E. J. Lowe
- Published in print:
- 2008
- Published Online:
- January 2009
- ISBN:
- 9780199217144
- eISBN:
- 9780191712418
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199217144.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind, Metaphysics/Epistemology
This book has two Parts. Part I prepares the ground for this theory of rational free action by seeking to undermine the threat that physicalism presents to it. This it does this by challenging the ...
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This book has two Parts. Part I prepares the ground for this theory of rational free action by seeking to undermine the threat that physicalism presents to it. This it does this by challenging the cogency of the causal closure argument for physicalism in all of its forms. It shows that a dualistic philosophy of mind — one which holds that human mental states and their subjects cannot simply be identified with bodily states and human bodies respectively — is both metaphysically coherent and entirely consistent with known empirical facts concerning mental causation and causation in the physical domain. Part II defends a middle path between classical agent causalism and volitionism. It accords to volitions the status of basic actions, maintains that these are free and spontaneous exercises of the two-way power of the will, performed in the light of reason, and contends that agents are the causal source of all change in the world — with rational, free agents like ourselves having a special place in the causal order as unmoved movers, or initiators of new causal chains. Rather than accepting the notion of event causation as perfectly legitimate in the inanimate domain and representing agent causation as a sui generis phenomenon restricted to rational beings, in which an agent as such is a cause, it holds that all causation is causation by agents, but that agents can only cause things to happen by acting in suitable ways. And it says that what is special about rational agents is that they possess a distinctively rational power — the power of will or choice. It also defends a thoroughgoing externalism regarding reasons for action, holding these to be mind-independent worldly entities rather than the beliefs and desires of agents.Less
This book has two Parts. Part I prepares the ground for this theory of rational free action by seeking to undermine the threat that physicalism presents to it. This it does this by challenging the cogency of the causal closure argument for physicalism in all of its forms. It shows that a dualistic philosophy of mind — one which holds that human mental states and their subjects cannot simply be identified with bodily states and human bodies respectively — is both metaphysically coherent and entirely consistent with known empirical facts concerning mental causation and causation in the physical domain. Part II defends a middle path between classical agent causalism and volitionism. It accords to volitions the status of basic actions, maintains that these are free and spontaneous exercises of the two-way power of the will, performed in the light of reason, and contends that agents are the causal source of all change in the world — with rational, free agents like ourselves having a special place in the causal order as unmoved movers, or initiators of new causal chains. Rather than accepting the notion of event causation as perfectly legitimate in the inanimate domain and representing agent causation as a sui generis phenomenon restricted to rational beings, in which an agent as such is a cause, it holds that all causation is causation by agents, but that agents can only cause things to happen by acting in suitable ways. And it says that what is special about rational agents is that they possess a distinctively rational power — the power of will or choice. It also defends a thoroughgoing externalism regarding reasons for action, holding these to be mind-independent worldly entities rather than the beliefs and desires of agents.
Gideon Yaffe
- Published in print:
- 2004
- Published Online:
- August 2004
- ISBN:
- 9780199268559
- eISBN:
- 9780191601415
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/019926855X.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, History of Philosophy
Manifest Activity examines Thomas Reid's efforts to provide answers to a host of traditional philosophical questions concerning the nature of the will, the powers of human beings, motivation, and the ...
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Manifest Activity examines Thomas Reid's efforts to provide answers to a host of traditional philosophical questions concerning the nature of the will, the powers of human beings, motivation, and the relation between human action and natural change. The concept of ‘active power’ stands at the centre of Reid's philosophy of action. He holds that actions are all and only the events of which some creature is the ‘efficient cause’, and he thinks a creature is the efficient cause of an event just in case it has the power to bring that event about and exerts it. Reid's conception both of human actions and changes in nature is deeply teleological. He holds that to exert a power is to direct an event towards an end, and he holds that all changes, whether actions or events in nature, flow from the exertion of power. The book explains the details of this view, Reid's reasons for holding it, and its implications to our understanding of action, agency, and our relation to the natural world.Less
Manifest Activity examines Thomas Reid's efforts to provide answers to a host of traditional philosophical questions concerning the nature of the will, the powers of human beings, motivation, and the relation between human action and natural change. The concept of ‘active power’ stands at the centre of Reid's philosophy of action. He holds that actions are all and only the events of which some creature is the ‘efficient cause’, and he thinks a creature is the efficient cause of an event just in case it has the power to bring that event about and exerts it. Reid's conception both of human actions and changes in nature is deeply teleological. He holds that to exert a power is to direct an event towards an end, and he holds that all changes, whether actions or events in nature, flow from the exertion of power. The book explains the details of this view, Reid's reasons for holding it, and its implications to our understanding of action, agency, and our relation to the natural world.
