G. E. Moore
William H. Shaw (ed.)
- Published in print:
- 2005
- Published Online:
- February 2006
- ISBN:
- 9780199272013
- eISBN:
- 9780191603181
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0199272018.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, History of Philosophy
This book is a new edition of G.E. Moore’s Ethics, originally published in 1912. In it, Moore analyzes the utilitarian account of right and wrong in great detail, defending the doctrine that results ...
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This book is a new edition of G.E. Moore’s Ethics, originally published in 1912. In it, Moore analyzes the utilitarian account of right and wrong in great detail, defending the doctrine that results are the test of right and wrong while rejecting utilitarianism’s hedonistic value theory. The book argues at length against attitudinal accounts of right and wrong, which threaten to undermine the objectivity or moral judgements. It also has important things to say about intrinsic value, free will, the motives of actions, and many other topics. Although Moore’s 1903 Principia Ethica has overshadowed it, Ethics is a rich text that displays great philosophical skill and intellectual candour, and merits careful study in its own right. Moore himself always regarded the book favourably. Thirty years after its publication, he wrote, ‘I myself like [it] better than Principia Ethica, because it seems to me to be much clearer and far less full of confusions and invalid arguments’. This edition of Ethics includes Moore’s essay, ‘The Nature of Moral Philosophy’. It also contains an introduction by the editor, notes on the text, a brief chronology of Moore’s life, an index, and suggestions for further reading.Less
This book is a new edition of G.E. Moore’s Ethics, originally published in 1912. In it, Moore analyzes the utilitarian account of right and wrong in great detail, defending the doctrine that results are the test of right and wrong while rejecting utilitarianism’s hedonistic value theory. The book argues at length against attitudinal accounts of right and wrong, which threaten to undermine the objectivity or moral judgements. It also has important things to say about intrinsic value, free will, the motives of actions, and many other topics. Although Moore’s 1903 Principia Ethica has overshadowed it, Ethics is a rich text that displays great philosophical skill and intellectual candour, and merits careful study in its own right. Moore himself always regarded the book favourably. Thirty years after its publication, he wrote, ‘I myself like [it] better than Principia Ethica, because it seems to me to be much clearer and far less full of confusions and invalid arguments’. This edition of Ethics includes Moore’s essay, ‘The Nature of Moral Philosophy’. It also contains an introduction by the editor, notes on the text, a brief chronology of Moore’s life, an index, and suggestions for further reading.
Florian Waszak, Anne Springer, and Wolfgang Prinz
- Published in print:
- 2010
- Published Online:
- May 2010
- ISBN:
- 9780195391381
- eISBN:
- 9780199776894
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195391381.003.0010
- Subject:
- Psychology, Cognitive Neuroscience, Social Psychology
Human action serves two complementary purposes. On the one hand, actions are meant to achieve desired effects in the environment. On the other hand, people act as a consequence of external events, ...
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Human action serves two complementary purposes. On the one hand, actions are meant to achieve desired effects in the environment. On the other hand, people act as a consequence of external events, trying to accommodate to environmental demands. While the former type of action is usually referred to as “voluntary,” “goal-directed,” or “intention-based,” the latter is often conceptualized as “response,” “reaction,” or “stimulus-based.” At the same time, the concepts of intention- and stimulus-based action control are inseparably interwoven. Although intention-based actions by definition rely on intentions, the planning process also needs to consider stimulus information from the agent’s actual environment. Similarly, although stimulus-based actions are triggered by external stimuli from the environment, stimulus information is not a sufficient condition for the execution of the action: to respond to the external information in the appropriate way, it rather needs to be complemented by an intentional set. In this chapter, we address theoretical and experimental approaches to the cognitive underpinnings of action control. We outline current theories of human action control and review experimental paradigms addressing this issue by comparing intention-based and stimulus-based actions or by investigating the interference between both types of action control. Finally, we discuss the function of the self within the proposed cognitive framework. For this purpose, we link the action control theories under discussion to cross-cultural and social-psychological evidence suggesting that individuals differ in self-regulatory performance depending on their social orientation—that is, how they define the self in connection to other people. We will claim that research on self-control can profit from cognitive research on action control because both fields deal with situations in which automatic behavioral tendencies need to be controlled and adjusted to the individual’s goals and desires, for example, losing weight, abstaining from alcohol, cigarettes or drugs, or avoiding violent and aggressive reactions to others. In turn, to understand from a cognitive perspective why people fail to withstand predominant responses to the environment, and, on the other hand, how they can successfully regulate their behavior can be viewed as a substantial part of understanding self-control.Less
Human action serves two complementary purposes. On the one hand, actions are meant to achieve desired effects in the environment. On the other hand, people act as a consequence of external events, trying to accommodate to environmental demands. While the former type of action is usually referred to as “voluntary,” “goal-directed,” or “intention-based,” the latter is often conceptualized as “response,” “reaction,” or “stimulus-based.” At the same time, the concepts of intention- and stimulus-based action control are inseparably interwoven. Although intention-based actions by definition rely on intentions, the planning process also needs to consider stimulus information from the agent’s actual environment. Similarly, although stimulus-based actions are triggered by external stimuli from the environment, stimulus information is not a sufficient condition for the execution of the action: to respond to the external information in the appropriate way, it rather needs to be complemented by an intentional set. In this chapter, we address theoretical and experimental approaches to the cognitive underpinnings of action control. We outline current theories of human action control and review experimental paradigms addressing this issue by comparing intention-based and stimulus-based actions or by investigating the interference between both types of action control. Finally, we discuss the function of the self within the proposed cognitive framework. For this purpose, we link the action control theories under discussion to cross-cultural and social-psychological evidence suggesting that individuals differ in self-regulatory performance depending on their social orientation—that is, how they define the self in connection to other people. We will claim that research on self-control can profit from cognitive research on action control because both fields deal with situations in which automatic behavioral tendencies need to be controlled and adjusted to the individual’s goals and desires, for example, losing weight, abstaining from alcohol, cigarettes or drugs, or avoiding violent and aggressive reactions to others. In turn, to understand from a cognitive perspective why people fail to withstand predominant responses to the environment, and, on the other hand, how they can successfully regulate their behavior can be viewed as a substantial part of understanding self-control.
