pulling together a diverse range of phenomena that have typically been treated separately: intention, resolution, choice, weakness and strength of will, temptation, addiction, and freedom of the will. Drawing on recent psychological research, it is argued that rather than being the pinnacle of rationality, these components work to compensate for our inability to make and maintain sound judgments. Choice is the capacity to form intentions even in the absence of judgment of which action is best. Weakness of will is the failure to maintain resolutions in the face of temptation, where temptation typically involves a shift in judgment as to what is best, or, in cases of addiction, a disconnection between what is judged best and what is desired. Strength of will is the corresponding ability to maintain a resolution in the face of temptation, an ability that requires the employment of a particular faculty or skill. Finally, the experience of freedom of the will is traced to the experiences of forming intentions, and of maintaining resolutions, both of which require effortful activity from the agent.Less
This book provides a unified account of the will, pulling together a diverse range of phenomena that have typically been treated separately: intention, resolution, choice, weakness and strength of will, temptation, addiction, and freedom of the will. Drawing on recent psychological research, it is argued that rather than being the pinnacle of rationality, these components work to compensate for our inability to make and maintain sound judgments. Choice is the capacity to form intentions even in the absence of judgment of which action is best. Weakness of will is the failure to maintain resolutions in the face of temptation, where temptation typically involves a shift in judgment as to what is best, or, in cases of addiction, a disconnection between what is judged best and what is desired. Strength of will is the corresponding ability to maintain a resolution in the face of temptation, an ability that requires the employment of a particular faculty or skill. Finally, the experience of freedom of the will is traced to the experiences of forming intentions, and of maintaining resolutions, both of which require effortful activity from the agent.
Alison Sinclair
- Published in print:
- 1993
- Published Online:
- October 2011
- ISBN:
- 9780198151906
- eISBN:
- 9780191672880
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198151906.003.0007
- Subject:
- Literature, Criticism/Theory
In Western literature, love and death appear regularly in conjunction with one another: death posited as the extreme, or perhaps the only possible expression, of true love; love, the only human ...
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In Western literature, love and death appear regularly in conjunction with one another: death posited as the extreme, or perhaps the only possible expression, of true love; love, the only human experience one has that appears sufficient to stand in counterpoise to our inevitable and ever approaching mortality. This book argues that the representation of cuckoldry in literature provides an artistic containment for anxieties about physical waning, which will lead inexorably towards death. Here, comedy sweetens the pill, as does distance, relieving the reader of the pain of identification with a male character whose fate he would presumably rather not share. Honour literature moves to a different point on the scale, dealing with human emotional vulnerability by defence, by the splitting-off and projecting-out of unwanted weakness, including the susceptibility to love and passion.Less
In Western literature, love and death appear regularly in conjunction with one another: death posited as the extreme, or perhaps the only possible expression, of true love; love, the only human experience one has that appears sufficient to stand in counterpoise to our inevitable and ever approaching mortality. This book argues that the representation of cuckoldry in literature provides an artistic containment for anxieties about physical waning, which will lead inexorably towards death. Here, comedy sweetens the pill, as does distance, relieving the reader of the pain of identification with a male character whose fate he would presumably rather not share. Honour literature moves to a different point on the scale, dealing with human emotional vulnerability by defence, by the splitting-off and projecting-out of unwanted weakness, including the susceptibility to love and passion.
Alfred R. Mele
- Published in print:
- 2012
- Published Online:
- May 2012
- ISBN:
- 9780199896134
- eISBN:
- 9780199949533
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199896134.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind
People backslide. They freely do things they believe it would be best on the whole not to do – and best from their own point of view, not just the perspective of their peers or their parents. The aim ...
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People backslide. They freely do things they believe it would be best on the whole not to do – and best from their own point of view, not just the perspective of their peers or their parents. The aim of this book is to explain why that happens. The first main item of business is to clarify the nature of backsliding – of actions that display some weakness of will. To this end, Mele uses traditional philosophical techniques dating back to Plato and Aristotle (whose work on weakness of will or “akrasia” he discusses) and some new studies in the emerging field of experimental philosophy. He then attacks the thesis that backsliding is an illusion because people never freely act contrary to what they judge best. Mele argues that it is extremely plausible that if people ever act freely, they sometimes backslide. The biggest challenge posed by backsliding is to explain why it happens. At the book’s heart is the development of a theoretical and empirical framework that sheds light both on backsliding and on exercises of self-control that prevent it. Here, Mele draws on work in social and developmental psychology and in psychiatry to motivate a view of human behavior in which both backsliding and overcoming the temptation to backslide are explicable. He argues that backsliding is no illusion and our theories about the springs of action, the power of evaluative judgments, human agency, human rationality, practical reasoning, and motivation should accommodate backsliding.Less
People backslide. They freely do things they believe it would be best on the whole not to do – and best from their own point of view, not just the perspective of their peers or their parents. The aim of this book is to explain why that happens. The first main item of business is to clarify the nature of backsliding – of actions that display some weakness of will. To this end, Mele uses traditional philosophical techniques dating back to Plato and Aristotle (whose work on weakness of will or “akrasia” he discusses) and some new studies in the emerging field of experimental philosophy. He then attacks the thesis that backsliding is an illusion because people never freely act contrary to what they judge best. Mele argues that it is extremely plausible that if people ever act freely, they sometimes backslide. The biggest challenge posed by backsliding is to explain why it happens. At the book’s heart is the development of a theoretical and empirical framework that sheds light both on backsliding and on exercises of self-control that prevent it. Here, Mele draws on work in social and developmental psychology and in psychiatry to motivate a view of human behavior in which both backsliding and overcoming the temptation to backslide are explicable. He argues that backsliding is no illusion and our theories about the springs of action, the power of evaluative judgments, human agency, human rationality, practical reasoning, and motivation should accommodate backsliding.
