Alfred R. Mele
- Published in print:
- 2012
- Published Online:
- May 2012
- ISBN:
- 9780199896134
- eISBN:
- 9780199949533
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199896134.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind
People backslide. They freely do things they believe it would be best on the whole not to do – and best from their own point of view, not just the perspective of their peers or their parents. The aim ...
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People backslide. They freely do things they believe it would be best on the whole not to do – and best from their own point of view, not just the perspective of their peers or their parents. The aim of this book is to explain why that happens. The first main item of business is to clarify the nature of backsliding – of actions that display some weakness of will. To this end, Mele uses traditional philosophical techniques dating back to Plato and Aristotle (whose work on weakness of will or “akrasia” he discusses) and some new studies in the emerging field of experimental philosophy. He then attacks the thesis that backsliding is an illusion because people never freely act contrary to what they judge best. Mele argues that it is extremely plausible that if people ever act freely, they sometimes backslide. The biggest challenge posed by backsliding is to explain why it happens. At the book’s heart is the development of a theoretical and empirical framework that sheds light both on backsliding and on exercises of self-control that prevent it. Here, Mele draws on work in social and developmental psychology and in psychiatry to motivate a view of human behavior in which both backsliding and overcoming the temptation to backslide are explicable. He argues that backsliding is no illusion and our theories about the springs of action, the power of evaluative judgments, human agency, human rationality, practical reasoning, and motivation should accommodate backsliding.Less
People backslide. They freely do things they believe it would be best on the whole not to do – and best from their own point of view, not just the perspective of their peers or their parents. The aim of this book is to explain why that happens. The first main item of business is to clarify the nature of backsliding – of actions that display some weakness of will. To this end, Mele uses traditional philosophical techniques dating back to Plato and Aristotle (whose work on weakness of will or “akrasia” he discusses) and some new studies in the emerging field of experimental philosophy. He then attacks the thesis that backsliding is an illusion because people never freely act contrary to what they judge best. Mele argues that it is extremely plausible that if people ever act freely, they sometimes backslide. The biggest challenge posed by backsliding is to explain why it happens. At the book’s heart is the development of a theoretical and empirical framework that sheds light both on backsliding and on exercises of self-control that prevent it. Here, Mele draws on work in social and developmental psychology and in psychiatry to motivate a view of human behavior in which both backsliding and overcoming the temptation to backslide are explicable. He argues that backsliding is no illusion and our theories about the springs of action, the power of evaluative judgments, human agency, human rationality, practical reasoning, and motivation should accommodate backsliding.
Richard Holton
- Published in print:
- 2009
- Published Online:
- September 2009
- ISBN:
- 9780199214570
- eISBN:
- 9780191706547
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199214570.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Moral Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind
This book provides a unified account of the will, pulling together a diverse range of phenomena that have typically been treated separately: intention, resolution, choice, weakness and strength of ...
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This book provides a unified account of the will, pulling together a diverse range of phenomena that have typically been treated separately: intention, resolution, choice, weakness and strength of will, temptation, addiction, and freedom of the will. Drawing on recent psychological research, it is argued that rather than being the pinnacle of rationality, these components work to compensate for our inability to make and maintain sound judgments. Choice is the capacity to form intentions even in the absence of judgment of which action is best. Weakness of will is the failure to maintain resolutions in the face of temptation, where temptation typically involves a shift in judgment as to what is best, or, in cases of addiction, a disconnection between what is judged best and what is desired. Strength of will is the corresponding ability to maintain a resolution in the face of temptation, an ability that requires the employment of a particular faculty or skill. Finally, the experience of freedom of the will is traced to the experiences of forming intentions, and of maintaining resolutions, both of which require effortful activity from the agent.Less
This book provides a unified account of the will, pulling together a diverse range of phenomena that have typically been treated separately: intention, resolution, choice, weakness and strength of will, temptation, addiction, and freedom of the will. Drawing on recent psychological research, it is argued that rather than being the pinnacle of rationality, these components work to compensate for our inability to make and maintain sound judgments. Choice is the capacity to form intentions even in the absence of judgment of which action is best. Weakness of will is the failure to maintain resolutions in the face of temptation, where temptation typically involves a shift in judgment as to what is best, or, in cases of addiction, a disconnection between what is judged best and what is desired. Strength of will is the corresponding ability to maintain a resolution in the face of temptation, an ability that requires the employment of a particular faculty or skill. Finally, the experience of freedom of the will is traced to the experiences of forming intentions, and of maintaining resolutions, both of which require effortful activity from the agent.
