Miranda Fricker
- Published in print:
- 2007
- Published Online:
- September 2007
- ISBN:
- 9780198237907
- eISBN:
- 9780191706844
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198237907.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology
Justice is one of the oldest and most central themes of philosophy, but sometimes we would do well to focus instead on injustice. In epistemology, the very idea that there is a first-order ethical ...
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Justice is one of the oldest and most central themes of philosophy, but sometimes we would do well to focus instead on injustice. In epistemology, the very idea that there is a first-order ethical dimension to our epistemic practices — the idea that there is such a thing as epistemic justice — remains obscure until we adjust the philosophical lens so that we see through to the negative space that is epistemic injustice. This book argues that there is a distinctively epistemic genus of injustice, in which someone is wronged specifically in their capacity as a knower, wronged therefore in a capacity essential to human value. The book identifies two forms of epistemic injustice: testimonial injustice and hermeneutical injustice. In doing so, it charts the ethical dimension of two fundamental epistemic practices: gaining knowledge by being told and making sense of our social experiences. As the account unfolds, the book travels through a range of philosophical problems. Thus, the book finds an analysis of social power; an account of prejudicial stereotypes; a characterization of two hybrid intellectual-ethical virtues; a revised account of the State of Nature used in genealogical explanations of the concept of knowledge; a discussion of objectification and ‘silencing’; and a framework for a virtue epistemological account of testimony. The book reveals epistemic injustice as a potent yet largely silent dimension of discrimination, analyses the wrong it perpetrates, and constructs two hybrid ethical-intellectual virtues of epistemic justice which aim to forestall it.Less
Justice is one of the oldest and most central themes of philosophy, but sometimes we would do well to focus instead on injustice. In epistemology, the very idea that there is a first-order ethical dimension to our epistemic practices — the idea that there is such a thing as epistemic justice — remains obscure until we adjust the philosophical lens so that we see through to the negative space that is epistemic injustice. This book argues that there is a distinctively epistemic genus of injustice, in which someone is wronged specifically in their capacity as a knower, wronged therefore in a capacity essential to human value. The book identifies two forms of epistemic injustice: testimonial injustice and hermeneutical injustice. In doing so, it charts the ethical dimension of two fundamental epistemic practices: gaining knowledge by being told and making sense of our social experiences. As the account unfolds, the book travels through a range of philosophical problems. Thus, the book finds an analysis of social power; an account of prejudicial stereotypes; a characterization of two hybrid intellectual-ethical virtues; a revised account of the State of Nature used in genealogical explanations of the concept of knowledge; a discussion of objectification and ‘silencing’; and a framework for a virtue epistemological account of testimony. The book reveals epistemic injustice as a potent yet largely silent dimension of discrimination, analyses the wrong it perpetrates, and constructs two hybrid ethical-intellectual virtues of epistemic justice which aim to forestall it.
Jason Baehr
- Published in print:
- 2011
- Published Online:
- September 2011
- ISBN:
- 9780199604074
- eISBN:
- 9780191729300
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199604074.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind
This book is a contribution to “responsibilist” or character‐based virtue‐epistemology, which is an approach to epistemology that gives a primary role to reflection on intellectual character virtues ...
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This book is a contribution to “responsibilist” or character‐based virtue‐epistemology, which is an approach to epistemology that gives a primary role to reflection on intellectual character virtues like inquisitiveness, open‐mindedness, carefulness and thoroughness in inquiry, and intellectual courage, rigor, and generosity. Beyond providing an accessible introduction to virtue epistemology and intellectual virtues, the book has two main goals. The first is to shed light on the nature and structure of intellectual virtues and their role in the cognitive economy. To this end, it examines the difference between intellectual virtues and intellectual faculties, talents, temperaments and skills, develops a “personal worth” account of the nature of an intellectual virtue, contrasts this account with several others, and provides analyses of two individual virtues: namely, open‐mindedness and intellectual courage. The second main goal is to account for the role that reflection on intellectual character virtues should play within epistemology at large. Here three main claims are defended. The first is that the concept of intellectual virtue does not merit a central or fundamental role with traditional epistemology. The second is that it does, nonetheless, merit a secondary or background role in this context. The third is that intellectual character virtues and their role in the intellectual life considered in their own right can form the basis an approach to epistemology that is distinct from but complementary to traditional epistemology. Finally, an Appendix examines the relation between intellectual and moral virtues.Less
This book is a contribution to “responsibilist” or character‐based virtue‐epistemology, which is an approach to epistemology that gives a primary role to reflection on intellectual character virtues like inquisitiveness, open‐mindedness, carefulness and thoroughness in inquiry, and intellectual courage, rigor, and generosity. Beyond providing an accessible introduction to virtue epistemology and intellectual virtues, the book has two main goals. The first is to shed light on the nature and structure of intellectual virtues and their role in the cognitive economy. To this end, it examines the difference between intellectual virtues and intellectual faculties, talents, temperaments and skills, develops a “personal worth” account of the nature of an intellectual virtue, contrasts this account with several others, and provides analyses of two individual virtues: namely, open‐mindedness and intellectual courage. The second main goal is to account for the role that reflection on intellectual character virtues should play within epistemology at large. Here three main claims are defended. The first is that the concept of intellectual virtue does not merit a central or fundamental role with traditional epistemology. The second is that it does, nonetheless, merit a secondary or background role in this context. The third is that intellectual character virtues and their role in the intellectual life considered in their own right can form the basis an approach to epistemology that is distinct from but complementary to traditional epistemology. Finally, an Appendix examines the relation between intellectual and moral virtues.
