Jonathan Jacobs
- Published in print:
- 2010
- Published Online:
- September 2010
- ISBN:
- 9780199542833
- eISBN:
- 9780191594359
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199542833.001.0001
- Subject:
- Religion, Judaism
This is a study of the key features of the moral psychology and metaethics of three important medieval Jewish philosophers, Saadia Gaon, Bahya ibn Pakuda, and Moses Maimonides. They are selected ...
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This is a study of the key features of the moral psychology and metaethics of three important medieval Jewish philosophers, Saadia Gaon, Bahya ibn Pakuda, and Moses Maimonides. They are selected because of the depth and subtlety of their thought and because of their relevance to central, enduring issues in moral philosophy. The book examines their views of freedom of the will, the virtues, the rationality of moral requirements, and the relation between rational justification and revelation. Their appropriations of Neoplatonic and Aristotelian thought are explicated, showing how their theistic commitments make crucial differences to moral psychology and moral epistemology. All three thinkers developed rationalistic philosophies and sought to show how Judaism does not include doctrines in conflict with reason. Maimonides receives the fullest attention, given that he articulated the most systematic and influential accounts of the main issues. While explicating the main claims and arguments of these thinkers, the book also shows the respects in which their thought remains relevant to several important issues and debates in moral philosophy. These thinkers' views of ‘the reasons of the commandments’ (in Torah) include resources for a sophisticated moral epistemology of tradition. The points of contact and contrast between medieval Jewish moral thought and the practical wisdom approach to moral theory and also natural law approaches are examined in detail.Less
This is a study of the key features of the moral psychology and metaethics of three important medieval Jewish philosophers, Saadia Gaon, Bahya ibn Pakuda, and Moses Maimonides. They are selected because of the depth and subtlety of their thought and because of their relevance to central, enduring issues in moral philosophy. The book examines their views of freedom of the will, the virtues, the rationality of moral requirements, and the relation between rational justification and revelation. Their appropriations of Neoplatonic and Aristotelian thought are explicated, showing how their theistic commitments make crucial differences to moral psychology and moral epistemology. All three thinkers developed rationalistic philosophies and sought to show how Judaism does not include doctrines in conflict with reason. Maimonides receives the fullest attention, given that he articulated the most systematic and influential accounts of the main issues. While explicating the main claims and arguments of these thinkers, the book also shows the respects in which their thought remains relevant to several important issues and debates in moral philosophy. These thinkers' views of ‘the reasons of the commandments’ (in Torah) include resources for a sophisticated moral epistemology of tradition. The points of contact and contrast between medieval Jewish moral thought and the practical wisdom approach to moral theory and also natural law approaches are examined in detail.
Ben Brice
- Published in print:
- 2007
- Published Online:
- January 2008
- ISBN:
- 9780199290253
- eISBN:
- 9780191710483
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199290253.001.0001
- Subject:
- Literature, 19th-century Literature and Romanticism
Coleridge tended to view objects in the natural world as if they were capable of articulating truths about his own poetic psyche. He also regarded such objects as if they were capable of illustrating ...
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Coleridge tended to view objects in the natural world as if they were capable of articulating truths about his own poetic psyche. He also regarded such objects as if they were capable of illustrating and embodying truths about a transcendent spiritual realm. After 1805, he posited a series of analogical ‘likenesses’ connecting the rational principles that inform human cognition with the rational principles that he believed informed the teleological structure of the natural world. Although he intuitively felt that nature had been constructed as a ‘mirror’ of the human mind, and that both mind and nature were ‘mirrors’ of a transcendent spiritual realm, he never found an explanation of such experiences that was fully immune to his own sceptical doubts. This book examines the nature of these doubts, and offers a new explanatory account of why Coleridge was unable to affirm his religious intuitions. The book situates his work within two important intellectual traditions. The first — a tradition of epistemological ‘piety’ or ‘modesty’ — informs the work of key precursors such as Kant, Hume, Locke, Boyle, and Calvin, and relates to Protestant critiques of natural reason. The second — a tradition of theological voluntarism — emphasizes the omnipotence and transcendence of God, as well as the arbitrary relationship subsisting between God and the created world. It is argued that Coleridge's familiarity with both of these interrelated intellectual traditions undermined his confidence in his ability to read the symbolic language of God in nature.Less
Coleridge tended to view objects in the natural world as if they were capable of articulating truths about his own poetic psyche. He also regarded such objects as if they were capable of illustrating and embodying truths about a transcendent spiritual realm. After 1805, he posited a series of analogical ‘likenesses’ connecting the rational principles that inform human cognition with the rational principles that he believed informed the teleological structure of the natural world. Although he intuitively felt that nature had been constructed as a ‘mirror’ of the human mind, and that both mind and nature were ‘mirrors’ of a transcendent spiritual realm, he never found an explanation of such experiences that was fully immune to his own sceptical doubts. This book examines the nature of these doubts, and offers a new explanatory account of why Coleridge was unable to affirm his religious intuitions. The book situates his work within two important intellectual traditions. The first — a tradition of epistemological ‘piety’ or ‘modesty’ — informs the work of key precursors such as Kant, Hume, Locke, Boyle, and Calvin, and relates to Protestant critiques of natural reason. The second — a tradition of theological voluntarism — emphasizes the omnipotence and transcendence of God, as well as the arbitrary relationship subsisting between God and the created world. It is argued that Coleridge's familiarity with both of these interrelated intellectual traditions undermined his confidence in his ability to read the symbolic language of God in nature.