Alfred R. Mele
- Published in print:
- 2012
- Published Online:
- May 2012
- ISBN:
- 9780199896134
- eISBN:
- 9780199949533
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199896134.003.0002
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind
There is a voluminous philosophical literature on akrasia that at least purports to be about weakness of will. Richard Holton has developed a view of the nature of weak-willed actions that, as he ...
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There is a voluminous philosophical literature on akrasia that at least purports to be about weakness of will. Richard Holton has developed a view of the nature of weak-willed actions that, as he reports, departs from most of the literature on the subject. If his view is correct, much of what has been written about akrasia and akratic actions is not about weakness of will and weak-willed actions. This chapter argues that the author’s view of the nature of akratic actions in earlier work—a view that accommodates both core akratic actions and akratic actions of other kinds—fares considerably better in the sphere of weakness of will than Holton’s view does. The argument benefits from some studies of folk conceptions of weakness of will that employ techniques of experimental philosophy. The chapter’s aim is to clarify the nature of weak-willed actions.Less
There is a voluminous philosophical literature on akrasia that at least purports to be about weakness of will. Richard Holton has developed a view of the nature of weak-willed actions that, as he reports, departs from most of the literature on the subject. If his view is correct, much of what has been written about akrasia and akratic actions is not about weakness of will and weak-willed actions. This chapter argues that the author’s view of the nature of akratic actions in earlier work—a view that accommodates both core akratic actions and akratic actions of other kinds—fares considerably better in the sphere of weakness of will than Holton’s view does. The argument benefits from some studies of folk conceptions of weakness of will that employ techniques of experimental philosophy. The chapter’s aim is to clarify the nature of weak-willed actions.
Sarah Stroud
- Published in print:
- 2010
- Published Online:
- May 2010
- ISBN:
- 9780195376685
- eISBN:
- 9780199776306
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195376685.003.0003
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Moral Philosophy
This chapter investigates whether procrastination is a species of weakness of will. Procrastination resembles weakness of will: the procrastinating agent is not doing x even though he in some sense ...
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This chapter investigates whether procrastination is a species of weakness of will. Procrastination resembles weakness of will: the procrastinating agent is not doing x even though he in some sense thinks he ought to be. However, the more precise characterizations of weakness of will that have been developed in the literature do not capture the full range of cases of procrastination. Is procrastination simply a variety of akrasia? No, because akrasia is a purely synchronic phenomenon, whereas procrastination is poor performance in the management of one’s agency over time. On a recent revisionist account from Holton and McIntyre, weakness of will centrally involves a failure to act on antecedently formed intentions. But this account, even though diachronic, cannot cover all cases of procrastination, either: weakness of will in this sense is exclusively a defect in plan implementation, whereas procrastination is sometimes constituted by defects in plan drafting and adoption.Less
This chapter investigates whether procrastination is a species of weakness of will. Procrastination resembles weakness of will: the procrastinating agent is not doing x even though he in some sense thinks he ought to be. However, the more precise characterizations of weakness of will that have been developed in the literature do not capture the full range of cases of procrastination. Is procrastination simply a variety of akrasia? No, because akrasia is a purely synchronic phenomenon, whereas procrastination is poor performance in the management of one’s agency over time. On a recent revisionist account from Holton and McIntyre, weakness of will centrally involves a failure to act on antecedently formed intentions. But this account, even though diachronic, cannot cover all cases of procrastination, either: weakness of will in this sense is exclusively a defect in plan implementation, whereas procrastination is sometimes constituted by defects in plan drafting and adoption.
Joseph Heath
- Published in print:
- 2008
- Published Online:
- January 2009
- ISBN:
- 9780195370294
- eISBN:
- 9780199871230
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195370294.003.0009
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Logic/Philosophy of Mathematics
The argument of the previous chapter suggests that, in general, people act in the way that they have best reason to act. This constitutes a tacit denial of the view that there is such a thing as ...
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The argument of the previous chapter suggests that, in general, people act in the way that they have best reason to act. This constitutes a tacit denial of the view that there is such a thing as intentional counterpreferential choice. The argument of this chapter makes this denial more plausible, by drawing out the philosophical implications of the phenomenon of hyperbolic discounting. The philosophical literature on weakness of will is marred by a failure to render explicit any assumptions that may be being made about individual time-preference. Incorporating an explicit discount rate resolves many of these issues, but also shows how many of the phenomena traditional classified as weakness of will can easily be given a rationalizing explanation, as temporary preference reversals.Less
The argument of the previous chapter suggests that, in general, people act in the way that they have best reason to act. This constitutes a tacit denial of the view that there is such a thing as intentional counterpreferential choice. The argument of this chapter makes this denial more plausible, by drawing out the philosophical implications of the phenomenon of hyperbolic discounting. The philosophical literature on weakness of will is marred by a failure to render explicit any assumptions that may be being made about individual time-preference. Incorporating an explicit discount rate resolves many of these issues, but also shows how many of the phenomena traditional classified as weakness of will can easily be given a rationalizing explanation, as temporary preference reversals.
