Luiz Carlos Bresser-Pereira
- Published in print:
- 2004
- Published Online:
- November 2004
- ISBN:
- 9780199261185
- eISBN:
- 9780191601507
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0199261180.003.0024
- Subject:
- Political Science, Democratization
State capacity depends, most of all, of its democratic institutions. Only a strong and legitimate state will be able to provide good governance, individual and social justice, the guarantee of ...
More
State capacity depends, most of all, of its democratic institutions. Only a strong and legitimate state will be able to provide good governance, individual and social justice, the guarantee of property rights and contracts, the protection to political and social rights, the defence of the national interests. An effective and efficient democratic state depends also on a good state organization and on competent government officials, able to make trade-offs between their legitimate personal objectives and the public interest. Public management reform is the contemporary form of assuring this kind state organization. In modern democracies, government officials–public managers as well as elected politicians–although also looking out for their own interests, are supposed to share republican virtues, to be committed to the general interest and to the protection of the public patrimony. Democratic institutions make them accountable for that.Less
State capacity depends, most of all, of its democratic institutions. Only a strong and legitimate state will be able to provide good governance, individual and social justice, the guarantee of property rights and contracts, the protection to political and social rights, the defence of the national interests. An effective and efficient democratic state depends also on a good state organization and on competent government officials, able to make trade-offs between their legitimate personal objectives and the public interest. Public management reform is the contemporary form of assuring this kind state organization. In modern democracies, government officials–public managers as well as elected politicians–although also looking out for their own interests, are supposed to share republican virtues, to be committed to the general interest and to the protection of the public patrimony. Democratic institutions make them accountable for that.
Gabriele Taylor
- Published in print:
- 2006
- Published Online:
- September 2006
- ISBN:
- 9780198235804
- eISBN:
- 9780191604058
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0198235801.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Moral Philosophy
This book focuses on the vices, which in Christian theology were most commonly selected as bringing death to the soul. These are sloth, envy, avarice, pride, anger, lust, and gluttony. The ...
More
This book focuses on the vices, which in Christian theology were most commonly selected as bringing death to the soul. These are sloth, envy, avarice, pride, anger, lust, and gluttony. The discussions concentrate on the essence of each vice, and treat their possessors as personifications. They will show a structural resemblance to each other, but there is no suggestion that all vices are of that type. It is shown that vices are harmful to their possessor, and negative support is given for some central claims of an Aristotelean-type virtue-theory.Less
This book focuses on the vices, which in Christian theology were most commonly selected as bringing death to the soul. These are sloth, envy, avarice, pride, anger, lust, and gluttony. The discussions concentrate on the essence of each vice, and treat their possessors as personifications. They will show a structural resemblance to each other, but there is no suggestion that all vices are of that type. It is shown that vices are harmful to their possessor, and negative support is given for some central claims of an Aristotelean-type virtue-theory.
George Cheney, Dan Lair, Dean Ritz, and Brenden Kendall
- Published in print:
- 2009
- Published Online:
- February 2010
- ISBN:
- 9780195182774
- eISBN:
- 9780199871001
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195182774.001.0001
- Subject:
- Business and Management, Corporate Governance and Accountability
This book offers a fresh perspective on ethics at work, questioning the notions that doing ethics at work has to be work, and that work is somehow a sphere where a different set of rules applies. ...