Gideon Yaffe
- Published in print:
- 2010
- Published Online:
- January 2011
- ISBN:
- 9780195381641
- eISBN:
- 9780199864911
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195381641.003.0017
- Subject:
- Psychology, Cognitive Psychology
This chapter explains the meaning and explores the historical sources of the voluntary act requirement in law. It argues that in many ways, even incorporating Libet's discoveries, there is no reason ...
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This chapter explains the meaning and explores the historical sources of the voluntary act requirement in law. It argues that in many ways, even incorporating Libet's discoveries, there is no reason to think that defendants generally fail to match the picture we find in the law. It suggests how further empirical work can help us to develop clarity on the question.Less
This chapter explains the meaning and explores the historical sources of the voluntary act requirement in law. It argues that in many ways, even incorporating Libet's discoveries, there is no reason to think that defendants generally fail to match the picture we find in the law. It suggests how further empirical work can help us to develop clarity on the question.
G. E. Moore
- Published in print:
- 2005
- Published Online:
- February 2006
- ISBN:
- 9780199272013
- eISBN:
- 9780191603181
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0199272018.003.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, History of Philosophy
This chapter and the one that follows analyze and elucidate the normative structure of utilitarianism. Although Moore did not consider himself a utilitarian, it becomes evident as the book proceeds ...
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This chapter and the one that follows analyze and elucidate the normative structure of utilitarianism. Although Moore did not consider himself a utilitarian, it becomes evident as the book proceeds that he accepts utilitarianism’s consequentialist account of right and wrong despite rejecting its hedonistic value theory. These opening chapters are a model of analytic exposition as Moore lays out utilitarianism’s theoretical commitments and contrasts various distinct but closely related normative theses. Moore expounds the utilitarian theory with far greater precision than the classical utilitarian thinkers ever achieved.Less
This chapter and the one that follows analyze and elucidate the normative structure of utilitarianism. Although Moore did not consider himself a utilitarian, it becomes evident as the book proceeds that he accepts utilitarianism’s consequentialist account of right and wrong despite rejecting its hedonistic value theory. These opening chapters are a model of analytic exposition as Moore lays out utilitarianism’s theoretical commitments and contrasts various distinct but closely related normative theses. Moore expounds the utilitarian theory with far greater precision than the classical utilitarian thinkers ever achieved.
Bernard J. Baars
- Published in print:
- 1997
- Published Online:
- May 2009
- ISBN:
- 9780195102659
- eISBN:
- 9780199864126
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195102659.003.0007
- Subject:
- Neuroscience, Sensory and Motor Systems, Behavioral Neuroscience
This chapter examines volition using the same approach that seemed to work for consciousness. That is, it asks: can we find examples of very similar voluntary and nonvoluntary actions that are ...
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This chapter examines volition using the same approach that seemed to work for consciousness. That is, it asks: can we find examples of very similar voluntary and nonvoluntary actions that are experienced as profoundly different? Can we find phenomenal contrasts? It is shown that the answer is a clear “yes”.Less
This chapter examines volition using the same approach that seemed to work for consciousness. That is, it asks: can we find examples of very similar voluntary and nonvoluntary actions that are experienced as profoundly different? Can we find phenomenal contrasts? It is shown that the answer is a clear “yes”.
Brian Davies
- Published in print:
- 1993
- Published Online:
- November 2003
- ISBN:
- 9780198267539
- eISBN:
- 9780191600500
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0198267533.003.0011
- Subject:
- Religion, Theology
Thomas Aquinas maintains that we share in the life of the Trinity as human beings, and in order to grasp the implications of that notion, this chapter examines what he thinks human beings are. First, ...