Frank Prochaska
- Published in print:
- 2008
- Published Online:
- January 2010
- ISBN:
- 9780199539796
- eISBN:
- 9780191713460
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199539796.001.0001
- Subject:
- History, British and Irish Modern History
This book examines the importance of Christianity as an inspiration for political and social behaviour in the nineteenth century, and the forces that undermined both religion and charity in the ...
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This book examines the importance of Christianity as an inspiration for political and social behaviour in the nineteenth century, and the forces that undermined both religion and charity in the twentieth. The waning of religion and the growth of government responsibility for social provision were closely intertwined. The book shows how the creation of the modern British state undermined religious belief and customs of associational citizenship. Through a study of four areas of social provision – education, visiting, infant welfare, and nursing – it unravels the complex evolving relationship between voluntarism and the state, and poses a new interpretation of Christian decline and the development of democratic traditions in Britain.Less
This book examines the importance of Christianity as an inspiration for political and social behaviour in the nineteenth century, and the forces that undermined both religion and charity in the twentieth. The waning of religion and the growth of government responsibility for social provision were closely intertwined. The book shows how the creation of the modern British state undermined religious belief and customs of associational citizenship. Through a study of four areas of social provision – education, visiting, infant welfare, and nursing – it unravels the complex evolving relationship between voluntarism and the state, and poses a new interpretation of Christian decline and the development of democratic traditions in Britain.
Paul Whiteley, Patrick Seyd, and Antony Billinghurst
- Published in print:
- 2006
- Published Online:
- September 2006
- ISBN:
- 9780199242825
- eISBN:
- 9780191604140
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0199242828.003.0004
- Subject:
- Political Science, UK Politics
This chapter examines the pathways to Liberal Democrat Party membership. The recruitment process is discussed, followed by what it means for the average respondent to be a party member. The key issue ...
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This chapter examines the pathways to Liberal Democrat Party membership. The recruitment process is discussed, followed by what it means for the average respondent to be a party member. The key issue of why people join the party is then considered. In examining motives for joining, two theoretical models of political participation are utilized: the civic voluntarism model and the general incentives model. Both resources and choices are important in explaining why people join the party. Members have more resources in the sense of higher incomes, better educational attainments, and higher status class characteristics than voters, but incentives are also important for influencing the decision to join the party. Thus, both models appear to be relevant in explaining why people join.Less
This chapter examines the pathways to Liberal Democrat Party membership. The recruitment process is discussed, followed by what it means for the average respondent to be a party member. The key issue of why people join the party is then considered. In examining motives for joining, two theoretical models of political participation are utilized: the civic voluntarism model and the general incentives model. Both resources and choices are important in explaining why people join the party. Members have more resources in the sense of higher incomes, better educational attainments, and higher status class characteristics than voters, but incentives are also important for influencing the decision to join the party. Thus, both models appear to be relevant in explaining why people join.
Walter Ott
- Published in print:
- 2009
- Published Online:
- September 2009
- ISBN:
- 9780199570430
- eISBN:
- 9780191722394
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199570430.003.0023
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology, Philosophy of Science
Any attempt to resuscitate the powers of created beings, and hence the bottom‐up picture, must navigate between two obstacles. On one side lies occultism: given ontological mechanism, there seems no ...
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Any attempt to resuscitate the powers of created beings, and hence the bottom‐up picture, must navigate between two obstacles. On one side lies occultism: given ontological mechanism, there seems no place for powers in nature, and nothing for them to do even if there were. On the other lurks voluntarism: if God is directly responsible for the distribution of motion, the bottom‐up view has been sacrificed, and the supervenience base of the powers of bodies must include more than their intrinsic properties. This chapter gathers up the threads of the previous ones to show precisely how Locke finds his own path between these two pitfalls.Less
Any attempt to resuscitate the powers of created beings, and hence the bottom‐up picture, must navigate between two obstacles. On one side lies occultism: given ontological mechanism, there seems no place for powers in nature, and nothing for them to do even if there were. On the other lurks voluntarism: if God is directly responsible for the distribution of motion, the bottom‐up view has been sacrificed, and the supervenience base of the powers of bodies must include more than their intrinsic properties. This chapter gathers up the threads of the previous ones to show precisely how Locke finds his own path between these two pitfalls.
