Gillian Russell
- Published in print:
- 2008
- Published Online:
- May 2008
- ISBN:
- 9780199232192
- eISBN:
- 9780191715907
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199232192.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Language
The analytic/synthetic distinction looks simple. It is a distinction between two different kinds of sentence: synthetic sentences are true in part because of the way the world is, and in part because ...
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The analytic/synthetic distinction looks simple. It is a distinction between two different kinds of sentence: synthetic sentences are true in part because of the way the world is, and in part because of what they mean, whereas analytic sentences — like all bachelors are unmarried and triangles have three sides — are different; they are true in virtue of meaning and so, no matter what the world is like, as long as the sentence means what it does, it will be true. The distinction seems powerful because analytic sentences seem to be knowable in a special way; one can know that all bachelors are unmarried, for example, just by thinking about what it means. But many 20th-century philosophers, with Quine in the lead, argued that there were no analytic sentences, that the idea of analyticity didn't even make sense and that the analytic/synthetic distinction was therefore an illusion. Others couldn't see how there could fail to be a distinction, however ingenious the arguments. But since the heyday of the debate, things have changed in the philosophy of language. Tools have been refined, confusions cleared up, and most significantly, many philosophers now accept a view of language — semantic externalism — on which it is possible to see how the distinction could fail. One might be tempted to think that ultimately the distinction has fallen for reasons other than those proposed in the original debate. This book argues that it hasn't. It uses the tools of contemporary philosophy of language to outline a view of analytic sentences which is compatible with semantic externalism, and defends that view against the old Quinean arguments. It then goes on to draw out some surprising epistemological consequences.Less
The analytic/synthetic distinction looks simple. It is a distinction between two different kinds of sentence: synthetic sentences are true in part because of the way the world is, and in part because of what they mean, whereas analytic sentences — like all bachelors are unmarried and triangles have three sides — are different; they are true in virtue of meaning and so, no matter what the world is like, as long as the sentence means what it does, it will be true. The distinction seems powerful because analytic sentences seem to be knowable in a special way; one can know that all bachelors are unmarried, for example, just by thinking about what it means. But many 20th-century philosophers, with Quine in the lead, argued that there were no analytic sentences, that the idea of analyticity didn't even make sense and that the analytic/synthetic distinction was therefore an illusion. Others couldn't see how there could fail to be a distinction, however ingenious the arguments. But since the heyday of the debate, things have changed in the philosophy of language. Tools have been refined, confusions cleared up, and most significantly, many philosophers now accept a view of language — semantic externalism — on which it is possible to see how the distinction could fail. One might be tempted to think that ultimately the distinction has fallen for reasons other than those proposed in the original debate. This book argues that it hasn't. It uses the tools of contemporary philosophy of language to outline a view of analytic sentences which is compatible with semantic externalism, and defends that view against the old Quinean arguments. It then goes on to draw out some surprising epistemological consequences.
Gillian Russell
- Published in print:
- 2008
- Published Online:
- May 2008
- ISBN:
- 9780199232192
- eISBN:
- 9780191715907
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199232192.003.0003
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Language
The traditional account of the analytic/synthetic distinction is based on a naive folk theory of language. This chapter explains how that folk theory supported a particular version of the ...
More
The traditional account of the analytic/synthetic distinction is based on a naive folk theory of language. This chapter explains how that folk theory supported a particular version of the analytic/synthetic distinction. It then provides alternatives to the folk picture and argues that we should distinguish four different kinds of meaning: character, content, reference determiner, and referent. This more fine-grained picture allows us to reconstruct analyticity as truth in virtue of reference determiner, which is more easily defended against the old arguments against analyticity. This move also solves the worry about equating analytic sentences with those that express necessary truths, and allows us to account for the status of the contingent analytic and the necessary a posteriori.Less
The traditional account of the analytic/synthetic distinction is based on a naive folk theory of language. This chapter explains how that folk theory supported a particular version of the analytic/synthetic distinction. It then provides alternatives to the folk picture and argues that we should distinguish four different kinds of meaning: character, content, reference determiner, and referent. This more fine-grained picture allows us to reconstruct analyticity as truth in virtue of reference determiner, which is more easily defended against the old arguments against analyticity. This move also solves the worry about equating analytic sentences with those that express necessary truths, and allows us to account for the status of the contingent analytic and the necessary a posteriori.
Gillian Russell
- Published in print:
- 2008
- Published Online:
- May 2008
- ISBN:
- 9780199232192
- eISBN:
- 9780191715907
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199232192.003.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Language
This chapter introduces and motivates study of the analytic/synthetic distinction, and provides a brief history of that distinction. It also contains some preliminaries which will be of use in the ...
More
This chapter introduces and motivates study of the analytic/synthetic distinction, and provides a brief history of that distinction. It also contains some preliminaries which will be of use in the rest of the book.Less
This chapter introduces and motivates study of the analytic/synthetic distinction, and provides a brief history of that distinction. It also contains some preliminaries which will be of use in the rest of the book.
Hale Bob
- Published in print:
- 2013
- Published Online:
- January 2014
- ISBN:
- 9780199669578
- eISBN:
- 9780191765186
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199669578.003.0006
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology, Logic/Philosophy of Mathematics
When it is necessary that p, what makes it so? In Michael Dummett’s words, what is the source of necessity? Some old arguments of Quine and Dummettare rehearsed, which show that not all necessities ...
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When it is necessary that p, what makes it so? In Michael Dummett’s words, what is the source of necessity? Some old arguments of Quine and Dummettare rehearsed, which show that not all necessities can be the product of conventions, and a further argument is given to show that none can. These arguments apply most clearly to conventionalism, but can be extended to cover looser versions of the linguistic theory which claim that necessity reduces to truth in virtue of meaning. Since matters of meaning and convention are contingent, defenders of conventionalism and truth in virtue of meaning must reject the S4 principle that what is necessary is necessarily so. As against this, it is argued that the logic of absolute necessity is the yet stronger modal logic S5. To complete the discussion of Blackburn’s Dilemma (see Ch.3), it is argued that the necessity-horn of that dilemma overlooks the possibility of non-transmissive explanations of necessity. Such explanations may be given in terms of the nature or essence of the logical functions.Less
When it is necessary that p, what makes it so? In Michael Dummett’s words, what is the source of necessity? Some old arguments of Quine and Dummettare rehearsed, which show that not all necessities can be the product of conventions, and a further argument is given to show that none can. These arguments apply most clearly to conventionalism, but can be extended to cover looser versions of the linguistic theory which claim that necessity reduces to truth in virtue of meaning. Since matters of meaning and convention are contingent, defenders of conventionalism and truth in virtue of meaning must reject the S4 principle that what is necessary is necessarily so. As against this, it is argued that the logic of absolute necessity is the yet stronger modal logic S5. To complete the discussion of Blackburn’s Dilemma (see Ch.3), it is argued that the necessity-horn of that dilemma overlooks the possibility of non-transmissive explanations of necessity. Such explanations may be given in terms of the nature or essence of the logical functions.