Alvin I. Goldman
- Published in print:
- 2012
- Published Online:
- May 2012
- ISBN:
- 9780199812875
- eISBN:
- 9780199933150
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199812875.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology, General
This is a collection of chapters by the leading proponent of process reliabilism, explaining its relation to rival and/or neighboring theories including evidentialism, other forms of reliabilism, and ...
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This is a collection of chapters by the leading proponent of process reliabilism, explaining its relation to rival and/or neighboring theories including evidentialism, other forms of reliabilism, and virtue epistemology. It addresses other prominent themes in contemporary epistemology, such as the internalism/externalism debate, the epistemological upshots of experimental challenges to intuitional methodology, the source of epistemic value, and social epistemology. The Introduction addresses late-breaking responses to ongoing exchanges with friends, rivals, and critics of reliabilism.Less
This is a collection of chapters by the leading proponent of process reliabilism, explaining its relation to rival and/or neighboring theories including evidentialism, other forms of reliabilism, and virtue epistemology. It addresses other prominent themes in contemporary epistemology, such as the internalism/externalism debate, the epistemological upshots of experimental challenges to intuitional methodology, the source of epistemic value, and social epistemology. The Introduction addresses late-breaking responses to ongoing exchanges with friends, rivals, and critics of reliabilism.
Talbot Brewer
- Published in print:
- 2009
- Published Online:
- May 2009
- ISBN:
- 9780199557882
- eISBN:
- 9780191720918
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199557882.003.0009
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Moral Philosophy
Anglo‐American philosophy has recently seen two simultaneous virtue‐theoretic revivals — one in ethics and the other in epistemology. One might naturally assume that these are two manifestations of a ...
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Anglo‐American philosophy has recently seen two simultaneous virtue‐theoretic revivals — one in ethics and the other in epistemology. One might naturally assume that these are two manifestations of a single resurgent conception of normativity, but in fact virtue epistemology has thus far been built upon a far more conventional conceptual foundation than the best work in virtue ethics. The real promise of virtue epistemology lies not in resolving puzzles that already preoccupy epistemologists but in inducing a fundamental shift in the scope, ambitions and agenda of epistemology. The aim of this chapter is to argue in favor of a fundamental shift of this sort. The guiding thought is that if we are to locate a telos of theoretical reflection with reference to which we can identify virtuous intellectual dispositions or capacities, we should look not towards the conventional epistemological goals of true belief or propositional knowledge, but towards fully actualized understanding. The chapter closes by showing how this change in view makes possible a unified account of ethical and epistemic virtues.Less
Anglo‐American philosophy has recently seen two simultaneous virtue‐theoretic revivals — one in ethics and the other in epistemology. One might naturally assume that these are two manifestations of a single resurgent conception of normativity, but in fact virtue epistemology has thus far been built upon a far more conventional conceptual foundation than the best work in virtue ethics. The real promise of virtue epistemology lies not in resolving puzzles that already preoccupy epistemologists but in inducing a fundamental shift in the scope, ambitions and agenda of epistemology. The aim of this chapter is to argue in favor of a fundamental shift of this sort. The guiding thought is that if we are to locate a telos of theoretical reflection with reference to which we can identify virtuous intellectual dispositions or capacities, we should look not towards the conventional epistemological goals of true belief or propositional knowledge, but towards fully actualized understanding. The chapter closes by showing how this change in view makes possible a unified account of ethical and epistemic virtues.
Michael DePaul and Linda Zagzebski (eds)
- Published in print:
- 2003
- Published Online:
- September 2010
- ISBN:
- 9780199252732
- eISBN:
- 9780191719288
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199252732.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Moral Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology
Virtues have always been vital to the work of ethicists, but only recently have been analyzed and employed by epistemologists. By shifting the loci of analyses from properties of beliefs to ...