Jeanette Kennett
- Published in print:
- 2003
- Published Online:
- October 2011
- ISBN:
- 9780199266302
- eISBN:
- 9780191699146
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199266302.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Moral Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology
Is it ever possible for people to act freely and intentionally against their better judgement? Is it ever possible to act in opposition to one's strongest desire? If either of these questions are ...
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Is it ever possible for people to act freely and intentionally against their better judgement? Is it ever possible to act in opposition to one's strongest desire? If either of these questions are answered in the negative, the common-sense distinctions between recklessness, weakness of will and compulsion collapse. This would threaten our ordinary notion of self-control and undermine our practice of holding each other responsible for moral failure. So a clear and plausible account of how weakness of will and self-control are possible is of great practical significance. Taking the problem of weakness of will as her starting point, Jeanette Kennett builds an admirably comprehensive and integrated account of moral agency which gives a central place to the capacity for self-control. Her account of the exercise and limits of self-control vindicates the common-sense distinction between weakness of will and compulsion and so underwrites our ordinary allocations of moral responsibility. She addresses with clarity and insight a range of important topics in moral psychology, such as the nature of valuing and desiring, conceptions of virtue, moral conflict, and the varieties of recklessness (here characterised as culpable bad judgement) — and does so in terms which make their relations to each other and to the challenges of real life obvious. Agency and Responsibility concludes by testing the accounts developed of self-control, moral failure, and moral responsibility against the hard cases provided by acts of extreme evil.Less
Is it ever possible for people to act freely and intentionally against their better judgement? Is it ever possible to act in opposition to one's strongest desire? If either of these questions are answered in the negative, the common-sense distinctions between recklessness, weakness of will and compulsion collapse. This would threaten our ordinary notion of self-control and undermine our practice of holding each other responsible for moral failure. So a clear and plausible account of how weakness of will and self-control are possible is of great practical significance. Taking the problem of weakness of will as her starting point, Jeanette Kennett builds an admirably comprehensive and integrated account of moral agency which gives a central place to the capacity for self-control. Her account of the exercise and limits of self-control vindicates the common-sense distinction between weakness of will and compulsion and so underwrites our ordinary allocations of moral responsibility. She addresses with clarity and insight a range of important topics in moral psychology, such as the nature of valuing and desiring, conceptions of virtue, moral conflict, and the varieties of recklessness (here characterised as culpable bad judgement) — and does so in terms which make their relations to each other and to the challenges of real life obvious. Agency and Responsibility concludes by testing the accounts developed of self-control, moral failure, and moral responsibility against the hard cases provided by acts of extreme evil.
Donald Davidson
- Published in print:
- 2001
- Published Online:
- November 2003
- ISBN:
- 9780199246274
- eISBN:
- 9780191715198
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0199246270.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind
This volume collects Davidson's seminal contributions to the philosophy of mind and the philosophy of action. Its overarching thesis is that the ordinary concept of causality we employ to render ...
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This volume collects Davidson's seminal contributions to the philosophy of mind and the philosophy of action. Its overarching thesis is that the ordinary concept of causality we employ to render physical processes intelligible should also be employed in describing and explaining human action. In the first of three subsections into which the papers are thematically organized, Davidson uses causality to give novel analyses of acting for a reason, of intending, weakness of will, and freedom of will. The second section provides the formal and ontological framework for those analyses. In particular, the logical form and attending ontology of action sentences and causal statements is explored. To uphold the analyses, Davidson urges us to accept the existence of non‐recurrent particulars, events, along with that of persons and other objects. The final section employs this ontology of events to provide an anti‐reductionist answer to the mind/matter debate that Davidson labels ‘anomalous monism’. Events enter causal relations regardless of how we describe them but can, for the sake of different explanatory purposes, be subsumed under mutually irreducible descriptions, claims Davidson. Events qualify as mental if caused and rationalized by reasons, but can be so described only if we subsume them under considerations that are not amenable to codification into strict laws. We abandon those considerations, collectively labelled the ‘constitutive ideal of rationality’, if we want to explain the physical occurrence of those very same events; in which case we have to describe them as governed by strict laws. The impossibility of intertranslating the two idioms by means of psychophysical laws blocks any analytically reductive relation between them. The mental and the physical would thus disintegrate were it not for causality, which is operative in both realms through a shared ontology of events.Less
This volume collects Davidson's seminal contributions to the philosophy of mind and the philosophy of action. Its overarching thesis is that the ordinary concept of causality we employ to render physical processes intelligible should also be employed in describing and explaining human action. In the first of three subsections into which the papers are thematically organized, Davidson uses causality to give novel analyses of acting for a reason, of intending, weakness of will, and freedom of will. The second section provides the formal and ontological framework for those analyses. In particular, the logical form and attending ontology of action sentences and causal statements is explored. To uphold the analyses, Davidson urges us to accept the existence of non‐recurrent particulars, events, along with that of persons and other objects. The final section employs this ontology of events to provide an anti‐reductionist answer to the mind/matter debate that Davidson labels ‘anomalous monism’. Events enter causal relations regardless of how we describe them but can, for the sake of different explanatory purposes, be subsumed under mutually irreducible descriptions, claims Davidson. Events qualify as mental if caused and rationalized by reasons, but can be so described only if we subsume them under considerations that are not amenable to codification into strict laws. We abandon those considerations, collectively labelled the ‘constitutive ideal of rationality’, if we want to explain the physical occurrence of those very same events; in which case we have to describe them as governed by strict laws. The impossibility of intertranslating the two idioms by means of psychophysical laws blocks any analytically reductive relation between them. The mental and the physical would thus disintegrate were it not for causality, which is operative in both realms through a shared ontology of events.
