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Anglo‐American philosophy has recently seen two simultaneous virtue‐theoretic revivals — one in ethics and the other in epistemology. One might naturally assume that these are two manifestations of a single resurgent conception of normativity, but in fact virtue epistemology has thus far been built upon a far more conventional conceptual foundation than the best work in virtue ethics. The real promise of virtue epistemology lies not in resolving puzzles that already preoccupy epistemologists but in inducing a fundamental shift in the scope, ambitions and agenda of epistemology. The aim of this chapter is to argue in favor of a fundamental shift of this sort. The guiding thought is that if we are to locate a telos of theoretical reflection with reference to which we can identify virtuous intellectual dispositions or capacities, we should look not towards the conventional epistemological goals of true belief or propositional knowledge, but towards fully actualized understanding. The chapter closes by showing how this change in view makes possible a unified account of ethical and epistemic virtues.

This chapter canvasses two master intuitions about knowledge: the ability intuition and the anti-luck intuition. It argues that a robust anti-luck epistemology, which takes the anti-luck intuition as central, cannot accommodate the ability intuition, and that a robust virtue epistemology which takes the ability intuition as central cannot accommodate the anti-luck intuition. It is suggested that the proper moral to be extracted from this impasse is that we need an anti-luck virtue epistemology — a theory of knowledge which incorporates two separate epistemic conditions designed to accommodate each of the two master intuitions about knowledge. Such a view can accommodate a range of key examples of interest to epistemologists. A genealogical diagnosis of the structure of knowledge is offered which supports this proposal. Anti-luck virtue epistemology can adequately respond to those versions of the value problem for knowledge which do not trade on the intuition that knowledge is finally valuable.

This chapter points out that standard versions of virtue epistemology accept and are motivated by the same central problems in epistemology — such as analyzing the concepts of knowledge and justification, and addressing skeptical challenges — which motivate contemporary epistemology. The only significant difference is that virtue epistemology claims that the concepts of knowledge and justification must be analyzed in terms of virtues. What motivates virtue ethicists, however, is not what is motivating other ethicists. The contemporary census amongst ethicists has a different set of problems than the ones motivating virtue ethicists. Virtue epistemologists should mount a similar challenge to their contemporaries: instead of focusing on static states such as beliefs and evaluating whether or not they are justified, they should focus their efforts on evaluating and regulating the activities of inquiry and deliberation, and the role which virtues play in such evaluation and regulation.

This chapter explains why virtue ethics in the latter twentieth century has taken the following two forms: (i) the first form orders evaluative concepts and then argues that the concept of a virtue is more basic than the concepts of a right act and a good state of affairs; (ii) the second form focuses on deeper questions about the nature and ambition of modern ethics and its ability to satisfy our need for reflective guidance. The former is a common approach given its focus on arguments for theory construction. The latter is more radical given that its themes are suspicious of rules and principles and, sometimes, moral theory itself. Because so many debates over virtue ethics reduce to debates over the kind of criteria needed to judge ethical theories, they will remain unresolved. Epistemologists must learn from moral philosophers about the myriad usages of virtue in language, as well as the different models each usage is working within.

It is high time for both ethicists and epistemologists to directly engage with each other. By bringing together each discipline's knowledge and perspective, relative to understanding the nature of intellectual virtues and vices, progress in answering some of epistemology's and ethics' vexing questions and disputes can be advanced. When epistemologists and ethicists analyze the nature and scope that intellectual virtues such as intellectual carefulness, thoroughness, humility, courage, autonomy, and fairness have on their disciplines, a deeper understanding of how humans form beliefs and conduct their moral lives surfaces. Because much of the work on intellectual virtues branches out into distinct historical, ethical, and epistemological projects, there is a lack of interdisciplinary participation amongst scholars. This book provides a remedy to this problem by bringing together historians, ethicists, and epistemologists into direct conversation with each other. The result of this unifying effort is an edited volume of essays written by some of the leading scholars in epistemology and ethics.

This chapter provides an introduction to intellectual virtues and virtue epistemology as well as an overview of the rest of the book. Several extended examples of intellectual virtue are given. This is followed by a brief history of virtue epistemology and a four‐fold classification of character‐based approaches to virtue epistemology. According to the classification, approaches to virtue epistemology fall into two main categories. Conservative virtue epistemology appeals to the concept of intellectual virtue in order to address or “solve” one or more problems in traditional epistemology. Autonomous approaches focus on intellectual character and virtues considered more or less in their own right. Each type also admits of both a stronger and weaker variety, making for a total of four varieties of character‐based virtue epistemology. Finally, a summary is provided of each of the remaining chapters.