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Thomas Aquinas maintains that we share in the life of the Trinity as human beings, and in order to grasp the implications of that notion, this chapter examines what he thinks human beings are. First, it looks at the concepts of Dualism (Descartes’ view that people are composed of a separate mind and body) and Physicalism (which says that people are made up of one kind of matter – or body – and that this includes the mind, or mental processes), and concludes that Aquinas occupied a viewpoint between these two extremes. Next, it looks at the position that he held on people as having both soul and body, which he does not treat as distinct things, but nevertheless feels obliged to distinguish. Following on from this, Aquinas’ thinking on death and the soul is examined. The last part of the chapter looks at desire and action; here, Aquinas is shown to treat human action both as voluntary (free) and as occurring on the basis of dispositions, which are determined by past events and by choice.Less
Thomas Aquinas maintains that we share in the life of the Trinity as human beings, and in order to grasp the implications of that notion, this chapter examines what he thinks human beings are. First, it looks at the concepts of Dualism (Descartes’ view that people are composed of a separate mind and body) and Physicalism (which says that people are made up of one kind of matter – or body – and that this includes the mind, or mental processes), and concludes that Aquinas occupied a viewpoint between these two extremes. Next, it looks at the position that he held on people as having both soul and body, which he does not treat as distinct things, but nevertheless feels obliged to distinguish. Following on from this, Aquinas’ thinking on death and the soul is examined. The last part of the chapter looks at desire and action; here, Aquinas is shown to treat human action both as voluntary (free) and as occurring on the basis of dispositions, which are determined by past events and by choice.
Pat Thane and Tanya Evans
- Published in print:
- 2012
- Published Online:
- September 2012
- ISBN:
- 9780199578504
- eISBN:
- 9780191741838
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199578504.001.0001
- Subject:
- History, Cultural History
This is the first attempt to describe the real lives of unmarried mothers, and attitudes to them, in England from the First World War to the present. We focus on England because the legal position, ...
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This is the first attempt to describe the real lives of unmarried mothers, and attitudes to them, in England from the First World War to the present. We focus on England because the legal position, and other circumstances, of unmarried mothers were often very different elsewhere in Britain. It uses women’s own life stories, among many other sources, to challenge stereotypes of the mothers as all desolate women, rejected by society and by their families, until social attitudes were transformed in the ‘permissive’ 1960s. It shows the diversity of their lives, their social backgrounds, and how often they were supported by their families, neighbours, and the fathers of their children before the 1960s, and continuing hostility by some sections of society since then. It challenges stereotypes, too, about the impact of war on sexual behaviour and about the stability of family life before the 1960s. Much of the evidence comes from the records of the National Council for the Unmarried Mother and Her Child, set up by prominent people in 1918 to help a social group they believed were neglected, and which is still very active today, as Gingerbread, supporting all lone parents who need them. Their work tells us not only about the lives of those mothers and children who had no other support but also another important story about the vibrancy of voluntary action throughout the past century and its continuing vital role, working alongside and in cooperation with the Welfare State to help mothers into work among other things. Their history is an inspiring example of how, throughout the past century, voluntary organizations in the ‘Big Society’ worked with, not against, the ‘Big State’.Less
This is the first attempt to describe the real lives of unmarried mothers, and attitudes to them, in England from the First World War to the present. We focus on England because the legal position, and other circumstances, of unmarried mothers were often very different elsewhere in Britain. It uses women’s own life stories, among many other sources, to challenge stereotypes of the mothers as all desolate women, rejected by society and by their families, until social attitudes were transformed in the ‘permissive’ 1960s. It shows the diversity of their lives, their social backgrounds, and how often they were supported by their families, neighbours, and the fathers of their children before the 1960s, and continuing hostility by some sections of society since then. It challenges stereotypes, too, about the impact of war on sexual behaviour and about the stability of family life before the 1960s. Much of the evidence comes from the records of the National Council for the Unmarried Mother and Her Child, set up by prominent people in 1918 to help a social group they believed were neglected, and which is still very active today, as Gingerbread, supporting all lone parents who need them. Their work tells us not only about the lives of those mothers and children who had no other support but also another important story about the vibrancy of voluntary action throughout the past century and its continuing vital role, working alongside and in cooperation with the Welfare State to help mothers into work among other things. Their history is an inspiring example of how, throughout the past century, voluntary organizations in the ‘Big Society’ worked with, not against, the ‘Big State’.
Michael S. Moore
- Published in print:
- 2010
- Published Online:
- September 2010
- ISBN:
- 9780199599509
- eISBN:
- 9780191594656
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199599509.001.0001
- Subject:
- Law, Philosophy of Law, Constitutional and Administrative Law
This book seeks illumination of three aspects of Anglo-American criminal law by the philosophy of action. These are, first, the general requirement that an accused perform some voluntary act before ...
