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Excuses and accusations

TERENCE ZUBER

in Inventing the Schlieffen Plan: German War Planning 1871-1914

As early as September 1914 it was clear that the reputation of the General Staff was in danger. There were also intense internal General Staff battles to assign blame for the defeat on the Marne. It ... More

As early as September 1914 it was clear that the reputation of the General Staff was in danger. There were also intense internal General Staff battles to assign blame for the defeat on the Marne. It is evident from the personal papers of Wilhelm Groener, the last Chief of the General Staff, that Groener decided in 1919 that the best solution was to place the blame on dead officers, who he alleged did not understand the infallible Schlieffen plan. This explains why there is no mention of the Schlieffen plan being the German war plan before 1919, when Groener ‘invented’ it. The ‘Schlieffen plan’ was therefore not built on documents and proof but on gross generalization and bald assertion. The Schlieffen plan has always been popular because in the simplest terms it tells a wide group of people — from armchair generals to opponents of ‘German militarism’ — exactly what they want to hear. Professional military analysis of actual German war planning documents shows the real nature of Schlieffen's planning and conclusively proves that there never was a ‘Schlieffen plan’.Less

Preparing for war

KEITH JEFFERY

in Field Marshal Sir Henry Wilson: A Political Soldier

Fifty years after the end of the World War I, Sir Charles Deedes, who had served under Henry Wilson in the War Office of Ireland before 1914, firmly stated that it was Wilson's energy, determination, ... More

Fifty years after the end of the World War I, Sir Charles Deedes, who had served under Henry Wilson in the War Office of Ireland before 1914, firmly stated that it was Wilson's energy, determination, and foresight that brought the British army to a state of readiness to proceed overseas in August 1914. Allowing that the British commitment to war alongside France was (as Wilson fervently believed) both morally and politically the right thing to do, it may be that Wilson's four years as director of military operations constituted the most productive and successful of his whole career. An alternative view, however, is that Wilson's achievements during these years were disastrous for Britain. This chapter discusses Wilson's planning in preparation for Britain's joining France in the war with Germany.Less

The British Army of the Rhine, Middle East Land Forces, and Conventional Deterrence: 1948 to 1956

David French

in Army, Empire, and Cold War: The British Army and Military Policy, 1945-1971

This chapter examines how the army prepared to fight high intensity conventional operations against Soviet forces in Europe or the Middle East. It explores the development of its war‐fighting ... More

This chapter examines how the army prepared to fight high intensity conventional operations against Soviet forces in Europe or the Middle East. It explores the development of its war‐fighting doctrine for conventional operations in the decade after 1945, and suggests that critics who have argued that its thinking had stultified are mistaken. It looks at the likely balance of forces that might have been pitted against each other in the two theatres, and examine the plans that the British evolved. Finally, it explores the army's readiness to fight in Europe, which would have been the decisive theatre, by analysing the conduct of the series of manoeuvres that it conducted between 1949 and 1952.Less

Fantasies of urban futures

James Greenhalgh

in Reconstructing modernity: Space, power and governance in mid-twentieth century British cities

This chapter examines the origins of the post-war Plans as a means to interrogate a number of historical stereotypes about Britain after the Second World War. In 1945 Hull and Manchester, in common ... More

This chapter examines the origins of the post-war Plans as a means to interrogate a number of historical stereotypes about Britain after the Second World War. In 1945 Hull and Manchester, in common with many other British towns and cities, produced comprehensive, detailed redevelopment plans. These Plans were a spectacular mix of maps, representations of modern architecture and ambitious cityscapes that sit, sometimes uneasily, alongside detailed tables, text and photographs. Initially examining continuities between the inter- and post-war plans, the chapter emphasises the importance of the Plans in local governments’ attempts to express long-held desires to control and shape the city. I argue that the Plans evidence an attempt to mould the future shape and idea of the modern city through imaginative use of urban fantasy. Images of modernism, I argue, were not presented as a realisable architectural aim, but as a way of mediating between the present and an indistinct, but fundamentally better future. I suggest flawed interpretations of the visual materials contained in the Plans are responsible for an over-emphasis on the influence of radical modernism in post-war Britain.Less

The Lebanon War

Yezid Sayigh

in Armed Struggle and the Search for State: The Palestinian National Movement, 1949-1993

By the end of May 1982, the PLO had a remarkably accurate picture of Israeli war plans. The PLO expected one of two scenarios. The first envisaged armoured attacks through Nabatiyya and Tyre linking ... More

