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The hajj has always had far-reaching political ramifications, but today, after a half century of sponsorship and regulation by governments around the world, it is more politicized than ever. In most countries, hajj administration is tainted with favoritism and corruption. All the major pilgrimage programs are explicitly tailored to benefit voting blocks and businesses at home while cultivating prestige and influence abroad. Frequently, pilgrim management is so politicized it subverts the central values of the hajj. Instead of promoting unity and equality, it divides Muslims along every conceivable line–ethnicity, language, class, party, region, sect, gender, and age.

This chapter begins by looking at long-term support in elections and in the polls for the Liberal Democrats, to see how it has evolved over the last half-century or so. This provides a context within which to judge the party’s future electoral prospects. The analysis of trends in Liberal Democrat voting intentions over a thirty-year period shows that the competitive situation between the Conservatives and Liberal Democrats is significantly greater than the competitive situation between Labour and the Liberal Democrats. It also shows that the party has to wait for its main rivals to make political mistakes and lose support before it can profit by winning over voters. This is described as the political equivalent of ‘waiting for Godot’, meaning that the Liberal Democrats are not the masters of their own electoral fate.

The history of Australian electoral systems shows a high degree of democratic experimentation. Australia employs the alternative vote to elect its lower house of parliament, and the single transferable vote to elect the upper house. In addition, the adoption of compulsory voting has consequences for the operation of those electoral systems. Political culture reflects a high degree of delegation by voters to political parties, and electoral reform is not high on the political agenda.

The government mandate in its full form fails descriptively because few spontaneous majorities form in support of one party, and there is no guarantee that the plurality party is not actually opposed by most electors. A minimal version might still apply however in terms of retrospective voting — a majority might still vote against a government. This idea has been particularly prominent in the economic voting literature, This chapter examines the evidence for ‘economic’ voting. It confirms previous comparative research by showing there is only limited evidence of consistent effects from growth, unemployment and inflation on voting. This is explained in terms of electoral reactions to any set of economic conditions never being undifferentiated or unproblematic. As there is always some rational argument for voting against incumbents some electors will always do so, accounting for a general fall of incumbent votes towards their long term norm. Median voter positions are not predictable from the state of the economy, but they do match government positions over the long term and indeed provide the equilibrium towards which government policy tends.

This chapter explores the explanatory power of the social cleavage model presented by Lipset and Rokkan in the 1960s. According to most of the dominant literature, the explanatory power of this model has declined over time. This trend is confirmed in this chapter. However, the findings in this chapter also show that social cleavage voting must be seen as the result of an interaction between groups in society on the one hand, and the political parties on the other. Changes in party appeal or party strategies are important factors to consider to understand the evolution of social cleavage voting.

This chapter demonstrates that the European voter is also an economic voter in the sense that negative evaluations of the economy hurt the electoral fortunes of incumbent parties. For those who expected that economic voting would be on the rise, the empirical results are disappointing. Systematic trends towards an increase in economic voting were not observed. Political events and institutional factors account for some of the variations in economic voting. For instance, the weak and irregular effects in Norway can be explained by the dominance of minority governments, a weak opposition, and the EU issue which dominated over economic concerns and probably reduced Labour’s ability to benefit from the first stage of the economic recovery in the 1993 election. Similarly, under a different institutional context, the British Conservative party in 1997 had less success than Labour four years later in taking advantage of an improving economy. These examples may suggest that institutions as well as embedded effects of political events influence the impact of economic evaluations on the vote.

Reform efforts aimed solely at elevating the democratic quality of campaigns are unlikely by themselves to have much success. At the same time, there is ample justification for attempting to gain greater control over the campaign environment for a different reason: to improve the accuracy with which elections record public opinion. In addition, the book's argument suggests that we might be well advised to shift priorities by worrying somewhat less than we do about problems of public opinion formation that appear during campaigns, and worrying somewhat more than we do about the problems and dynamics of public opinion formation in civil society.