More
This book offers a fresh perspective on ethics at work, questioning the notions that doing ethics at work has to be work, and that work is somehow a sphere where a different set of rules applies. When we separate ethics from life, we put it beyond our daily reach, treating it as something that is meaningful only at certain moments. This problem permeates our everyday talk about ethics at work, in popular culture, in our textbooks, and even in our ethics codes. This book uses insights from the fields of communications and rhetoric to show how in the very framing of ethics—even before we get to specific decisions—we limit the potential roles of ethics in our work lives and in the pursuit of happiness. Sayings such as “It's just a job” and “Let the market decide” are two examples of demonstrating that our perspective on professional ethics is shaped and reinforced by everyday language. The standard “bad apples” approach to dealing with corporate and governmental wrongdoing is not surprising; few people are willing to consider how to cultivate “the good orchard.” The book argues that ethics is about more than behaviour regulation, spectacular scandals, and comprehensive codes. The authors offer a new take on virtue ethics, referencing Aristotle's practical ideal of eudaimonia, or flourishing, allowing us to tell new stories about the ordinary and to see the extraordinary aspects of professional integrity and success.Less
This book offers a fresh perspective on ethics at work, questioning the notions that doing ethics at work has to be work, and that work is somehow a sphere where a different set of rules applies. When we separate ethics from life, we put it beyond our daily reach, treating it as something that is meaningful only at certain moments. This problem permeates our everyday talk about ethics at work, in popular culture, in our textbooks, and even in our ethics codes. This book uses insights from the fields of communications and rhetoric to show how in the very framing of ethics—even before we get to specific decisions—we limit the potential roles of ethics in our work lives and in the pursuit of happiness. Sayings such as “It's just a job” and “Let the market decide” are two examples of demonstrating that our perspective on professional ethics is shaped and reinforced by everyday language. The standard “bad apples” approach to dealing with corporate and governmental wrongdoing is not surprising; few people are willing to consider how to cultivate “the good orchard.” The book argues that ethics is about more than behaviour regulation, spectacular scandals, and comprehensive codes. The authors offer a new take on virtue ethics, referencing Aristotle's practical ideal of eudaimonia, or flourishing, allowing us to tell new stories about the ordinary and to see the extraordinary aspects of professional integrity and success.
Robert C. Roberts and W. Jay Wood
- Published in print:
- 2007
- Published Online:
- May 2007
- ISBN:
- 9780199283675
- eISBN:
- 9780191712661
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199283675.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Moral Philosophy
Some of the most interesting work in late-20th-century epistemology reintroduced, from ancient and medieval philosophy, the idea of an intellectual virtue and the related idea of proper epistemic ...
More
Some of the most interesting work in late-20th-century epistemology reintroduced, from ancient and medieval philosophy, the idea of an intellectual virtue and the related idea of proper epistemic function. But most of that work employed such concepts, with questionable success, in the interest of defining justification, warrant, or knowledge; and little or none of it offered detailed analyses of intellectual virtues. This book proposes and illustrates a different purpose for epistemology, one that we see in early modern thinkers, especially John Locke — namely that of guiding, refining, and informing the epistemic practices of the intellectual segment of the population. One important aspect of the project of such a ‘regulative epistemology’ is the intellectual character of the epistemic agent. For this purpose, fairly detailed sketches of particular intellectual virtues and of virtues' relations to epistemic goods, epistemic faculties, and epistemic practices, gain special importance. An underlying thesis is that a strict dichotomy between the intellectual virtues and the moral virtues is a mistake.Less
Some of the most interesting work in late-20th-century epistemology reintroduced, from ancient and medieval philosophy, the idea of an intellectual virtue and the related idea of proper epistemic function. But most of that work employed such concepts, with questionable success, in the interest of defining justification, warrant, or knowledge; and little or none of it offered detailed analyses of intellectual virtues. This book proposes and illustrates a different purpose for epistemology, one that we see in early modern thinkers, especially John Locke — namely that of guiding, refining, and informing the epistemic practices of the intellectual segment of the population. One important aspect of the project of such a ‘regulative epistemology’ is the intellectual character of the epistemic agent. For this purpose, fairly detailed sketches of particular intellectual virtues and of virtues' relations to epistemic goods, epistemic faculties, and epistemic practices, gain special importance. An underlying thesis is that a strict dichotomy between the intellectual virtues and the moral virtues is a mistake.
Miranda Fricker
- Published in print:
- 2007
- Published Online:
- September 2007
- ISBN:
- 9780198237907
- eISBN:
- 9780191706844
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198237907.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology
Justice is one of the oldest and most central themes of philosophy, but sometimes we would do well to focus instead on injustice. In epistemology, the very idea that there is a first-order ethical ...