By the end of May 1982, the PLO had a remarkably accurate picture of Israeli war plans. The PLO expected one of two scenarios. The first envisaged armoured attacks through Nabatiyya and Tyre linking up with amphibious landings at Qasmiyya or Zahrani, with heliborne or naval diversions at other points and a possible thrust towards Hasbayya. The IDF might also circle round Sidon to link up with a major troop landing at the Awwali river estuary to the north, and then drive towards a second beachhead at Damur. The PLO apparently viewed the latter option as unlikely. The PLO concluded that in either case the IDF would halt south of Sidon within five days, at which point the superpowers would impose a ceasefire and resume the peace process. This was a major misreading of Israeli and US aims, but otherwise the PLO accurately anticipated the IDF's plans.Less

Naval Strategies in Collision: Britain, the USA, and Japan at the Beginning of the Pacific War

Evan Mawdsley

in The Sea and the Second World War: Maritime Aspects of a Global Conflict

In the 1920s and 1930s, three important visions of future naval war in the Pacific were extant: the American ORANGE war plans, the Japanese "Attrition/Interception" concept, and the British ... More

In the 1920s and 1930s, three important visions of future naval war in the Pacific were extant: the American ORANGE war plans, the Japanese "Attrition/Interception" concept, and the British "Singapore strategy." This chapter by Evan Mawdsleyexamines what relevance these expectations had to the situation after the outbreak of full-scale war in China (1937) and Europe (1939), and especially after the fall of France in May-June 1940. It discusses how the war planning of the USA, Japan, and Britain dovetailed, and how it developed in the light of geopolitical and technological changes in the two years preceding the attacks on Malaya and Hawaii; June-July 1941 marked a second significant turning point. Finally, the chapter considers the relationship between the two actions of the Imperial Navy planned for December 1941, the "Southern Operation" and the "Hawaiian Operation," and the connection between those two Japanese strikes and the American-British "ABC-1" strategy of March 1941.Less

A Theory of Alliance Treaty Negotiation Outcomes

Paul Poast

in Arguing about Alliances: The Art of Agreement in Military-Pact Negotiations

This chapter discusses the book's argument that joint war planning provides a useful conceptual framework for explaining agreement and nonagreement in alliance treaty negotiations. Drawing on ... More

This chapter discusses the book's argument that joint war planning provides a useful conceptual framework for explaining agreement and nonagreement in alliance treaty negotiations. Drawing on bargaining theory and negotiation analysis, it focuses on two key variables. The first variable is compatibility of ideal war plans. This refers to the participants' respective ideal war plans not having contradictory strategic components or operational components. Tensions can arise from conflicting military doctrines, such as one negotiation participant adhering to an offensive doctrine and another following a defensive doctrine. Thus, the key to ideal war plan compatibility is that both participants have similar notions of the threat and similar philosophies about the application of military force against that threat. The second variable is the attractiveness of outside options. Outside options are the policies each participant will pursue if the negotiation ends in nonagreement. Such policies include unilateral action or an alliance treaty with another state. The chapter then explains how these two variables lead to four types of alliance treaty negotiations: Same Page, Pleasant Surprise, Revealed Deadlock, and Standard Bargaining. It also details the three components of a war plan: strategic, operational, and tactical.Less

Naval Gunfire Support In Operation Neptune: A Reexamination

Barbara Brooks Tomblin

in The United States and the Second World War: New Perspectives on Diplomacy, War, and the Home Front

This chapter delivers a captivating narrative that takes readers from the choppy and cold waters of the French coast to the shores of North Africa, to Sicily, and to the ... More

This chapter delivers a captivating narrative that takes readers from the choppy and cold waters of the French coast to the shores of North Africa, to Sicily, and to the deadly beaches of Salerno, and then back again to Normandy on June 6, 1944. It demonstrates that the U.S. Navy's successes on June 6 were largely the result of putting into practice the lessons learned from previous amphibious assaults launched in the Mediterranean during 1942 and 1943. In part, because none of the major Mediterranean landings included pre-invasion bombardments of the landing zones, Allied planners recognized the need to wear down German defenses at Normandy with a pre-landing shelling, even at the sacrifice of surprise. The landings in North Africa and Italy not only highlighted the need for close-in fire support for the troops assaulting the beaches, but also revealed the effectiveness of air spot gunfire support and the need for more effective minesweeping operations. Amphibious operations prior to June 6, 1944, also uncovered the need for better defenses against German U-boat, E-boat, and air attacks. Even by the time of the Normandy landings, war planners failed to recognize, despite a wealth of information, the inherent limitations that Allied warships and landing craft would have in silencing enemy shore batteries. This oversight contributed much to the bloodshed on June 6.Less