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Virtues have always been vital to the work of ethicists, but only recently have been analyzed and employed by epistemologists. By shifting the loci of analyses from properties of beliefs to intellectual traits of agents, a formidable epistemological movement has birthed into what has been called virtue epistemology. Ironically, although virtue epistemology got its inspiration from virtue ethics, this is the first book that brings virtue epistemologists and virtue ethicists together to contribute their particular expertise, and the first that is devoted to the topic of intellectual virtue. Virtue epistemology has received considerable interest as an alternative to traditional approaches in epistemology. This book provides different accounts of what is an intellectual virtue — why it is epistemically valuable — and how intellectual virtues can provide greater clarity in understanding the traditional targets of analysis: namely, knowledge, rationality, and justification. For example, some accounts take knowledge or justified beliefs to be a reliable belief-forming process or faculty or agent. Other accounts take a more robust form of virtue epistemology wherein the fundamental bearer of epistemic value is an intellectual virtue akin to the kinds of virtues used in ethics. Still other accounts model the structure of an epistemic theory on virtue ethics. The aim of this book, then, is to provide a collective effort that helps resolve some of the vexing problems in epistemology by understanding how virtue ethics and the concept of a virtue can do significant epistemological work. What is more, this book aims to bring together both the knowledge and perspectives of virtue ethicists and virtue epistemologists so as to advance the contributions each discipline provides to the other.Less
Virtues have always been vital to the work of ethicists, but only recently have been analyzed and employed by epistemologists. By shifting the loci of analyses from properties of beliefs to intellectual traits of agents, a formidable epistemological movement has birthed into what has been called virtue epistemology. Ironically, although virtue epistemology got its inspiration from virtue ethics, this is the first book that brings virtue epistemologists and virtue ethicists together to contribute their particular expertise, and the first that is devoted to the topic of intellectual virtue. Virtue epistemology has received considerable interest as an alternative to traditional approaches in epistemology. This book provides different accounts of what is an intellectual virtue — why it is epistemically valuable — and how intellectual virtues can provide greater clarity in understanding the traditional targets of analysis: namely, knowledge, rationality, and justification. For example, some accounts take knowledge or justified beliefs to be a reliable belief-forming process or faculty or agent. Other accounts take a more robust form of virtue epistemology wherein the fundamental bearer of epistemic value is an intellectual virtue akin to the kinds of virtues used in ethics. Still other accounts model the structure of an epistemic theory on virtue ethics. The aim of this book, then, is to provide a collective effort that helps resolve some of the vexing problems in epistemology by understanding how virtue ethics and the concept of a virtue can do significant epistemological work. What is more, this book aims to bring together both the knowledge and perspectives of virtue ethicists and virtue epistemologists so as to advance the contributions each discipline provides to the other.
Talbot Brewer
- Published in print:
- 2009
- Published Online:
- May 2009
- ISBN:
- 9780199557882
- eISBN:
- 9780191720918
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199557882.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Moral Philosophy
The virtue ethics movement in recent philosophical ethics can usefully be divided into two quite separate streams of thought. Some have turned to the texts of Plato and Aristotle for new answers to ...
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The virtue ethics movement in recent philosophical ethics can usefully be divided into two quite separate streams of thought. Some have turned to the texts of Plato and Aristotle for new answers to established questions in philosophical ethics, while others have sought a vantage point from which the basic questions of the field could themselves be put in question. The aim of this book is to elaborate and defend a version of the second, more radical sort of virtue ethics. The book begins with a fundamental reconsideration of the way in which thought makes itself practical in temporally extended activities and lives. This reconsideration yields an alternative picture of the self — a picture with recognizably Aristotelian and Platonic elements — and puts that picture to work in retrieving an unfamiliar conception of the proper task of philosophical ethics, one that provides a suitable home for retrieving the virtue concepts. The critical bite of the book is directed in the first instance at ideas that are prevalent among philosophers. Yet there is reason to think that these philosophical ideas express a conception of the self that shapes contemporary Western culture, and that hinders our capacity to make full sense of our activities, passions, and lives, or to attain full articulacy about the values to which we might hope to answer. The book argues that the rise of the fact/value distinction and of the characteristically modern distinction between person‐relative and impersonal goods are best understood as a story of encroaching confusion and not as the story of progressive discovery that they are often taken to be. The book culminates in an attempt to show that the ethical and epistemic virtues conduce to a single, monistic sort of goodness that fosters intimate relationships as well as healthy political community, and that overcomes the putative opposition between self‐interest and morality.Less
The virtue ethics movement in recent philosophical ethics can usefully be divided into two quite separate streams of thought. Some have turned to the texts of Plato and Aristotle for new answers to established questions in philosophical ethics, while others have sought a vantage point from which the basic questions of the field could themselves be put in question. The aim of this book is to elaborate and defend a version of the second, more radical sort of virtue ethics. The book begins with a fundamental reconsideration of the way in which thought makes itself practical in temporally extended activities and lives. This reconsideration yields an alternative picture of the self — a picture with recognizably Aristotelian and Platonic elements — and puts that picture to work in retrieving an unfamiliar conception of the proper task of philosophical ethics, one that provides a suitable home for retrieving the virtue concepts. The critical bite of the book is directed in the first instance at ideas that are prevalent among philosophers. Yet there is reason to think that these philosophical ideas express a conception of the self that shapes contemporary Western culture, and that hinders our capacity to make full sense of our activities, passions, and lives, or to attain full articulacy about the values to which we might hope to answer. The book argues that the rise of the fact/value distinction and of the characteristically modern distinction between person‐relative and impersonal goods are best understood as a story of encroaching confusion and not as the story of progressive discovery that they are often taken to be. The book culminates in an attempt to show that the ethical and epistemic virtues conduce to a single, monistic sort of goodness that fosters intimate relationships as well as healthy political community, and that overcomes the putative opposition between self‐interest and morality.