Sarah Stroud and Christine Tappolet (eds)
- Published in print:
- 2003
- Published Online:
- January 2005
- ISBN:
- 9780199257362
- eISBN:
- 9780191601842
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0199257361.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind
Among the many practical failures that threaten us, weakness of will or akrasia is often considered to be a paradigm of irrationality. The eleven new essays in this collection give a rich overview of ...
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Among the many practical failures that threaten us, weakness of will or akrasia is often considered to be a paradigm of irrationality. The eleven new essays in this collection give a rich overview of the current debate over weakness of will and practical irrationality more generally. Issues covered include classical questions such as the distinction between weakness of will and compulsion, the connection between evaluative judgement and motivation, the role of emotions in akrasia, rational agency, and the existence of the will. They also include new topics, such as group akrasia, strength of will, the nature of correct choice, the structure of decision theory, the temporality of prudential reasons, and emotional rationality. The essays advance two central tasks: exploration of the implications of akrasia and other putatively irrational phenomena for the nature of practical reason and rationality; and consideration of possible explanations for such phenomena. The former intersects with recent theorizing about the nature of practical reason in general, and the latter with work in the philosophy of mind about the kinds of mental states and entities we need to posit in order adequately to understand human action.Less
Among the many practical failures that threaten us, weakness of will or akrasia is often considered to be a paradigm of irrationality. The eleven new essays in this collection give a rich overview of the current debate over weakness of will and practical irrationality more generally. Issues covered include classical questions such as the distinction between weakness of will and compulsion, the connection between evaluative judgement and motivation, the role of emotions in akrasia, rational agency, and the existence of the will. They also include new topics, such as group akrasia, strength of will, the nature of correct choice, the structure of decision theory, the temporality of prudential reasons, and emotional rationality. The essays advance two central tasks: exploration of the implications of akrasia and other putatively irrational phenomena for the nature of practical reason and rationality; and consideration of possible explanations for such phenomena. The former intersects with recent theorizing about the nature of practical reason in general, and the latter with work in the philosophy of mind about the kinds of mental states and entities we need to posit in order adequately to understand human action.
Ira Katznelson
- Published in print:
- 1993
- Published Online:
- January 2005
- ISBN:
- 9780198279242
- eISBN:
- 9780191601910
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0198279248.001.0001
- Subject:
- Political Science, Political Theory
Defeated in the East and discredited in the West, Marxism has broken down as an ideology and as a guide to governance. However, for all its flaws, it remains an important tool for understanding and ...
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Defeated in the East and discredited in the West, Marxism has broken down as an ideology and as a guide to governance. However, for all its flaws, it remains an important tool for understanding and raising questions about key aspects of modern life. In Marxism and the City, Ira Katznelson critically assesses the scholarship on cities that has developed within Marxism in the past quarter century to show how some of the most important weaknesses in Marxism as a social theory can be remedied by forcing it to engage seriously with cities and spatial concerns. He argues that such a Marxism still has a significant contribution to make to the discussion of historical questions such as the transition from feudalism to a world composed of capitalist economies and nation‐states and the acquiescence of the western working classes to capitalism. Katznelson demonstrates how a Marxism that embraces complexity and is open to engagement with other social–theoretical traditions can illuminate understanding of cities and of the patterns of class and group formation that have characterized urban life in the West.Less
Defeated in the East and discredited in the West, Marxism has broken down as an ideology and as a guide to governance. However, for all its flaws, it remains an important tool for understanding and raising questions about key aspects of modern life. In Marxism and the City, Ira Katznelson critically assesses the scholarship on cities that has developed within Marxism in the past quarter century to show how some of the most important weaknesses in Marxism as a social theory can be remedied by forcing it to engage seriously with cities and spatial concerns. He argues that such a Marxism still has a significant contribution to make to the discussion of historical questions such as the transition from feudalism to a world composed of capitalist economies and nation‐states and the acquiescence of the western working classes to capitalism. Katznelson demonstrates how a Marxism that embraces complexity and is open to engagement with other social–theoretical traditions can illuminate understanding of cities and of the patterns of class and group formation that have characterized urban life in the West.