Matthias Steup (ed.)
- Published in print:
- 2001
- Published Online:
- November 2003
- ISBN:
- 9780195128925
- eISBN:
- 9780199833764
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0195128923.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology
Gathers 11 new and 3 previously published essays, all of which bear on questions having to do with epistemic justification, responsibility, and virtue. In the Introduction, Steup provides a summary ...
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Gathers 11 new and 3 previously published essays, all of which bear on questions having to do with epistemic justification, responsibility, and virtue. In the Introduction, Steup provides a summary of each of the essays as well as a brief account of his defense of doxastic involuntarism. In the first part of the volume – Epistemic Duty and the Normativity of Justification – Susan Haack discusses the ethics of belief, Bruce Russell explores the distinction between subjective and objective justification and its relevance to the analysis of knowledge, and Richard Fumerton questions the normativity of justification. In the second part – Epistemic Deontology and Doxastic Voluntarism – Robert Audi, Richard Feldman, and Carl Ginet discuss whether belief is, as is commonly supposed, involuntary, and whether its involuntariness is an obstacle to conceiving of epistemic justification in terms of duty fulfillment. In the third part – Epistemic Deontology and the Internality of Justification – Alvin Goldman subjects internalism, the view that justifiers must be internal to the mind, to a penetrating critique, and Matthias Steup defends internalism against Goldman's criticism. The papers in part four – Justification and Truth – address the question of how justification is related to truth as the epistemic goal. Marian David examines various strategies of linking epistemic justification to the truth goal and highlights the way in which they fail, and Michael DePaul argues that since we value knowledge more than mere true belief, truth cannot be our sole epistemic goal. The papers in the fifth section – Epistemic Virtue and Criteria of Justified Belief – explore the question of whether we can derive criteria of knowledge and justified belief without falling into circularity or succumbing to skepticism. Ernest Sosa proposes virtue perspectivism as a response to skepticism, and Noah Lemos defends the commonsense approach of G. E. Moore. The concluding papers in part six – Beyond Deontology – make a case for orienting epistemological inquiry in a new direction. Vrinda Dalmiya argues that focus on the knowing self motivates a care‐based version of virtue epistemology, and Linda Zagzebski proposes that virtue epistemology is particularly well suited for analyzing the neglected concept of understanding.Less
Gathers 11 new and 3 previously published essays, all of which bear on questions having to do with epistemic justification, responsibility, and virtue. In the Introduction, Steup provides a summary of each of the essays as well as a brief account of his defense of doxastic involuntarism. In the first part of the volume – Epistemic Duty and the Normativity of Justification – Susan Haack discusses the ethics of belief, Bruce Russell explores the distinction between subjective and objective justification and its relevance to the analysis of knowledge, and Richard Fumerton questions the normativity of justification. In the second part – Epistemic Deontology and Doxastic Voluntarism – Robert Audi, Richard Feldman, and Carl Ginet discuss whether belief is, as is commonly supposed, involuntary, and whether its involuntariness is an obstacle to conceiving of epistemic justification in terms of duty fulfillment. In the third part – Epistemic Deontology and the Internality of Justification – Alvin Goldman subjects internalism, the view that justifiers must be internal to the mind, to a penetrating critique, and Matthias Steup defends internalism against Goldman's criticism. The papers in part four – Justification and Truth – address the question of how justification is related to truth as the epistemic goal. Marian David examines various strategies of linking epistemic justification to the truth goal and highlights the way in which they fail, and Michael DePaul argues that since we value knowledge more than mere true belief, truth cannot be our sole epistemic goal. The papers in the fifth section – Epistemic Virtue and Criteria of Justified Belief – explore the question of whether we can derive criteria of knowledge and justified belief without falling into circularity or succumbing to skepticism. Ernest Sosa proposes virtue perspectivism as a response to skepticism, and Noah Lemos defends the commonsense approach of G. E. Moore. The concluding papers in part six – Beyond Deontology – make a case for orienting epistemological inquiry in a new direction. Vrinda Dalmiya argues that focus on the knowing self motivates a care‐based version of virtue epistemology, and Linda Zagzebski proposes that virtue epistemology is particularly well suited for analyzing the neglected concept of understanding.
Richard Dean
- Published in print:
- 2006
- Published Online:
- September 2006
- ISBN:
- 9780199285723
- eISBN:
- 9780191603938
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0199285721.003.0012
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Moral Philosophy
This chapter makes three large-scale points about the positions developed in the book. First, it explains that taking good will as an end in itself is consistent with Jerome Schneewind’s emphasis on ...