Duncan Pritchard
- Published in print:
- 2010
- Published Online:
- September 2010
- ISBN:
- 9780199586264
- eISBN:
- 9780191723360
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199586264.003.0003
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology, General
This chapter canvasses two master intuitions about knowledge: the ability intuition and the anti-luck intuition. It argues that a robust anti-luck epistemology, which takes the anti-luck intuition as ...
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This chapter canvasses two master intuitions about knowledge: the ability intuition and the anti-luck intuition. It argues that a robust anti-luck epistemology, which takes the anti-luck intuition as central, cannot accommodate the ability intuition, and that a robust virtue epistemology which takes the ability intuition as central cannot accommodate the anti-luck intuition. It is suggested that the proper moral to be extracted from this impasse is that we need an anti-luck virtue epistemology — a theory of knowledge which incorporates two separate epistemic conditions designed to accommodate each of the two master intuitions about knowledge. Such a view can accommodate a range of key examples of interest to epistemologists. A genealogical diagnosis of the structure of knowledge is offered which supports this proposal. Anti-luck virtue epistemology can adequately respond to those versions of the value problem for knowledge which do not trade on the intuition that knowledge is finally valuable.Less
This chapter canvasses two master intuitions about knowledge: the ability intuition and the anti-luck intuition. It argues that a robust anti-luck epistemology, which takes the anti-luck intuition as central, cannot accommodate the ability intuition, and that a robust virtue epistemology which takes the ability intuition as central cannot accommodate the anti-luck intuition. It is suggested that the proper moral to be extracted from this impasse is that we need an anti-luck virtue epistemology — a theory of knowledge which incorporates two separate epistemic conditions designed to accommodate each of the two master intuitions about knowledge. Such a view can accommodate a range of key examples of interest to epistemologists. A genealogical diagnosis of the structure of knowledge is offered which supports this proposal. Anti-luck virtue epistemology can adequately respond to those versions of the value problem for knowledge which do not trade on the intuition that knowledge is finally valuable.
Christopher Hookway
- Published in print:
- 2003
- Published Online:
- September 2010
- ISBN:
- 9780199252732
- eISBN:
- 9780191719288
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199252732.003.0009
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Moral Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology
This chapter points out that standard versions of virtue epistemology accept and are motivated by the same central problems in epistemology — such as analyzing the concepts of knowledge and ...
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This chapter points out that standard versions of virtue epistemology accept and are motivated by the same central problems in epistemology — such as analyzing the concepts of knowledge and justification, and addressing skeptical challenges — which motivate contemporary epistemology. The only significant difference is that virtue epistemology claims that the concepts of knowledge and justification must be analyzed in terms of virtues. What motivates virtue ethicists, however, is not what is motivating other ethicists. The contemporary census amongst ethicists has a different set of problems than the ones motivating virtue ethicists. Virtue epistemologists should mount a similar challenge to their contemporaries: instead of focusing on static states such as beliefs and evaluating whether or not they are justified, they should focus their efforts on evaluating and regulating the activities of inquiry and deliberation, and the role which virtues play in such evaluation and regulation.Less
This chapter points out that standard versions of virtue epistemology accept and are motivated by the same central problems in epistemology — such as analyzing the concepts of knowledge and justification, and addressing skeptical challenges — which motivate contemporary epistemology. The only significant difference is that virtue epistemology claims that the concepts of knowledge and justification must be analyzed in terms of virtues. What motivates virtue ethicists, however, is not what is motivating other ethicists. The contemporary census amongst ethicists has a different set of problems than the ones motivating virtue ethicists. Virtue epistemologists should mount a similar challenge to their contemporaries: instead of focusing on static states such as beliefs and evaluating whether or not they are justified, they should focus their efforts on evaluating and regulating the activities of inquiry and deliberation, and the role which virtues play in such evaluation and regulation.
David Solomon
- Published in print:
- 2003
- Published Online:
- September 2010
- ISBN:
- 9780199252732
- eISBN:
- 9780191719288
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199252732.003.0004
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Moral Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology
This chapter explains why virtue ethics in the latter twentieth century has taken the following two forms: (i) the first form orders evaluative concepts and then argues that the concept of a virtue ...
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This chapter explains why virtue ethics in the latter twentieth century has taken the following two forms: (i) the first form orders evaluative concepts and then argues that the concept of a virtue is more basic than the concepts of a right act and a good state of affairs; (ii) the second form focuses on deeper questions about the nature and ambition of modern ethics and its ability to satisfy our need for reflective guidance. The former is a common approach given its focus on arguments for theory construction. The latter is more radical given that its themes are suspicious of rules and principles and, sometimes, moral theory itself. Because so many debates over virtue ethics reduce to debates over the kind of criteria needed to judge ethical theories, they will remain unresolved. Epistemologists must learn from moral philosophers about the myriad usages of virtue in language, as well as the different models each usage is working within.Less
This chapter explains why virtue ethics in the latter twentieth century has taken the following two forms: (i) the first form orders evaluative concepts and then argues that the concept of a virtue is more basic than the concepts of a right act and a good state of affairs; (ii) the second form focuses on deeper questions about the nature and ambition of modern ethics and its ability to satisfy our need for reflective guidance. The former is a common approach given its focus on arguments for theory construction. The latter is more radical given that its themes are suspicious of rules and principles and, sometimes, moral theory itself. Because so many debates over virtue ethics reduce to debates over the kind of criteria needed to judge ethical theories, they will remain unresolved. Epistemologists must learn from moral philosophers about the myriad usages of virtue in language, as well as the different models each usage is working within.