Gadis Gadzhiev
- Published in print:
- 2001
- Published Online:
- November 2003
- ISBN:
- 9780199244089
- eISBN:
- 9780191600364
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0199244081.003.0010
- Subject:
- Political Science, Democratization
Describes Russia as an incomplete democracy, in which a compromise regarding constitutional engineering was never reached and important decisions regarding power‐sharing were postponed, ultimately ...
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Describes Russia as an incomplete democracy, in which a compromise regarding constitutional engineering was never reached and important decisions regarding power‐sharing were postponed, ultimately leading to the institutionalization of a super‐presidential regime created through brute force. The chapter emphasizes that Russia was the only post‐communist country that experienced a military intervention after democratic elections had taken place. The first part of the chapter focuses on how the process of amending the 1978 Russian Constitution deteriorated into a power struggle between the parliament and the president and describes the institutional structure that resulted from this contentious process. Finally, the chapter demonstrates how the Russian Constitution, which set clear rules for the institutional game but without respect for the division of power principle, has contributed to state weakness. It is emphasized that by concentrating power in the presidency, the executive has become overburdened and the state ineffective.Less
Describes Russia as an incomplete democracy, in which a compromise regarding constitutional engineering was never reached and important decisions regarding power‐sharing were postponed, ultimately leading to the institutionalization of a super‐presidential regime created through brute force. The chapter emphasizes that Russia was the only post‐communist country that experienced a military intervention after democratic elections had taken place. The first part of the chapter focuses on how the process of amending the 1978 Russian Constitution deteriorated into a power struggle between the parliament and the president and describes the institutional structure that resulted from this contentious process. Finally, the chapter demonstrates how the Russian Constitution, which set clear rules for the institutional game but without respect for the division of power principle, has contributed to state weakness. It is emphasized that by concentrating power in the presidency, the executive has become overburdened and the state ineffective.
Andrew Moravcsik
- Published in print:
- 2001
- Published Online:
- November 2003
- ISBN:
- 9780199245000
- eISBN:
- 9780191599996
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0199245002.003.0007
- Subject:
- Political Science, European Union
Moravcsik attacks the view, shared by Euro‐enthusiasts and Euro‐sceptics alike, that current developments in the EU herald the advent of a European federal state; according to Moravcsik, the EU lacks ...
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Moravcsik attacks the view, shared by Euro‐enthusiasts and Euro‐sceptics alike, that current developments in the EU herald the advent of a European federal state; according to Moravcsik, the EU lacks and is likely to continue to lack the fundamental competences that would make it federal. To make this point, Moravcsik emphasizes what the EU does not do and is unlikely to take on in the foreseeable future, spelling out how the ‘EU plays almost no role—at most a weak sort of international coordination—in most of the issue‐areas about which European voters care most, such as taxation, social welfare provision, defence, high foreign policy, policing, education, cultural policy, human rights, and small business policy’. Moravcsik finds this not surprising, since the EU's built‐in ‘constitutional constraints’, from fiscal to legislative and regulatory powers, create a strong bias towards the status quo. His normative conclusion that the ‘existing hybrid status quo is sufficiently efficient and adequately legitimate to resist any fundamental institutional reform’ seems to echo Weiler's conclusion in Ch. 2 that the EU ‘ain’t broke, so don’t fix it’, although the two authors get to this position from opposite premises: Weiler thinks that today's EU founded on constitutional tolerance—bowing to the majority without being one people—is an amazingly ambitious project, while Moravcsik celebrates the EU's character as ‘a second‐best constitutional compromise designed to cope pragmatically with concrete problems’. The three sections of the chapter: (1) describe the existing confederal structure of EU institutions, focussing on the substantive narrowness and institutional weakness of its mandate; (2) examine the causes of this narrow and weak institutional mandate in the European constitutional settlement; and (3) assess the normative consequences for the democratic legitimacy of the EU state structure.Less
Moravcsik attacks the view, shared by Euro‐enthusiasts and Euro‐sceptics alike, that current developments in the EU herald the advent of a European federal state; according to Moravcsik, the EU lacks and is likely to continue to lack the fundamental competences that would make it federal. To make this point, Moravcsik emphasizes what the EU does not do and is unlikely to take on in the foreseeable future, spelling out how the ‘EU plays almost no role—at most a weak sort of international coordination—in most of the issue‐areas about which European voters care most, such as taxation, social welfare provision, defence, high foreign policy, policing, education, cultural policy, human rights, and small business policy’. Moravcsik finds this not surprising, since the EU's built‐in ‘constitutional constraints’, from fiscal to legislative and regulatory powers, create a strong bias towards the status quo. His normative conclusion that the ‘existing hybrid status quo is sufficiently efficient and adequately legitimate to resist any fundamental institutional reform’ seems to echo Weiler's conclusion in Ch. 2 that the EU ‘ain’t broke, so don’t fix it’, although the two authors get to this position from opposite premises: Weiler thinks that today's EU founded on constitutional tolerance—bowing to the majority without being one people—is an amazingly ambitious project, while Moravcsik celebrates the EU's character as ‘a second‐best constitutional compromise designed to cope pragmatically with concrete problems’. The three sections of the chapter: (1) describe the existing confederal structure of EU institutions, focussing on the substantive narrowness and institutional weakness of its mandate; (2) examine the causes of this narrow and weak institutional mandate in the European constitutional settlement; and (3) assess the normative consequences for the democratic legitimacy of the EU state structure.