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This book seeks illumination of three aspects of Anglo-American criminal law by the philosophy of action. These are, first, the general requirement that an accused perform some voluntary act before he can be convicted of crime; second, that that voluntary act have the properties marking it as one of the kinds of acts prohibited by statute, what lawyers call the ‘actus reus’ of crimes; and third, the double jeopardy requirement that no one should be prosecuted or punished more than once for doing but one act instantiating but one offence. These three requirements are seen as part of the ‘general part’ of the criminal law, the part that applies to all crimes and that gives the criminal law a unified structure. As such they aid both the efficient drafting of a criminal code by the legislature and the application/interpretation of criminal codes by courts. The theory of action defended in the book – and from which illumination of the criminal law is sought – in a version of the family of theories known as causal theories of action. The thesis is that actions are those bodily movements caused by volitions when those volitions have those movements as their object, and nothing else. The criminal law's voluntary act requirement is then seen as the requirement that there be such an act. Omissions, states a person is in, thoughts, and involuntary bodily movements such as reflex reactions, are not acts by such a causal theory. The criminal law's actus reus requirement is seen as the requirement that a voluntary act must possess those causal or other properties definitive of the types of action prohibited by a criminal code. And the criminal law's double jeopardy requirements is seen as a conjunctive requirement: first, that no one be punished for the same kind of action, where the identity of act-types is governed by the kinds of acts morality makes wrong; unless the actor did that act more than once, where the identity of act-tokens is governed by the theory of action defended throughout the book. The philosophy of action illuminates the criminal law in these three ways because of certain moral theses, which the book also defends; that criminal liability both does and should track moral responsibility; that moral responsibility exists principally for what we do rather than for who we are, what we think, or what we fail to prevent; that actions causing harms are more blameworthy than actions that only risk or attempt such harms; and that punishment should be in proposition to the number and degree of wrong(s) done.Less
This book seeks illumination of three aspects of Anglo-American criminal law by the philosophy of action. These are, first, the general requirement that an accused perform some voluntary act before he can be convicted of crime; second, that that voluntary act have the properties marking it as one of the kinds of acts prohibited by statute, what lawyers call the ‘actus reus’ of crimes; and third, the double jeopardy requirement that no one should be prosecuted or punished more than once for doing but one act instantiating but one offence. These three requirements are seen as part of the ‘general part’ of the criminal law, the part that applies to all crimes and that gives the criminal law a unified structure. As such they aid both the efficient drafting of a criminal code by the legislature and the application/interpretation of criminal codes by courts. The theory of action defended in the book – and from which illumination of the criminal law is sought – in a version of the family of theories known as causal theories of action. The thesis is that actions are those bodily movements caused by volitions when those volitions have those movements as their object, and nothing else. The criminal law's voluntary act requirement is then seen as the requirement that there be such an act. Omissions, states a person is in, thoughts, and involuntary bodily movements such as reflex reactions, are not acts by such a causal theory. The criminal law's actus reus requirement is seen as the requirement that a voluntary act must possess those causal or other properties definitive of the types of action prohibited by a criminal code. And the criminal law's double jeopardy requirements is seen as a conjunctive requirement: first, that no one be punished for the same kind of action, where the identity of act-types is governed by the kinds of acts morality makes wrong; unless the actor did that act more than once, where the identity of act-tokens is governed by the theory of action defended throughout the book. The philosophy of action illuminates the criminal law in these three ways because of certain moral theses, which the book also defends; that criminal liability both does and should track moral responsibility; that moral responsibility exists principally for what we do rather than for who we are, what we think, or what we fail to prevent; that actions causing harms are more blameworthy than actions that only risk or attempt such harms; and that punishment should be in proposition to the number and degree of wrong(s) done.
John Offer
- Published in print:
- 2006
- Published Online:
- March 2012
- ISBN:
- 9781861345318
- eISBN:
- 9781447301455
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Policy Press
- DOI:
- 10.1332/policypress/9781861345318.003.0008
- Subject:
- Social Work, Social Policy
This chapter addresses idealism and non-idealism as properties of social theories about voluntary action. It also pays attention to idealist and non-idealist social thought in voluntary organisations ...