Linda Zagzebski and Michael DePaul (eds)
- Published in print:
- 2003
- Published Online:
- September 2010
- ISBN:
- 9780199252732
- eISBN:
- 9780191719288
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199252732.003.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Moral Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology
It is high time for both ethicists and epistemologists to directly engage with each other. By bringing together each discipline's knowledge and perspective, relative to understanding the nature of ...
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It is high time for both ethicists and epistemologists to directly engage with each other. By bringing together each discipline's knowledge and perspective, relative to understanding the nature of intellectual virtues and vices, progress in answering some of epistemology's and ethics' vexing questions and disputes can be advanced. When epistemologists and ethicists analyze the nature and scope that intellectual virtues such as intellectual carefulness, thoroughness, humility, courage, autonomy, and fairness have on their disciplines, a deeper understanding of how humans form beliefs and conduct their moral lives surfaces. Because much of the work on intellectual virtues branches out into distinct historical, ethical, and epistemological projects, there is a lack of interdisciplinary participation amongst scholars. This book provides a remedy to this problem by bringing together historians, ethicists, and epistemologists into direct conversation with each other. The result of this unifying effort is an edited volume of essays written by some of the leading scholars in epistemology and ethics.Less
It is high time for both ethicists and epistemologists to directly engage with each other. By bringing together each discipline's knowledge and perspective, relative to understanding the nature of intellectual virtues and vices, progress in answering some of epistemology's and ethics' vexing questions and disputes can be advanced. When epistemologists and ethicists analyze the nature and scope that intellectual virtues such as intellectual carefulness, thoroughness, humility, courage, autonomy, and fairness have on their disciplines, a deeper understanding of how humans form beliefs and conduct their moral lives surfaces. Because much of the work on intellectual virtues branches out into distinct historical, ethical, and epistemological projects, there is a lack of interdisciplinary participation amongst scholars. This book provides a remedy to this problem by bringing together historians, ethicists, and epistemologists into direct conversation with each other. The result of this unifying effort is an edited volume of essays written by some of the leading scholars in epistemology and ethics.
Jason Baehr
- Published in print:
- 2011
- Published Online:
- September 2011
- ISBN:
- 9780199604074
- eISBN:
- 9780191729300
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199604074.003.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind
This chapter provides an introduction to intellectual virtues and virtue epistemology as well as an overview of the rest of the book. Several extended examples of intellectual virtue are given. This ...
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This chapter provides an introduction to intellectual virtues and virtue epistemology as well as an overview of the rest of the book. Several extended examples of intellectual virtue are given. This is followed by a brief history of virtue epistemology and a four‐fold classification of character‐based approaches to virtue epistemology. According to the classification, approaches to virtue epistemology fall into two main categories. Conservative virtue epistemology appeals to the concept of intellectual virtue in order to address or “solve” one or more problems in traditional epistemology. Autonomous approaches focus on intellectual character and virtues considered more or less in their own right. Each type also admits of both a stronger and weaker variety, making for a total of four varieties of character‐based virtue epistemology. Finally, a summary is provided of each of the remaining chapters.Less
This chapter provides an introduction to intellectual virtues and virtue epistemology as well as an overview of the rest of the book. Several extended examples of intellectual virtue are given. This is followed by a brief history of virtue epistemology and a four‐fold classification of character‐based approaches to virtue epistemology. According to the classification, approaches to virtue epistemology fall into two main categories. Conservative virtue epistemology appeals to the concept of intellectual virtue in order to address or “solve” one or more problems in traditional epistemology. Autonomous approaches focus on intellectual character and virtues considered more or less in their own right. Each type also admits of both a stronger and weaker variety, making for a total of four varieties of character‐based virtue epistemology. Finally, a summary is provided of each of the remaining chapters.
Jason Baehr
- Published in print:
- 2011
- Published Online:
- September 2011
- ISBN:
- 9780199604074
- eISBN:
- 9780191729300
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199604074.003.0010
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind
This chapter draws together several elements of the preceding chapters by considering their implications for the viability of the four main varieties of character‐based virtue epistemology outlined ...
