Jonathan Fox
- Published in print:
- 2007
- Published Online:
- May 2008
- ISBN:
- 9780199208852
- eISBN:
- 9780191709005
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199208852.003.0011
- Subject:
- Political Science, Democratization
This concluding chapter explores several general conceptual propositions, in an effort to contribute to future research that will ‘map’ accountability pathways with greater precision. Empowerment is ...
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This concluding chapter explores several general conceptual propositions, in an effort to contribute to future research that will ‘map’ accountability pathways with greater precision. Empowerment is distinguished from rights, defined in terms of enforceable claims. The chapter also details the problems of ‘low accountability traps’ and the ‘positioning’ of accountability agents in terms of their relationships to state and society. The difficulty of launching pro-accountability ‘virtuous circles’ is addressed with the proposed concept of ‘accountabilities of scale’, drawing on an analogy with ‘economies of scale’. The ‘vertical integration’ of civil society actors takes into account the challenge of scale, followed by a questioning of the ‘power of sunshine’ to leverage accountability outcomes. These concepts offer analytical tools for understanding when voice can change the balance of power by embedding accountability reforms into the state. Meanwhile, millions of citizens are weighing the decision of whether to pursue exit instead.Less
This concluding chapter explores several general conceptual propositions, in an effort to contribute to future research that will ‘map’ accountability pathways with greater precision. Empowerment is distinguished from rights, defined in terms of enforceable claims. The chapter also details the problems of ‘low accountability traps’ and the ‘positioning’ of accountability agents in terms of their relationships to state and society. The difficulty of launching pro-accountability ‘virtuous circles’ is addressed with the proposed concept of ‘accountabilities of scale’, drawing on an analogy with ‘economies of scale’. The ‘vertical integration’ of civil society actors takes into account the challenge of scale, followed by a questioning of the ‘power of sunshine’ to leverage accountability outcomes. These concepts offer analytical tools for understanding when voice can change the balance of power by embedding accountability reforms into the state. Meanwhile, millions of citizens are weighing the decision of whether to pursue exit instead.
Shelly Kagan
- Published in print:
- 2012
- Published Online:
- January 2013
- ISBN:
- 9780199895595
- eISBN:
- 9780199980093
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199895595.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Moral Philosophy
People differ in terms of how morally deserving they are. And it is a good thing if people get what they deserve. Accordingly, it is important to work out an adequate theory of moral desert. But ...
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People differ in terms of how morally deserving they are. And it is a good thing if people get what they deserve. Accordingly, it is important to work out an adequate theory of moral desert. But while certain aspects of such a theory have been frequently discussed in the philosophical literature, many others have been surprisingly neglected. For example, if it is indeed true that it is morally good for people to get what they deserve, does it always do the same amount of good when someone gets what they deserve? Or does it matter how deserving the person is? If we cannot give someone exactly what they deserve, is it better to give too much—or better to give too little? Does being twice as virtuous make you twice as deserving? And how are we to take into account the thought that what you deserve depends in part on how others are doing? This book explores a number of these less familiar questions, using graphs to illustrate the various possible answers. The result is a careful investigation into the nature of moral desert, one that reveals desert to have a hidden complexity that most of us have failed to recognize.Less
People differ in terms of how morally deserving they are. And it is a good thing if people get what they deserve. Accordingly, it is important to work out an adequate theory of moral desert. But while certain aspects of such a theory have been frequently discussed in the philosophical literature, many others have been surprisingly neglected. For example, if it is indeed true that it is morally good for people to get what they deserve, does it always do the same amount of good when someone gets what they deserve? Or does it matter how deserving the person is? If we cannot give someone exactly what they deserve, is it better to give too much—or better to give too little? Does being twice as virtuous make you twice as deserving? And how are we to take into account the thought that what you deserve depends in part on how others are doing? This book explores a number of these less familiar questions, using graphs to illustrate the various possible answers. The result is a careful investigation into the nature of moral desert, one that reveals desert to have a hidden complexity that most of us have failed to recognize.
Howard J. Curzer
- Published in print:
- 2012
- Published Online:
- May 2012
- ISBN:
- 9780199693726
- eISBN:
- 9780191738890
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199693726.003.0016
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Ancient Philosophy, Moral Philosophy
Aristotle’s moral development path has six stages. At each stage the learner gains a different component of virtue at the prompting of a different catalyst, but those who lack the relevant catalyst ...