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This chapter addresses idealism and non-idealism as properties of social theories about voluntary action. It also pays attention to idealist and non-idealist social thought in voluntary organisations themselves and their purposes. The pro-state idealist social thought in ‘official’ or governmental circles concerning the perceived role of and relationships with voluntary action, and the changes in such thought and in government relationships with voluntary action in the 1970s are then explained. Next, the chapter considers the innovation of classifying voluntary organisations by the kind of social theory they profess in their own ‘mission statements’ and suggests this is helpful in considering voluntary action and the ‘third way’. It examines new approaches to the study of voluntary action in social life, sensitive to the theoretical orientations of all of the parties concerned. It is clear that the framework could not have been constructed unless the three assumptions presented had been abandoned.Less
This chapter addresses idealism and non-idealism as properties of social theories about voluntary action. It also pays attention to idealist and non-idealist social thought in voluntary organisations themselves and their purposes. The pro-state idealist social thought in ‘official’ or governmental circles concerning the perceived role of and relationships with voluntary action, and the changes in such thought and in government relationships with voluntary action in the 1970s are then explained. Next, the chapter considers the innovation of classifying voluntary organisations by the kind of social theory they profess in their own ‘mission statements’ and suggests this is helpful in considering voluntary action and the ‘third way’. It examines new approaches to the study of voluntary action in social life, sensitive to the theoretical orientations of all of the parties concerned. It is clear that the framework could not have been constructed unless the three assumptions presented had been abandoned.
Pat Thane and Tanya Evans
- Published in print:
- 2012
- Published Online:
- September 2012
- ISBN:
- 9780199578504
- eISBN:
- 9780191741838
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199578504.003.0002
- Subject:
- History, Cultural History
Points out how many ‘illegitimate’ children were born between the 1830s and 1930s, but that we don't know how many stayed with their mothers. It outlines the variety of ways they stayed together: for ...
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Points out how many ‘illegitimate’ children were born between the 1830s and 1930s, but that we don't know how many stayed with their mothers. It outlines the variety of ways they stayed together: for example, a child being brought up by grandparents believing they were its parents and their journey of discovery until the shock of finding out. The surprising extent of secret cohabitation because divorce was difficult, and its social acceptability if the families behaved respectably. Increased illegitimacy during the First World War and the moral panic that resulted. Foundation of the National Council for the Unmarried Mother and Her Child (NC) to protect mothers and children. Problems of survival of poor mothers and children with support from their families or the fathers, forcing some to have their children adopted.Less
Points out how many ‘illegitimate’ children were born between the 1830s and 1930s, but that we don't know how many stayed with their mothers. It outlines the variety of ways they stayed together: for example, a child being brought up by grandparents believing they were its parents and their journey of discovery until the shock of finding out. The surprising extent of secret cohabitation because divorce was difficult, and its social acceptability if the families behaved respectably. Increased illegitimacy during the First World War and the moral panic that resulted. Foundation of the National Council for the Unmarried Mother and Her Child (NC) to protect mothers and children. Problems of survival of poor mothers and children with support from their families or the fathers, forcing some to have their children adopted.
Pat Thane and Tanya Evans
- Published in print:
- 2012
- Published Online:
- September 2012
- ISBN:
- 9780199578504
- eISBN:
- 9780191741838
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199578504.003.0004
- Subject:
- History, Cultural History
‘Illegitimacy’ increased again during the Second World War, causing another moral panic about rampant sexuality among young people. Official statistics showed reality: pre-marital pregnancy was ...
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‘Illegitimacy’ increased again during the Second World War, causing another moral panic about rampant sexuality among young people. Official statistics showed reality: pre-marital pregnancy was common before the war, but absence of fathers at war prevented many marriages, leading to more unmarried motherhood. Different experiences of civilian mothers, war workers, and pregnant servicewomen. Problems of mixed-race babies. Inadequacy of public services when families couldn't or wouldn't help. NC and other voluntary agencies vital and called on by the state to help. New services introduced, leading to permanent improvements in welfare after the war. Individual wartime life stories: a woman civil servant supported by her family and colleagues, other women rejected; Eric Clapton discovers his ‘mother’ is his grandmother, his ‘sister’ his mother. Traumatic for him.Less
‘Illegitimacy’ increased again during the Second World War, causing another moral panic about rampant sexuality among young people. Official statistics showed reality: pre-marital pregnancy was common before the war, but absence of fathers at war prevented many marriages, leading to more unmarried motherhood. Different experiences of civilian mothers, war workers, and pregnant servicewomen. Problems of mixed-race babies. Inadequacy of public services when families couldn't or wouldn't help. NC and other voluntary agencies vital and called on by the state to help. New services introduced, leading to permanent improvements in welfare after the war. Individual wartime life stories: a woman civil servant supported by her family and colleagues, other women rejected; Eric Clapton discovers his ‘mother’ is his grandmother, his ‘sister’ his mother. Traumatic for him.
Pat Thane and Tanya Evans
- Published in print:
- 2012
- Published Online:
- September 2012
- ISBN:
- 9780199578504
- eISBN:
- 9780191741838
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199578504.003.0006
- Subject:
- History, Cultural History
Real improvements for poorer unmarried mothers in the Welfare State created by the post-war Labour Government, building on the wartime experience of inadequate public services for mothers and ...