N. M. L. Nathan
- Published in print:
- 1992
- Published Online:
- October 2011
- ISBN:
- 9780198239543
- eISBN:
- 9780191679957
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198239543.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology
Beneath metaphysical problems there often lies a conflict between what we want to be true and what we believe to be true. This book shows how these conflicts can be systematically thought through, ...
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Beneath metaphysical problems there often lies a conflict between what we want to be true and what we believe to be true. This book shows how these conflicts can be systematically thought through, and proposes a resolution as a general philosophical objective. It examines in detail a set of interrelated oppositions about the freedom and the reality of the will. It shows how difficult it is to find a freedom either of decision or of action that is both an object of reflective desire and an object of rational disbelief. It also discusses conflicts about volition as such, contending that the veridicality of volitional experience is no less easy to doubt than the veridicality of our experience of colours. In this context, arguments emerge for a voluntarist theory of the self.Less
Beneath metaphysical problems there often lies a conflict between what we want to be true and what we believe to be true. This book shows how these conflicts can be systematically thought through, and proposes a resolution as a general philosophical objective. It examines in detail a set of interrelated oppositions about the freedom and the reality of the will. It shows how difficult it is to find a freedom either of decision or of action that is both an object of reflective desire and an object of rational disbelief. It also discusses conflicts about volition as such, contending that the veridicality of volitional experience is no less easy to doubt than the veridicality of our experience of colours. In this context, arguments emerge for a voluntarist theory of the self.
Nikolas Rose and Joelle M. Abi-Rached
- Published in print:
- 2013
- Published Online:
- October 2017
- ISBN:
- 9780691149608
- eISBN:
- 9781400846337
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Princeton University Press
- DOI:
- 10.23943/princeton/9780691149608.003.0001
- Subject:
- Neuroscience, Development
This introductory chapter provides an overview of the emergence of a neuromolecular vision of the brain. This means a new scale at which the brain and nervous system was conceptualized, and a new way ...
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This introductory chapter provides an overview of the emergence of a neuromolecular vision of the brain. This means a new scale at which the brain and nervous system was conceptualized, and a new way in which their activities were understood. At this molecular level, the structure and processes of the brain and central nervous system were made understandable as material processes of interaction among molecules in neurons and the synapses between them. These were conceived in terms of the biophysical, chemical, and electrical properties of their constituent parts. At this scale, in a profoundly reductionist approach, despite the recognition that there was much that could not yet be explained, there seemed nothing mysterious about the operations of the nervous system. Indeed, mental processes—cognition, emotion, volition—could be explained in entirely material ways, as the outcome of biological processes in the brain.Less
This introductory chapter provides an overview of the emergence of a neuromolecular vision of the brain. This means a new scale at which the brain and nervous system was conceptualized, and a new way in which their activities were understood. At this molecular level, the structure and processes of the brain and central nervous system were made understandable as material processes of interaction among molecules in neurons and the synapses between them. These were conceived in terms of the biophysical, chemical, and electrical properties of their constituent parts. At this scale, in a profoundly reductionist approach, despite the recognition that there was much that could not yet be explained, there seemed nothing mysterious about the operations of the nervous system. Indeed, mental processes—cognition, emotion, volition—could be explained in entirely material ways, as the outcome of biological processes in the brain.
John Bricke
- Published in print:
- 2000
- Published Online:
- October 2011
- ISBN:
- 9780198250111
- eISBN:
- 9780191681240
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198250111.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, History of Philosophy, Moral Philosophy
This is a philosophical study of the theory of mind and morality that David Hume developed in his Treatise of Human Nature and other writings. The chief elements in this theory of mind are Hume's ...
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This is a philosophical study of the theory of mind and morality that David Hume developed in his Treatise of Human Nature and other writings. The chief elements in this theory of mind are Hume's accounts of reasons for action and of the complex interrelations of desire, volition, and affection. On this basis, the book lays out and defends Hume's thoroughgoing non-cognitivist theory of moral judgement, and shows that cognitivist and standard sentimentalist readings of Hume are unsatisfactory, as are the usual interpretations of his views on the connections between morality, justice, and convention.Less
This is a philosophical study of the theory of mind and morality that David Hume developed in his Treatise of Human Nature and other writings. The chief elements in this theory of mind are Hume's accounts of reasons for action and of the complex interrelations of desire, volition, and affection. On this basis, the book lays out and defends Hume's thoroughgoing non-cognitivist theory of moral judgement, and shows that cognitivist and standard sentimentalist readings of Hume are unsatisfactory, as are the usual interpretations of his views on the connections between morality, justice, and convention.