Mark D. White
- Published in print:
- 2010
- Published Online:
- May 2010
- ISBN:
- 9780195376685
- eISBN:
- 9780199776306
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195376685.003.0013
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Moral Philosophy
Economists, psychologists, and philosophers have written extensively on the causes of procrastination. While their work helps us understand why people procrastinate, it does not explain how they can ...
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Economists, psychologists, and philosophers have written extensively on the causes of procrastination. While their work helps us understand why people procrastinate, it does not explain how they can resist the urge to procrastinate. This chapter argues that this is a result of a refusal to acknowledge a faculty of choice, or a will, separate from preferences or desires, which can overwhelm their pull. Based on the moral philosophy of Immanuel Kant, as well as contemporary work in volitionism, this chapter applies to procrastination a Kantian-economic model of decision making that emphasizes strength of character and willpower, which can serve as alternatives to the coping strategies offered elsewhere in the literature.Less
Economists, psychologists, and philosophers have written extensively on the causes of procrastination. While their work helps us understand why people procrastinate, it does not explain how they can resist the urge to procrastinate. This chapter argues that this is a result of a refusal to acknowledge a faculty of choice, or a will, separate from preferences or desires, which can overwhelm their pull. Based on the moral philosophy of Immanuel Kant, as well as contemporary work in volitionism, this chapter applies to procrastination a Kantian-economic model of decision making that emphasizes strength of character and willpower, which can serve as alternatives to the coping strategies offered elsewhere in the literature.
Thomas E. Hill Jr.
- Published in print:
- 2012
- Published Online:
- September 2012
- ISBN:
- 9780199692002
- eISBN:
- 9780191741241
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199692002.003.0007
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Moral Philosophy, Political Philosophy
This chapter explores similarities and differences between Kant’s ideas about moral virtue and various ideas associated with virtue ethics. It identifies some misconceptions of Kant’s ethics and ...
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This chapter explores similarities and differences between Kant’s ideas about moral virtue and various ideas associated with virtue ethics. It identifies some misconceptions of Kant’s ethics and highlights features that may be overlooked. As in the previous chapter, Kant’s distinctive understanding of virtue as moral strength is highlighted. Finally the chapter comments on the apparent differences between Kant’s theory and some views associated with “virtue ethics” regarding (A) the need for moral rules, (B) sensitivity to particular contexts, (C) morally good motivation, and (D) the standard for right action. Kant treats virtue as a kind of strength of the will to do what is right. Virtue is more than having good intentions, and we need to develop it over time. We have a duty to try to develop virtue, but we are also responsible if, lacking sufficient virtue, we do wrong through weakness of will. We have particular virtues insofar as our will to fulfill various specific duties is strong, but it is not the implications of Kant’s position for particular virtues (and vices) of character that is most interesting. Apart from that, Kant’s ideas raise questions about moral responsibility and strength and weakness of will that present special problems of understanding, even though (arguably) in some respects Kant’s ideas reflect familiar common sense views.Less
This chapter explores similarities and differences between Kant’s ideas about moral virtue and various ideas associated with virtue ethics. It identifies some misconceptions of Kant’s ethics and highlights features that may be overlooked. As in the previous chapter, Kant’s distinctive understanding of virtue as moral strength is highlighted. Finally the chapter comments on the apparent differences between Kant’s theory and some views associated with “virtue ethics” regarding (A) the need for moral rules, (B) sensitivity to particular contexts, (C) morally good motivation, and (D) the standard for right action. Kant treats virtue as a kind of strength of the will to do what is right. Virtue is more than having good intentions, and we need to develop it over time. We have a duty to try to develop virtue, but we are also responsible if, lacking sufficient virtue, we do wrong through weakness of will. We have particular virtues insofar as our will to fulfill various specific duties is strong, but it is not the implications of Kant’s position for particular virtues (and vices) of character that is most interesting. Apart from that, Kant’s ideas raise questions about moral responsibility and strength and weakness of will that present special problems of understanding, even though (arguably) in some respects Kant’s ideas reflect familiar common sense views.
Jeanette Kennett
- Published in print:
- 2003
- Published Online:
- October 2011
- ISBN:
- 9780199266302
- eISBN:
- 9780191699146
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199266302.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Moral Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology
Is it ever possible for people to act freely and intentionally against their better judgement? Is it ever possible to act in opposition to one's strongest desire? If either of these questions are ...