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This chapter makes three large-scale points about the positions developed in the book. First, it explains that taking good will as an end in itself is consistent with Jerome Schneewind’s emphasis on the historical context of Kant’s revolutionary moral insights. In particular, Kant’s opposition to voluntarism or divine command theory fits with the good will reading. The second point is that of all the possible readings of the humanity formulation, the least justified is the one which takes the mere power of choice or Willkür to be the end in itself. The third point is just a final emphasis on the role of humanity in Kant’s moral theory, that Kant not only takes humanity to be an object of moral concern, but also a moral ideal toward which we should strive continuously.Less
This chapter makes three large-scale points about the positions developed in the book. First, it explains that taking good will as an end in itself is consistent with Jerome Schneewind’s emphasis on the historical context of Kant’s revolutionary moral insights. In particular, Kant’s opposition to voluntarism or divine command theory fits with the good will reading. The second point is that of all the possible readings of the humanity formulation, the least justified is the one which takes the mere power of choice or Willkür to be the end in itself. The third point is just a final emphasis on the role of humanity in Kant’s moral theory, that Kant not only takes humanity to be an object of moral concern, but also a moral ideal toward which we should strive continuously.
Michelle Kosch
- Published in print:
- 2006
- Published Online:
- September 2006
- ISBN:
- 9780199289110
- eISBN:
- 9780191604003
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0199289115.003.0005
- Subject:
- Philosophy, History of Philosophy
This chapter examines the post-1809 change in Schelling’s view of the system-freedom problem, shows the change to arise from consideration of the problem of freedom for evil, and introduces the main ...
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This chapter examines the post-1809 change in Schelling’s view of the system-freedom problem, shows the change to arise from consideration of the problem of freedom for evil, and introduces the main ideas of the late positive philosophy.Less
This chapter examines the post-1809 change in Schelling’s view of the system-freedom problem, shows the change to arise from consideration of the problem of freedom for evil, and introduces the main ideas of the late positive philosophy.
Michelle Kosch
- Published in print:
- 2006
- Published Online:
- September 2006
- ISBN:
- 9780199289110
- eISBN:
- 9780191604003
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0199289115.003.0008
- Subject:
- Philosophy, History of Philosophy
This chapter outlines Kierkegaard’s account of Christian belief and the foundations of Christian ethics, and his positive account of moral agency.
This chapter outlines Kierkegaard’s account of Christian belief and the foundations of Christian ethics, and his positive account of moral agency.
David Pears
- Published in print:
- 2006
- Published Online:
- January 2007
- ISBN:
- 9780199247707
- eISBN:
- 9780191714481
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199247707.003.0004
- Subject:
- Philosophy, History of Philosophy
Wittgenstein's anthropocentric treatment of logic is more difficult to accept, and even understand, than his anthropocentric treatment of the regular application of general words. There are also two ...
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Wittgenstein's anthropocentric treatment of logic is more difficult to accept, and even understand, than his anthropocentric treatment of the regular application of general words. There are also two further reasons for the greater difficulty of his account of logical necessity. One is that its Conventionalism, with its strong hint of artificiality, steals the limelight, while its Voluntarism, which has no such implication, stands behind it in the shadows and fails to cancel the implication of capriciousness. The other, more general, reason is that both his Conventionalism and his Voluntarism seem to be inconsistent with his rejection of all theorizing in philosophy. These two stumbling-blocks are connected in a way that will be explained, and their importance will be shown in the detailed exposition of his account of logical necessity.Less
Wittgenstein's anthropocentric treatment of logic is more difficult to accept, and even understand, than his anthropocentric treatment of the regular application of general words. There are also two further reasons for the greater difficulty of his account of logical necessity. One is that its Conventionalism, with its strong hint of artificiality, steals the limelight, while its Voluntarism, which has no such implication, stands behind it in the shadows and fails to cancel the implication of capriciousness. The other, more general, reason is that both his Conventionalism and his Voluntarism seem to be inconsistent with his rejection of all theorizing in philosophy. These two stumbling-blocks are connected in a way that will be explained, and their importance will be shown in the detailed exposition of his account of logical necessity.
Lynn Davidman
- Published in print:
- 2007
- Published Online:
- January 2007
- ISBN:
- 9780195305418
- eISBN:
- 9780199785094
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195305418.003.0003
- Subject:
- Religion, Religion and Society
This essay is based on 30 open-ended interviews with Jews in the Northeast who do not belong to synagogues. Unsynagogued Jews present an interesting challenge to the general sociological tradition ...