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Aristotle’s moral development path has six stages. At each stage the learner gains a different component of virtue at the prompting of a different catalyst, but those who lack the relevant catalyst remain fixated or regress. The many become generous-minded; the generous-minded become incontinent; and the incontinent become continent by performing virtuous acts prompted by (1) threat of punishment, (2) shame, and (3) remorse, respectively. The continent become naturally virtuous by (4) listening to the right music. The naturally virtuous become properly virtuous by (5) being taught which character traits are conducive to happiness. Thus the properly virtuous gain the knowledge of why virtuous acts are virtuous. An important Aristotelian observation is that people progress at different rates with respect to different spheres. A person can be simultaneously incontinent with respect to sensual pleasure and virtuous with respect to physical risk, for example.Less
Aristotle’s moral development path has six stages. At each stage the learner gains a different component of virtue at the prompting of a different catalyst, but those who lack the relevant catalyst remain fixated or regress. The many become generous-minded; the generous-minded become incontinent; and the incontinent become continent by performing virtuous acts prompted by (1) threat of punishment, (2) shame, and (3) remorse, respectively. The continent become naturally virtuous by (4) listening to the right music. The naturally virtuous become properly virtuous by (5) being taught which character traits are conducive to happiness. Thus the properly virtuous gain the knowledge of why virtuous acts are virtuous. An important Aristotelian observation is that people progress at different rates with respect to different spheres. A person can be simultaneously incontinent with respect to sensual pleasure and virtuous with respect to physical risk, for example.
John Marenbon
- Published in print:
- 2015
- Published Online:
- October 2017
- ISBN:
- 9780691142555
- eISBN:
- 9781400866359
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Princeton University Press
- DOI:
- 10.23943/princeton/9780691142555.003.0016
- Subject:
- Religion, Philosophy of Religion
This epilogue discusses Leibniz's particular interest in China. Like his predecessors, Leibniz's preferred virtuous pagans were also ancient philosophers, but he was partial to those of China. ...
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This epilogue discusses Leibniz's particular interest in China. Like his predecessors, Leibniz's preferred virtuous pagans were also ancient philosophers, but he was partial to those of China. Leibniz had showed an interest in China from the mid-1670s and, from 1689, roughly in the middle of his career, he began to conduct a correspondence with a number of the Jesuit missionaries to China, seeking information about Chinese writings, thought and language, as well as current news about political and religious developments. His intense interest in China and his voracious reading of all he could find out about it grew from these correspondences, and his fullest thoughts about Chinese religion are expressed in one of his last works, a letter On the Natural Theology of the Chinese, written in 1716 — the year of his death.Less
This epilogue discusses Leibniz's particular interest in China. Like his predecessors, Leibniz's preferred virtuous pagans were also ancient philosophers, but he was partial to those of China. Leibniz had showed an interest in China from the mid-1670s and, from 1689, roughly in the middle of his career, he began to conduct a correspondence with a number of the Jesuit missionaries to China, seeking information about Chinese writings, thought and language, as well as current news about political and religious developments. His intense interest in China and his voracious reading of all he could find out about it grew from these correspondences, and his fullest thoughts about Chinese religion are expressed in one of his last works, a letter On the Natural Theology of the Chinese, written in 1716 — the year of his death.
John Marenbon
- Published in print:
- 2015
- Published Online:
- October 2017
- ISBN:
- 9780691142555
- eISBN:
- 9781400866359
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Princeton University Press
- DOI:
- 10.23943/princeton/9780691142555.003.0011
- Subject:
- Religion, Philosophy of Religion
This chapter considers the highly paradoxical position occupied by ancient pagans, who are considered genuinely and outstandingly virtuous and yet at the same are condemned to Hell. This paradox is ...
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This chapter considers the highly paradoxical position occupied by ancient pagans, who are considered genuinely and outstandingly virtuous and yet at the same are condemned to Hell. This paradox is discussed in detail before the chapter goes on to explain Dante's position in this paradox, by looking at Dante's attitude to pagan wisdom and its relation to Christianity, especially his adoption, but transformation, of the position of limited relativism which strictly separates the spheres of philosophical enquiry and Christian doctrine. The damnation of virtuous pagans turns out to be the price required by this approach, which remains deliberately paradoxical, despite Dante's innovation of placing them in a special part of Hell, where there are no physical torments. Furthermore, the chapter looks at another aspect of Dante's discussion of paganism — his treatment of Epicurus and his followers — and links it to a comparison with his great admirer and commentator, Boccaccio.Less
This chapter considers the highly paradoxical position occupied by ancient pagans, who are considered genuinely and outstandingly virtuous and yet at the same are condemned to Hell. This paradox is discussed in detail before the chapter goes on to explain Dante's position in this paradox, by looking at Dante's attitude to pagan wisdom and its relation to Christianity, especially his adoption, but transformation, of the position of limited relativism which strictly separates the spheres of philosophical enquiry and Christian doctrine. The damnation of virtuous pagans turns out to be the price required by this approach, which remains deliberately paradoxical, despite Dante's innovation of placing them in a special part of Hell, where there are no physical torments. Furthermore, the chapter looks at another aspect of Dante's discussion of paganism — his treatment of Epicurus and his followers — and links it to a comparison with his great admirer and commentator, Boccaccio.
