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This book argues that Clausewitz developed a wide-ranging political theory of war by reflecting not only on the success, but also on the limitations and the failure of Napoleon's method of waging war. Successes, failures, and defeats of Napoleon forced Clausewitz to reflect on questions that went beyond purely military matters and led him to develop a political theory of war. Analyses of three paradigmatic campaigns — which are symbolized by Jena, Moscow, and Waterloo — are placed at the center of understanding surrounding Clausewitz's On War and it's inherent problems, like the relation of absolute and real war, theory and practice, the primacy of politics, the enigma of the first chapter, and the dialectics of attack and defense. Clausewitz's analysis of these war campaigns are the cornerstones of On War and redounded to the ‘wondrous trinity’, which is the basis for a general theory of war and which is quite different from the so-called trinitarian war.

This book is among the first to address the issues raised by the International Criminal Court from an International Relations perspective. By clearly outlining a theoretical framework to interpret these issues, it makes a significant contribution to the English School's study of international society. More specifically, it offers a concise definition of ‘world society’ and thus helps to resolve a longstanding problem in international theory. This groundbreaking conceptual work is supported by an indepth empirical analysis of American opposition to the ICC. The book goes beyond the familiar arguments related to national interests and argues that the Court has exposed the extent to which American notions of accountability are tied to the nation‐state. Where other democracies are willing to renegotiate their social contract because they see themselves as part of world society, the US protects its particular contract with ‘the American people’ because it offers a means of distinguishing that nation and its democracy from the rest of the world. In opposing the ICC, therefore, the US seeks to defend a society of states because this kind of society can accommodate American exceptionalism and advance particular US interests. This ‘sovereigntist’, or more accurately ‘Americanist’, influence is further illustrated in chapters on the customary international law, universal jurisdiction, transatlantic relations and US policy on international humanitarian law in the war on terror. The book concludes by evoking E.H. Carr's criticism of those great powers who claim that a harmony exists between their particular interests and those of wider society. It also recalls his argument that great powers sometimes need to compromise and in this context it argues that support for the ICC is a more effective means of fulfilling America's purpose and a less costly sacrifice for the US to make than that demanded by the ‘Americanist’ policy of nation‐building.

This book describes and explains the basic tenets of just war theory and gives a precise, succinct, and highly critical account of its present status and of the most important and controversial current debates surrounding it. Rejecting certain traditional, in effect medieval assumptions of just war theory and advancing a liberal outlook, it argues that every single individual is a legitimate authority and has, under certain circumstances, the right to declare war on others or the state. It also argues that just cause cannot be established independently of the other criteria of ius ad bellum (the justification for entering into war), except for right intention, which the book interprets more leniently than is traditional. Turning to ius in bello (which governs the conduct of a war) the book criticizes the doctrine of double effect and concludes that insofar as wars kill innocents, albeit as ‘collateral damage’, they cannot be just, but at best justified as the lesser evil. The book gives particular attention to the question why soldiers, allegedly, are legitimate targets and civilians not. Discussing four approaches to the explanation of the difference, it is argued that the four principles underlying them should all be taken into account and outlines how their comparative weighting can proceed when applied to concrete cases. The resulting approach does not square the distinction between legitimate and illegitimate targets with that between soldiers and civilians: this has extremely important consequences for the conduct of war. Finally, the book analyses the concept of terrorism, arguing that some forms of ‘terrorism’ are not terrorism at all and that, under certain circumstances, even terrorism proper can be justified.

This book asserts that the Civil War marks the end of one era of American legal history, and the beginning of another. Abraham Lincoln's famous Gettysberg Address is viewed as the beginning of a new kind of “covert” constitutional law – one with a stronger emphasis on equality in the wake of the abolition of slavery – which was legally established in the Amendments made to the U.S. Constitution between 1865 and 1870. The author asserts that the influence of this “secret constitution”, which has varied in degree from Reconstruction to the present day, is visible in the rulings of the Supreme Court on issues hinging on personal freedom, equality, and discrimination.