This chapter discusses social choice theory, an axiomatic and deductive approach to societal problem solving by existing or possible voting procedures. Social choice theory in economics and political science considers how the members of a society such as voters or policy makers may make societal decisions such as selection among competing candidates to office or policies by existing or possible voting systems. Thus, social combination models and social choice theory address the same basic issue: the aggregation of group member preferences to a collective group response. As a historical example, the representatives from the American colonies who met at the Constitutional Convention of 1787 faced a multitude of judgmental issues on the composition, powers, and procedures of their government. Over four months, they achieved consensus on the U.S. Constitution. Once this consensus on judgmental issues was achieved, the U.S. Constitution became a conceptual system and guide for group problem solving for subsequent generations of Americans.

Addresses the question of the relevance the German mixed‐member electoral system has for the party system and for candidate vote, and argues that the mixed‐member electoral system does indeed live up to its German moniker of ‘personalized proportional representation’, in that it provides at once individualized representation of geographic constituencies and proportionality. The analysis proceeds in four steps and discusses the impact of the electoral system on the interparty and intraparty dimensions. The first two sections deal with the impact of the electoral system (a) on the party system, and (b) on voting behavior, with special attention to ticket‐splitting. The third and fourth sections deal with (a) candidate selection and opportunity structures as shaped by the electoral system and the parties, and (b) the likelihood of a district performance‐based personal vote for members of parliament. Concludes with a confrontation of the normative expectations of the founding fathers and empirical reality and speculates about the future of the German party system.

In the field of electoral systems, Britain has long held out as a bastion of stability, as the country seen as least likely to undergo fundamental electoral reform, but this picture was rudely shattered in the late spring of 1997, with the election of a new Labour government. The central argument of this chapter is that the current debate over British electoral reform should be viewed as part of a wider process of the coming of age of British politics. A review of the historical debate reveals a series of failed initiatives to reform the electoral system, suggesting that the matter has never been entirely put to rest, and that there has always been the prospect of its re‐emergence. The current episode, dating from the election of the new government in 1997, provides reason to expect that electoral reform may really happen this time, and indeed already has happened in a number of British electoral arenas (European Parliament; London mayor; Northern Ireland, Scottish, Welsh and London Assemblies). The chapter is arranged as follows: the first section summarizes the historical record from 1860 to 1970, and provides evidence of a political elite willing at least to countenance the idea of experimenting with change, even if not yet prepared to embrace it; the second section explores possible explanations for why the issue re‐emerged in the 1990s and describes the reforms implemented in that period (up to 2000); this is followed by an outline of the deliberations and proposals of the Independent Commission on the Voting System for the British House of Commons (the Jenkins Commission), which was established by the new Labour prime minister, Tony Blair, in December 1997, whose report was published in October 1998 and suggested ‘alternative vote plus (AV+)’ as the new electoral system; the concluding section discusses the current prospects for electoral reform in the UK.

Civil rights litigation in the USA successfully interpreted the 1965 Voting Rights Act as implying the right of minority voters to elect the candidates of their choice. This gave the impetus to ‘race‐conscious districting’, which created voting districts in which minority citizens (primarily Black and Latino) formed a voting majority. This chapter explores the success of this in raising the proportion of black representatives but also the problems this mechanism has generated. It uses this case study to argue the importance of combining a politics of ideas with a politics of presence.

When some parties have many seats and some have few, we need a meaningful ‘effective’ number of parties so as to compare the effects of electoral systems on party systems. The standard way to express the effective number of parties is to convert to fractional seat shares, square them, add, and take the inverse. The same can be done with fractional vote shares. This method is not ideal, but all others are worse. Effective number of parties can be complemented by a measure of balance in party sizes.

Excessive deviation from proportional representation may hurt the democratic legitimacy of the regime. The simplest way to measure the deviation from PR is to add all the differences between seat and vote shares of each party, then divide by two. Proportionality profiles are a way to show which parties are advantaged and which are disadvantaged. Volatility of votes from one election to the next can be measured the same way as the deviation from PR.