John Marenbon
- Published in print:
- 2015
- Published Online:
- October 2017
- ISBN:
- 9780691142555
- eISBN:
- 9781400866359
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Princeton University Press
- DOI:
- 10.23943/princeton/9780691142555.003.0012
- Subject:
- Religion, Philosophy of Religion
This chapter turns to another pair struggling with the Problem of Paganism: William Langland and Geoffrey Chaucer. For Langland, the Problem is an issue addressed directly, with the focus on the ...
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This chapter turns to another pair struggling with the Problem of Paganism: William Langland and Geoffrey Chaucer. For Langland, the Problem is an issue addressed directly, with the focus on the salvation of virtuous pagans. But, despite the explicit doctrinal discussion, Langland is not simply doing the same thing in vernacular verse as the university theologians: the complex form of his poem makes the positions he takes less clearly defined, but allows him to adumbrate daring ideas outside the range of the scholastic discussions. By contrast, Chaucer avoids the theological problems almost entirely; more perhaps than any other medieval writer, he explores the Problem of Paganism by imagining himself within a pagan world, whilst aware, as his readers too would be, that there is an external Christian perspective on it, which is only partly accessible from his viewpoint on the inside.Less
This chapter turns to another pair struggling with the Problem of Paganism: William Langland and Geoffrey Chaucer. For Langland, the Problem is an issue addressed directly, with the focus on the salvation of virtuous pagans. But, despite the explicit doctrinal discussion, Langland is not simply doing the same thing in vernacular verse as the university theologians: the complex form of his poem makes the positions he takes less clearly defined, but allows him to adumbrate daring ideas outside the range of the scholastic discussions. By contrast, Chaucer avoids the theological problems almost entirely; more perhaps than any other medieval writer, he explores the Problem of Paganism by imagining himself within a pagan world, whilst aware, as his readers too would be, that there is an external Christian perspective on it, which is only partly accessible from his viewpoint on the inside.
John Marenbon
- Published in print:
- 2015
- Published Online:
- October 2017
- ISBN:
- 9780691142555
- eISBN:
- 9781400866359
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Princeton University Press
- DOI:
- 10.23943/princeton/9780691142555.003.0014
- Subject:
- Religion, Philosophy of Religion
This chapter turns to the second aspect of the Problem of Paganism: virtue. The dominant view among scholastic theologians in the late thirteenth and fourteenth centuries was that pagans could be ...
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This chapter turns to the second aspect of the Problem of Paganism: virtue. The dominant view among scholastic theologians in the late thirteenth and fourteenth centuries was that pagans could be genuinely virtuous, although their virtues were not of the sort which could merit salvation. In the period after 1400, mainstream Catholic theologians in the scholastic tradition tended to take the same broad view as their predecessors, but reformulating it to take account of new opponents. By contrast, and surprisingly, writers more influenced by humanism were often more sceptical about pagan virtue, although they presented their doubts in sophisticated literary forms. From 1500, the newly discovered pagans of America presented another side to the problem of pagan virtue, overlooked by most mainstream writers on them, but noticed by Jean de Léry and probed by Montaigne. This chapter looks at each of these approaches in turn.Less
This chapter turns to the second aspect of the Problem of Paganism: virtue. The dominant view among scholastic theologians in the late thirteenth and fourteenth centuries was that pagans could be genuinely virtuous, although their virtues were not of the sort which could merit salvation. In the period after 1400, mainstream Catholic theologians in the scholastic tradition tended to take the same broad view as their predecessors, but reformulating it to take account of new opponents. By contrast, and surprisingly, writers more influenced by humanism were often more sceptical about pagan virtue, although they presented their doubts in sophisticated literary forms. From 1500, the newly discovered pagans of America presented another side to the problem of pagan virtue, overlooked by most mainstream writers on them, but noticed by Jean de Léry and probed by Montaigne. This chapter looks at each of these approaches in turn.
John Marenbon
- Published in print:
- 2015
- Published Online:
- October 2017
- ISBN:
- 9780691142555
- eISBN:
- 9781400866359
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Princeton University Press
- DOI:
- 10.23943/princeton/9780691142555.003.0015
- Subject:
- Religion, Philosophy of Religion
This chapter examines how sixteenth- and seventeenth-century theologians faced a new theological challenge in light of new evidence that there exists millions of virtuous pagans who had had no chance ...