Berent Enç
- Published in print:
- 2003
- Published Online:
- April 2005
- ISBN:
- 9780199256020
- eISBN:
- 9780191602238
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0199256020.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind
Attempts to answer the question of whether it is possible to understand agency as realized within a world construed ‘naturalistically’, that is, in terms of causal relations among events and states ...
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Attempts to answer the question of whether it is possible to understand agency as realized within a world construed ‘naturalistically’, that is, in terms of causal relations among events and states of affairs, or whether an adequate ontology requires sui generis acts that are essentially voluntary, such as volitions or agent-causation. Berent Enç defends the possibility of naturalizing agency via a causal theory of action (CTA). In doing that, he develops his key notion of basic action (Chs 2 and 3); he offers a ‘general and original’ solution to the problem of causal deviance (Ch. 4); and, he attempts to answer the objection that CTA removes the agent from the picture altogether by offering a purely causal model for the deliberative process that underlies practical reasoning (Ch. 5). Furthermore, the book discusses objections to volitional theories (Ch. 1), intentions and intentional action (Ch. 6), and the compatibility of Enç’s CTA with attractive accounts of autonomy and freedom (Ch. 7).Less
Attempts to answer the question of whether it is possible to understand agency as realized within a world construed ‘naturalistically’, that is, in terms of causal relations among events and states of affairs, or whether an adequate ontology requires sui generis acts that are essentially voluntary, such as volitions or agent-causation. Berent Enç defends the possibility of naturalizing agency via a causal theory of action (CTA). In doing that, he develops his key notion of basic action (Chs 2 and 3); he offers a ‘general and original’ solution to the problem of causal deviance (Ch. 4); and, he attempts to answer the objection that CTA removes the agent from the picture altogether by offering a purely causal model for the deliberative process that underlies practical reasoning (Ch. 5). Furthermore, the book discusses objections to volitional theories (Ch. 1), intentions and intentional action (Ch. 6), and the compatibility of Enç’s CTA with attractive accounts of autonomy and freedom (Ch. 7).
Christopher Lake
- Published in print:
- 2001
- Published Online:
- November 2003
- ISBN:
- 9780199241743
- eISBN:
- 9780191599743
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0199241740.003.0004
- Subject:
- Political Science, Political Theory
Ch. 3 moves on from the question of why responsibility matters to that of what we are responsible for. It asks what a political, rather than a metaphysical, account of responsibility demands in terms ...
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Ch. 3 moves on from the question of why responsibility matters to that of what we are responsible for. It asks what a political, rather than a metaphysical, account of responsibility demands in terms of its preconditions and assesses attributions of responsibility on the basis of claims about volition and affirmation. From there, it moves on to examine claims about responsibility, as these are made in the context of principles of equal opportunity.Less
Ch. 3 moves on from the question of why responsibility matters to that of what we are responsible for. It asks what a political, rather than a metaphysical, account of responsibility demands in terms of its preconditions and assesses attributions of responsibility on the basis of claims about volition and affirmation. From there, it moves on to examine claims about responsibility, as these are made in the context of principles of equal opportunity.
Nele De Cuyper, Hans De Witte, Moshe Krausz, Gisela Mohr, and Thomas Rigotti
- Published in print:
- 2010
- Published Online:
- September 2010
- ISBN:
- 9780199542697
- eISBN:
- 9780191715389
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199542697.003.0004
- Subject:
- Business and Management, HRM / IR
This chapter provides some core data comparing the attitudes and experiences of permanent and temporary workers on a range of outcomes. Contrary to initial assumptions, it reveals that temporary ...