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This chapter draws together several elements of the preceding chapters by considering their implications for the viability of the four main varieties of character‐based virtue epistemology outlined in Chapter 1. The main focus is the weaker and stronger versions of autonomous virtue epistemology. The stronger version maintains that an immediate or autonomous focus on intellectual virtues and their role in the cognitive life should replace or supplant traditional epistemological theorizing. The weaker version considers an immediate theoretical concern with intellectual virtues a proper complement to traditional epistemology. It is argued, contra Jonathan Kvanvig (1992), that the stronger version of autonomous virtue epistemology is unwarranted, but that the weaker version has considerable promise, and indeed that it likely represents the way of the future in character‐based virtue epistemology.Less
This chapter draws together several elements of the preceding chapters by considering their implications for the viability of the four main varieties of character‐based virtue epistemology outlined in Chapter 1. The main focus is the weaker and stronger versions of autonomous virtue epistemology. The stronger version maintains that an immediate or autonomous focus on intellectual virtues and their role in the cognitive life should replace or supplant traditional epistemological theorizing. The weaker version considers an immediate theoretical concern with intellectual virtues a proper complement to traditional epistemology. It is argued, contra Jonathan Kvanvig (1992), that the stronger version of autonomous virtue epistemology is unwarranted, but that the weaker version has considerable promise, and indeed that it likely represents the way of the future in character‐based virtue epistemology.
Duncan Pritchard
- Published in print:
- 2005
- Published Online:
- April 2005
- ISBN:
- 9780199280384
- eISBN:
- 9780191602290
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/019928038X.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology
One of the key supposed ‘platitudes’ of contemporary epistemology is the claim that knowledge excludes luck. One can see the attraction of such a claim, in that knowledge is something that one can ...
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One of the key supposed ‘platitudes’ of contemporary epistemology is the claim that knowledge excludes luck. One can see the attraction of such a claim, in that knowledge is something that one can take credit for; it is an achievement of sorts, and yet luck undermines genuine achievements. The problem, however, is that luck seems to be an all-pervasive feature of our epistemic enterprises that tempts us to think that either scepticism is true, and we don’t know very much after all, or else knowledge is compatible with knowledge after all. My claim is that we do not need to choose between these two austere alternatives, since a closer inspection of what is involved in the notion of epistemic luck reveals varieties of luck that are compatible with knowledge possession and varieties that aren’t. We can thus do justice to the intuition that knowledge is compatible with (some forms of) luck without acceding to the sceptical claim that we do not know as much as we think we do. Nevertheless, I also claim that there is a sceptical problem lurking in the background that is related to the problem of epistemic luck, though it is not best thought of in terms of the possession of knowledge.Less
One of the key supposed ‘platitudes’ of contemporary epistemology is the claim that knowledge excludes luck. One can see the attraction of such a claim, in that knowledge is something that one can take credit for; it is an achievement of sorts, and yet luck undermines genuine achievements. The problem, however, is that luck seems to be an all-pervasive feature of our epistemic enterprises that tempts us to think that either scepticism is true, and we don’t know very much after all, or else knowledge is compatible with knowledge after all. My claim is that we do not need to choose between these two austere alternatives, since a closer inspection of what is involved in the notion of epistemic luck reveals varieties of luck that are compatible with knowledge possession and varieties that aren’t. We can thus do justice to the intuition that knowledge is compatible with (some forms of) luck without acceding to the sceptical claim that we do not know as much as we think we do. Nevertheless, I also claim that there is a sceptical problem lurking in the background that is related to the problem of epistemic luck, though it is not best thought of in terms of the possession of knowledge.
Ernest Sosa
- Published in print:
- 2007
- Published Online:
- September 2007
- ISBN:
- 9780199297023
- eISBN:
- 9780191711411
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199297023.003.0002
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology
This chapter presents a theory of knowledge as coming in two main varieties: the animal and the reflective. Animal knowledge is apt belief, which hits the mark of truth through the exercise of ...
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This chapter presents a theory of knowledge as coming in two main varieties: the animal and the reflective. Animal knowledge is apt belief, which hits the mark of truth through the exercise of competence, of intellectual virtue. This account enables a further, broader approach to scepticism, both dream scepticism and the more radical scepticism of outre scenarios such as the envatted brain and others of its ilk.Less
This chapter presents a theory of knowledge as coming in two main varieties: the animal and the reflective. Animal knowledge is apt belief, which hits the mark of truth through the exercise of competence, of intellectual virtue. This account enables a further, broader approach to scepticism, both dream scepticism and the more radical scepticism of outre scenarios such as the envatted brain and others of its ilk.
Duncan Pritchard
- Published in print:
- 2010
- Published Online:
- September 2010
- ISBN:
- 9780199586264
- eISBN:
- 9780191723360
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199586264.003.0002
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology, General
This chapter describes two forms of virtue epistemology: modest and robust. The latter is uniquely able to make a plausible case for the thesis that knowledge is a cognitive form of achievement. ...