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This chapter examines how sixteenth- and seventeenth-century theologians faced a new theological challenge in light of new evidence that there exists millions of virtuous pagans who had had no chance of hearing about Christianity (labelled here as ‘invincibly ignorant pagans’). This challenge emerged from the discovery of America and other lands at the end of the fifteenth century, revealing yet new territories where, to all appearances, Christianity had never been preached. However the chapter shows that, on some fifteenth-century treatments of pagan salvation, and on seventeenth-century treatments of illustrious ancient pagans, this new challenge was not entirely new, and that the older lines of discussion were continued, though in a modern format.Less
This chapter examines how sixteenth- and seventeenth-century theologians faced a new theological challenge in light of new evidence that there exists millions of virtuous pagans who had had no chance of hearing about Christianity (labelled here as ‘invincibly ignorant pagans’). This challenge emerged from the discovery of America and other lands at the end of the fifteenth century, revealing yet new territories where, to all appearances, Christianity had never been preached. However the chapter shows that, on some fifteenth-century treatments of pagan salvation, and on seventeenth-century treatments of illustrious ancient pagans, this new challenge was not entirely new, and that the older lines of discussion were continued, though in a modern format.
Paul Russell
- Published in print:
- 2008
- Published Online:
- May 2008
- ISBN:
- 9780195110333
- eISBN:
- 9780199872084
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195110333.003.0017
- Subject:
- Philosophy, History of Philosophy
According to the irreligious interpretation, there are two key claims that Hume seeks to establish in the Treatise in respect of morality. The first is that Hume defends the “autonomy of morality” in ...
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According to the irreligious interpretation, there are two key claims that Hume seeks to establish in the Treatise in respect of morality. The first is that Hume defends the “autonomy of morality” in relation to religion. The foundations of moral and political life, he holds, rest with our human nature, not with the doctrines and dogmas of (Christian) religion. Closely connected with this issue, Hume also aims to show that “speculative atheism” does not imply “practical atheism” or any kind of “moral licentiousness.” Taken together, these two components of Hume's moral system constitute a defence and interpretation of “virtuous atheism.”Less
According to the irreligious interpretation, there are two key claims that Hume seeks to establish in the Treatise in respect of morality. The first is that Hume defends the “autonomy of morality” in relation to religion. The foundations of moral and political life, he holds, rest with our human nature, not with the doctrines and dogmas of (Christian) religion. Closely connected with this issue, Hume also aims to show that “speculative atheism” does not imply “practical atheism” or any kind of “moral licentiousness.” Taken together, these two components of Hume's moral system constitute a defence and interpretation of “virtuous atheism.”
Joseph Chan
- Published in print:
- 2013
- Published Online:
- October 2017
- ISBN:
- 9780691158617
- eISBN:
- 9781400848690
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Princeton University Press
- DOI:
- 10.23943/princeton/9780691158617.003.0006
- Subject:
- Political Science, Political Theory
This chapter contends that the idea of human rights is compatible with the Confucian understanding of ethics and society, but that in the ideal society people will be guided by precepts of ...
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This chapter contends that the idea of human rights is compatible with the Confucian understanding of ethics and society, but that in the ideal society people will be guided by precepts of benevolence and virtues rather than by considerations of human rights. Thus, human rights do not play an important practical role in an ideal society, for the same reason that rites are not important in the Grand Union. However, in nonideal situations, where virtuous relationships break down and mediation fails to reconcile conflicts, human rights can become a powerful fallback apparatus for the vulnerable to protect their legitimate interests against exploitation. The importance of human rights lies in its instrumental function. But unlike liberalism, Confucian ethics would not take human rights as constitutive of human worth or dignity.Less
This chapter contends that the idea of human rights is compatible with the Confucian understanding of ethics and society, but that in the ideal society people will be guided by precepts of benevolence and virtues rather than by considerations of human rights. Thus, human rights do not play an important practical role in an ideal society, for the same reason that rites are not important in the Grand Union. However, in nonideal situations, where virtuous relationships break down and mediation fails to reconcile conflicts, human rights can become a powerful fallback apparatus for the vulnerable to protect their legitimate interests against exploitation. The importance of human rights lies in its instrumental function. But unlike liberalism, Confucian ethics would not take human rights as constitutive of human worth or dignity.
Ian Simpson Ross
- Published in print:
- 1995
- Published Online:
- November 2003
- ISBN:
- 9780198288213
- eISBN:
- 9780191596827
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0198288212.003.0017
- Subject:
- Economics and Finance, History of Economic Thought
Smith was devoted in his attentions to Hume as he lay dying, but, ever the man of prudence, gave his best friend some pain through unwillingness to see through the press the Dialogues concerning ...