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Real improvements for poorer unmarried mothers in the Welfare State created by the post-war Labour Government, building on the wartime experience of inadequate public services for mothers and children. The new NHS brought safer childbirth. Benefits improved, but housing was hard to find and they were often excluded from council housing. Many voluntary Mother and Baby Homes remained grim and women avoided them where possible, but they gradually improved. The NC worked with state agencies to bring about these improvements and to help mothers negotiate the benefit system and to train for and find work, as most mothers wanted. Many were better educated and more confident than before the war. Most lived on their earnings and/or help from the father or their family. NC also helped mothers of children whose father was an overseas serviceman who had returned home and women who had babies by British servicemen abroad.Less
Real improvements for poorer unmarried mothers in the Welfare State created by the post-war Labour Government, building on the wartime experience of inadequate public services for mothers and children. The new NHS brought safer childbirth. Benefits improved, but housing was hard to find and they were often excluded from council housing. Many voluntary Mother and Baby Homes remained grim and women avoided them where possible, but they gradually improved. The NC worked with state agencies to bring about these improvements and to help mothers negotiate the benefit system and to train for and find work, as most mothers wanted. Many were better educated and more confident than before the war. Most lived on their earnings and/or help from the father or their family. NC also helped mothers of children whose father was an overseas serviceman who had returned home and women who had babies by British servicemen abroad.
G. E. Moore
- Published in print:
- 2005
- Published Online:
- February 2006
- ISBN:
- 9780199272013
- eISBN:
- 9780191603181
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0199272018.003.0003
- Subject:
- Philosophy, History of Philosophy
Moore maintains that, in principle, there is an objective answer to questions of right and wrong. More specifically, that a particular action cannot be both right and wrong, either at the same time ...
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Moore maintains that, in principle, there is an objective answer to questions of right and wrong. More specifically, that a particular action cannot be both right and wrong, either at the same time or at different times. In this chapter and the next, Moore argues against theories that deny this latter proposition and thus reject the objectivity of moral judgments. Beginning with a critique of the thesis that when one asserts that an action is right or wrong, one is merely asserting that one has a certain feeling towards it, this chapter focuses its critical fire on various attitudinal theories of ethics.Less
Moore maintains that, in principle, there is an objective answer to questions of right and wrong. More specifically, that a particular action cannot be both right and wrong, either at the same time or at different times. In this chapter and the next, Moore argues against theories that deny this latter proposition and thus reject the objectivity of moral judgments. Beginning with a critique of the thesis that when one asserts that an action is right or wrong, one is merely asserting that one has a certain feeling towards it, this chapter focuses its critical fire on various attitudinal theories of ethics.
Pat Thane and Tanya Evans
- Published in print:
- 2012
- Published Online:
- September 2012
- ISBN:
- 9780199578504
- eISBN:
- 9780191741838
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199578504.003.0001
- Subject:
- History, Cultural History
The Introduction introduces two main themes; first, the experiences of and attitudes to unmarried mothers and their children in twentieth-century England stressing the diversity of those experiences ...
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The Introduction introduces two main themes; first, the experiences of and attitudes to unmarried mothers and their children in twentieth-century England stressing the diversity of those experiences at all times and challenging stereotypes about the mothers and about the history of the family. Secondly, the history of a voluntary organization, established in 1918 as the National Council for the Unmarried Mother and Her Child, still active as Gingerbread, stressing it as an example of the continuing importance of voluntary action in the Welfare State and that voluntary and state welfare have always been complementary in their provision for unmarried mothers and children as in many other areas. They have not been antagonistic as much ‘Big Society’ rhetoric suggests.Less
The Introduction introduces two main themes; first, the experiences of and attitudes to unmarried mothers and their children in twentieth-century England stressing the diversity of those experiences at all times and challenging stereotypes about the mothers and about the history of the family. Secondly, the history of a voluntary organization, established in 1918 as the National Council for the Unmarried Mother and Her Child, still active as Gingerbread, stressing it as an example of the continuing importance of voluntary action in the Welfare State and that voluntary and state welfare have always been complementary in their provision for unmarried mothers and children as in many other areas. They have not been antagonistic as much ‘Big Society’ rhetoric suggests.
Stephen Shute and Andrew Simester (eds)
- Published in print:
- 2002
- Published Online:
- January 2010
- ISBN:
- 9780199243495
- eISBN:
- 9780191714177
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199243495.001.0001
- Subject:
- Law, Criminal Law and Criminology
Written by philosophers and lawyers from the United States and the United Kingdom, this collection of original essays offers new insights into the doctrines that make up the general part of the ...
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Written by philosophers and lawyers from the United States and the United Kingdom, this collection of original essays offers new insights into the doctrines that make up the general part of the criminal law. It sheds theoretical light on the diversity and unity of the general part and advances our understanding of such key issues as criminalisation, omissions, voluntary actions, knowledge, belief, reckelssness, duress, self-defence, entrapment and officially-induced mistake of law.Less
Written by philosophers and lawyers from the United States and the United Kingdom, this collection of original essays offers new insights into the doctrines that make up the general part of the criminal law. It sheds theoretical light on the diversity and unity of the general part and advances our understanding of such key issues as criminalisation, omissions, voluntary actions, knowledge, belief, reckelssness, duress, self-defence, entrapment and officially-induced mistake of law.