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This chapter provides some core data comparing the attitudes and experiences of permanent and temporary workers on a range of outcomes. Contrary to initial assumptions, it reveals that temporary workers report more positive attitudes and outcomes than permanent workers on most variables. The chapter seeks explanations for this result. First, it explores whether different work experiences of temporary and permanent workers can explain the differences in attitudes and well‐being but finds no evidence of mediation. Secondly, it explores variations within the temporary workforce based on objective characteristics such as contract type, duration and time left before the contract ends. It finds that differences between types of temporary worker based on these characteristics are small and less than those between all types of temporary worker and permanent workers, confirming that they can sensibly be treated as a single group when compared with permanent workers. The chapter reports subjective characteristics of temporary workers including the reasons why people undertake temporary work and shows that it is mainly used as a stepping stone or arises from the difficulty of finding a permanent job. These are more frequently cited than deliberately choosing temporary work. However the subjective characteristics, including reasons for undertaking temporary work and perceived employment prospects, have little impact in explaining variations in the well‐being of temporary workers.Less
This chapter provides some core data comparing the attitudes and experiences of permanent and temporary workers on a range of outcomes. Contrary to initial assumptions, it reveals that temporary workers report more positive attitudes and outcomes than permanent workers on most variables. The chapter seeks explanations for this result. First, it explores whether different work experiences of temporary and permanent workers can explain the differences in attitudes and well‐being but finds no evidence of mediation. Secondly, it explores variations within the temporary workforce based on objective characteristics such as contract type, duration and time left before the contract ends. It finds that differences between types of temporary worker based on these characteristics are small and less than those between all types of temporary worker and permanent workers, confirming that they can sensibly be treated as a single group when compared with permanent workers. The chapter reports subjective characteristics of temporary workers including the reasons why people undertake temporary work and shows that it is mainly used as a stepping stone or arises from the difficulty of finding a permanent job. These are more frequently cited than deliberately choosing temporary work. However the subjective characteristics, including reasons for undertaking temporary work and perceived employment prospects, have little impact in explaining variations in the well‐being of temporary workers.
John Baer, James C. Kaufman, and Roy F. Baumeister (eds)
- Published in print:
- 2008
- Published Online:
- May 2008
- ISBN:
- 9780195189636
- eISBN:
- 9780199868605
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195189636.001.0001
- Subject:
- Psychology, Social Psychology
Do people have free will, or is universal belief an illusion? If free will is more than an illusion, what kind of free will do people have? How can free will influence behavior? Can free will be ...
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Do people have free will, or is universal belief an illusion? If free will is more than an illusion, what kind of free will do people have? How can free will influence behavior? Can free will be studied, verified, and understood scientifically? These are a few of the questions this book attempts to answer. People generally act as though they believe in their own free will: they don't feel like automatons, and they don't treat one another as they might treat robots. While acknowledging many constraints and influences on behavior, people nonetheless act as if they (and their neighbors) are largely in control of many if not most of the decisions they make. Belief in free will also underpins the sense that people are responsible for their actions. Psychological explanations of behavior rarely mention free will as a factor, however. Can psychological science find room for free will? How do leading psychologists conceptualize free will, and what role do they believe free will plays in shaping behavior? This book looks both at recent experimental and theoretical work directly related to free will and at the ways leading psychologists from all branches of psychology deal with the philosophical problems long associated with the question of free will, such as the relationship between determinism and free will and the importance of consciousness in free will. It also includes commentaries by leading philosophers on what psychologists can contribute to long-running philosophical struggles with this most distinctly human belief.Less
Do people have free will, or is universal belief an illusion? If free will is more than an illusion, what kind of free will do people have? How can free will influence behavior? Can free will be studied, verified, and understood scientifically? These are a few of the questions this book attempts to answer. People generally act as though they believe in their own free will: they don't feel like automatons, and they don't treat one another as they might treat robots. While acknowledging many constraints and influences on behavior, people nonetheless act as if they (and their neighbors) are largely in control of many if not most of the decisions they make. Belief in free will also underpins the sense that people are responsible for their actions. Psychological explanations of behavior rarely mention free will as a factor, however. Can psychological science find room for free will? How do leading psychologists conceptualize free will, and what role do they believe free will plays in shaping behavior? This book looks both at recent experimental and theoretical work directly related to free will and at the ways leading psychologists from all branches of psychology deal with the philosophical problems long associated with the question of free will, such as the relationship between determinism and free will and the importance of consciousness in free will. It also includes commentaries by leading philosophers on what psychologists can contribute to long-running philosophical struggles with this most distinctly human belief.
John Russell Roberts
- Published in print:
- 2007
- Published Online:
- May 2007
- ISBN:
- 9780195313932
- eISBN:
- 9780199871926
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195313932.003.0005
- Subject:
- Philosophy, History of Philosophy
This chapter applies the various interpretive tools developed in the previous chapters to the question of the relationship between Berkeley's metaphysics and occasionalism. It is widely believed that ...