Planning: Imagining and planning for death in wartime

Lucy Noakes

in Dying for the Nation: Death, Grief and Bereavement in Second World War Britain

This chapter traces the development of British plans to prevent, mitigate and cope with the mass death of civilians that was expected in any future conflict. It sets these within the political, ... More

This chapter traces the development of British plans to prevent, mitigate and cope with the mass death of civilians that was expected in any future conflict. It sets these within the political, social and cultural history of the decade; in particular the growth of an emotional culture of self-management, discussed in the previous chapter, the failure of disarmament in the early 1930s, the bombing of civilians in that decade, and the widely shared belief that any future war would be apocalyptic. It argues that as Britain moved towards another total war, the state realised that the dead would include civilians alongside the military, and that the management of these dead, and of the grief of the bereaved, would be central to public support for the war effort, and for the maintenance of morale amongst a people asked to go to war once again.Less

From Conquest to Containment: The Legacy of Occupation

C. T. Sandars

in America’s Overseas Garrisons: The Leasehold Empire

This chapter discusses the initial post-World War II planning of the U.S. and the legacy of occupation. After the war, the U.S. deployed occupation forces in Germany and Japan, two principal enemy ... More

This chapter discusses the initial post-World War II planning of the U.S. and the legacy of occupation. After the war, the U.S. deployed occupation forces in Germany and Japan, two principal enemy powers it had defeated, and its two associate countries, Italy and Korea. The U.S. did not originally plan to retain long-term garrisons in these four countries but it was prompted by the onset of the Cold War. In addition, the U.S. also maintained occupation forces for ten years in Austria, which were only withdrawn after the signing of the Austrian State Treaty in 1955.Less

Analyzing Alliance Treaty Negotiation Outcomes

Paul Poast

in Arguing about Alliances: The Art of Agreement in Military-Pact Negotiations

This chapter explores basic patterns in the data described in the previous chapter using cross tabulations. These tabulations show that having strategic and operational compatibility is strongly ... More

This chapter explores basic patterns in the data described in the previous chapter using cross tabulations. These tabulations show that having strategic and operational compatibility is strongly associated with a higher rate of agreement in alliance treaty negotiations. They also demonstrate that agreement can be reached, though less often, even between states that lack ideal war plan compatibility. The suggestive evidence offered by these cross tabulations is useful, but the cross tabulations also raise questions. While the initial patterns are supportive of this book's theory, the chapter is concerned about potential complications in the data that could undermine the ability to draw inferences about the relationships between variables. These potential complications include selection bias and omitted variable bias. The chapter then identifies how and under what conditions the existence of an outside option influences the outcome of alliance treaty negotiations.Less

Planning for Victory

Dirk Bönker

in Militarism in a Global Age: Naval Ambitions in Germany and the United States before World War I

This chapter examines how the obsessive quest for military victory, the cult of the decisive battle, and visions of large-scale battle came to define operational planning that focused on big-power ... More

This chapter examines how the obsessive quest for military victory, the cult of the decisive battle, and visions of large-scale battle came to define operational planning that focused on big-power wars in regional maritime settings, such as the North Sea, the North Atlantic, the Caribbean, and the Pacific. Preparing for war was central to the navalist enterprise of the German and U.S. navies in the global age. Operational planning functioned as the interface between the geopolitical agendas and military imagination of the two naval elites. On the one hand, thinking about maritime warfare became embedded in war plans. On the other hand, war plans served the purposes of threat and deterrence and envisioned geopolitical confrontation with other major powers. Operational planning provided the ultimate field of enactment for the commitment to battle fleet warfare and climactic combat. This chapter provides an overview of U.S. planning for war with Germany as well as German planning for war with the United States.Less

Strategy, Diplomacy, and the Cold War: The United States, Turkey, And Nato, 1945–1952

Melvyn P. Leffler

in Safeguarding Democratic Capitalism: U.S. Foreign Policy and National Security, 1920-2015

This chapter takes a look at U.S. war planning during the Cold War. Looking through Joint Chiefs of Staff records, the chapter shows that U.S. war planning, although crude, began in the early months ... More

This chapter takes a look at U.S. war planning during the Cold War. Looking through Joint Chiefs of Staff records, the chapter shows that U.S. war planning, although crude, began in the early months of 1946. If war erupted, for whatever reasons, the war plans called for the United States to strike the Soviet Union (USSR). Expecting Soviet armies to overrun most of Europe very quickly, planners assumed that the United States would launch its attack primarily from bases in the United Kingdom and the British-controlled Cairo-Suez base in the Middle East. To protect the latter, it would be essential to slow down Soviet armies marching southward to conquer the Middle East. The United States needed the Turkish army to thwart Soviet military advances and required Turkish airfields to insure the success of the strategic offensive against targets inside the USSR.Less