More
Justice is one of the oldest and most central themes of philosophy, but sometimes we would do well to focus instead on injustice. In epistemology, the very idea that there is a first-order ethical dimension to our epistemic practices — the idea that there is such a thing as epistemic justice — remains obscure until we adjust the philosophical lens so that we see through to the negative space that is epistemic injustice. This book argues that there is a distinctively epistemic genus of injustice, in which someone is wronged specifically in their capacity as a knower, wronged therefore in a capacity essential to human value. The book identifies two forms of epistemic injustice: testimonial injustice and hermeneutical injustice. In doing so, it charts the ethical dimension of two fundamental epistemic practices: gaining knowledge by being told and making sense of our social experiences. As the account unfolds, the book travels through a range of philosophical problems. Thus, the book finds an analysis of social power; an account of prejudicial stereotypes; a characterization of two hybrid intellectual-ethical virtues; a revised account of the State of Nature used in genealogical explanations of the concept of knowledge; a discussion of objectification and ‘silencing’; and a framework for a virtue epistemological account of testimony. The book reveals epistemic injustice as a potent yet largely silent dimension of discrimination, analyses the wrong it perpetrates, and constructs two hybrid ethical-intellectual virtues of epistemic justice which aim to forestall it.Less
Justice is one of the oldest and most central themes of philosophy, but sometimes we would do well to focus instead on injustice. In epistemology, the very idea that there is a first-order ethical dimension to our epistemic practices — the idea that there is such a thing as epistemic justice — remains obscure until we adjust the philosophical lens so that we see through to the negative space that is epistemic injustice. This book argues that there is a distinctively epistemic genus of injustice, in which someone is wronged specifically in their capacity as a knower, wronged therefore in a capacity essential to human value. The book identifies two forms of epistemic injustice: testimonial injustice and hermeneutical injustice. In doing so, it charts the ethical dimension of two fundamental epistemic practices: gaining knowledge by being told and making sense of our social experiences. As the account unfolds, the book travels through a range of philosophical problems. Thus, the book finds an analysis of social power; an account of prejudicial stereotypes; a characterization of two hybrid intellectual-ethical virtues; a revised account of the State of Nature used in genealogical explanations of the concept of knowledge; a discussion of objectification and ‘silencing’; and a framework for a virtue epistemological account of testimony. The book reveals epistemic injustice as a potent yet largely silent dimension of discrimination, analyses the wrong it perpetrates, and constructs two hybrid ethical-intellectual virtues of epistemic justice which aim to forestall it.
Jeffrey C. King
- Published in print:
- 2007
- Published Online:
- May 2007
- ISBN:
- 9780199226061
- eISBN:
- 9780191710377
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199226061.003.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Language
This introductory chapter begins with a brief analysis of why philosophers believe in propositions. The main purpose of the book is then discussed, which is to formulate and defend a detailed account ...
More
This introductory chapter begins with a brief analysis of why philosophers believe in propositions. The main purpose of the book is then discussed, which is to formulate and defend a detailed account of the metaphysical nature of propositions. In so doing, it discusses some oppositions to propositions as well. It is argued that there is no mystery about what propositions are. Given rather minimal assumptions it follows that propostions exist, and we can begin to see how and why they have truth conditions and so represent the world as being a certain way. An overview of the chapters included in the volume is presented.Less
This introductory chapter begins with a brief analysis of why philosophers believe in propositions. The main purpose of the book is then discussed, which is to formulate and defend a detailed account of the metaphysical nature of propositions. In so doing, it discusses some oppositions to propositions as well. It is argued that there is no mystery about what propositions are. Given rather minimal assumptions it follows that propostions exist, and we can begin to see how and why they have truth conditions and so represent the world as being a certain way. An overview of the chapters included in the volume is presented.
Gregory S. Alexander and Eduardo M. Peñalver (eds)
- Published in print:
- 2009
- Published Online:
- May 2010
- ISBN:
- 9780195391572
- eISBN:
- 9780199775804
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195391572.001.0001
- Subject:
- Law, Environmental and Energy Law
The relationship between individuals and communities — all manner of communities, but especially the state — is a central preoccupation of property theory. Across a broad range of property thought — ...