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This chapter applies the various interpretive tools developed in the previous chapters to the question of the relationship between Berkeley's metaphysics and occasionalism. It is widely believed that Berkeley's own views on human and divine agency imply a commitment to some form of occasionalism. This chapter makes plain just how deeply incompatible Berkeley's views and occasionalism are, and shows how difficult it is within Berkeley's metaphysics to raise the sort of problems that motivate occasionalism in the first place.Less
This chapter applies the various interpretive tools developed in the previous chapters to the question of the relationship between Berkeley's metaphysics and occasionalism. It is widely believed that Berkeley's own views on human and divine agency imply a commitment to some form of occasionalism. This chapter makes plain just how deeply incompatible Berkeley's views and occasionalism are, and shows how difficult it is within Berkeley's metaphysics to raise the sort of problems that motivate occasionalism in the first place.
John Baer, James C Kaufman, and Roy F Baumeister
- Published in print:
- 2008
- Published Online:
- May 2008
- ISBN:
- 9780195189636
- eISBN:
- 9780199868605
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195189636.003.0001
- Subject:
- Psychology, Social Psychology
This introductory chapter provides an overview of the book and summarizes each of the chapters. The book looks both at recent experimental and theoretical work directly related to free will and at ...
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This introductory chapter provides an overview of the book and summarizes each of the chapters. The book looks both at recent experimental and theoretical work directly related to free will and at ways psychologists deal with the philosophical problems long associated with the question of free will. Topics include the relationship between determinism and free will, the cognitive processes or mental structures that underlie volition, the role of consciousness in the exercise of free will, personal responsibility for actions, the possibility that free will is an illusion; how free will might emerge and function, even in a psyche that is run largely via unconscious processes; how we might explain the nearly universal belief in free will, and how a psychology of conscious free will be tested and demonstrated experimentally.Less
This introductory chapter provides an overview of the book and summarizes each of the chapters. The book looks both at recent experimental and theoretical work directly related to free will and at ways psychologists deal with the philosophical problems long associated with the question of free will. Topics include the relationship between determinism and free will, the cognitive processes or mental structures that underlie volition, the role of consciousness in the exercise of free will, personal responsibility for actions, the possibility that free will is an illusion; how free will might emerge and function, even in a psyche that is run largely via unconscious processes; how we might explain the nearly universal belief in free will, and how a psychology of conscious free will be tested and demonstrated experimentally.
William R Miller and David J Atencio
- Published in print:
- 2008
- Published Online:
- May 2008
- ISBN:
- 9780195189636
- eISBN:
- 9780199868605
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195189636.003.0014
- Subject:
- Psychology, Social Psychology
Volitional choice is assumed in morality, law, religion, business, and everyday social discourse. Free will can be understood as one of multiple factors influencing action, and thus accounting for a ...
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Volitional choice is assumed in morality, law, religion, business, and everyday social discourse. Free will can be understood as one of multiple factors influencing action, and thus accounting for a proportion of variance in human behavior. It interacts with the influences of genetics, environment, and experience. The volitional controllability of a behavior is measurable. The proportion of variance attributable to volition would be expected to vary across individuals, across behaviors, and for the same behavior within the same individual over time. The capacity for volitional control of behavior (self-regulation) emerges gradually over the course of development. Specific interventions have been developed and tested to strengthen volitional control of behavior. A comprehensive psychology of human nature should incorporate volition as one determinant of behavior, rather than conceptualizing it as antithetical to biological and environmental influences.Less
Volitional choice is assumed in morality, law, religion, business, and everyday social discourse. Free will can be understood as one of multiple factors influencing action, and thus accounting for a proportion of variance in human behavior. It interacts with the influences of genetics, environment, and experience. The volitional controllability of a behavior is measurable. The proportion of variance attributable to volition would be expected to vary across individuals, across behaviors, and for the same behavior within the same individual over time. The capacity for volitional control of behavior (self-regulation) emerges gradually over the course of development. Specific interventions have been developed and tested to strengthen volitional control of behavior. A comprehensive psychology of human nature should incorporate volition as one determinant of behavior, rather than conceptualizing it as antithetical to biological and environmental influences.
Marian Klamer
- Published in print:
- 2008
- Published Online:
- January 2009
- ISBN:
- 9780199238385
- eISBN:
- 9780191716768
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199238385.003.0009
- Subject:
- Linguistics, Semantics and Pragmatics
This chapter discusses semantic parameters relevant to the alignment systems of nine lesser-known languages of eastern Indonesia. The alignment is primarily determined by the proto-Agent feature ...