Jens Borchert and Gary Copeland
- Published in print:
- 2003
- Published Online:
- January 2005
- ISBN:
- 9780199260362
- eISBN:
- 9780191601873
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0199260362.003.0021
- Subject:
- Political Science, Comparative Politics
American politicians have about the greatest choice in terms of the electoral offices they want to pursue. However, only a minority of these numerous offices is professionalized. Moreover, while ...
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American politicians have about the greatest choice in terms of the electoral offices they want to pursue. However, only a minority of these numerous offices is professionalized. Moreover, while partisan coordination of political careers was true in the second half of the nineteenth century, it no longer is. Today American politicians largely are political entrepreneurs running their own political careers with the help of other professions that have developed around professional politics and of interest groups, which collect and donate most of the money needed for electoral campaigns. The most highly prized office is that of a member of Congress. Professional politicians in the United States, hence, are mostly professional legislators. It is here that long careers can be realized whereas executive terms tend to be rather short. Changes in the situation of politicians occur most frequently as an often- unintended result of institutional reform, which has been high on the agenda for quite some time.Less
American politicians have about the greatest choice in terms of the electoral offices they want to pursue. However, only a minority of these numerous offices is professionalized. Moreover, while partisan coordination of political careers was true in the second half of the nineteenth century, it no longer is. Today American politicians largely are political entrepreneurs running their own political careers with the help of other professions that have developed around professional politics and of interest groups, which collect and donate most of the money needed for electoral campaigns. The most highly prized office is that of a member of Congress. Professional politicians in the United States, hence, are mostly professional legislators. It is here that long careers can be realized whereas executive terms tend to be rather short. Changes in the situation of politicians occur most frequently as an often- unintended result of institutional reform, which has been high on the agenda for quite some time.
Christopher Hood
- Published in print:
- 2000
- Published Online:
- November 2003
- ISBN:
- 9780198297659
- eISBN:
- 9780191599484
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0198297653.003.0010
- Subject:
- Political Science, Comparative Politics
Returns to the general question of what sort of science public management is or can be and how cultural theory can contribute to that science. Concludes by taking stock of the cultural‐theory ...
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Returns to the general question of what sort of science public management is or can be and how cultural theory can contribute to that science. Concludes by taking stock of the cultural‐theory approach as a framework for analysing public management, surveying its strengths and weaknesses. It does not claim there are no problems with the approach—on the contrary, there are major gaps and ambiguities and some of the underlying logic needs attention, but in spite of such weaknesses, the claim is that a cultural‐theory framework has much to contribute to a way of thinking about the art of the state that is neither sham science nor mere craft. To assess the cultural‐theory approach, this concluding chapter discusses three sorts of objections to the cultural‐theory framework as a way of analysing public management. One possible line of criticism might be called the ‘nursery toys’ objection—the claim that cultural theory is too simple for sophisticated analysis and is therefore better suited for the elementary stages of understanding than for advanced or professional analysis; a second possible line of criticism might be called the ‘soft science’ objection—the claim that, whatever its level of sophistication or applicability to management, the theory is, even on its own terms, limited, ambiguous, and perhaps even unfalsifiable; a third line of criticism might be called the ‘wrong tool’ objection—i.e. the claim that cultural theory, however sophisticated, cannot be an adequate basis for a theory of management, because ultimately it has little to say about the central what‐to‐do questions of organization that management and managers need to be concerned with—and by this view, it is the wrong tool for the job.Less
Returns to the general question of what sort of science public management is or can be and how cultural theory can contribute to that science. Concludes by taking stock of the cultural‐theory approach as a framework for analysing public management, surveying its strengths and weaknesses. It does not claim there are no problems with the approach—on the contrary, there are major gaps and ambiguities and some of the underlying logic needs attention, but in spite of such weaknesses, the claim is that a cultural‐theory framework has much to contribute to a way of thinking about the art of the state that is neither sham science nor mere craft. To assess the cultural‐theory approach, this concluding chapter discusses three sorts of objections to the cultural‐theory framework as a way of analysing public management. One possible line of criticism might be called the ‘nursery toys’ objection—the claim that cultural theory is too simple for sophisticated analysis and is therefore better suited for the elementary stages of understanding than for advanced or professional analysis; a second possible line of criticism might be called the ‘soft science’ objection—the claim that, whatever its level of sophistication or applicability to management, the theory is, even on its own terms, limited, ambiguous, and perhaps even unfalsifiable; a third line of criticism might be called the ‘wrong tool’ objection—i.e. the claim that cultural theory, however sophisticated, cannot be an adequate basis for a theory of management, because ultimately it has little to say about the central what‐to‐do questions of organization that management and managers need to be concerned with—and by this view, it is the wrong tool for the job.