W.F.R. Hardie
- Published in print:
- 1980
- Published Online:
- October 2011
- ISBN:
- 9780198246329
- eISBN:
- 9780191680953
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198246329.003.0008
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Ancient Philosophy, Moral Philosophy
At the beginning of Book III, Aristotle gives reasons for discussing the distinction between the ‘voluntary’ (hekousion) and the ‘involuntary’. To say that some action was done, some effect produced, ...
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At the beginning of Book III, Aristotle gives reasons for discussing the distinction between the ‘voluntary’ (hekousion) and the ‘involuntary’. To say that some action was done, some effect produced, ‘voluntarily’ normally implies that there was an ‘intention’ to produce it. At Chapter 2 of the EN, the difference of meaning between ‘voluntary’ and hekousion can be seen. When one says of someone that he did something ‘involuntarily’, one conveys that some result that he produced was not intended. When one says that he did what he did ‘unwillingly’, one conveys that the result was intended but not desired.Less
At the beginning of Book III, Aristotle gives reasons for discussing the distinction between the ‘voluntary’ (hekousion) and the ‘involuntary’. To say that some action was done, some effect produced, ‘voluntarily’ normally implies that there was an ‘intention’ to produce it. At Chapter 2 of the EN, the difference of meaning between ‘voluntary’ and hekousion can be seen. When one says of someone that he did something ‘involuntarily’, one conveys that some result that he produced was not intended. When one says that he did what he did ‘unwillingly’, one conveys that the result was intended but not desired.
Jose Harris
- Published in print:
- 1997
- Published Online:
- October 2011
- ISBN:
- 9780198206859
- eISBN:
- 9780191677335
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198206859.003.0019
- Subject:
- History, British and Irish Modern History, Social History
In the years that followed, Beveridge was elected to the House of Commons. Later, the new Labour Government began the process of implementing Beveridge's proposals that provided the basis of the ...
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In the years that followed, Beveridge was elected to the House of Commons. Later, the new Labour Government began the process of implementing Beveridge's proposals that provided the basis of the modern welfare state. Beveridge created Baron Beveridge of Tuggal and eventually became leader of the Liberals in the House of Lords. Despite the rapidly changing character of post-war society, Beveridge's views on social policy continued to attract a good deal of popular attention throughout his old age, both in Britain and abroad. He visited different places and was regularly consulted by federal and provincial officials on social reconstruction. Beveridge's forays into public debate continued for the rest of his life; and, despite his exclusion from the inner circles of governments, the benchmark of ‘Beveridge’ continued to exercise a powerful constraint over the boundaries of social policy for many years after the war.Less
In the years that followed, Beveridge was elected to the House of Commons. Later, the new Labour Government began the process of implementing Beveridge's proposals that provided the basis of the modern welfare state. Beveridge created Baron Beveridge of Tuggal and eventually became leader of the Liberals in the House of Lords. Despite the rapidly changing character of post-war society, Beveridge's views on social policy continued to attract a good deal of popular attention throughout his old age, both in Britain and abroad. He visited different places and was regularly consulted by federal and provincial officials on social reconstruction. Beveridge's forays into public debate continued for the rest of his life; and, despite his exclusion from the inner circles of governments, the benchmark of ‘Beveridge’ continued to exercise a powerful constraint over the boundaries of social policy for many years after the war.
Daniel M. Wegner (ed.)
- Published in print:
- 2017
- Published Online:
- September 2018
- ISBN:
- 9780262534925
- eISBN:
- 9780262344876
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- The MIT Press
- DOI:
- 10.7551/mitpress/9780262534925.003.0002
- Subject:
- Psychology, Cognitive Psychology
This chapter explores the anatomical and temporal origins of the experience of will. It examines issues of where the will arises by considering first the anatomy of voluntary action—how it differs ...
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This chapter explores the anatomical and temporal origins of the experience of will. It examines issues of where the will arises by considering first the anatomy of voluntary action—how it differs from involuntary action and where in the body it appears to arise. The chapter then moves on to the sensation of effort in the muscles and mind during action to learn how the perception of the body influences the experience of will, and then looks directly at the brain sources of voluntary action through studies of brain stimulation. These anatomical travels are supplemented by a temporal itinerary, an examination of the time course of events in mind and body as voluntary actions are produced.Less
This chapter explores the anatomical and temporal origins of the experience of will. It examines issues of where the will arises by considering first the anatomy of voluntary action—how it differs from involuntary action and where in the body it appears to arise. The chapter then moves on to the sensation of effort in the muscles and mind during action to learn how the perception of the body influences the experience of will, and then looks directly at the brain sources of voluntary action through studies of brain stimulation. These anatomical travels are supplemented by a temporal itinerary, an examination of the time course of events in mind and body as voluntary actions are produced.