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This chapter discusses semantic parameters relevant to the alignment systems of nine lesser-known languages of eastern Indonesia. The alignment is primarily determined by the proto-Agent feature ‘volition’ and the proto-Patient feature ‘undergoer of change of state’. The distinction between dynamic and static predicates plays only a limited role.Less
This chapter discusses semantic parameters relevant to the alignment systems of nine lesser-known languages of eastern Indonesia. The alignment is primarily determined by the proto-Agent feature ‘volition’ and the proto-Patient feature ‘undergoer of change of state’. The distinction between dynamic and static predicates plays only a limited role.
Theodore Markopoulos
- Published in print:
- 2008
- Published Online:
- January 2009
- ISBN:
- 9780199539857
- eISBN:
- 9780191716317
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199539857.003.0002
- Subject:
- Linguistics, Syntax and Morphology, Historical Linguistics
This chapter examines the semantic, morphosyntactic, and sociolinguistic properties of the three AVCs in Ancient Greek (5th–3rd c. BC). It illustrates the fact that the most frequent FC, “μέλλω + ...
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This chapter examines the semantic, morphosyntactic, and sociolinguistic properties of the three AVCs in Ancient Greek (5th–3rd c. BC). It illustrates the fact that the most frequent FC, “μέλλω + Infinitive” had the basic meaning of intention, which could give rise to prediction in specific contexts, through contextual implicatures. The analysis of μέλλω and of the other AVCs is based on an extended corpus, comprising texts of various registers.Less
This chapter examines the semantic, morphosyntactic, and sociolinguistic properties of the three AVCs in Ancient Greek (5th–3rd c. BC). It illustrates the fact that the most frequent FC, “μέλλω + Infinitive” had the basic meaning of intention, which could give rise to prediction in specific contexts, through contextual implicatures. The analysis of μέλλω and of the other AVCs is based on an extended corpus, comprising texts of various registers.
Nelson Cowan
- Published in print:
- 1998
- Published Online:
- January 2008
- ISBN:
- 9780195119107
- eISBN:
- 9780199870097
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195119107.003.0008
- Subject:
- Psychology, Cognitive Psychology
The chapter emphasizes a level of analysis at which subdivisions are avoided until shown to be fundamental. It helps especially in investigations of short-term memory, selective attention, and the ...
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The chapter emphasizes a level of analysis at which subdivisions are avoided until shown to be fundamental. It helps especially in investigations of short-term memory, selective attention, and the relationship between them. Fundamental, seemingly obvious concepts actually have been questioned in the literature and so are revisited. The chapter summarizes ways in which memory and attention appear to be closely interrelated. This is important because it includes observations that could be drawn only by aggregating across previous chapters. Directions for evolution of the theoretical framework are considered. The cognitive concepts are mapped onto brain structures. Moreover, both behavioral and brain research methods are challenged to make the best use of multiple levels of analysis. In this regard, even positing a homunculus, a portion of the mind that somehow carries out volition, is useful to divide human information processing into subcategories, allowing some of them to be better understood.Less
The chapter emphasizes a level of analysis at which subdivisions are avoided until shown to be fundamental. It helps especially in investigations of short-term memory, selective attention, and the relationship between them. Fundamental, seemingly obvious concepts actually have been questioned in the literature and so are revisited. The chapter summarizes ways in which memory and attention appear to be closely interrelated. This is important because it includes observations that could be drawn only by aggregating across previous chapters. Directions for evolution of the theoretical framework are considered. The cognitive concepts are mapped onto brain structures. Moreover, both behavioral and brain research methods are challenged to make the best use of multiple levels of analysis. In this regard, even positing a homunculus, a portion of the mind that somehow carries out volition, is useful to divide human information processing into subcategories, allowing some of them to be better understood.
Michael S. Moore
- Published in print:
- 2010
- Published Online:
- September 2010
- ISBN:
- 9780199599509
- eISBN:
- 9780191594656
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199599509.001.0001
- Subject:
- Law, Philosophy of Law, Constitutional and Administrative Law
This book seeks illumination of three aspects of Anglo-American criminal law by the philosophy of action. These are, first, the general requirement that an accused perform some voluntary act before ...