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This chapter describes two forms of virtue epistemology: modest and robust. The latter is uniquely able to make a plausible case for the thesis that knowledge is a cognitive form of achievement. Since achievements are, arguably, finally valuable, robust virtue epistemology thus seems uniquely able to offer a defence of the thesis that knowledge is finally valuable, and thereby resolve the various forms of the value of problem for knowledge. Unfortunately, the view faces some fatal problems. In particular, it is shown that there are cases of knowledge — such as testimonial knowledge that is gained via trust — which do not constitute achievements. There are also cases of cognitive achievement — such as the cognitive achievement on display in the barn facade case — which do not constitute knowledge because of the presence of environmental epistemic luck. In light of the failure of robust virtue epistemology to deal with the value problem(s) for knowledge, it is argued that knowledge is not finally valuable.Less
This chapter describes two forms of virtue epistemology: modest and robust. The latter is uniquely able to make a plausible case for the thesis that knowledge is a cognitive form of achievement. Since achievements are, arguably, finally valuable, robust virtue epistemology thus seems uniquely able to offer a defence of the thesis that knowledge is finally valuable, and thereby resolve the various forms of the value of problem for knowledge. Unfortunately, the view faces some fatal problems. In particular, it is shown that there are cases of knowledge — such as testimonial knowledge that is gained via trust — which do not constitute achievements. There are also cases of cognitive achievement — such as the cognitive achievement on display in the barn facade case — which do not constitute knowledge because of the presence of environmental epistemic luck. In light of the failure of robust virtue epistemology to deal with the value problem(s) for knowledge, it is argued that knowledge is not finally valuable.
Duncan Pritchard
- Published in print:
- 2005
- Published Online:
- April 2005
- ISBN:
- 9780199280384
- eISBN:
- 9780191602290
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/019928038X.003.0008
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology
I argue that the notion of reflective epistemic luck raises important questions about the centrality to epistemology of a conception of justification that demands that one is able to take cognitive ...
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I argue that the notion of reflective epistemic luck raises important questions about the centrality to epistemology of a conception of justification that demands that one is able to take cognitive responsibility for one’s beliefs. I take a critical look at some of the recent ‘virtue epistemologies’ that have been put forward in the recent literature which define knowledge in terms of the epistemic virtues and cognitive faculties. More specifically, I contrast broadly externalist construals of the virtue-theoretic thesis—such as the ‘agent reliabilism’ advanced, for example, by Ernest Sosa and John Greco—with virtue epistemologies that roughly fall into the internalist camp—in particular, ‘neo-Aristotelian’ theories, such as the view defended by Linda Zagzebski. I claim that in each case a key part of the motivation for offering such a view lies in a desire to eliminate a species of epistemic luck that is thought to be left uneliminated by rival theories of knowledge. In general, I claim that externalists and internalists in epistemology often speak past one another precisely because they are concerned with these different types of epistemic luck, and that disambiguating the species of epistemic luck at issue in this debate can help us to find a way of reconciling both internalist and externalist intuitions about knowledge. I conclude by arguing that once the ambiguous role of epistemic luck in the development of these virtue epistemological theories is made explicit, then the motivation to offer a specifically virtue-theoretic theory of knowledge subsides.Less
I argue that the notion of reflective epistemic luck raises important questions about the centrality to epistemology of a conception of justification that demands that one is able to take cognitive responsibility for one’s beliefs. I take a critical look at some of the recent ‘virtue epistemologies’ that have been put forward in the recent literature which define knowledge in terms of the epistemic virtues and cognitive faculties. More specifically, I contrast broadly externalist construals of the virtue-theoretic thesis—such as the ‘agent reliabilism’ advanced, for example, by Ernest Sosa and John Greco—with virtue epistemologies that roughly fall into the internalist camp—in particular, ‘neo-Aristotelian’ theories, such as the view defended by Linda Zagzebski. I claim that in each case a key part of the motivation for offering such a view lies in a desire to eliminate a species of epistemic luck that is thought to be left uneliminated by rival theories of knowledge. In general, I claim that externalists and internalists in epistemology often speak past one another precisely because they are concerned with these different types of epistemic luck, and that disambiguating the species of epistemic luck at issue in this debate can help us to find a way of reconciling both internalist and externalist intuitions about knowledge. I conclude by arguing that once the ambiguous role of epistemic luck in the development of these virtue epistemological theories is made explicit, then the motivation to offer a specifically virtue-theoretic theory of knowledge subsides.
Miranda Fricker
- Published in print:
- 2007
- Published Online:
- September 2007
- ISBN:
- 9780198237907
- eISBN:
- 9780191706844
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198237907.003.0004
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology
This chapter presents a diagnostic account of the state of play in the epistemology of testimony, and proposes a virtue epistemological non-inferentialist alternative. This account depends on ...
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This chapter presents a diagnostic account of the state of play in the epistemology of testimony, and proposes a virtue epistemological non-inferentialist alternative. This account depends on arguments substantiating a parallel between the moral cognitivist account of virtuous perception, and a proposed account of epistemically virtuous perception that the virtuous hearer possesses owing to a well-trained testimonial sensibility. He perceives his interlocutor as more, or less, credible in what she is telling him.Less
This chapter presents a diagnostic account of the state of play in the epistemology of testimony, and proposes a virtue epistemological non-inferentialist alternative. This account depends on arguments substantiating a parallel between the moral cognitivist account of virtuous perception, and a proposed account of epistemically virtuous perception that the virtuous hearer possesses owing to a well-trained testimonial sensibility. He perceives his interlocutor as more, or less, credible in what she is telling him.
Linda Zagzebski
- Published in print:
- 2001
- Published Online:
- November 2003
- ISBN:
- 9780195128925
- eISBN:
- 9780199833764
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0195128923.003.0015
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology
Proposes an analysis of the concept of understanding. Finds three important, relevant strands of thought in the works of Plato and Aristotle, among which the most important one is that understanding ...