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Is it ever possible for people to act freely and intentionally against their better judgement? Is it ever possible to act in opposition to one's strongest desire? If either of these questions are answered in the negative, the common-sense distinctions between recklessness, weakness of will and compulsion collapse. This would threaten our ordinary notion of self-control and undermine our practice of holding each other responsible for moral failure. So a clear and plausible account of how weakness of will and self-control are possible is of great practical significance. Taking the problem of weakness of will as her starting point, Jeanette Kennett builds an admirably comprehensive and integrated account of moral agency which gives a central place to the capacity for self-control. Her account of the exercise and limits of self-control vindicates the common-sense distinction between weakness of will and compulsion and so underwrites our ordinary allocations of moral responsibility. She addresses with clarity and insight a range of important topics in moral psychology, such as the nature of valuing and desiring, conceptions of virtue, moral conflict, and the varieties of recklessness (here characterised as culpable bad judgement) — and does so in terms which make their relations to each other and to the challenges of real life obvious. Agency and Responsibility concludes by testing the accounts developed of self-control, moral failure, and moral responsibility against the hard cases provided by acts of extreme evil.Less
Is it ever possible for people to act freely and intentionally against their better judgement? Is it ever possible to act in opposition to one's strongest desire? If either of these questions are answered in the negative, the common-sense distinctions between recklessness, weakness of will and compulsion collapse. This would threaten our ordinary notion of self-control and undermine our practice of holding each other responsible for moral failure. So a clear and plausible account of how weakness of will and self-control are possible is of great practical significance. Taking the problem of weakness of will as her starting point, Jeanette Kennett builds an admirably comprehensive and integrated account of moral agency which gives a central place to the capacity for self-control. Her account of the exercise and limits of self-control vindicates the common-sense distinction between weakness of will and compulsion and so underwrites our ordinary allocations of moral responsibility. She addresses with clarity and insight a range of important topics in moral psychology, such as the nature of valuing and desiring, conceptions of virtue, moral conflict, and the varieties of recklessness (here characterised as culpable bad judgement) — and does so in terms which make their relations to each other and to the challenges of real life obvious. Agency and Responsibility concludes by testing the accounts developed of self-control, moral failure, and moral responsibility against the hard cases provided by acts of extreme evil.
Sarah Stroud and Christine Tappolet (eds)
- Published in print:
- 2003
- Published Online:
- January 2005
- ISBN:
- 9780199257362
- eISBN:
- 9780191601842
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0199257361.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind
Among the many practical failures that threaten us, weakness of will or akrasia is often considered to be a paradigm of irrationality. The eleven new essays in this collection give a rich overview of ...
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Among the many practical failures that threaten us, weakness of will or akrasia is often considered to be a paradigm of irrationality. The eleven new essays in this collection give a rich overview of the current debate over weakness of will and practical irrationality more generally. Issues covered include classical questions such as the distinction between weakness of will and compulsion, the connection between evaluative judgement and motivation, the role of emotions in akrasia, rational agency, and the existence of the will. They also include new topics, such as group akrasia, strength of will, the nature of correct choice, the structure of decision theory, the temporality of prudential reasons, and emotional rationality. The essays advance two central tasks: exploration of the implications of akrasia and other putatively irrational phenomena for the nature of practical reason and rationality; and consideration of possible explanations for such phenomena. The former intersects with recent theorizing about the nature of practical reason in general, and the latter with work in the philosophy of mind about the kinds of mental states and entities we need to posit in order adequately to understand human action.Less
Among the many practical failures that threaten us, weakness of will or akrasia is often considered to be a paradigm of irrationality. The eleven new essays in this collection give a rich overview of the current debate over weakness of will and practical irrationality more generally. Issues covered include classical questions such as the distinction between weakness of will and compulsion, the connection between evaluative judgement and motivation, the role of emotions in akrasia, rational agency, and the existence of the will. They also include new topics, such as group akrasia, strength of will, the nature of correct choice, the structure of decision theory, the temporality of prudential reasons, and emotional rationality. The essays advance two central tasks: exploration of the implications of akrasia and other putatively irrational phenomena for the nature of practical reason and rationality; and consideration of possible explanations for such phenomena. The former intersects with recent theorizing about the nature of practical reason in general, and the latter with work in the philosophy of mind about the kinds of mental states and entities we need to posit in order adequately to understand human action.
Jeanette Kennett
- Published in print:
- 2003
- Published Online:
- October 2011
- ISBN:
- 9780199266302
- eISBN:
- 9780191699146
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199266302.003.0003
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Moral Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology
This chapter focuses on Humean accounts. It first examines Donald Davidson's distinctly Humean account of reasons for action in his paper ‘How is the Weakness of the Will Possible?’, and looks into ...