Andrew Knapp
- Published in print:
- 2002
- Published Online:
- November 2003
- ISBN:
- 9780199240562
- eISBN:
- 9780191600296
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0199240566.003.0005
- Subject:
- Political Science, Comparative Politics
General Charles de Gaulle, founder of the Fifth French Republic in 1958, was a bitter opponent of the unchecked power of political parties, for which he blamed the failure of earlier Republics, but ...
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General Charles de Gaulle, founder of the Fifth French Republic in 1958, was a bitter opponent of the unchecked power of political parties, for which he blamed the failure of earlier Republics, but his vision of the future was as naïve as his diagnosis of the past was tendentious, for the problem of the Third and Fourth Republics was rather the weakness of parties. The main surprise of the Fifth Republic was the emergence, from 1962, of the secure parliamentary majorities that France had hitherto lacked; in addition, since 1965, when de Gaulle himself found that he needed party support to campaign for re‐election, the presidency itself has been a key stake in party competition. These two developments transformed the role of parties, and the party system of the Fifth Republic may now be described as one of bipolar multipartism. This contains two distinct and opposed sets of dynamics (pressures): bipolarity, (which is encouraged in important ways by France's political institutions), and forces in the party system pointing towards fragmentation and multipartism; these pressures exist in every party system, but the French case is unusual because they are so evenly balanced. The introduction discusses this situation; the next three sections cover the same topics as those in the other country case studies in the book, and examine party legitimacy, party organizational strength (finance and staffing, and activism, and parties in civil society), and party functionality (in political recruitment, governance, interest articulation and aggregation, political participation, and political communication and education).Less
General Charles de Gaulle, founder of the Fifth French Republic in 1958, was a bitter opponent of the unchecked power of political parties, for which he blamed the failure of earlier Republics, but his vision of the future was as naïve as his diagnosis of the past was tendentious, for the problem of the Third and Fourth Republics was rather the weakness of parties. The main surprise of the Fifth Republic was the emergence, from 1962, of the secure parliamentary majorities that France had hitherto lacked; in addition, since 1965, when de Gaulle himself found that he needed party support to campaign for re‐election, the presidency itself has been a key stake in party competition. These two developments transformed the role of parties, and the party system of the Fifth Republic may now be described as one of bipolar multipartism. This contains two distinct and opposed sets of dynamics (pressures): bipolarity, (which is encouraged in important ways by France's political institutions), and forces in the party system pointing towards fragmentation and multipartism; these pressures exist in every party system, but the French case is unusual because they are so evenly balanced. The introduction discusses this situation; the next three sections cover the same topics as those in the other country case studies in the book, and examine party legitimacy, party organizational strength (finance and staffing, and activism, and parties in civil society), and party functionality (in political recruitment, governance, interest articulation and aggregation, political participation, and political communication and education).
Grant Hardy
- Published in print:
- 2010
- Published Online:
- May 2010
- ISBN:
- 9780199731701
- eISBN:
- 9780199777167
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199731701.003.0008
- Subject:
- Religion, Religion and Literature, World Religions
For the last fifty pages of the Book of Mormon, there is a new narrator, Mormon's son Moroni. He is portrayed as a reluctant writer, the last survivor of his civilization. He is also the narrator ...
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For the last fifty pages of the Book of Mormon, there is a new narrator, Mormon's son Moroni. He is portrayed as a reluctant writer, the last survivor of his civilization. He is also the narrator with the clearest sense of his audience—readers living many centuries in the future. He appears to have given up on persuading them through the sorts of rational arguments about fulfilled prophecies employed by his father, and instead he hopes that his weakness in writing will be compensated for by God's revelation to readers. Moroni tells the story of the Jaredites, a people who predated the Nephites in the New World, and he emphasizes connections between their history and that of the Nephites. He also seems to have Christianized their account, for the regular references to Jesus are all in his editorial comments rather than in the narrative that he ostensibly paraphrased from Jaredite records.Less
For the last fifty pages of the Book of Mormon, there is a new narrator, Mormon's son Moroni. He is portrayed as a reluctant writer, the last survivor of his civilization. He is also the narrator with the clearest sense of his audience—readers living many centuries in the future. He appears to have given up on persuading them through the sorts of rational arguments about fulfilled prophecies employed by his father, and instead he hopes that his weakness in writing will be compensated for by God's revelation to readers. Moroni tells the story of the Jaredites, a people who predated the Nephites in the New World, and he emphasizes connections between their history and that of the Nephites. He also seems to have Christianized their account, for the regular references to Jesus are all in his editorial comments rather than in the narrative that he ostensibly paraphrased from Jaredite records.
Risto Saarinen
- Published in print:
- 2011
- Published Online:
- September 2011
- ISBN:
- 9780199606818
- eISBN:
- 9780191729614
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199606818.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, History of Philosophy, Moral Philosophy
Weakness of will, the phenomenon of acting contrary to one's own better judgement, remains a prominent discussion topic in philosophy. The book covers the reflection on weakness of will between 1350 ...