More
The relationship between individuals and communities — all manner of communities, but especially the state — is a central preoccupation of property theory. Across a broad range of property thought — from utilitarian to Lockean to Hegelian — scholars have expended enormous effort explaining what owners can do with their property and the extent to which the community or the state can participate in those decisions. Discussions of property rights, from whatever perspective, necessarily reflect ideas about the proper domain and limits of individual and community power. Property stands so squarely at the intersection between the individual and community because systems of property are always the creation of some community. Moreover, systems of property have as their subject matter the allocation among community members of rights and duties with respect to resources that human beings need in order to survive and flourish. These allocative decisions are crucially important both to individuals, owners and non-owners alike, and to the community as a whole. In other words, whenever we discuss property, we are unavoidably discussing the architecture of community and of the individual's place within it. Even though the relationship between individuals and community stands at the conceptual center of property theory, the normative theories of community underlying discussions of property are frequently left implicit. This book aims to remedy this deficiency. With essays by property theorists from five different countries, it addresses various facets of the intersection between property and community.Less
The relationship between individuals and communities — all manner of communities, but especially the state — is a central preoccupation of property theory. Across a broad range of property thought — from utilitarian to Lockean to Hegelian — scholars have expended enormous effort explaining what owners can do with their property and the extent to which the community or the state can participate in those decisions. Discussions of property rights, from whatever perspective, necessarily reflect ideas about the proper domain and limits of individual and community power. Property stands so squarely at the intersection between the individual and community because systems of property are always the creation of some community. Moreover, systems of property have as their subject matter the allocation among community members of rights and duties with respect to resources that human beings need in order to survive and flourish. These allocative decisions are crucially important both to individuals, owners and non-owners alike, and to the community as a whole. In other words, whenever we discuss property, we are unavoidably discussing the architecture of community and of the individual's place within it. Even though the relationship between individuals and community stands at the conceptual center of property theory, the normative theories of community underlying discussions of property are frequently left implicit. This book aims to remedy this deficiency. With essays by property theorists from five different countries, it addresses various facets of the intersection between property and community.
Frisbee Sheffield
- Published in print:
- 2006
- Published Online:
- September 2007
- ISBN:
- 9780199286775
- eISBN:
- 9780191713194
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199286775.001.0001
- Subject:
- Classical Studies, Ancient Greek, Roman, and Early Christian Philosophy
This book is concerned with Plato's examination of the nature and aims of human desire, and the role that it plays in our ethical lives. For Plato, analysing our desires is a way of reflecting on the ...
More
This book is concerned with Plato's examination of the nature and aims of human desire, and the role that it plays in our ethical lives. For Plato, analysing our desires is a way of reflecting on the kind of people that we are, and on our prospects for a worthwhile and happy life. This assumes that desires are the sorts of thing that are amenable to such reflection. This book considers why Plato held such a view, and in what direction he thought our desires could best be shaped. The kind of relationships which typically took place at symposia was an important way in which young men learnt how to value and desire the right kinds of things, and in the appropriate manner. They were, in short, a way in which virtue was transmitted to the young. The book argues that seen in this light, the Symposium belongs amongst those dialogues concerned with moral education. The Symposium offers a distinctive approach to central Platonic themes concerning education, virtue, epistemology, and moral psychology, one that is grounded in an account of the nature and goals of a loving relationship.Less
This book is concerned with Plato's examination of the nature and aims of human desire, and the role that it plays in our ethical lives. For Plato, analysing our desires is a way of reflecting on the kind of people that we are, and on our prospects for a worthwhile and happy life. This assumes that desires are the sorts of thing that are amenable to such reflection. This book considers why Plato held such a view, and in what direction he thought our desires could best be shaped. The kind of relationships which typically took place at symposia was an important way in which young men learnt how to value and desire the right kinds of things, and in the appropriate manner. They were, in short, a way in which virtue was transmitted to the young. The book argues that seen in this light, the Symposium belongs amongst those dialogues concerned with moral education. The Symposium offers a distinctive approach to central Platonic themes concerning education, virtue, epistemology, and moral psychology, one that is grounded in an account of the nature and goals of a loving relationship.
Gillian Russell
- Published in print:
- 2008
- Published Online:
- May 2008
- ISBN:
- 9780199232192
- eISBN:
- 9780191715907
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199232192.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Language
The analytic/synthetic distinction looks simple. It is a distinction between two different kinds of sentence: synthetic sentences are true in part because of the way the world is, and in part because ...