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This chapter focuses on Humean accounts. It first examines Donald Davidson's distinctly Humean account of reasons for action in his paper ‘How is the Weakness of the Will Possible?’, and looks into his characterization of practical reasoning and weakness of will. It then investigates the possibility argued for by Jackson, Biglow, Dods, and Pargeter, that the akratic conflict is not what the folk theorists thought it was, and that the problem does not arise. However, the chapter argues that these alternative constructions of akrasia, with their explicitly reductive view of evaluation, do not succeed in capturing the phenomenon they set out to explain. The chapter concludes that the conceptual resources available to Humeans are too thin to enable them to sufficiently address the issue of justification to explain and distinguish the various failures of agency that are of main concern.Less
This chapter focuses on Humean accounts. It first examines Donald Davidson's distinctly Humean account of reasons for action in his paper ‘How is the Weakness of the Will Possible?’, and looks into his characterization of practical reasoning and weakness of will. It then investigates the possibility argued for by Jackson, Biglow, Dods, and Pargeter, that the akratic conflict is not what the folk theorists thought it was, and that the problem does not arise. However, the chapter argues that these alternative constructions of akrasia, with their explicitly reductive view of evaluation, do not succeed in capturing the phenomenon they set out to explain. The chapter concludes that the conceptual resources available to Humeans are too thin to enable them to sufficiently address the issue of justification to explain and distinguish the various failures of agency that are of main concern.
Richard McCarty
- Published in print:
- 2009
- Published Online:
- September 2009
- ISBN:
- 9780199567720
- eISBN:
- 9780191721465
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199567720.003.0007
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind, History of Philosophy
The “radical evil” of human nature is, in Kant's view, our enduring predisposition to deviate from the moral law. It comes in three degrees: frailty (moral weakness), impurity, and depravity ...
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The “radical evil” of human nature is, in Kant's view, our enduring predisposition to deviate from the moral law. It comes in three degrees: frailty (moral weakness), impurity, and depravity (wickedness). We are evil in these ways by an act of free choice antecedent to moral experience, in the intelligible world. In this world we can make progress in combating radical evil by strengthening our moral resolve. Our being evil by nature does not preclude our having a good will, however. In Kant's view a good will is universal. It is our common “predisposition to personality”, our tendency to feel respect for the moral law, and the basis of our human dignity. Acting on that incentive gives an action “moral worth”.Less
The “radical evil” of human nature is, in Kant's view, our enduring predisposition to deviate from the moral law. It comes in three degrees: frailty (moral weakness), impurity, and depravity (wickedness). We are evil in these ways by an act of free choice antecedent to moral experience, in the intelligible world. In this world we can make progress in combating radical evil by strengthening our moral resolve. Our being evil by nature does not preclude our having a good will, however. In Kant's view a good will is universal. It is our common “predisposition to personality”, our tendency to feel respect for the moral law, and the basis of our human dignity. Acting on that incentive gives an action “moral worth”.
Duncan MacIntosh
- Published in print:
- 2010
- Published Online:
- May 2010
- ISBN:
- 9780195376685
- eISBN:
- 9780199776306
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195376685.003.0004
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Moral Philosophy
Chrisoula Andreou says procrastination qua imprudent delay is modeled by Warren Quinn’s self-torturer, who supposedly has intransitive preferences that rank each indulgence in something that delays ...
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Chrisoula Andreou says procrastination qua imprudent delay is modeled by Warren Quinn’s self-torturer, who supposedly has intransitive preferences that rank each indulgence in something that delays his global goals over working toward those goals and who finds it vague where best to stop indulging. His pair-wise choices to indulge result in his failing the goals, which he then regrets. This chapter argues, contra the money-pump argument, that it is not irrational to have or choose from intransitive preferences; so the agent’s delays are not imprudent, not instances of procrastination. Moreover, the self-torturer case is intelligible only if there is no vagueness and if the agent’s preferences are transitive. But then he would delay only from ordinary weakness of will. And when it is vague where best to stop indulging, rational agents would use symmetry-breaking techniques; so, again, any procrastination would be explained by standard weakness of will, not vagueness.Less
Chrisoula Andreou says procrastination qua imprudent delay is modeled by Warren Quinn’s self-torturer, who supposedly has intransitive preferences that rank each indulgence in something that delays his global goals over working toward those goals and who finds it vague where best to stop indulging. His pair-wise choices to indulge result in his failing the goals, which he then regrets. This chapter argues, contra the money-pump argument, that it is not irrational to have or choose from intransitive preferences; so the agent’s delays are not imprudent, not instances of procrastination. Moreover, the self-torturer case is intelligible only if there is no vagueness and if the agent’s preferences are transitive. But then he would delay only from ordinary weakness of will. And when it is vague where best to stop indulging, rational agents would use symmetry-breaking techniques; so, again, any procrastination would be explained by standard weakness of will, not vagueness.