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This book seeks illumination of three aspects of Anglo-American criminal law by the philosophy of action. These are, first, the general requirement that an accused perform some voluntary act before he can be convicted of crime; second, that that voluntary act have the properties marking it as one of the kinds of acts prohibited by statute, what lawyers call the ‘actus reus’ of crimes; and third, the double jeopardy requirement that no one should be prosecuted or punished more than once for doing but one act instantiating but one offence. These three requirements are seen as part of the ‘general part’ of the criminal law, the part that applies to all crimes and that gives the criminal law a unified structure. As such they aid both the efficient drafting of a criminal code by the legislature and the application/interpretation of criminal codes by courts. The theory of action defended in the book – and from which illumination of the criminal law is sought – in a version of the family of theories known as causal theories of action. The thesis is that actions are those bodily movements caused by volitions when those volitions have those movements as their object, and nothing else. The criminal law's voluntary act requirement is then seen as the requirement that there be such an act. Omissions, states a person is in, thoughts, and involuntary bodily movements such as reflex reactions, are not acts by such a causal theory. The criminal law's actus reus requirement is seen as the requirement that a voluntary act must possess those causal or other properties definitive of the types of action prohibited by a criminal code. And the criminal law's double jeopardy requirements is seen as a conjunctive requirement: first, that no one be punished for the same kind of action, where the identity of act-types is governed by the kinds of acts morality makes wrong; unless the actor did that act more than once, where the identity of act-tokens is governed by the theory of action defended throughout the book. The philosophy of action illuminates the criminal law in these three ways because of certain moral theses, which the book also defends; that criminal liability both does and should track moral responsibility; that moral responsibility exists principally for what we do rather than for who we are, what we think, or what we fail to prevent; that actions causing harms are more blameworthy than actions that only risk or attempt such harms; and that punishment should be in proposition to the number and degree of wrong(s) done.Less
This book seeks illumination of three aspects of Anglo-American criminal law by the philosophy of action. These are, first, the general requirement that an accused perform some voluntary act before he can be convicted of crime; second, that that voluntary act have the properties marking it as one of the kinds of acts prohibited by statute, what lawyers call the ‘actus reus’ of crimes; and third, the double jeopardy requirement that no one should be prosecuted or punished more than once for doing but one act instantiating but one offence. These three requirements are seen as part of the ‘general part’ of the criminal law, the part that applies to all crimes and that gives the criminal law a unified structure. As such they aid both the efficient drafting of a criminal code by the legislature and the application/interpretation of criminal codes by courts. The theory of action defended in the book – and from which illumination of the criminal law is sought – in a version of the family of theories known as causal theories of action. The thesis is that actions are those bodily movements caused by volitions when those volitions have those movements as their object, and nothing else. The criminal law's voluntary act requirement is then seen as the requirement that there be such an act. Omissions, states a person is in, thoughts, and involuntary bodily movements such as reflex reactions, are not acts by such a causal theory. The criminal law's actus reus requirement is seen as the requirement that a voluntary act must possess those causal or other properties definitive of the types of action prohibited by a criminal code. And the criminal law's double jeopardy requirements is seen as a conjunctive requirement: first, that no one be punished for the same kind of action, where the identity of act-types is governed by the kinds of acts morality makes wrong; unless the actor did that act more than once, where the identity of act-tokens is governed by the theory of action defended throughout the book. The philosophy of action illuminates the criminal law in these three ways because of certain moral theses, which the book also defends; that criminal liability both does and should track moral responsibility; that moral responsibility exists principally for what we do rather than for who we are, what we think, or what we fail to prevent; that actions causing harms are more blameworthy than actions that only risk or attempt such harms; and that punishment should be in proposition to the number and degree of wrong(s) done.
Michael S. Moore
- Published in print:
- 2010
- Published Online:
- September 2010
- ISBN:
- 9780199599509
- eISBN:
- 9780191594656
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199599509.003.0006
- Subject:
- Law, Philosophy of Law, Constitutional and Administrative Law
Actions are partially identical with bodily movements; they are fully identical only with the sequence, volitions-cause-bodily movement. Volitional causation of bodily movements is thus an essential ...
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Actions are partially identical with bodily movements; they are fully identical only with the sequence, volitions-cause-bodily movement. Volitional causation of bodily movements is thus an essential feature of actions. What sort of mental state a volition is claimed to be is examined in nine successive steps. Why we have reason to think that volitions exist is given in two steps: first, that there are mental states of intention that are not reducible to beliefs or desires, either singly or in combination; and second, that among the hierarchy of intentions that guide rational action there will be an intention to do the simplest thing we know how to do, which intention will be a volition. A variety of scepticisms about volitions, many stemming from ordinary language philosophy, are also examined and rejected.Less
Actions are partially identical with bodily movements; they are fully identical only with the sequence, volitions-cause-bodily movement. Volitional causation of bodily movements is thus an essential feature of actions. What sort of mental state a volition is claimed to be is examined in nine successive steps. Why we have reason to think that volitions exist is given in two steps: first, that there are mental states of intention that are not reducible to beliefs or desires, either singly or in combination; and second, that among the hierarchy of intentions that guide rational action there will be an intention to do the simplest thing we know how to do, which intention will be a volition. A variety of scepticisms about volitions, many stemming from ordinary language philosophy, are also examined and rejected.