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This essay is based on 30 open-ended interviews with Jews in the Northeast who do not belong to synagogues. Unsynagogued Jews present an interesting challenge to the general sociological tradition which sees ascription and choice as disparate ways of constructing a sense of self. These Jews clearly affirmed their understanding (consistent with the contemporary “new voluntarism” perspective) that religious association and practice are a matter of choice. Nevertheless, they also claimed that they have no choice about being Jewish; it is a matter of ascription. In practicing Judaism in everyday life, they creatively drew upon traditional symbols and practices to enact Jewish rituals in their own creative, syncretic ways. These unsynagogued Jews suggest that studies of contemporary religion should pay attention to practice as well as belief.Less
This essay is based on 30 open-ended interviews with Jews in the Northeast who do not belong to synagogues. Unsynagogued Jews present an interesting challenge to the general sociological tradition which sees ascription and choice as disparate ways of constructing a sense of self. These Jews clearly affirmed their understanding (consistent with the contemporary “new voluntarism” perspective) that religious association and practice are a matter of choice. Nevertheless, they also claimed that they have no choice about being Jewish; it is a matter of ascription. In practicing Judaism in everyday life, they creatively drew upon traditional symbols and practices to enact Jewish rituals in their own creative, syncretic ways. These unsynagogued Jews suggest that studies of contemporary religion should pay attention to practice as well as belief.
Samuel Scheffler
- Published in print:
- 2002
- Published Online:
- November 2003
- ISBN:
- 9780199257676
- eISBN:
- 9780191600197
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0199257671.003.0004
- Subject:
- Political Science, Political Theory
Scheffler's main aim in this essay is to explore the nature of ‘associative duties’—the special duties that participants in close personal relationships and members of significant social groups are ...
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Scheffler's main aim in this essay is to explore the nature of ‘associative duties’—the special duties that participants in close personal relationships and members of significant social groups are thought to have to one another. These duties occupy a central position in common‐sense moral thinking, even though their precise content is often unclear. Scheffler considers two objections to associative duties: the voluntarist objection, rooted in an ideal of freedom and autonomy; and the distributive objection, rooted in a principle of equality. Like associative duties themselves, the values of freedom and equality exert genuine authority within common‐sense moral thought, and so there are deep internal conflicts in our thinking about the extent of our responsibilities to different individuals and groups.Less
Scheffler's main aim in this essay is to explore the nature of ‘associative duties’—the special duties that participants in close personal relationships and members of significant social groups are thought to have to one another. These duties occupy a central position in common‐sense moral thinking, even though their precise content is often unclear. Scheffler considers two objections to associative duties: the voluntarist objection, rooted in an ideal of freedom and autonomy; and the distributive objection, rooted in a principle of equality. Like associative duties themselves, the values of freedom and equality exert genuine authority within common‐sense moral thought, and so there are deep internal conflicts in our thinking about the extent of our responsibilities to different individuals and groups.
Samuel Scheffler
- Published in print:
- 2002
- Published Online:
- November 2003
- ISBN:
- 9780199257676
- eISBN:
- 9780191600197
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0199257671.003.0007
- Subject:
- Political Science, Political Theory
In opposition to the voluntarist view that special responsibilities must be based on consent or some other voluntary act, this essay sketches a non‐reductionist account of such responsibilities. The ...
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In opposition to the voluntarist view that special responsibilities must be based on consent or some other voluntary act, this essay sketches a non‐reductionist account of such responsibilities. The non‐reductionist account begins with the idea that to value non‐instrumentally one's relationship to another person is to see that person's needs, interests, and desires as providing one with reasons for action and thus, in effect, to see the relationship as a source of special responsibilities. Scheffler then argues that one's relationships to other people do in fact give rise to special responsibilities when they are relationships that one has reason to value. Towards the end of the essay, he considers how a non‐reductionist might respond to two objections to special responsibilities, the voluntarist objection and the distributive objection. In meeting both objections, the non‐reductionist could concede that there are other moral values in addition to special responsibilities while still maintaining that special responsibilities must be part of any adequate moral scheme.Less
In opposition to the voluntarist view that special responsibilities must be based on consent or some other voluntary act, this essay sketches a non‐reductionist account of such responsibilities. The non‐reductionist account begins with the idea that to value non‐instrumentally one's relationship to another person is to see that person's needs, interests, and desires as providing one with reasons for action and thus, in effect, to see the relationship as a source of special responsibilities. Scheffler then argues that one's relationships to other people do in fact give rise to special responsibilities when they are relationships that one has reason to value. Towards the end of the essay, he considers how a non‐reductionist might respond to two objections to special responsibilities, the voluntarist objection and the distributive objection. In meeting both objections, the non‐reductionist could concede that there are other moral values in addition to special responsibilities while still maintaining that special responsibilities must be part of any adequate moral scheme.
