Jason Baehr
- Published in print:
- 2011
- Published Online:
- September 2011
- ISBN:
- 9780199604074
- eISBN:
- 9780191729300
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199604074.003.0007
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind
The personal worth conception of intellectual virtue introduced and defended in Chapter 6 is contrasted with five other accounts of intellectual or moral virtue in the literature. The accounts of ...
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The personal worth conception of intellectual virtue introduced and defended in Chapter 6 is contrasted with five other accounts of intellectual or moral virtue in the literature. The accounts of Thomas Hurka (2002) and Robert Adams (2007) are shown to have certain significant similarities to a personal worth account, but also to have certain defects that are not shared by this account. The personal worth account is then contrasted with a naturalistic account of intellectual virtue inspired by Rosalind Hursthouse's (1999) theory of moral virtue, Julia Driver's (2000) consequentialist account of intellectual virtue, and Linda Zagzebski's (1996) motivational account of intellectual virtue. Substantive objections are raised against each of these conceptions. The result is a further defense of the personal worth conception of intellectual virtue.Less
The personal worth conception of intellectual virtue introduced and defended in Chapter 6 is contrasted with five other accounts of intellectual or moral virtue in the literature. The accounts of Thomas Hurka (2002) and Robert Adams (2007) are shown to have certain significant similarities to a personal worth account, but also to have certain defects that are not shared by this account. The personal worth account is then contrasted with a naturalistic account of intellectual virtue inspired by Rosalind Hursthouse's (1999) theory of moral virtue, Julia Driver's (2000) consequentialist account of intellectual virtue, and Linda Zagzebski's (1996) motivational account of intellectual virtue. Substantive objections are raised against each of these conceptions. The result is a further defense of the personal worth conception of intellectual virtue.