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Weakness of will, the phenomenon of acting contrary to one's own better judgement, remains a prominent discussion topic in philosophy. The book covers the reflection on weakness of will between 1350 and 1650. It deals not only with a broad range of Renaissance authors (e.g. Petrarch, Donato Acciaiuoli, John Mair, Francesco Piccolomini), but also with the theologically coloured debates of the Reformation period (e.g. Martin Luther, Philip Melanchthon, John Calvin, Lambert Daneau). The book also discusses the impact of these authors on some prominent figures of early modernity (Shakespeare, Descartes, Spinoza, Leibniz). While most of the historical research on weakness of will has focused on the reception history of Aristotle's Nicomachean Ethics, the present study pays attention to the Platonic and Stoic discussions and their revival during the Renaissance and the Reformation. The study also shows the ways in which Augustine's discussion of the divided will is intertwined with the Christian reception of ancient Greek ethics. The theological underpinnings of early modern authors do not rule out weakness of will, but they transform the philosophical discussion and drive it towards new solutions. In addition to the Aristotelian explanations of weakness of will, the Platonic and Stoic-Augustinian explanatory models feature prominently in the Renaissance and the Reformation.Less
Weakness of will, the phenomenon of acting contrary to one's own better judgement, remains a prominent discussion topic in philosophy. The book covers the reflection on weakness of will between 1350 and 1650. It deals not only with a broad range of Renaissance authors (e.g. Petrarch, Donato Acciaiuoli, John Mair, Francesco Piccolomini), but also with the theologically coloured debates of the Reformation period (e.g. Martin Luther, Philip Melanchthon, John Calvin, Lambert Daneau). The book also discusses the impact of these authors on some prominent figures of early modernity (Shakespeare, Descartes, Spinoza, Leibniz). While most of the historical research on weakness of will has focused on the reception history of Aristotle's Nicomachean Ethics, the present study pays attention to the Platonic and Stoic discussions and their revival during the Renaissance and the Reformation. The study also shows the ways in which Augustine's discussion of the divided will is intertwined with the Christian reception of ancient Greek ethics. The theological underpinnings of early modern authors do not rule out weakness of will, but they transform the philosophical discussion and drive it towards new solutions. In addition to the Aristotelian explanations of weakness of will, the Platonic and Stoic-Augustinian explanatory models feature prominently in the Renaissance and the Reformation.
David Faure
- Published in print:
- 2006
- Published Online:
- September 2011
- ISBN:
- 9789622097834
- eISBN:
- 9789882206694
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Hong Kong University Press
- DOI:
- 10.5790/hongkong/9789622097834.001.0001
- Subject:
- Economics and Finance, South and East Asia
This book provides an original, clear approach to the development of business in China from 1500 to the 1990s, and sheds new light on the strengths and weaknesses of Chinese business today. The book ...
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This book provides an original, clear approach to the development of business in China from 1500 to the 1990s, and sheds new light on the strengths and weaknesses of Chinese business today. The book assumes little background in China or Chinese business practice.Less
This book provides an original, clear approach to the development of business in China from 1500 to the 1990s, and sheds new light on the strengths and weaknesses of Chinese business today. The book assumes little background in China or Chinese business practice.
Michael Quinlan
- Published in print:
- 2009
- Published Online:
- May 2009
- ISBN:
- 9780199563944
- eISBN:
- 9780191721274
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199563944.003.0014
- Subject:
- Political Science, International Relations and Politics
This final chapter considers what action might be taken, short of the at-best-distant abolitionist goal, to constrain the risks and costs and to optimize the peace-maintaining contribution of nuclear ...
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This final chapter considers what action might be taken, short of the at-best-distant abolitionist goal, to constrain the risks and costs and to optimize the peace-maintaining contribution of nuclear armouries while they continue to exist. Drawing largely upon earlier chapters, it summarizes what needs to be done in the non-proliferation field both over problem countries and in remedying wider systemic weaknesses. It reviews the potential for further steps, especially though not only by the United States and Russia, on nuclear disarmament and related issues such as transparency and the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT). It notes the scope for improving doctrines and postures, for example, by clarifying the ‘no first use’ issue and by ending any remaining arrangements for holding nuclear forces at short notice to launch. Finally, it recalls that though this direct nuclear-weapon agenda is still important, the central path to dependable peace and security must still be primarily a matter of basic political advance in resolving disputes and improving structures for managing them.Less
This final chapter considers what action might be taken, short of the at-best-distant abolitionist goal, to constrain the risks and costs and to optimize the peace-maintaining contribution of nuclear armouries while they continue to exist. Drawing largely upon earlier chapters, it summarizes what needs to be done in the non-proliferation field both over problem countries and in remedying wider systemic weaknesses. It reviews the potential for further steps, especially though not only by the United States and Russia, on nuclear disarmament and related issues such as transparency and the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT). It notes the scope for improving doctrines and postures, for example, by clarifying the ‘no first use’ issue and by ending any remaining arrangements for holding nuclear forces at short notice to launch. Finally, it recalls that though this direct nuclear-weapon agenda is still important, the central path to dependable peace and security must still be primarily a matter of basic political advance in resolving disputes and improving structures for managing them.