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Smith was devoted in his attentions to Hume as he lay dying, but, ever the man of prudence, gave his best friend some pain through unwillingness to see through the press the Dialogues concerning Natural Religion. In the event, Smith was violently abused by Christians for describing Hume in a published letter as approaching as near to the idea of a ‘perfectly wise and virtuous man’ as human weakness permits. Smith would have been in further trouble if his 1778 Machiavellian advice about a solution to the American problem had been published, for it advocated returning Canada to the French, and Florida to the Spaniards, to ensure that independent Americans would become allies of Britain.Less
Smith was devoted in his attentions to Hume as he lay dying, but, ever the man of prudence, gave his best friend some pain through unwillingness to see through the press the Dialogues concerning Natural Religion. In the event, Smith was violently abused by Christians for describing Hume in a published letter as approaching as near to the idea of a ‘perfectly wise and virtuous man’ as human weakness permits. Smith would have been in further trouble if his 1778 Machiavellian advice about a solution to the American problem had been published, for it advocated returning Canada to the French, and Florida to the Spaniards, to ensure that independent Americans would become allies of Britain.
Romila Thapar
- Published in print:
- 2012
- Published Online:
- September 2012
- ISBN:
- 9780198077244
- eISBN:
- 9780199081073
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198077244.003.0022
- Subject:
- History, Indian History
This chapter investigates why Aśoka Maurya adopted the policy of Dhamma and the purpose it served. It considers the immediate background of the Mauryas, the development of Buddhism at this period, ...
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This chapter investigates why Aśoka Maurya adopted the policy of Dhamma and the purpose it served. It considers the immediate background of the Mauryas, the development of Buddhism at this period, and the relationship between Buddhism and the ideas of Aśoka. It explains that the concept of Dharma used in the sense of Law and Social Order was by no means new to Mauryan India and that Aśoka, with the adoption of Dhamma, made an attempt to humanise it and show that in fact what mattered most was virtuous behaviour. It also argues that in the propagation of his Dhamma Aśoka was attempting to reform the narrow attitude of religious teaching and to promote throughout the empire a consciousness of social behaviour so broad in its scope, that no cultural group could object to it.Less
This chapter investigates why Aśoka Maurya adopted the policy of Dhamma and the purpose it served. It considers the immediate background of the Mauryas, the development of Buddhism at this period, and the relationship between Buddhism and the ideas of Aśoka. It explains that the concept of Dharma used in the sense of Law and Social Order was by no means new to Mauryan India and that Aśoka, with the adoption of Dhamma, made an attempt to humanise it and show that in fact what mattered most was virtuous behaviour. It also argues that in the propagation of his Dhamma Aśoka was attempting to reform the narrow attitude of religious teaching and to promote throughout the empire a consciousness of social behaviour so broad in its scope, that no cultural group could object to it.
Graciana del Castillo
- Published in print:
- 2008
- Published Online:
- January 2009
- ISBN:
- 9780199237739
- eISBN:
- 9780191717239
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199237739.003.0016
- Subject:
- Economics and Finance, Development, Growth, and Environmental, International
In designing the strategy for post-conflict economic reconstruction, policymakers will need to keep in mind that good macroeconomic management is necessary but not sufficient for the reactivation of ...
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In designing the strategy for post-conflict economic reconstruction, policymakers will need to keep in mind that good macroeconomic management is necessary but not sufficient for the reactivation of investment, trade, and employment. Adequate microeconomic policies to improve the business climate and to minimize distortions so that markets and industries can perform better are also necessary. A virtuous circle of sustainable growth and social inclusion can only be created through increased investment, higher productivity, and international competitiveness; and employment policies that do not neglect the most vulnerable. To ignore the political, social, and security constraints under which post-conflict countries operate by adopting drastic or untimely policies, may jeopardize the transition to peace. Arguing that lack of employment has been the most serious deterrent to effective reconstruction, this chapter distinguishes among four types of investment and proposes a five-pronged employment promotion strategy that post-conflict countries could adopt with the support of donors.Less
In designing the strategy for post-conflict economic reconstruction, policymakers will need to keep in mind that good macroeconomic management is necessary but not sufficient for the reactivation of investment, trade, and employment. Adequate microeconomic policies to improve the business climate and to minimize distortions so that markets and industries can perform better are also necessary. A virtuous circle of sustainable growth and social inclusion can only be created through increased investment, higher productivity, and international competitiveness; and employment policies that do not neglect the most vulnerable. To ignore the political, social, and security constraints under which post-conflict countries operate by adopting drastic or untimely policies, may jeopardize the transition to peace. Arguing that lack of employment has been the most serious deterrent to effective reconstruction, this chapter distinguishes among four types of investment and proposes a five-pronged employment promotion strategy that post-conflict countries could adopt with the support of donors.