Richard Holton
- Published in print:
- 2003
- Published Online:
- January 2005
- ISBN:
- 9780199257362
- eISBN:
- 9780191601842
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0199257361.003.0003
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind
Most recent accounts of will power have tried to explain it as reducible to the operation of beliefs and desires. In opposition to such accounts, this essay argues for a distinct faculty of will ...
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Most recent accounts of will power have tried to explain it as reducible to the operation of beliefs and desires. In opposition to such accounts, this essay argues for a distinct faculty of will power. Considerations from philosophy and from social psychology are used in support.Less
Most recent accounts of will power have tried to explain it as reducible to the operation of beliefs and desires. In opposition to such accounts, this essay argues for a distinct faculty of will power. Considerations from philosophy and from social psychology are used in support.
Ingmar Persson
- Published in print:
- 2005
- Published Online:
- February 2006
- ISBN:
- 9780199276905
- eISBN:
- 9780191603198
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0199276900.003.0013
- Subject:
- Philosophy, General
The possibility of akrasia or weakness of will, i.e., the phenomenon of agents acting against their best judgement or reasons, presents a problem for internalism. This chapter reviews and rejects a ...
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The possibility of akrasia or weakness of will, i.e., the phenomenon of agents acting against their best judgement or reasons, presents a problem for internalism. This chapter reviews and rejects a number of accounts of weakness of will by Donald Davidson, Christine Korsgaard, Alfred Mele, Gary Watson and others. It ends by providing an account weakness of will which is consistent with internalism, as acting against the best reasons that are dispositionally stored in the agent’s mind, but which fail to be causally operative by failing to become occurrent.Less
The possibility of akrasia or weakness of will, i.e., the phenomenon of agents acting against their best judgement or reasons, presents a problem for internalism. This chapter reviews and rejects a number of accounts of weakness of will by Donald Davidson, Christine Korsgaard, Alfred Mele, Gary Watson and others. It ends by providing an account weakness of will which is consistent with internalism, as acting against the best reasons that are dispositionally stored in the agent’s mind, but which fail to be causally operative by failing to become occurrent.
Richard McCarty
- Published in print:
- 2009
- Published Online:
- September 2009
- ISBN:
- 9780199567720
- eISBN:
- 9780191721465
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199567720.003.0002
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind, History of Philosophy
Kant's concept of incentives is the key to solving the problem of justification and explanation. The “incorporation” of incentives into the maxims that justify actions enables them also to explain ...
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Kant's concept of incentives is the key to solving the problem of justification and explanation. The “incorporation” of incentives into the maxims that justify actions enables them also to explain actions. Incentives have both objective and subjective dimensions: they refer to objects of desire, and they are also subjective motive forces, with the power to explain actions. As psychological forces, incentives can be identified with “practical pleasures”. They can be either sense-based (stimuli) or intellect-based (motiva). The greater the practical pleasure the stronger the incentive, and so the stronger its action-explaining, motive force. Moral weakness of will is weakness in the intellect-based moral incentive, compared with sense-based inclination.Less
Kant's concept of incentives is the key to solving the problem of justification and explanation. The “incorporation” of incentives into the maxims that justify actions enables them also to explain actions. Incentives have both objective and subjective dimensions: they refer to objects of desire, and they are also subjective motive forces, with the power to explain actions. As psychological forces, incentives can be identified with “practical pleasures”. They can be either sense-based (stimuli) or intellect-based (motiva). The greater the practical pleasure the stronger the incentive, and so the stronger its action-explaining, motive force. Moral weakness of will is weakness in the intellect-based moral incentive, compared with sense-based inclination.
F. H. Buckley
- Published in print:
- 2009
- Published Online:
- May 2009
- ISBN:
- 9780195341263
- eISBN:
- 9780199866892
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195341263.003.0004
- Subject:
- Law, Philosophy of Law
Akrasia is weakness of the will, where a person knows what choice is in his best interest, but lacks the strength of will to make it. The akrates might be in the grip of an overpowering passion; he ...