Harold D. Clarke, David Sanders, Marianne C. Stewart, and Paul Whiteley
- Published in print:
- 2004
- Published Online:
- November 2004
- ISBN:
- 9780199244881
- eISBN:
- 9780191601521
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/019924488X.003.0007
- Subject:
- Political Science, UK Politics
Uses confirmatory factor analysis to locate electoral participation in a broader matrix of political activities, and presents alternative theoretical models that might be used to explain the decline ...
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Uses confirmatory factor analysis to locate electoral participation in a broader matrix of political activities, and presents alternative theoretical models that might be used to explain the decline in electoral turnout in Britain and other mature democracies. The relative deprivation or equity-fairness model stresses the gap between what an individual expects and what s/he gets out of life. The civic voluntarism model focuses on the resources that individuals bring to bear on the decision to vote or not and the mobilization efforts that are made by other actors. The social capital model emphasizes social trust and the individual’s involvement with social organizations. The cognitive mobilization model highlights the role of political interest, political knowledge, and media usage. Finally, the general incentives model supplements a broadly defined Downsian-style cost-benefit analysis with variables that take account of a variety of other incentives, such as ‘doing one’s democratic duty’.Less
Uses confirmatory factor analysis to locate electoral participation in a broader matrix of political activities, and presents alternative theoretical models that might be used to explain the decline in electoral turnout in Britain and other mature democracies. The relative deprivation or equity-fairness model stresses the gap between what an individual expects and what s/he gets out of life. The civic voluntarism model focuses on the resources that individuals bring to bear on the decision to vote or not and the mobilization efforts that are made by other actors. The social capital model emphasizes social trust and the individual’s involvement with social organizations. The cognitive mobilization model highlights the role of political interest, political knowledge, and media usage. Finally, the general incentives model supplements a broadly defined Downsian-style cost-benefit analysis with variables that take account of a variety of other incentives, such as ‘doing one’s democratic duty’.
Mark C. Murphy
- Published in print:
- 2011
- Published Online:
- January 2012
- ISBN:
- 9780199693665
- eISBN:
- 9780191732010
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199693665.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Religion, Moral Philosophy
There has been a revival in theistic ethics within mainstream contemporary moral philosophy. The characteristic methodology of this revival is to proceed by asking whether there are features of moral ...
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There has been a revival in theistic ethics within mainstream contemporary moral philosophy. The characteristic methodology of this revival is to proceed by asking whether there are features of moral norms that can be adequately explained only if we hold that such norms have some sort of theistic foundation. But this methodology, fruitful as it has been, is one-sided. This book proceeds not from the side of the moral norms, so to speak, but from the God side of things: what sort of explanatory relationship should we expect between God and moral norms given the existence of the God of orthodox theism? This question asks whether orthodox theism's conception of God as an absolutely perfect being militates in favor of a particular view of the explanation of morality by appeal to theistic facts. This book puts this methodology to work and shows that, surprisingly, the two dominant theistic accounts of morality — natural law theory and theological voluntarism (divine command theory) — fail to offer the sort of explanation of morality that we would expect given the existence of the God of orthodox theism. Drawing on the discussion of a structurally similar problem — that of the relationship between God and the laws of nature — a third, more adequate account of the relationship between God and morality is articulated, one in which facts about God and facts about nature cooperate in the explanation of moral law.Less
There has been a revival in theistic ethics within mainstream contemporary moral philosophy. The characteristic methodology of this revival is to proceed by asking whether there are features of moral norms that can be adequately explained only if we hold that such norms have some sort of theistic foundation. But this methodology, fruitful as it has been, is one-sided. This book proceeds not from the side of the moral norms, so to speak, but from the God side of things: what sort of explanatory relationship should we expect between God and moral norms given the existence of the God of orthodox theism? This question asks whether orthodox theism's conception of God as an absolutely perfect being militates in favor of a particular view of the explanation of morality by appeal to theistic facts. This book puts this methodology to work and shows that, surprisingly, the two dominant theistic accounts of morality — natural law theory and theological voluntarism (divine command theory) — fail to offer the sort of explanation of morality that we would expect given the existence of the God of orthodox theism. Drawing on the discussion of a structurally similar problem — that of the relationship between God and the laws of nature — a third, more adequate account of the relationship between God and morality is articulated, one in which facts about God and facts about nature cooperate in the explanation of moral law.
John Bishop
- Published in print:
- 2007
- Published Online:
- May 2007
- ISBN:
- 9780199205547
- eISBN:
- 9780191709432
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199205547.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Religion
Can it be justifiable to commit oneself ‘by faith’ to a religious claim when its truth lacks adequate support from one's total available evidence? After critiquing both Wittgensteinian and Reformed ...