Daniel C. Russell
- Published in print:
- 2009
- Published Online:
- May 2009
- ISBN:
- 9780199565795
- eISBN:
- 9780191721311
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199565795.003.0004
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Moral Philosophy, Ancient Philosophy
People often describe virtue ethics as holding that an action is right if and only if it is what an agent with a virtuous character would do in the circumstances. Nonetheless, virtue ethicists in ...
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People often describe virtue ethics as holding that an action is right if and only if it is what an agent with a virtuous character would do in the circumstances. Nonetheless, virtue ethicists in recent years have increasingly retreated from ideas about what “the virtuous person” would do, viewing such ideas as too abstract and idealized to be of much real use. This chapter explores these objections, and particularly Christine Swanton's virtue ethical account of right action which avoids making any reference to ideal virtuous persons. Swanton argues that such ideals are perilous, and treats virtue as a “threshold concept”, on which one need only be “virtuous enough” to be genuinely virtuous. It is argued that “virtuous enough” has meaning only by relying on an ideal of virtuousness after all, that that ideal threatens none of the perils that worry Swanton, and that that ideal must include phronesis.Less
People often describe virtue ethics as holding that an action is right if and only if it is what an agent with a virtuous character would do in the circumstances. Nonetheless, virtue ethicists in recent years have increasingly retreated from ideas about what “the virtuous person” would do, viewing such ideas as too abstract and idealized to be of much real use. This chapter explores these objections, and particularly Christine Swanton's virtue ethical account of right action which avoids making any reference to ideal virtuous persons. Swanton argues that such ideals are perilous, and treats virtue as a “threshold concept”, on which one need only be “virtuous enough” to be genuinely virtuous. It is argued that “virtuous enough” has meaning only by relying on an ideal of virtuousness after all, that that ideal threatens none of the perils that worry Swanton, and that that ideal must include phronesis.
David Fisher
- Published in print:
- 2011
- Published Online:
- May 2011
- ISBN:
- 9780199599240
- eISBN:
- 9780191725692
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199599240.001.0001
- Subject:
- Religion, Philosophy of Religion, Religion and Society
There has been a recent revival of interest in the just‐war tradition. But can a medieval theory help us answer twenty‐first‐century security concerns? The book explores how just‐war thinking needs ...
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There has been a recent revival of interest in the just‐war tradition. But can a medieval theory help us answer twenty‐first‐century security concerns? The book explores how just‐war thinking needs to be developed to provide such guidance. Part One examines challenges to just‐war thinking, including those posed by moral scepticism and relativism. It explores the nature and grounds of moral reasoning; the relation between public and private morality; and how just‐war teaching needs to be refashioned to provide practical guidance not just to politicians and generals but to ordinary service people. The complexity and difficulty of moral decision‐making require a new ethical approach—characterized as virtuous consequentialism—that recognizes the importance of both the internal quality and the external effects of agency; and of the moral principles and virtues needed to enact them. Virtuous consequentialism restores to the virtues an importance lost in recent just‐war thinking. Just‐war teaching, so reinforced, is applied in Part Two to address key contemporary security challenges, including the changing nature of war, military pre‐emption and torture, the morality of the Iraq War, and humanitarian intervention. The book concludes that, with the ending of the strategic certainties of the cold war, the need for moral clarity over when, where, and how to start, conduct, and conclude war has never been greater. The just‐war tradition provides not only a robust but also an indispensable guide for addressing the security challenges of the twenty‐first century.Less
There has been a recent revival of interest in the just‐war tradition. But can a medieval theory help us answer twenty‐first‐century security concerns? The book explores how just‐war thinking needs to be developed to provide such guidance. Part One examines challenges to just‐war thinking, including those posed by moral scepticism and relativism. It explores the nature and grounds of moral reasoning; the relation between public and private morality; and how just‐war teaching needs to be refashioned to provide practical guidance not just to politicians and generals but to ordinary service people. The complexity and difficulty of moral decision‐making require a new ethical approach—characterized as virtuous consequentialism—that recognizes the importance of both the internal quality and the external effects of agency; and of the moral principles and virtues needed to enact them. Virtuous consequentialism restores to the virtues an importance lost in recent just‐war thinking. Just‐war teaching, so reinforced, is applied in Part Two to address key contemporary security challenges, including the changing nature of war, military pre‐emption and torture, the morality of the Iraq War, and humanitarian intervention. The book concludes that, with the ending of the strategic certainties of the cold war, the need for moral clarity over when, where, and how to start, conduct, and conclude war has never been greater. The just‐war tradition provides not only a robust but also an indispensable guide for addressing the security challenges of the twenty‐first century.
