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This chapter discusses the four features of paternalism: (1) benefits the patient, (2) needs moral justification, (3) does not have patient’s consent, and (4) the patient believes he can make his own decision, showing why accounts that leave out any of these features is inadequate. It then contrasts the accounts of the justification of paternalism offered by act consequentialism and strict deontology with the justification procedure offered by common morality, and discusses several cases of paternalism.

This chapter surveys several theoretical stances that Hume takes. It discusses Hume's naturalism, and addresses the role of the is—ought argument in his moral theory. That argument is that theorists commonly move from is-statements to ought-statements without justification; and that move often seems to leave the implication that the normative ought-claims are merely objective observations. Because Hume specifically argues against them and is sometimes engaged in showing how his account refutes them, two schools of moral theory — rationalist and intuitionist ethics — are considered to set the background for Hume's theory. Hume's use of virtue theory, some of which is relatively novel and probably even objectionable to traditional virtue theorists is then analysed. It is argued that Hume used the language and paraphernalia of virtue theory primarily because it was the going language of his time and he had to use it if he was to join the ongoing debates.

This introductory chapter begins with a discussion of the vices considered in this essay, namely, sloth, envy, avarice, pride, anger, lust, and gluttony. It argues that these so-called ‘deadly sins’ were correctly named and correctly classed together. Irrespective of their theological background, they are similar in structure in that the agent’s thoughts and desires, while differing in content depending on the vice in question, focus primarily on the self and its position in the world. They are similar also in that in each case they are destructive of that self and prevent its flourishing.

This chapter turns from social psychology to philosophical psychology, arguing that the positive account of personality suggested by situationism is one that virtue theory can naturally embrace, provided that virtues are forms of responsiveness to reasons. It begins by further defending the empirical adequacy of such a personality theory, which some philosophical psychologists have ignored, played down, or explicitly rejected. The rest of the chapter considers several possible virtue-theoretical responses to John Doris' recent charge that no virtue theory embracing the situationist view of personality could be both empirically and normatively adequate. The chapter rejects Doris' assumption that a normatively adequate virtue theory must depict virtues as proclivities to stereotypically “virtuous” behaviors. Rather, the virtue theorist can define character traits in terms of cognitive-affective personality attributes, and define virtues as character traits that are appropriately responsive to reasons. The chapter concludes that virtue theories that make phronesis part of all virtue are in the unique position of standing firmly on the current evidence from social psychology about the nature of personality.

Sexual modesty is a feminist sexual virtue—in one sense, but not another. There are at least two distinct kinds of feminist sexual virtues: first, character traits that allow individual sexual flourishing given the realities of sexism within a specific social context; second, character traits related to sex that encourage feminist change. Modesty is a feminist sexual virtue in the second sense—it encourages feminist change, however minimally. More precisely, modesty is a feminist sexual virtue for those women whose sexuality is overvalued, though not for those women whose sexuality is undervalued. Regrettably, I doubt that sexual modesty is a feminist sexual virtue in the first sense; given the realities of sexism, being modest doesn’t necessarily allow individual women to flourish sexually, but might in fact put a damper on their sex lives. In identifying sexual modesty as a feminist sexual virtue for women, I find a surprising point of agreement with conservative and feminist critic Roger Scruton, though we disagree about why sexual modesty is a virtue for women. However, I put myself at odds with those feminist writers who consider women’s sexually provocative display of their bodies and their sexuality to be a feminist act.

The thesis that the virtues form a unity — in particular, that to have any virtue is to have them all — has struck many as hopelessly ambitious: isn't it obvious that people have some virtues and even the phronesis that goes with them, while nonetheless lacking other virtues? This chapter first considers whether the virtues conflict and whether the development of different virtues may be zero-sum, defending a negative answer in each case. It then defends the idea that what unifies the virtues is the phronesis they all share. Finally, it distinguishes between two interpretations of the unity thesis. The unity thesis is typically interpreted as holding that, for any agent, that agent can have phronesis only if that agent also has all the virtues. By contrast, the chapter interprets the unity thesis as holding that any theoretical model of phronesis must also be a model of all the virtues, and argues that, so interpreted, the unity thesis is true.

Philosophical psychologists have told us that “situationism” is bad news for virtue ethics and virtue theory more generally. Situationism is a research paradigm in social psychology that holds that situational variables have an impact on behavior that tells against disposition-based explanations of behavior. Some philosophical psychologists have argued that since there is little evidence for psychological dispositions, and since virtue theory as such is a normative theory about such dispositions, therefore virtue theory as such is empirically misguided. And since virtue ethics presupposes some theory of the virtues, virtue ethics is empirically misguided, too, and therefore of little practical value to creatures like us. This chapter begins a sustained argument that while situationism is plausible; it is not bad news for virtue theory provided that virtues are understood as forms of responsiveness to reasons. While situationism is bad news for “dispositions” of a certain type, virtues need not and indeed should not be understood as dispositions of this type. The chapter closely examines the contrast between situationism and the more traditional research program it means to replace, namely dispositionism. It then reviews situationism as motivating a positive alternative in personality theory and some positive evidence in favor of that alternative.

This chapter focuses on the Aristotelian virtues of ‘magnificence’ and ‘magnanimity,’ rejecting the popular view that here Aristotle reveals a conception of the virtues as seemly qualities of members of a grand, influential elite. Against this, it is argued first that some virtues are restricted to specific groups because only members of those groups will have the relevant occasion to develop and exercise those virtues; and there is nothing elitist about the thought that unusual social prominence can be such an occasion. Second, it is argued that it is exactly this thought that underlies Aristotle’s account of magnificence and magnanimity, which require distinctive forms of practical reasoning that are made salient only by demands peculiar to positions of social prominence. Lastly, the idea that some virtues are distinctive just in virtue of belonging to an elite class individuates virtues without reference to differences in practical reasoning between them. Such an idea, it is argued, is inimical to the very structure of an Aristotelian virtue theory.