Measuring War Planning and Negotiation Outcomes

Paul Poast

in Arguing about Alliances: The Art of Agreement in Military-Pact Negotiations

This chapter describes the data collection and data manipulation required to measure alliance treaty negotiation outcomes (agreement or nonagreement) and ideal war plan compatibility. To code ... More

This chapter describes the data collection and data manipulation required to measure alliance treaty negotiation outcomes (agreement or nonagreement) and ideal war plan compatibility. To code agreement, the author uses two sources of data to identify negotiations that ended in agreement and to identify negotiations that ended in nonagreement. To code ideal war plan compatibility, the author uses data on both strategic compatibility and operational compatibility. Drawing from well-established data identifying the threats states face, the author identifies the threats facing each negotiation participant and then codes strategic compatibility as the ratio of the participants' shared threats to the total number of threats faced by the participants. The higher this ratio, the more likely the participants are to have compatible views regarding which state(s) should be the target of the alliance treaty. Drawing on the idea that the operational component of a state's ideal war plan emanates from its military doctrine, the author uses battle-level data from previous wars fought by negotiation participants to code whether the participants shared offensive or defensive military doctrines. These measures of strategic compatibility and operational compatibility are used to code when the negotiation participants have only strategic compatibility, only operational compatibility, or both strategic and operational compatibility.Less

Preparing for a New Enemy

in From Hot War to Cold: The U.S. Navy and National Security Affairs, 1945–1955

This chapter discusses the emergence of the new enemy in the early postwar years. In the fall of 1945 the hopes of United States civilians and military leaders for a continuing period of peace were ... More

This chapter discusses the emergence of the new enemy in the early postwar years. In the fall of 1945 the hopes of United States civilians and military leaders for a continuing period of peace were dashed by events in Europe and Asia. As the Soviet Union moved ever farther away from its wartime partnership with its Western Allies and began staking out its national interests more boldly in areas beyond its immediate military sway, the American interpretation of Soviet actions began changing from a neutral stance to a highly negative one. The Joint Chiefs of Staff started viewing the Soviet Union as a potential enemy and took actions accordingly. American war planning in the early postwar years was halting and somewhat disparate, as military staff officers tried to adjust their wartime concepts to the changing international situation and the likely effects of new weapon technologies such as the atomic bomb. Nonetheless, this planning increased in sophistication during the latter part of 1947, even though its focus shifted increasingly toward an overwhelming reliance on the employment of atomic weapons.Less

Negotiations and the Future of Alliance Studies

Paul Poast

in Arguing about Alliances: The Art of Agreement in Military-Pact Negotiations

This concluding chapter summarizes the book's main claims and empirical findings, discussing the implications of these findings as well as directions for future research. At their heart, alliance ... More

This concluding chapter summarizes the book's main claims and empirical findings, discussing the implications of these findings as well as directions for future research. At their heart, alliance treaties are about using military force. As such, war planning can be conceptualized as the core of alliance treaty negotiations. Equipped with this premise, the book argued that the key variable determining whether conditions are conducive to agreement is the compatibility of the participants' ideal war plans. These plans must be both operationally and strategically compatible. When war plan compatibility is low, the second key explanatory variable comes into play: the number of negotiation participants that have attractive outside options. The chapter then highlights how the arguments and evidence in the book indicate new research directions in four areas related to alliances: alliance treaty design, alliance reliability, NATO expansion, and the formation of defense cooperation agreements.Less

Made in the USA, 1940–1943

Patricia Clavin

in Securing the World Economy: The Reinvention of the League of Nations, 1920-1946

In September 1940, the League of Nations established a Mission at the Institute of Advanced Study in Princeton. While colleagues back in Geneva were isolated, the Princeton Mission served as a hub of ... More

In September 1940, the League of Nations established a Mission at the Institute of Advanced Study in Princeton. While colleagues back in Geneva were isolated, the Princeton Mission served as a hub of expertise for the US administration and social scientific communities engaged in planning a new order for international relations. The Mission was also an important resource for the British government, and for European governments in exile. Life was not without its difficulties. Money and staff where short, and there was the competing ambitions of the International Labour Organization, now based in Montreal, with which to contend. The Mission drafted Anglo-American documents supporting the Atlantic Charter and developed its own unique take on the challenges states would face once war was over. It was played a central role in the creation of an United Nations Food and Agriculture Organization and supported United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration.Less