Daniel C. Russell
- Published in print:
- 2009
- Published Online:
- May 2009
- ISBN:
- 9780199565795
- eISBN:
- 9780191721311
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199565795.003.0011
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Moral Philosophy, Ancient Philosophy
The thesis that the virtues form a unity — in particular, that to have any virtue is to have them all — has struck many as hopelessly ambitious: isn't it obvious that people have some virtues and ...
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The thesis that the virtues form a unity — in particular, that to have any virtue is to have them all — has struck many as hopelessly ambitious: isn't it obvious that people have some virtues and even the phronesis that goes with them, while nonetheless lacking other virtues? This chapter first considers whether the virtues conflict and whether the development of different virtues may be zero-sum, defending a negative answer in each case. It then defends the idea that what unifies the virtues is the phronesis they all share. Finally, it distinguishes between two interpretations of the unity thesis. The unity thesis is typically interpreted as holding that, for any agent, that agent can have phronesis only if that agent also has all the virtues. By contrast, the chapter interprets the unity thesis as holding that any theoretical model of phronesis must also be a model of all the virtues, and argues that, so interpreted, the unity thesis is true.Less
The thesis that the virtues form a unity — in particular, that to have any virtue is to have them all — has struck many as hopelessly ambitious: isn't it obvious that people have some virtues and even the phronesis that goes with them, while nonetheless lacking other virtues? This chapter first considers whether the virtues conflict and whether the development of different virtues may be zero-sum, defending a negative answer in each case. It then defends the idea that what unifies the virtues is the phronesis they all share. Finally, it distinguishes between two interpretations of the unity thesis. The unity thesis is typically interpreted as holding that, for any agent, that agent can have phronesis only if that agent also has all the virtues. By contrast, the chapter interprets the unity thesis as holding that any theoretical model of phronesis must also be a model of all the virtues, and argues that, so interpreted, the unity thesis is true.
Daniel Russell
- Published in print:
- 2005
- Published Online:
- October 2005
- ISBN:
- 9780199282845
- eISBN:
- 9780191602931
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0199282846.003.0007
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Ancient Philosophy
In Philebus, Plato makes clear his view that pleasure is actually part of the agent's own goodness, because her goodness consists in, among other things, the sorts of attitudes she has and ...
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In Philebus, Plato makes clear his view that pleasure is actually part of the agent's own goodness, because her goodness consists in, among other things, the sorts of attitudes she has and perspectives she adopts in the various dimensions of her life, and her pleasure is itself just such a crucial attitude and perspective. When Plato says that pleasure is necessary for happiness, he does not mean that good character could never be enough for happiness without pleasure. Rather, as the dialogue unfolds he reveals that pleasure is actually a part of good character as a whole, the product of reason's transforming all dimensions of the self. Since good character, or virtue, is this sort of whole, pleasure is necessary for happiness, because virtue is sufficient for happiness. Thus, the key to understanding Plato's position can be found in his analysis of the nature of pleasure and how it functions in a person's life. This chapter argues that in Plato's Philebus the pleasure of a virtuous character is necessary and important for happiness because it is a necessary and important part of that character, which, in turn, is what determines happiness.Less
In Philebus, Plato makes clear his view that pleasure is actually part of the agent's own goodness, because her goodness consists in, among other things, the sorts of attitudes she has and perspectives she adopts in the various dimensions of her life, and her pleasure is itself just such a crucial attitude and perspective. When Plato says that pleasure is necessary for happiness, he does not mean that good character could never be enough for happiness without pleasure. Rather, as the dialogue unfolds he reveals that pleasure is actually a part of good character as a whole, the product of reason's transforming all dimensions of the self. Since good character, or virtue, is this sort of whole, pleasure is necessary for happiness, because virtue is sufficient for happiness. Thus, the key to understanding Plato's position can be found in his analysis of the nature of pleasure and how it functions in a person's life. This chapter argues that in Plato's Philebus the pleasure of a virtuous character is necessary and important for happiness because it is a necessary and important part of that character, which, in turn, is what determines happiness.
David Fisher
- Published in print:
- 2011
- Published Online:
- May 2011
- ISBN:
- 9780199599240
- eISBN:
- 9780191725692
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199599240.003.0010
- Subject:
- Religion, Philosophy of Religion, Religion and Society
Following the 9/11 attacks, al‐Qaeda and other terrorist groups pose a threat, operating with global networks and potentially armed with weapons of mass destruction. To counter these threats, US ...