This chapter presents a theory of knowledge as coming in two main varieties: the animal and the reflective. Animal knowledge is apt belief, which hits the mark of truth through the exercise of competence, of intellectual virtue. This account enables a further, broader approach to scepticism, both dream scepticism and the more radical scepticism of outre scenarios such as the envatted brain and others of its ilk.

This chapter draws together several elements of the preceding chapters by considering their implications for the viability of the four main varieties of character‐based virtue epistemology outlined in Chapter 1. The main focus is the weaker and stronger versions of autonomous virtue epistemology. The stronger version maintains that an immediate or autonomous focus on intellectual virtues and their role in the cognitive life should replace or supplant traditional epistemological theorizing. The weaker version considers an immediate theoretical concern with intellectual virtues a proper complement to traditional epistemology. It is argued, contra Jonathan Kvanvig (1992), that the stronger version of autonomous virtue epistemology is unwarranted, but that the weaker version has considerable promise, and indeed that it likely represents the way of the future in character‐based virtue epistemology.

This chapter describes two forms of virtue epistemology: modest and robust. The latter is uniquely able to make a plausible case for the thesis that knowledge is a cognitive form of achievement. Since achievements are, arguably, finally valuable, robust virtue epistemology thus seems uniquely able to offer a defence of the thesis that knowledge is finally valuable, and thereby resolve the various forms of the value of problem for knowledge. Unfortunately, the view faces some fatal problems. In particular, it is shown that there are cases of knowledge — such as testimonial knowledge that is gained via trust — which do not constitute achievements. There are also cases of cognitive achievement — such as the cognitive achievement on display in the barn facade case — which do not constitute knowledge because of the presence of environmental epistemic luck. In light of the failure of robust virtue epistemology to deal with the value problem(s) for knowledge, it is argued that knowledge is not finally valuable.

I argue that the notion of reflective epistemic luck raises important questions about the centrality to epistemology of a conception of justification that demands that one is able to take cognitive responsibility for one’s beliefs. I take a critical look at some of the recent ‘virtue epistemologies’ that have been put forward in the recent literature which define knowledge in terms of the epistemic virtues and cognitive faculties. More specifically, I contrast broadly externalist construals of the virtue-theoretic thesis—such as the ‘agent reliabilism’ advanced, for example, by Ernest Sosa and John Greco—with virtue epistemologies that roughly fall into the internalist camp—in particular, ‘neo-Aristotelian’ theories, such as the view defended by Linda Zagzebski. I claim that in each case a key part of the motivation for offering such a view lies in a desire to eliminate a species of epistemic luck that is thought to be left uneliminated by rival theories of knowledge. In general, I claim that externalists and internalists in epistemology often speak past one another precisely because they are concerned with these different types of epistemic luck, and that disambiguating the species of epistemic luck at issue in this debate can help us to find a way of reconciling both internalist and externalist intuitions about knowledge. I conclude by arguing that once the ambiguous role of epistemic luck in the development of these virtue epistemological theories is made explicit, then the motivation to offer a specifically virtue-theoretic theory of knowledge subsides.

This chapter presents a diagnostic account of the state of play in the epistemology of testimony, and proposes a virtue epistemological non-inferentialist alternative. This account depends on arguments substantiating a parallel between the moral cognitivist account of virtuous perception, and a proposed account of epistemically virtuous perception that the virtuous hearer possesses owing to a well-trained testimonial sensibility. He perceives his interlocutor as more, or less, credible in what she is telling him.

This chapter argues that the standard epistemological requirements of impartiality on the part of the knower, and passivity on the part of the thing under investigation, exclude from the purview of epistemology a very important kind of knowledge, namely: knowledge of persons. Feminist philosophers have focused on problems in explaining knowledge of other persons, but the same considerations require a reorientation in the way we think of knowledge of oneself. Because of the subjectivity of the knower and reflexive nature of the investigation involving self-knowledge, one's inquiry is affected in a way that challenges the accuracy of what is learned. The chapter's response is to treat the procedural methods used to obtain knowledge of oneself as continuous with the methods of acquiring knowledge of other persons via knowing their moral and cognitive characters. It highlights the intersection between virtue ethics and virtue epistemology.

It is widely agreed that knowledge has greater value than mere true belief. This chapter begins by identifying a weak sense of ‘know’ (in which it means ‘believe truly’) under which knowledge cannot have greater value. There is a stronger sense of ‘know’ for which the value superiority thesis is plausible. The chapter offers two solutions to the swamping problem. The conditional probability solution states that reliabilist knowledge is more valuable than true belief because the former is a better indicator than the latter of future true belief. The second solution explains how a reliable process token can bring independent value into the picture. This can happen either because the value of a token process derives from the type it instantiates (type-instrumentalism) or because the value associated with a reliable process acquires independent, not merely derivative, value (value autonomization). The chapter's final section contrasts our approaches with those of virtue epistemology.