This book sheds light on Clausewitz's purpose in writing On War, and the methodology he employed. While many scholars agree that Clausewitz's work is frequently misunderstood, almost none have explored his methodology to see whether it might enhance our understanding of his concepts. This book lays out Clausewitz's purpose and methodology in a brisk and straightforward style. It then uses that as a basis for understanding his contributions to the ever growing body of knowledge of war. The specific contributions this study addresses are Clausewitz's theories concerning the nature of war, the relationship between war and politics, and several of the major principles of strategy he examined. These theories and principles lie at the heart of the current debates over the nature of contemporary conflict. They also underpin much of the instruction that prepares military and civilian leaders for their roles in the development and execution of military strategy. This book is organized into three parts. The first provides students with background information concerning Clausewitz's purpose and method. The second lays out his theories regarding the nature of war, his ideas concerning the relationship between war and policy, and the complementary balance between friction and military genius. The final part examines his concept of strategy, and several of his strategic principles, particularly the centre of gravity, and reveals how they relate to contemporary war. Together, these themes represent the core of what professional military curricula usually cover of Clausewitz.

The book analyses the changes that have occurred in developing countries since the end of the Cold War. The first section highlights major areas of change in economics, politics, and security and institutions, while the second section develops these themes and reveals the diversity of experience through regional case studies (Latin America, Asia Pacific, Africa, South Asia, and the Middle East).

The Kosovo Report is a final product of the work by the Independent International Commission on Kosovo, established to examine key developments prior to, during, and after the Kosovo war, including systematic violations of human rights in the region. The report assesses effectiveness of diplomatic efforts to prevent the war, legality of the NATO bombing campaign against Yugoslavia, and the progress of the United Nations in post‐conflict reconstruction. The Report makes a recommendation for the future status of Kosovo and proposes a new general framework for humanitarian intervention based on principles of legitimacy. It argues that the intervention by the international community in the Kosovo conflict did not so much create a precedent for intervention elsewhere as raise vital question about the legitimacy and practicability of the use of military force to defend human rights. The intervention, the Report concludes, exposed the limitations of the current international law on the balance between the rights of citizens and the rights of states; it demonstrated the difficulties that ensue when even the most sophisticated and professional military forces are deployed to achieve humanitarian goals; and it showed the immense obstacles that lie in the path of creating multi‐ethnic cooperation in societies torn apart by ethnic war.

Many have long suspected that when America takes up arms it is a rich man's war, but a poor man's fight. Despite these concerns about social inequality in military sacrifice, the hard data to validate such claims has been kept out of public view. The Casualty Gap renews the debate over unequal sacrifice by bringing to light new evidence on the inequality dimensions of American wartime casualties. It demonstrates unequivocally that since the conclusion of World War II, communities at the lower end of the socioeconomic ladder have borne a disproportionate share of the human costs of war. Moreover, they show for the first time that when Americans are explicitly confronted with evidence of this inequality, they become markedly less supportive of the nation's war efforts. The Casualty Gap also uncovers how wartime deaths affect entire communities. Citizens who see the high price war exacts on friends and neighbors become more likely to oppose war and to vote against the political leaders waging it than residents of low-casualty communities. Moreover, extensive empirical evidence connects higher community casualty rates in Korea and Vietnam to lower levels of trust in government, interest in politics, and electoral and non-electoral participation. In this way, the casualty gap threatens the very vibrancy of American democracy by depressing civic engagement in high-casualty communities for years after the last gun falls silent.

The book is the first in-depth ethnographic study of churched religion in the Pacific Northwest. It describes and explains how Protestant churches survive and thrive in the most unchurched region of the country. The study is based on nearly 450 interviews from thirty-four vital liberal and evangelical Protestant churches in the Pacific Northwest. These two sets of congregations embody separate moral worldviews and the study shows how these moral worldviews conflict, compete, and, on rare occasions, find common ground in five areas: ideology; religious beliefs; organizational and ritual life; mission (both local and international), and finally, how each relates to the politics of the region and nation. Evangelicals have dominated the public discourse on American religious life and politics over the last decade; it has become popular to accuse them of advocating an American theocracy. There was no evidence for this claim in the data from this study. Evangelicals do want influence — focusing intense energy on a political culture to nurture families — but they express the same intense distrust of the government that was found among liberals. Moreover, the study found relative disinterest on the part of liberals in influencing the public square. There was little consensus among liberals in protesting the Iraq War. Nonetheless, liberals were committed to a “moral culture” like evangelicals, though with distinctively different values — embracing a culture of inclusiveness and hospitality for homosexuals, the homeless, and the hungry.