Michael Moore
- Published in print:
- 2010
- Published Online:
- September 2010
- ISBN:
- 9780199599493
- eISBN:
- 9780191594649
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199599493.003.0006
- Subject:
- Law, Philosophy of Law, Criminal Law and Criminology
Central to human agency and thus to moral responsibility is the idea of human action. An earlier book (Act and Crime) defended a version of a causal theory of action according to which all human ...
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Central to human agency and thus to moral responsibility is the idea of human action. An earlier book (Act and Crime) defended a version of a causal theory of action according to which all human actions are in essence willed bodily movements and nothing else. This theory is defended against the extended secondary literature criticizing this theory.Less
Central to human agency and thus to moral responsibility is the idea of human action. An earlier book (Act and Crime) defended a version of a causal theory of action according to which all human actions are in essence willed bodily movements and nothing else. This theory is defended against the extended secondary literature criticizing this theory.
Steven Nadler
- Published in print:
- 2010
- Published Online:
- January 2011
- ISBN:
- 9780198250081
- eISBN:
- 9780191712586
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198250081.003.0004
- Subject:
- Philosophy, History of Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology
This chapter is an examination of the details of Malebranche’s account of divine activity in his occasionalism, and in particular his notion of divine general volitions. Contrary to a reading first ...
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This chapter is an examination of the details of Malebranche’s account of divine activity in his occasionalism, and in particular his notion of divine general volitions. Contrary to a reading first offered by Arnauld in his correspondence with Leibniz, according to which Malebranche’s God acts by way of volitions with general content (or laws), this chapter argues that Malebranche’s God acts constantly and ubiquitously in nature by way of volitions with particular contents, although these volitions are always in accordance with general laws of nature.Less
This chapter is an examination of the details of Malebranche’s account of divine activity in his occasionalism, and in particular his notion of divine general volitions. Contrary to a reading first offered by Arnauld in his correspondence with Leibniz, according to which Malebranche’s God acts by way of volitions with general content (or laws), this chapter argues that Malebranche’s God acts constantly and ubiquitously in nature by way of volitions with particular contents, although these volitions are always in accordance with general laws of nature.
Walter Ott
- Published in print:
- 2009
- Published Online:
- September 2009
- ISBN:
- 9780199570430
- eISBN:
- 9780191722394
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199570430.003.0012
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology, Philosophy of Science
Some commentators, such as Leibniz and Steven Nadler, think that, for Malebranche, God must will each and every physical event as such. Others, such as Nicholas Jolley (and perhaps Arnauld), hold ...
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Some commentators, such as Leibniz and Steven Nadler, think that, for Malebranche, God must will each and every physical event as such. Others, such as Nicholas Jolley (and perhaps Arnauld), hold that Malebranchean divine volitions are conditional in form, so that God need not meddle directly in each event that occurs. This chapter settles the controversy. It emerges that Leibniz is indeed correct. And yet this does not mean that God is continuously active, constantly adjusting his will to new situations; instead, he can timelessly will an indefinitely long string of individual states of affairs. A corresponding difficulty arises when we try to see how Malebranche can claim that the divine laws are efficacious. This chapter argues that Malebranche offers two analyses of laws — a conditional analysis, whereby laws have the logical form of conditionals, and a summary analysis, whereby laws are nothing more than convenient ways of speaking about God's individual volitions. It is only in the latter sense that Malebranchean laws can be efficacious.Less
Some commentators, such as Leibniz and Steven Nadler, think that, for Malebranche, God must will each and every physical event as such. Others, such as Nicholas Jolley (and perhaps Arnauld), hold that Malebranchean divine volitions are conditional in form, so that God need not meddle directly in each event that occurs. This chapter settles the controversy. It emerges that Leibniz is indeed correct. And yet this does not mean that God is continuously active, constantly adjusting his will to new situations; instead, he can timelessly will an indefinitely long string of individual states of affairs. A corresponding difficulty arises when we try to see how Malebranche can claim that the divine laws are efficacious. This chapter argues that Malebranche offers two analyses of laws — a conditional analysis, whereby laws have the logical form of conditionals, and a summary analysis, whereby laws are nothing more than convenient ways of speaking about God's individual volitions. It is only in the latter sense that Malebranchean laws can be efficacious.