Rose Lindsey, John Mohan, Sarah Bulloch, and Elizabeth Metcalfe
- Published in print:
- 2018
- Published Online:
- January 2019
- ISBN:
- 9781447324836
- eISBN:
- 9781447324850
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Policy Press
- DOI:
- 10.1332/policypress/9781447324836.003.0008
- Subject:
- Sociology, Organizations
This chapter reviews existing research on attitudes to voluntary action. Despite the importance of this topic, public attitudes have received even less consistent consideration over time than ...
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This chapter reviews existing research on attitudes to voluntary action. Despite the importance of this topic, public attitudes have received even less consistent consideration over time than voluntary action itself. This chapter summarises information from the National Survey of Volunteering (1981 and 1991) and the British Social Attitudes Surveys (from the 1990s) on the virtues of voluntarism, and the relationship between voluntary action and government policy. However, given the later gaps in the statistical record, the emphasis in the chapter is firmly upon two key Mass Observation Project directives, implemented 16 years apart, in 1996 and 2012. Writers have a strong sense of where the boundary should lie between statutory responsibility and voluntary initiative; and demonstrate particular concerns of and criticisms about the use of volunteers to substitute for paid staff, and to undercut the position of the lowest-paid members of society. Writers also discuss strong concerns about the ways in which governments take the contribution of volunteers for granted, leading to scepticism about individual and community capacities to take on further social responsibilities. We argue that the rationales on which appeals for greater voluntary effort are made are crucial to the success of these appeals.Less
This chapter reviews existing research on attitudes to voluntary action. Despite the importance of this topic, public attitudes have received even less consistent consideration over time than voluntary action itself. This chapter summarises information from the National Survey of Volunteering (1981 and 1991) and the British Social Attitudes Surveys (from the 1990s) on the virtues of voluntarism, and the relationship between voluntary action and government policy. However, given the later gaps in the statistical record, the emphasis in the chapter is firmly upon two key Mass Observation Project directives, implemented 16 years apart, in 1996 and 2012. Writers have a strong sense of where the boundary should lie between statutory responsibility and voluntary initiative; and demonstrate particular concerns of and criticisms about the use of volunteers to substitute for paid staff, and to undercut the position of the lowest-paid members of society. Writers also discuss strong concerns about the ways in which governments take the contribution of volunteers for granted, leading to scepticism about individual and community capacities to take on further social responsibilities. We argue that the rationales on which appeals for greater voluntary effort are made are crucial to the success of these appeals.
Ezequiel Morsella, Tanaz Molapour, and Margaret T. Lynn
- Published in print:
- 2013
- Published Online:
- September 2013
- ISBN:
- 9780199988341
- eISBN:
- 9780199346295
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199988341.003.0018
- Subject:
- Psychology, Cognitive Psychology, Developmental Psychology
This chapter tackles the problem of volition from an inductive (instead of deductive) and descriptive (instead of normative) approach. In this “bottom-up” approach, a distinction is made between the ...
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This chapter tackles the problem of volition from an inductive (instead of deductive) and descriptive (instead of normative) approach. In this “bottom-up” approach, a distinction is made between the high-level properties of human voluntary action and its necessary basic components—the building blocks that are necessary for voluntary action to exist. First reviewed are the documented properties of voluntary processes, including high-level cognitions such as the sense of agency (that is, the sense that the self is responsible for the occurrence of a physical or mental act) and less intuitive properties, including distortions in time perception and the ability to influence that which enters attentional awareness. The chapter then examines how the instantiation of voluntary action rests on three primary components: The phenomenal state (the most basic form of conscious awareness), ideomotor processing (a form of action control), and the skeletal muscle output system (the only effector in the body that is controlled voluntarily). We conclude by discussing how the interdependences among these three components provide a unique insight into the mechanisms of voluntary action and the nature of human agency.Less
This chapter tackles the problem of volition from an inductive (instead of deductive) and descriptive (instead of normative) approach. In this “bottom-up” approach, a distinction is made between the high-level properties of human voluntary action and its necessary basic components—the building blocks that are necessary for voluntary action to exist. First reviewed are the documented properties of voluntary processes, including high-level cognitions such as the sense of agency (that is, the sense that the self is responsible for the occurrence of a physical or mental act) and less intuitive properties, including distortions in time perception and the ability to influence that which enters attentional awareness. The chapter then examines how the instantiation of voluntary action rests on three primary components: The phenomenal state (the most basic form of conscious awareness), ideomotor processing (a form of action control), and the skeletal muscle output system (the only effector in the body that is controlled voluntarily). We conclude by discussing how the interdependences among these three components provide a unique insight into the mechanisms of voluntary action and the nature of human agency.