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Following the 9/11 attacks, al‐Qaeda and other terrorist groups pose a threat, operating with global networks and potentially armed with weapons of mass destruction. To counter these threats, US policy‐makers argued that extreme times justify extreme measures. These include pre‐emptive military action to forestall terrorist attacks and new methods of interrogation to uncover them. Just‐war thinking would license neither the new US doctrine of pre‐emption nor the new interrogation techniques. For an absolutist torture is always wrong, but a consequentialist, such as Dershowitz, justifies torture if it could save lives. To understand why torture is wrong we need to deploy all the resources of virtuous consequentialism, attending not just to the consequences but the internal states and character of the torturer and his victim. We want our public servants to be virtuous. Yet we need our special interrogators to be men or women of vice.Less
Following the 9/11 attacks, al‐Qaeda and other terrorist groups pose a threat, operating with global networks and potentially armed with weapons of mass destruction. To counter these threats, US policy‐makers argued that extreme times justify extreme measures. These include pre‐emptive military action to forestall terrorist attacks and new methods of interrogation to uncover them. Just‐war thinking would license neither the new US doctrine of pre‐emption nor the new interrogation techniques. For an absolutist torture is always wrong, but a consequentialist, such as Dershowitz, justifies torture if it could save lives. To understand why torture is wrong we need to deploy all the resources of virtuous consequentialism, attending not just to the consequences but the internal states and character of the torturer and his victim. We want our public servants to be virtuous. Yet we need our special interrogators to be men or women of vice.
David Fisher
- Published in print:
- 2011
- Published Online:
- May 2011
- ISBN:
- 9780199599240
- eISBN:
- 9780191725692
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199599240.003.0001
- Subject:
- Religion, Philosophy of Religion, Religion and Society
The book addresses three challenges to just‐war thinking. First, how can a theory developed in medieval Christendom guide our thinking about war in a predominantly secular and increasingly morally ...
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The book addresses three challenges to just‐war thinking. First, how can a theory developed in medieval Christendom guide our thinking about war in a predominantly secular and increasingly morally sceptical twenty‐first century society? Second, how can a theory developed for the guidance of medieval princes offer help to ordinary service people, including the ‘strategic corporal’ whose tactical decisions may have strategic significance? Third, how can we ensure politicians and service people are not only familiar with just‐war thinking but behave justly. To answer these challenges the book develops in Part One a framework for moral reasoning—called virtuous consequentialism—that seeks to furnish a rationale for moral principles in general and the just‐war principles in particular and also a guide to their application in practice. The just‐war principles, so reinforced, are put to work in Part Two to answer contemporary security challenges.Less
The book addresses three challenges to just‐war thinking. First, how can a theory developed in medieval Christendom guide our thinking about war in a predominantly secular and increasingly morally sceptical twenty‐first century society? Second, how can a theory developed for the guidance of medieval princes offer help to ordinary service people, including the ‘strategic corporal’ whose tactical decisions may have strategic significance? Third, how can we ensure politicians and service people are not only familiar with just‐war thinking but behave justly. To answer these challenges the book develops in Part One a framework for moral reasoning—called virtuous consequentialism—that seeks to furnish a rationale for moral principles in general and the just‐war principles in particular and also a guide to their application in practice. The just‐war principles, so reinforced, are put to work in Part Two to answer contemporary security challenges.
David Fisher
- Published in print:
- 2011
- Published Online:
- May 2011
- ISBN:
- 9780199599240
- eISBN:
- 9780191725692
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199599240.003.0004
- Subject:
- Religion, Philosophy of Religion, Religion and Society
Consequentialists gave reason the role of calculating the consequences for human welfare of our actions. But consequentialists have come under attack from deontologists and virtue ethicists. This ...
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Consequentialists gave reason the role of calculating the consequences for human welfare of our actions. But consequentialists have come under attack from deontologists and virtue ethicists. This chapter seeks to explore common ground, arguing for an approach called ‘virtuous consequentialism’ that draws strength from the rival schools. It recognizes the importance of both the internal quality and the external effects of moral agency; and of the moral principles and the virtues needed to enact them. Learning from the teachings of Aristotle and Aquinas, it proposes a broader vision of what constitutes human flourishing and what consequences are to be attended to in making moral judgements. Recognition of our communitarian nature also helps answer Thrasymachus' challenge: ‘Why should I be just?’ posed in Plato's Republic. Moral rules furnish the guidelines to enable us to live well together in a community.Less
Consequentialists gave reason the role of calculating the consequences for human welfare of our actions. But consequentialists have come under attack from deontologists and virtue ethicists. This chapter seeks to explore common ground, arguing for an approach called ‘virtuous consequentialism’ that draws strength from the rival schools. It recognizes the importance of both the internal quality and the external effects of moral agency; and of the moral principles and the virtues needed to enact them. Learning from the teachings of Aristotle and Aquinas, it proposes a broader vision of what constitutes human flourishing and what consequences are to be attended to in making moral judgements. Recognition of our communitarian nature also helps answer Thrasymachus' challenge: ‘Why should I be just?’ posed in Plato's Republic. Moral rules furnish the guidelines to enable us to live well together in a community.