In the ‘war on terror’ both sides have taken great pains to justify their actions in moral terms. As force is employed so are sophisticated arguments which directly invoke the just war traditions of the West and Islam. This book explores the moral‐theological arguments for war offered by the George W. Bush administration and al‐Qaeda. It examines the way in which these actors have drawn upon key just war concepts and, in some cases, reconceptualized their scope and content. The book's principal contention is that, in significant ways, the just war arguments of Bush and bin Laden are inconsistent with the moral requirements of their respective just war traditions. In two parts, the book examines these arguments in relation to the body of thought which comprises the Western just war tradition and that of Islamic jihad, and assesses the consistency of Bush and bin Laden's claims. The central argument of the book—that the Bush administration and al‐Qaeda depart from important consensuses about justified warfare—contains within it an alternative way of understanding the war on terror. Rather than a clash between civilizations, it is suggested that the war on terror can be accounted for by a clash within civilizations: in resorting to violence, both sides have acted against their own traditions and contravened the requirements of their own civilizations.

While an old doctrine of Just War exists, surprisingly little conceptual thinking has gone into what constitutes a Just Peace. This book presents various — and at times conflicting — viewpoints on this question of Just Peace from perspectives originating in political science, history, international law, political philosophy, cultural studies, and theology, as well as from a policy perspective. The book challenges a liberal perception of peace founded on norms claiming universal scope, and instead looks to negotiation for arriving at shared views that help build a consensus on what justice might mean in specific circumstances. Although some contributors explicitly outline and advocate specific cases for ‘justifiable violence’, it is made clear that alternative and non-violent ways to peace need to be contemplated, and conceptualized. Even though the path through justice is a demanding one, its accomplishment opens the way to a durable settlement accepted by the parties initially engaged in conflict. Clearly, the more ambitious goal of peace with justice can lead to smaller chances for success. It may even derail the whole enterprise and keep the flames of violent conflict alive through the search for ‘justice’, particularly because this concept is not necessarily the same for all concerned parties. Ultimately, an inter-subjective consensus needs to be built through negotiation with both parties to a conflict so that the concepts of shared history, and an often inextricable future, can be reached with a mutual understanding. In this collective process, it is more likely that a stable foundation can be created through recognition, renouncement, and rule, and thus a Just Peace can be achieved.

Covering the period from the late 1930s up to the spring of 1940, this book offers the first systematic comparison of how two countries, Britain and France, responded to the possibility and then reality of total war by examining developments in three dimensions: strategic, domestic political, and political economic. To date, studies of French and British policies during this period have focused almost exclusively on diplomatic and military events. Yet because 20th-century war demanded a massive effort on the part of nations and societies, its study requires a broader approach, one that encompasses the political, social, and economic dimensions as well as the links between them. Using a wide array of archival and secondary sources, including the records of government departments, trade unions, business groups, and political parties, this book demonstrates that the British were more successful in managing the strains of modern industrial war than the French. Whereas in France political, economic, and military developments combined to produce a multi-faceted crisis by early 1940, imperilling the war effort against Germany, developments in Britain followed a different course that laid the political and economic foundations for a long war. The book addresses such current historical debates as the nature of the political Right and Left in Europe during the 1930s, the extent of rearmament and economic mobilization, and the causes of France's defeat in 1940. As an extended comparison of how two liberal democracies met the challenge of war, it also addresses debates concerning the relationship between democratic regimes and capabilities for war, the influence of domestic versus systemic factors on national policies, and the nature and relative performance of different types of political economic regimes.