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Akrasia is weakness of the will, where a person knows what choice is in his best interest, but lacks the strength of will to make it. The akrates might be in the grip of an overpowering passion; he might be an addict; he might be self-deceived about his strength of will; he might be a divided self, where a strong- and weak-willed person battle for control, or undergo a reversal of preferences in which a later self regrets choices made by a prior self. Finally, he might be a hyperbolic discounter who over-consumes in the present and doesn't save enough for the future. None of this makes a case for paternalism if the person might remove temptation from his path through self-binding strategies.Less
Akrasia is weakness of the will, where a person knows what choice is in his best interest, but lacks the strength of will to make it. The akrates might be in the grip of an overpowering passion; he might be an addict; he might be self-deceived about his strength of will; he might be a divided self, where a strong- and weak-willed person battle for control, or undergo a reversal of preferences in which a later self regrets choices made by a prior self. Finally, he might be a hyperbolic discounter who over-consumes in the present and doesn't save enough for the future. None of this makes a case for paternalism if the person might remove temptation from his path through self-binding strategies.
Risto Saarinen
- Published in print:
- 2011
- Published Online:
- September 2011
- ISBN:
- 9780199606818
- eISBN:
- 9780191729614
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199606818.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, History of Philosophy, Moral Philosophy
Weakness of will, the phenomenon of acting contrary to one's own better judgement, remains a prominent discussion topic in philosophy. The book covers the reflection on weakness of will between 1350 ...
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Weakness of will, the phenomenon of acting contrary to one's own better judgement, remains a prominent discussion topic in philosophy. The book covers the reflection on weakness of will between 1350 and 1650. It deals not only with a broad range of Renaissance authors (e.g. Petrarch, Donato Acciaiuoli, John Mair, Francesco Piccolomini), but also with the theologically coloured debates of the Reformation period (e.g. Martin Luther, Philip Melanchthon, John Calvin, Lambert Daneau). The book also discusses the impact of these authors on some prominent figures of early modernity (Shakespeare, Descartes, Spinoza, Leibniz). While most of the historical research on weakness of will has focused on the reception history of Aristotle's Nicomachean Ethics, the present study pays attention to the Platonic and Stoic discussions and their revival during the Renaissance and the Reformation. The study also shows the ways in which Augustine's discussion of the divided will is intertwined with the Christian reception of ancient Greek ethics. The theological underpinnings of early modern authors do not rule out weakness of will, but they transform the philosophical discussion and drive it towards new solutions. In addition to the Aristotelian explanations of weakness of will, the Platonic and Stoic-Augustinian explanatory models feature prominently in the Renaissance and the Reformation.Less
Weakness of will, the phenomenon of acting contrary to one's own better judgement, remains a prominent discussion topic in philosophy. The book covers the reflection on weakness of will between 1350 and 1650. It deals not only with a broad range of Renaissance authors (e.g. Petrarch, Donato Acciaiuoli, John Mair, Francesco Piccolomini), but also with the theologically coloured debates of the Reformation period (e.g. Martin Luther, Philip Melanchthon, John Calvin, Lambert Daneau). The book also discusses the impact of these authors on some prominent figures of early modernity (Shakespeare, Descartes, Spinoza, Leibniz). While most of the historical research on weakness of will has focused on the reception history of Aristotle's Nicomachean Ethics, the present study pays attention to the Platonic and Stoic discussions and their revival during the Renaissance and the Reformation. The study also shows the ways in which Augustine's discussion of the divided will is intertwined with the Christian reception of ancient Greek ethics. The theological underpinnings of early modern authors do not rule out weakness of will, but they transform the philosophical discussion and drive it towards new solutions. In addition to the Aristotelian explanations of weakness of will, the Platonic and Stoic-Augustinian explanatory models feature prominently in the Renaissance and the Reformation.
Ingmar Persson
- Published in print:
- 2005
- Published Online:
- February 2006
- ISBN:
- 9780199276905
- eISBN:
- 9780191603198
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0199276900.003.0014
- Subject:
- Philosophy, General
This chapter develops the account of weakness of will suggested in the preceding chapter by indicating some factors which could prevent dispositional reasons from receiving episodic mental ...
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This chapter develops the account of weakness of will suggested in the preceding chapter by indicating some factors which could prevent dispositional reasons from receiving episodic mental representation. One such factor is a bias towards the perceived (or a bias towards the present, as Derek Parfit calls it), i.e., a tendency to have one’s attention glued to what one currently perceives. Another such factor is derived from David Hume’s principles of association of ideascalled the mechanism of spontaneous induction, which induces one to imagine that the future will be like what one has experienced.Less
This chapter develops the account of weakness of will suggested in the preceding chapter by indicating some factors which could prevent dispositional reasons from receiving episodic mental representation. One such factor is a bias towards the perceived (or a bias towards the present, as Derek Parfit calls it), i.e., a tendency to have one’s attention glued to what one currently perceives. Another such factor is derived from David Hume’s principles of association of ideascalled the mechanism of spontaneous induction, which induces one to imagine that the future will be like what one has experienced.