More
The analytic/synthetic distinction looks simple. It is a distinction between two different kinds of sentence: synthetic sentences are true in part because of the way the world is, and in part because of what they mean, whereas analytic sentences — like all bachelors are unmarried and triangles have three sides — are different; they are true in virtue of meaning and so, no matter what the world is like, as long as the sentence means what it does, it will be true. The distinction seems powerful because analytic sentences seem to be knowable in a special way; one can know that all bachelors are unmarried, for example, just by thinking about what it means. But many 20th-century philosophers, with Quine in the lead, argued that there were no analytic sentences, that the idea of analyticity didn't even make sense and that the analytic/synthetic distinction was therefore an illusion. Others couldn't see how there could fail to be a distinction, however ingenious the arguments. But since the heyday of the debate, things have changed in the philosophy of language. Tools have been refined, confusions cleared up, and most significantly, many philosophers now accept a view of language — semantic externalism — on which it is possible to see how the distinction could fail. One might be tempted to think that ultimately the distinction has fallen for reasons other than those proposed in the original debate. This book argues that it hasn't. It uses the tools of contemporary philosophy of language to outline a view of analytic sentences which is compatible with semantic externalism, and defends that view against the old Quinean arguments. It then goes on to draw out some surprising epistemological consequences.Less
The analytic/synthetic distinction looks simple. It is a distinction between two different kinds of sentence: synthetic sentences are true in part because of the way the world is, and in part because of what they mean, whereas analytic sentences — like all bachelors are unmarried and triangles have three sides — are different; they are true in virtue of meaning and so, no matter what the world is like, as long as the sentence means what it does, it will be true. The distinction seems powerful because analytic sentences seem to be knowable in a special way; one can know that all bachelors are unmarried, for example, just by thinking about what it means. But many 20th-century philosophers, with Quine in the lead, argued that there were no analytic sentences, that the idea of analyticity didn't even make sense and that the analytic/synthetic distinction was therefore an illusion. Others couldn't see how there could fail to be a distinction, however ingenious the arguments. But since the heyday of the debate, things have changed in the philosophy of language. Tools have been refined, confusions cleared up, and most significantly, many philosophers now accept a view of language — semantic externalism — on which it is possible to see how the distinction could fail. One might be tempted to think that ultimately the distinction has fallen for reasons other than those proposed in the original debate. This book argues that it hasn't. It uses the tools of contemporary philosophy of language to outline a view of analytic sentences which is compatible with semantic externalism, and defends that view against the old Quinean arguments. It then goes on to draw out some surprising epistemological consequences.
Talbot Brewer
- Published in print:
- 2009
- Published Online:
- May 2009
- ISBN:
- 9780199557882
- eISBN:
- 9780191720918
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199557882.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Moral Philosophy
The virtue ethics movement in recent philosophical ethics can usefully be divided into two quite separate streams of thought. Some have turned to the texts of Plato and Aristotle for new answers to ...
More
The virtue ethics movement in recent philosophical ethics can usefully be divided into two quite separate streams of thought. Some have turned to the texts of Plato and Aristotle for new answers to established questions in philosophical ethics, while others have sought a vantage point from which the basic questions of the field could themselves be put in question. The aim of this book is to elaborate and defend a version of the second, more radical sort of virtue ethics. The book begins with a fundamental reconsideration of the way in which thought makes itself practical in temporally extended activities and lives. This reconsideration yields an alternative picture of the self — a picture with recognizably Aristotelian and Platonic elements — and puts that picture to work in retrieving an unfamiliar conception of the proper task of philosophical ethics, one that provides a suitable home for retrieving the virtue concepts. The critical bite of the book is directed in the first instance at ideas that are prevalent among philosophers. Yet there is reason to think that these philosophical ideas express a conception of the self that shapes contemporary Western culture, and that hinders our capacity to make full sense of our activities, passions, and lives, or to attain full articulacy about the values to which we might hope to answer. The book argues that the rise of the fact/value distinction and of the characteristically modern distinction between person‐relative and impersonal goods are best understood as a story of encroaching confusion and not as the story of progressive discovery that they are often taken to be. The book culminates in an attempt to show that the ethical and epistemic virtues conduce to a single, monistic sort of goodness that fosters intimate relationships as well as healthy political community, and that overcomes the putative opposition between self‐interest and morality.Less
The virtue ethics movement in recent philosophical ethics can usefully be divided into two quite separate streams of thought. Some have turned to the texts of Plato and Aristotle for new answers to established questions in philosophical ethics, while others have sought a vantage point from which the basic questions of the field could themselves be put in question. The aim of this book is to elaborate and defend a version of the second, more radical sort of virtue ethics. The book begins with a fundamental reconsideration of the way in which thought makes itself practical in temporally extended activities and lives. This reconsideration yields an alternative picture of the self — a picture with recognizably Aristotelian and Platonic elements — and puts that picture to work in retrieving an unfamiliar conception of the proper task of philosophical ethics, one that provides a suitable home for retrieving the virtue concepts. The critical bite of the book is directed in the first instance at ideas that are prevalent among philosophers. Yet there is reason to think that these philosophical ideas express a conception of the self that shapes contemporary Western culture, and that hinders our capacity to make full sense of our activities, passions, and lives, or to attain full articulacy about the values to which we might hope to answer. The book argues that the rise of the fact/value distinction and of the characteristically modern distinction between person‐relative and impersonal goods are best understood as a story of encroaching confusion and not as the story of progressive discovery that they are often taken to be. The book culminates in an attempt to show that the ethical and epistemic virtues conduce to a single, monistic sort of goodness that fosters intimate relationships as well as healthy political community, and that overcomes the putative opposition between self‐interest and morality.