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Can it be justifiable to commit oneself ‘by faith’ to a religious claim when its truth lacks adequate support from one's total available evidence? After critiquing both Wittgensteinian and Reformed epistemologies of religious belief, this book defends a modest fideism that understands theistic commitment as involving ‘doxastic venture’ in the face of evidential ambiguity: practical commitment to propositions held to be true through ‘passional’ causes (causes other than the recognition of evidence of or for their truth). It is argued that the justifiability of religious faith-ventures is ultimately a moral issue — although such ventures can be morally justifiable only if they accord with the proper exercise of our rational epistemic capacities. The book canvasses issues concerning the ethics of belief and doxastic voluntarism. William James's ‘justification of faith’ in The Will to Believe is extended by requiring that justifiable faith-ventures should be morally acceptable both in motivation and content. The book conducts an extended debate between fideists and ‘hard line’ evidentialists, who maintain that religious faith-ventures are never justifiable. It concludes that, although neither fideists nor evidentialists can succeed in establishing their opponents' irrationality, fideism may nevertheless be morally preferable, as a less dogmatic, more self-accepting, even a more loving, position than its evidentialist rival.Less
Can it be justifiable to commit oneself ‘by faith’ to a religious claim when its truth lacks adequate support from one's total available evidence? After critiquing both Wittgensteinian and Reformed epistemologies of religious belief, this book defends a modest fideism that understands theistic commitment as involving ‘doxastic venture’ in the face of evidential ambiguity: practical commitment to propositions held to be true through ‘passional’ causes (causes other than the recognition of evidence of or for their truth). It is argued that the justifiability of religious faith-ventures is ultimately a moral issue — although such ventures can be morally justifiable only if they accord with the proper exercise of our rational epistemic capacities. The book canvasses issues concerning the ethics of belief and doxastic voluntarism. William James's ‘justification of faith’ in The Will to Believe is extended by requiring that justifiable faith-ventures should be morally acceptable both in motivation and content. The book conducts an extended debate between fideists and ‘hard line’ evidentialists, who maintain that religious faith-ventures are never justifiable. It concludes that, although neither fideists nor evidentialists can succeed in establishing their opponents' irrationality, fideism may nevertheless be morally preferable, as a less dogmatic, more self-accepting, even a more loving, position than its evidentialist rival.
John Bishop
- Published in print:
- 2007
- Published Online:
- May 2007
- ISBN:
- 9780199205547
- eISBN:
- 9780191709432
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199205547.003.0002
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Religion
This chapter argues that reflective believers' concern is ultimately not just for the epistemic, but for the moral justifiability of their taking faith-beliefs to be true. In response to the doxastic ...
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This chapter argues that reflective believers' concern is ultimately not just for the epistemic, but for the moral justifiability of their taking faith-beliefs to be true. In response to the doxastic voluntarism this seems to imply, it is argued that control in relation to beliefs is exercised at two ‘loci’: indirect control over what we hold to be true, and direct control over what we take to be true in our practical reasoning. This latter is open to moral evaluation whenever the actions to which such reasoning can lead are morally significant. This condition is met in the case of theistic faith-beliefs, which pervasively influence how people live. We therefore need an ethics of belief, or better, of faith-commitment that specifies the conditions under which it is morally permissible to commit oneself practically to the truth of a theistic (or any other) faith-belief.Less
This chapter argues that reflective believers' concern is ultimately not just for the epistemic, but for the moral justifiability of their taking faith-beliefs to be true. In response to the doxastic voluntarism this seems to imply, it is argued that control in relation to beliefs is exercised at two ‘loci’: indirect control over what we hold to be true, and direct control over what we take to be true in our practical reasoning. This latter is open to moral evaluation whenever the actions to which such reasoning can lead are morally significant. This condition is met in the case of theistic faith-beliefs, which pervasively influence how people live. We therefore need an ethics of belief, or better, of faith-commitment that specifies the conditions under which it is morally permissible to commit oneself practically to the truth of a theistic (or any other) faith-belief.
Gerald McKenny
- Published in print:
- 2010
- Published Online:
- May 2010
- ISBN:
- 9780199582679
- eISBN:
- 9780191722981
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199582679.003.0007
- Subject:
- Religion, Theology
How and by whom is it decided which among the possible courses of action available to the agent in a situation of choice is the one that God commands? This question is made both difficult and urgent ...