B. Keith Putt (ed.)
- Published in print:
- 2009
- Published Online:
- March 2011
- ISBN:
- 9780823230457
- eISBN:
- 9780823235223
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Fordham University Press
- DOI:
- 10.5422/fso/9780823230457.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology
Merold Westphal has been in the foremost ranks of philosophers who proclaim a new post-secular philosophy. By articulating an epistemology sensitive to the realities of cognitive ...
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Merold Westphal has been in the foremost ranks of philosophers who proclaim a new post-secular philosophy. By articulating an epistemology sensitive to the realities of cognitive finitude and moral weakness, he defends a wisdom that begins in both humility and commitment, one that always confesses that human beings can encounter meaning and truth only as human beings, never as gods. This book focuses on this wisdom of humility that characterizes Westphal's thought and explores how that wisdom, expressed through the redemptive dynamic of doubt, can contribute to developing a post-secular apologetic for faith. This book can function both as an accessible introduction to Westphal for those who have not read him extensively and also as an informed critical appreciation and extension of his work for those who are more experienced readers.Less
Merold Westphal has been in the foremost ranks of philosophers who proclaim a new post-secular philosophy. By articulating an epistemology sensitive to the realities of cognitive finitude and moral weakness, he defends a wisdom that begins in both humility and commitment, one that always confesses that human beings can encounter meaning and truth only as human beings, never as gods. This book focuses on this wisdom of humility that characterizes Westphal's thought and explores how that wisdom, expressed through the redemptive dynamic of doubt, can contribute to developing a post-secular apologetic for faith. This book can function both as an accessible introduction to Westphal for those who have not read him extensively and also as an informed critical appreciation and extension of his work for those who are more experienced readers.
Chrisoula Andreou and Mark D. White (eds)
- Published in print:
- 2010
- Published Online:
- May 2010
- ISBN:
- 9780195376685
- eISBN:
- 9780199776306
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195376685.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Moral Philosophy
When we fail to achieve our goals, procrastination is often the culprit. But how exactly is procrastination to be understood? It has been described as imprudent, irrational, inconsistent, and even ...
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When we fail to achieve our goals, procrastination is often the culprit. But how exactly is procrastination to be understood? It has been described as imprudent, irrational, inconsistent, and even immoral, but there has been no sustained philosophical debate concerning the topic. This volume starts in on the task of integrating the problem of procrastination into philosophical inquiry. The focus is on exploring procrastination in relation to agency, rationality, and ethics—topics that philosophy is well suited to address. Theoretically and empirically informed analyses are developed and applied with the aim of shedding light on a vexing practical problem that generates a great deal of frustration, regret, and harm. Some of the key questions addressed include the following: How can we analyze procrastination in a way that does justice to both its voluntary and its self-defeating dimensions? What kind of practical failing is procrastination? Is it a form of weakness of will? Is it the product of fragmented agency? Is it a vice? Given the nature of procrastination, what are the most promising coping strategies?Less
When we fail to achieve our goals, procrastination is often the culprit. But how exactly is procrastination to be understood? It has been described as imprudent, irrational, inconsistent, and even immoral, but there has been no sustained philosophical debate concerning the topic. This volume starts in on the task of integrating the problem of procrastination into philosophical inquiry. The focus is on exploring procrastination in relation to agency, rationality, and ethics—topics that philosophy is well suited to address. Theoretically and empirically informed analyses are developed and applied with the aim of shedding light on a vexing practical problem that generates a great deal of frustration, regret, and harm. Some of the key questions addressed include the following: How can we analyze procrastination in a way that does justice to both its voluntary and its self-defeating dimensions? What kind of practical failing is procrastination? Is it a form of weakness of will? Is it the product of fragmented agency? Is it a vice? Given the nature of procrastination, what are the most promising coping strategies?
Jerome Murphy‐O'Connor
- Published in print:
- 2010
- Published Online:
- January 2011
- ISBN:
- 9780199592104
- eISBN:
- 9780191595608
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199592104.003.0012
- Subject:
- Religion, Biblical Studies, Early Christian Studies
In all instances in the Corinthian correspondence when ‘Jesus’ is used alone, without any qualification, it carries the connotation of an earthly existence marked by weakness, humiliation, and ...
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In all instances in the Corinthian correspondence when ‘Jesus’ is used alone, without any qualification, it carries the connotation of an earthly existence marked by weakness, humiliation, and suffering. ‘Another Jesus’ in consequence should be the antithesis, namely, ‘the lord of glory’ preached by Paul's opponents at Corinth.Less
In all instances in the Corinthian correspondence when ‘Jesus’ is used alone, without any qualification, it carries the connotation of an earthly existence marked by weakness, humiliation, and suffering. ‘Another Jesus’ in consequence should be the antithesis, namely, ‘the lord of glory’ preached by Paul's opponents at Corinth.