Katja Maria Vogt
- Published in print:
- 2008
- Published Online:
- January 2008
- ISBN:
- 9780195320091
- eISBN:
- 9780199869657
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195320091.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Ancient Philosophy
The book is a comprehensive study of early Stoic political philosophy. It considers the conceptions of the cosmic city and the common law as central to the Stoics' theory, and discusses how these ...
More
The book is a comprehensive study of early Stoic political philosophy. It considers the conceptions of the cosmic city and the common law as central to the Stoics' theory, and discusses how these conceptions are integral to Stoic thought on reason, wisdom, and life in agreement with nature. Accordingly, the book devotes detailed attention to central areas of Stoic philosophy, such as the theory of affiliation (oikeiôsis), appropriate and perfect action, epistemology, and theology. The book discusses competing interpretations of Stoic cosmopolitanism, arguing that the ideal city of the early Stoics is the cosmos and thus is already in existence. All human beings live in the cosmic city, but only the wise and the gods are its citizens. The book devotes equal attention to the interpretation of the Stoics' conception of law. To live by the law, it is argued, is to live by nature, in a way which relies on understanding what is of value to human beings, rather than on following a set of rules. Against the view that early Stoic thought about these issues is best described as exploring an ideal for individual agents, the book argues that the Stoics are offering a theory which, while deeply connected with the core concerns of Stoic ethics, can be considered a genuine contribution to political philosophy.Less
The book is a comprehensive study of early Stoic political philosophy. It considers the conceptions of the cosmic city and the common law as central to the Stoics' theory, and discusses how these conceptions are integral to Stoic thought on reason, wisdom, and life in agreement with nature. Accordingly, the book devotes detailed attention to central areas of Stoic philosophy, such as the theory of affiliation (oikeiôsis), appropriate and perfect action, epistemology, and theology. The book discusses competing interpretations of Stoic cosmopolitanism, arguing that the ideal city of the early Stoics is the cosmos and thus is already in existence. All human beings live in the cosmic city, but only the wise and the gods are its citizens. The book devotes equal attention to the interpretation of the Stoics' conception of law. To live by the law, it is argued, is to live by nature, in a way which relies on understanding what is of value to human beings, rather than on following a set of rules. Against the view that early Stoic thought about these issues is best described as exploring an ideal for individual agents, the book argues that the Stoics are offering a theory which, while deeply connected with the core concerns of Stoic ethics, can be considered a genuine contribution to political philosophy.
Richard Finn OP
- Published in print:
- 2006
- Published Online:
- September 2007
- ISBN:
- 9780199283606
- eISBN:
- 9780191712692
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199283606.001.0001
- Subject:
- Classical Studies, European History: BCE to 500CE
The book examines the various sources, distinctive forms, privileged recipients, and likely extent of almsgiving in the churches of the later empire. Almsgiving was crucial in the construction of the ...
