Ben Bradley
- Published in print:
- 2016
- Published Online:
- November 2016
- ISBN:
- 9780199357703
- eISBN:
- 9780199357734
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199357703.003.0005
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Moral Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind
This chapter defends the provocative claim that if a certain popular view of virtue is true, then virtue has no intrinsic value, and so it can play no useful role in moral theory. The view in ...
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This chapter defends the provocative claim that if a certain popular view of virtue is true, then virtue has no intrinsic value, and so it can play no useful role in moral theory. The view in question is virtue consequentialism—roughly, the idea that virtues are good because of the good consequences they bring. Versions of the view can be found in the works of Julia Driver, Philippa Foot, and Rosalind Hursthouse. This chapter argues that the only tenable variant of virtue consequentialism is contrastivism: the idea that a character trait is or is not a virtue only in comparison with another trait. The problem is that if this view is right, then virtues cannot be used in evaluating either people or outcomes. So if virtue ought to play a role in such evaluation, then virtue consequentialism ought to be rejected.Less
This chapter defends the provocative claim that if a certain popular view of virtue is true, then virtue has no intrinsic value, and so it can play no useful role in moral theory. The view in question is virtue consequentialism—roughly, the idea that virtues are good because of the good consequences they bring. Versions of the view can be found in the works of Julia Driver, Philippa Foot, and Rosalind Hursthouse. This chapter argues that the only tenable variant of virtue consequentialism is contrastivism: the idea that a character trait is or is not a virtue only in comparison with another trait. The problem is that if this view is right, then virtues cannot be used in evaluating either people or outcomes. So if virtue ought to play a role in such evaluation, then virtue consequentialism ought to be rejected.
Justin Tosi and Brandon Warmke
- Published in print:
- 2020
- Published Online:
- March 2020
- ISBN:
- 9780190900151
- eISBN:
- 9780190900182
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/oso/9780190900151.003.0006
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Moral Philosophy, Political Philosophy
This chapter discusses moral grandstanding from the standpoint of virtue ethics. Three common approaches to virtue ethics are considered. A virtuous person would not grandstand according to the ...
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This chapter discusses moral grandstanding from the standpoint of virtue ethics. Three common approaches to virtue ethics are considered. A virtuous person would not grandstand according to the classical conception of virtue, on which virtue is doing the right thing for the right reason. People would be disappointed if they found out that a widely admired, historic speech turned out to be grandstanding. Vanity, the general character trait most closely associated with grandstanding, is not plausibly a virtue according to virtue consequentialism. Finally, grandstanding is an abuse of morality, like the one Nietzsche labels the slave revolt in morals, as grandstanders use moral talk as an underhanded shortcut to satisfy their will to power.Less
This chapter discusses moral grandstanding from the standpoint of virtue ethics. Three common approaches to virtue ethics are considered. A virtuous person would not grandstand according to the classical conception of virtue, on which virtue is doing the right thing for the right reason. People would be disappointed if they found out that a widely admired, historic speech turned out to be grandstanding. Vanity, the general character trait most closely associated with grandstanding, is not plausibly a virtue according to virtue consequentialism. Finally, grandstanding is an abuse of morality, like the one Nietzsche labels the slave revolt in morals, as grandstanders use moral talk as an underhanded shortcut to satisfy their will to power.