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Proposes an analysis of the concept of understanding. Finds three important, relevant strands of thought in the works of Plato and Aristotle, among which the most important one is that understanding involves representing the world nonpropositionally, e.g. through visualization or diagrams. Taking this to be the defining characteristic, proposes that understanding is a state of comprehending nonpropositional structures of reality, such as automobiles, pieces of music or art, the character of a person, or a causal nexus. Argues that virtue epistemology is better suited than traditional epistemology to help us develop a successful analysis of understanding thus conceived. For unlike the theories from which it departs, virtue epistemology takes the objects of valuable epistemic states to consist of both propositional and nonpropositional objects.Less
Proposes an analysis of the concept of understanding. Finds three important, relevant strands of thought in the works of Plato and Aristotle, among which the most important one is that understanding involves representing the world nonpropositionally, e.g. through visualization or diagrams. Taking this to be the defining characteristic, proposes that understanding is a state of comprehending nonpropositional structures of reality, such as automobiles, pieces of music or art, the character of a person, or a causal nexus. Argues that virtue epistemology is better suited than traditional epistemology to help us develop a successful analysis of understanding thus conceived. For unlike the theories from which it departs, virtue epistemology takes the objects of valuable epistemic states to consist of both propositional and nonpropositional objects.
Christine McKinnon
- Published in print:
- 2003
- Published Online:
- September 2010
- ISBN:
- 9780199252732
- eISBN:
- 9780191719288
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199252732.003.0011
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Moral Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology
This chapter argues that the standard epistemological requirements of impartiality on the part of the knower, and passivity on the part of the thing under investigation, exclude from the purview of ...
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This chapter argues that the standard epistemological requirements of impartiality on the part of the knower, and passivity on the part of the thing under investigation, exclude from the purview of epistemology a very important kind of knowledge, namely: knowledge of persons. Feminist philosophers have focused on problems in explaining knowledge of other persons, but the same considerations require a reorientation in the way we think of knowledge of oneself. Because of the subjectivity of the knower and reflexive nature of the investigation involving self-knowledge, one's inquiry is affected in a way that challenges the accuracy of what is learned. The chapter's response is to treat the procedural methods used to obtain knowledge of oneself as continuous with the methods of acquiring knowledge of other persons via knowing their moral and cognitive characters. It highlights the intersection between virtue ethics and virtue epistemology.Less
This chapter argues that the standard epistemological requirements of impartiality on the part of the knower, and passivity on the part of the thing under investigation, exclude from the purview of epistemology a very important kind of knowledge, namely: knowledge of persons. Feminist philosophers have focused on problems in explaining knowledge of other persons, but the same considerations require a reorientation in the way we think of knowledge of oneself. Because of the subjectivity of the knower and reflexive nature of the investigation involving self-knowledge, one's inquiry is affected in a way that challenges the accuracy of what is learned. The chapter's response is to treat the procedural methods used to obtain knowledge of oneself as continuous with the methods of acquiring knowledge of other persons via knowing their moral and cognitive characters. It highlights the intersection between virtue ethics and virtue epistemology.
Alvin I. Goldman and Erik J. Olsson
- Published in print:
- 2009
- Published Online:
- September 2009
- ISBN:
- 9780199231188
- eISBN:
- 9780191710827
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199231188.003.0002
- Subject:
- Philosophy, General
It is widely agreed that knowledge has greater value than mere true belief. This chapter begins by identifying a weak sense of ‘know’ (in which it means ‘believe truly’) under which knowledge cannot ...
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It is widely agreed that knowledge has greater value than mere true belief. This chapter begins by identifying a weak sense of ‘know’ (in which it means ‘believe truly’) under which knowledge cannot have greater value. There is a stronger sense of ‘know’ for which the value superiority thesis is plausible. The chapter offers two solutions to the swamping problem. The conditional probability solution states that reliabilist knowledge is more valuable than true belief because the former is a better indicator than the latter of future true belief. The second solution explains how a reliable process token can bring independent value into the picture. This can happen either because the value of a token process derives from the type it instantiates (type-instrumentalism) or because the value associated with a reliable process acquires independent, not merely derivative, value (value autonomization). The chapter's final section contrasts our approaches with those of virtue epistemology.Less
It is widely agreed that knowledge has greater value than mere true belief. This chapter begins by identifying a weak sense of ‘know’ (in which it means ‘believe truly’) under which knowledge cannot have greater value. There is a stronger sense of ‘know’ for which the value superiority thesis is plausible. The chapter offers two solutions to the swamping problem. The conditional probability solution states that reliabilist knowledge is more valuable than true belief because the former is a better indicator than the latter of future true belief. The second solution explains how a reliable process token can bring independent value into the picture. This can happen either because the value of a token process derives from the type it instantiates (type-instrumentalism) or because the value associated with a reliable process acquires independent, not merely derivative, value (value autonomization). The chapter's final section contrasts our approaches with those of virtue epistemology.