The sensibility theory of morals is a subjectivist theory. To some, this is a sufficient reason for rejection. They insist that morality is objective. It is an objective fact that killing innocent people is wrong. Subjectivism loses sight of this. It makes morality too dependent on us. Subjectivists can respond to this objection in one of two ways. One strategy is to deny that objectivity and subjectivity are incompatible. Another is to deny that morality is objective. The former strategy has been more popular, but the latter is more viable. This chapter argues that objectivity and subjectivity are compatible, but that morality is not objective. It surveys leading ethical theories that have defended objectivism in one or another sense. Some of these objectivist theories are compatible with subjectivism, and others are not. This chapter contends that all of them have insurmountable flaws. It concludes by pointing out that a flight from objectivism need not be a flight from realism. There are moral facts; they are just purely subjective facts.

This chapter examines a body of social-psychological experiments that appear to give evidence against dispositionist accounts of personality and in favor of the importance of situation construal for behavior — a central situationist claim. The interpretation of this evidence has been the subject of enormous recent philosophical controversy. Consequently, the chapter begins by examining the methodology behind these experiments. It then reviews a small but representative sample of four major experiments of this type, and then considers and rejects a number of objections to the situationist interpretations of the findings of these experiments. The chapter argues that the evidence favors situationism, and in particular a cognitive-affective personality theory over a dispositionist one.

This chapter surveys recent work on philosophical issues raised by religious diversity or pluralism. It focuses on four topics. The first is the epistemological challenge of religious diversity. The rationality of commitment to any particular religious tradition seems to be threatened by the existence of rival traditions. The second is the political problem of religious toleration. Religious conflict throughout the world suggests a need for better arguments against religious intolerance than those currently available. The third is the task of understanding the concept of religion. Religious pluralism fuels debate about whether the concept of religion can be defined in terms of necessary and sufficient conditions or, if it cannot, whether it must be analyzed in terms of family resemblances. And the fourth is the enterprise of making constructive comparisons in religious ethics. Similarities and differences between the virtue theories of diverse religious traditions illuminate strengths and weaknesses in the ethical thought of the religions subjected to comparison. The chapter argues from these examples to the conclusion that religious diversity gives rise to several exciting and important problems that ought to be high on the agenda of philosophy of religion.

This chapter looks at the shocking but robust results obtained by social epistemologists in experiments that prompt a situationist attack on virtue theory. Based on a body of troubling results in social psychology, an intriguing critique has been pressed in recent years against virtue ethics, raising doubts both about its moral psychology and about its normative content. Similar discoveries have been made by social psychologists about belief management so that a similar critique can be pressed against virtue epistemology. The chapter shows how the logical structure of scholars' response to the critique of virtue ethics is closely replicated by a response available to the virtue epistemologist.

This chapter introduces virtue epistemology—the shift from evaluating beliefs to evaluating characteristic traits of epistemic agents. Some Mahābhārata episodes and the complexity of dharma come close to Linda Zagzebski’s ‘pure virtue theory’—a form of virtue responsibilism where epistemic excellence lies in regulating search for truth by dispositions called ‘intellectual virtues’. The epic’s condoning of lying (under certain circumstances) introduces the new intellectual virtue of receptivity, the ability to harmonize truth with moral values. However, the focus is on analyzing a ‘good knower’ in terms of relational humility. This disposition is discussed in terms of its difference from mere humility, its foregrounding a will to ignorance in the search for limits of knowledge, and its reaching out to others as sources of epistemic authority. In spite of this enrichment of epistemic virtues through the Mahābhārata, the chapter concludes with limitations of knowing when analysed in this way.

This chapter argues that since it has neither the maximization component of utilitarianism, nor the deontological constraints of rights theory, virtue ethics can restrict animal experimentation to a narrow set of justified cases, while not prohibiting it outright. It contends that virtue theory can capture the general appeal of both utilitarianism and rights theory while avoiding the major problems of each. It also addresses six relevant elements in morally evaluating animal research programs. In light of these six conditions, this chapter suggests that very few cases of animal experimentation will be clearly justified.

This chapter moves from the concept of happiness to a particular conception of it, beginning with the very idea that virtuous activity could have anything to do with happiness. Instead of beginning with a fixed notion of virtuous activity and arguing that it is important for happiness, this chapter argues that eudaimonia affords a good place to begin in thinking about what counts as an excellence or virtue in a human being in the first place. The chapter focuses on the formal constraints on conceptions of happiness that Aristotle proposed, and argues that a life of virtuous activity meets those constraints.

This chapter relocates the debate about the theoretical virtues to the empirical level and argues that the question of whether the virtues (and what virtues, if any) have epistemic import is best answered empirically, through an examination of actual scientific theories and hypotheses in the history of science. As a concrete example of this approach, the chapter discusses a case study from the mid-nineteenth-century debate about the transmissibility of puerperal fever. It argues that this case shows that the virtues are at least sometimes epistemic, but also that neither scientific realists nor anti-realists get it quite right: the virtues, even if epistemic, are not necessarily truth-conducive, but neither are they merely pragmatic. It also argues that the discussion of puerperal fever shows that the virtue question, as it is currently featured in the scientific realism debate, ought to be reformulated. We should examine not just whether a given scientific theory has virtues or not, but rather how debates among competing theories, all of which have some virtues, get resolved.