Sarah Stroud
- Published in print:
- 2003
- Published Online:
- January 2005
- ISBN:
- 9780199257362
- eISBN:
- 9780191601842
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0199257361.003.0006
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind
A practical judgement is one which enjoys an internal, necessary relation to subsequent action or intention, and which can serve as a sufficient explanation of such action or intention. Does the ...
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A practical judgement is one which enjoys an internal, necessary relation to subsequent action or intention, and which can serve as a sufficient explanation of such action or intention. Does the phenomenon of weakness of will show that deliberation does not characteristically issue in such practical judgements? The author argues that the possibility of akrasia does not threaten the view that we make practical judgements, when the latter thesis is properly understood. Indeed, the author suggests that the alleged possibility of global akrasia actually supports the practical‐judgement model over what she considers its main rival, a kind of ‘Humean externalism’ about practical reason.Less
A practical judgement is one which enjoys an internal, necessary relation to subsequent action or intention, and which can serve as a sufficient explanation of such action or intention. Does the phenomenon of weakness of will show that deliberation does not characteristically issue in such practical judgements? The author argues that the possibility of akrasia does not threaten the view that we make practical judgements, when the latter thesis is properly understood. Indeed, the author suggests that the alleged possibility of global akrasia actually supports the practical‐judgement model over what she considers its main rival, a kind of ‘Humean externalism’ about practical reason.
Donald Davidson
- Published in print:
- 2001
- Published Online:
- November 2003
- ISBN:
- 9780199246274
- eISBN:
- 9780191715198
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0199246270.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind
This volume collects Davidson's seminal contributions to the philosophy of mind and the philosophy of action. Its overarching thesis is that the ordinary concept of causality we employ to render ...
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This volume collects Davidson's seminal contributions to the philosophy of mind and the philosophy of action. Its overarching thesis is that the ordinary concept of causality we employ to render physical processes intelligible should also be employed in describing and explaining human action. In the first of three subsections into which the papers are thematically organized, Davidson uses causality to give novel analyses of acting for a reason, of intending, weakness of will, and freedom of will. The second section provides the formal and ontological framework for those analyses. In particular, the logical form and attending ontology of action sentences and causal statements is explored. To uphold the analyses, Davidson urges us to accept the existence of non‐recurrent particulars, events, along with that of persons and other objects. The final section employs this ontology of events to provide an anti‐reductionist answer to the mind/matter debate that Davidson labels ‘anomalous monism’. Events enter causal relations regardless of how we describe them but can, for the sake of different explanatory purposes, be subsumed under mutually irreducible descriptions, claims Davidson. Events qualify as mental if caused and rationalized by reasons, but can be so described only if we subsume them under considerations that are not amenable to codification into strict laws. We abandon those considerations, collectively labelled the ‘constitutive ideal of rationality’, if we want to explain the physical occurrence of those very same events; in which case we have to describe them as governed by strict laws. The impossibility of intertranslating the two idioms by means of psychophysical laws blocks any analytically reductive relation between them. The mental and the physical would thus disintegrate were it not for causality, which is operative in both realms through a shared ontology of events.Less
This volume collects Davidson's seminal contributions to the philosophy of mind and the philosophy of action. Its overarching thesis is that the ordinary concept of causality we employ to render physical processes intelligible should also be employed in describing and explaining human action. In the first of three subsections into which the papers are thematically organized, Davidson uses causality to give novel analyses of acting for a reason, of intending, weakness of will, and freedom of will. The second section provides the formal and ontological framework for those analyses. In particular, the logical form and attending ontology of action sentences and causal statements is explored. To uphold the analyses, Davidson urges us to accept the existence of non‐recurrent particulars, events, along with that of persons and other objects. The final section employs this ontology of events to provide an anti‐reductionist answer to the mind/matter debate that Davidson labels ‘anomalous monism’. Events enter causal relations regardless of how we describe them but can, for the sake of different explanatory purposes, be subsumed under mutually irreducible descriptions, claims Davidson. Events qualify as mental if caused and rationalized by reasons, but can be so described only if we subsume them under considerations that are not amenable to codification into strict laws. We abandon those considerations, collectively labelled the ‘constitutive ideal of rationality’, if we want to explain the physical occurrence of those very same events; in which case we have to describe them as governed by strict laws. The impossibility of intertranslating the two idioms by means of psychophysical laws blocks any analytically reductive relation between them. The mental and the physical would thus disintegrate were it not for causality, which is operative in both realms through a shared ontology of events.