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How and by whom is it decided which among the possible courses of action available to the agent in a situation of choice is the one that God commands? This question is made both difficult and urgent by Barth's rejection of casuistry, that is, the rational procedure of specifying a general norm drawn from scripture, reason, or tradition in light of particular circumstances. Barth argues that the command of God comes to us already specified and calls only for our obedience. He seems thereby to deny that there are any rational constraints on what God might command or on what we might take to be God's command. This chapter examines Barth's portrayal of the encounter of human beings with the command of God as a prayerful hearing that includes the rational evaluation of possible courses of action and is preceded by instruction which offers approximate knowledge of what God will command based on the revealed history of God's encounter with humanity.Less
How and by whom is it decided which among the possible courses of action available to the agent in a situation of choice is the one that God commands? This question is made both difficult and urgent by Barth's rejection of casuistry, that is, the rational procedure of specifying a general norm drawn from scripture, reason, or tradition in light of particular circumstances. Barth argues that the command of God comes to us already specified and calls only for our obedience. He seems thereby to deny that there are any rational constraints on what God might command or on what we might take to be God's command. This chapter examines Barth's portrayal of the encounter of human beings with the command of God as a prayerful hearing that includes the rational evaluation of possible courses of action and is preceded by instruction which offers approximate knowledge of what God will command based on the revealed history of God's encounter with humanity.
Jonathan Jacobs
- Published in print:
- 2010
- Published Online:
- September 2010
- ISBN:
- 9780199542833
- eISBN:
- 9780191594359
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199542833.003.0006
- Subject:
- Religion, Judaism
This is a brief discussion of some specific issues of pronounced concern to medieval Jewish thinkers. These include the relation between moral requirements and moral ideals, and also the conception ...
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This is a brief discussion of some specific issues of pronounced concern to medieval Jewish thinkers. These include the relation between moral requirements and moral ideals, and also the conception of morality as based upon divine command. The discussion indicates how some of the medieval approaches to these issues differ from influential modern formulations, and it suggests some respects in which the older understandings have considerable merit. In particular, it is shown how the medievals held that a tradition could be rational even though the justifications for some elements of it are not evident to us. In contrast to much modern moral thought, these thinkers did not insist on a requirement's justification being evident as a condition for accepting it as a requirement. In their view, it is sometimes necessary to fulfil requirements in order to be able to ascertain their justifications.Less
This is a brief discussion of some specific issues of pronounced concern to medieval Jewish thinkers. These include the relation between moral requirements and moral ideals, and also the conception of morality as based upon divine command. The discussion indicates how some of the medieval approaches to these issues differ from influential modern formulations, and it suggests some respects in which the older understandings have considerable merit. In particular, it is shown how the medievals held that a tradition could be rational even though the justifications for some elements of it are not evident to us. In contrast to much modern moral thought, these thinkers did not insist on a requirement's justification being evident as a condition for accepting it as a requirement. In their view, it is sometimes necessary to fulfil requirements in order to be able to ascertain their justifications.
Matthew Hilton and James McKay (eds)
- Published in print:
- 2011
- Published Online:
- January 2013
- ISBN:
- 9780197264829
- eISBN:
- 9780191754036
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- British Academy
- DOI:
- 10.5871/bacad/9780197264829.001.0001
- Subject:
- History, British and Irish Modern History
This book provides the historical background to the rise of the Big Society, surveying the history of voluntarism over the last century. Politicians and commentators have long bemoaned the supposed ...
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This book provides the historical background to the rise of the Big Society, surveying the history of voluntarism over the last century. Politicians and commentators have long bemoaned the supposed decline of civic life, fretting about its health and its future. In fact, the real story of voluntarism over the last hundred years has not been decline, but constant evolution and change. Whether we use the terms charity, philanthropy, civil society, non-governmental organisations, the third sector or the Big Society, voluntary endeavour is one of the most vibrant and dynamic areas of British public life. The scholars featured in this collection show how the voluntary sector's role in society, and its relationship with the state, has constantly adapted to its surroundings. Volumtary groups have raised new agendas, tackled old problems in new ways, acted as alternatives to statutory provision and as catalysts for further government action. They have emerged out of citizens' concerns, independent of government, and yet have remained willing to work with politicians of all persuasions. By surveying the sheer extent and diversity of the sector since the start of the First World War, the book demonstrates that voluntarism not only continues to thrive, but is also far larger than any political agenda that may be imposed upon it.Less
This book provides the historical background to the rise of the Big Society, surveying the history of voluntarism over the last century. Politicians and commentators have long bemoaned the supposed decline of civic life, fretting about its health and its future. In fact, the real story of voluntarism over the last hundred years has not been decline, but constant evolution and change. Whether we use the terms charity, philanthropy, civil society, non-governmental organisations, the third sector or the Big Society, voluntary endeavour is one of the most vibrant and dynamic areas of British public life. The scholars featured in this collection show how the voluntary sector's role in society, and its relationship with the state, has constantly adapted to its surroundings. Volumtary groups have raised new agendas, tackled old problems in new ways, acted as alternatives to statutory provision and as catalysts for further government action. They have emerged out of citizens' concerns, independent of government, and yet have remained willing to work with politicians of all persuasions. By surveying the sheer extent and diversity of the sector since the start of the First World War, the book demonstrates that voluntarism not only continues to thrive, but is also far larger than any political agenda that may be imposed upon it.