More
The book examines the various sources, distinctive forms, privileged recipients, and likely extent of almsgiving in the churches of the later empire. Almsgiving was crucial in the construction of the bishop's authority, but was also a cooperative task involving clerics and laity in which honour was shared and which exposed the bishop to criticism. Almsgiving by monks belongs in the context of self-dispossession and attracted further alms for distribution to the destitute, but proved controversial not least because of the potential for competition with bishops. Lay people were encouraged to give, at set times and in particular places, both through the Church's agency and directly to the poor. These practices gained meaning from the promotion of almsgiving in many forms, of which preaching was the most important. It involved redescription of the poor and the incorporation of almsgiving within the virtues of generosity and justice. So cast, Christian almsgiving differed from pagan almsgiving as an honourable benefaction typical of leadership. This distinctive pattern of thought and conduct existed alongside an older classical pattern of benefaction, and the interaction between them generated controversy over the conduct of bishops and consecrated virgins. The co-inherence of co-operation and competition in Christian almsgiving, together with the continued existence of traditional euergetism, meant, however, that Christian alms did not, as is sometimes thought, turn bishops into the megapatrons of their cities.Less
The book examines the various sources, distinctive forms, privileged recipients, and likely extent of almsgiving in the churches of the later empire. Almsgiving was crucial in the construction of the bishop's authority, but was also a cooperative task involving clerics and laity in which honour was shared and which exposed the bishop to criticism. Almsgiving by monks belongs in the context of self-dispossession and attracted further alms for distribution to the destitute, but proved controversial not least because of the potential for competition with bishops. Lay people were encouraged to give, at set times and in particular places, both through the Church's agency and directly to the poor. These practices gained meaning from the promotion of almsgiving in many forms, of which preaching was the most important. It involved redescription of the poor and the incorporation of almsgiving within the virtues of generosity and justice. So cast, Christian almsgiving differed from pagan almsgiving as an honourable benefaction typical of leadership. This distinctive pattern of thought and conduct existed alongside an older classical pattern of benefaction, and the interaction between them generated controversy over the conduct of bishops and consecrated virgins. The co-inherence of co-operation and competition in Christian almsgiving, together with the continued existence of traditional euergetism, meant, however, that Christian alms did not, as is sometimes thought, turn bishops into the megapatrons of their cities.
- Published in print:
- 2002
- Published Online:
- August 2004
- ISBN:
- 9780199245789
- eISBN:
- 9780191601453
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0199245789.001.0001
- Subject:
- Religion, Early Christian Studies
De officiis, by Ambrose of Milan (c. 339–397), is one of the most important texts of Latin Patristic literature, and a major work of early Christian ethics. Modelled on the De officiis ...
More
De officiis, by Ambrose of Milan (c. 339–397), is one of the most important texts of Latin Patristic literature, and a major work of early Christian ethics. Modelled on the De officiis of Cicero, it synthesizes Stoic assumptions on virtue and expediency with biblical patterns of humility, charity, and self–denial to present Ambrose's vision of conduct appropriate for representatives of the church of Milan in the late 380s. Ambrose aspires to demonstrate that Christian values not only match but also exceed the moral standards advocated by Cicero. His purpose is not to build bridges between Cicero and Christ, but to replace Cicero's work with a new Christian account of duties, designed to show the social triumph of the gospel in the world of the Roman Empire. This edition consists of Ambrose's Latin text and a new English translation, the first since the nineteenth century. The Introduction considers in detail such matters as the composition of the work, its intended purpose, and its combination of biblical teaching and Ciceronian Stoicism. The Commentary (Volume 2 of the set) concentrates on the structure of the work, its copious citations of Scripture and Cicero, and its historical and social context.Less
De officiis, by Ambrose of Milan (c. 339–397), is one of the most important texts of Latin Patristic literature, and a major work of early Christian ethics. Modelled on the De officiis of Cicero, it synthesizes Stoic assumptions on virtue and expediency with biblical patterns of humility, charity, and self–denial to present Ambrose's vision of conduct appropriate for representatives of the church of Milan in the late 380s. Ambrose aspires to demonstrate that Christian values not only match but also exceed the moral standards advocated by Cicero. His purpose is not to build bridges between Cicero and Christ, but to replace Cicero's work with a new Christian account of duties, designed to show the social triumph of the gospel in the world of the Roman Empire. This edition consists of Ambrose's Latin text and a new English translation, the first since the nineteenth century. The Introduction considers in detail such matters as the composition of the work, its intended purpose, and its combination of biblical teaching and Ciceronian Stoicism. The Commentary (Volume 2 of the set) concentrates on the structure of the work, its copious citations of Scripture and Cicero, and its historical and social context.
Terry Horgan and Mark Timmons (eds)
- Published in print:
- 2006
- Published Online:
- May 2010
- ISBN:
- 9780199269914
- eISBN:
- 9780191710032
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199269914.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Moral Philosophy, General
In How Should Ethics Relate to (the rest of) Philosophy?, Stephen Darwall challenges both the claims of independence and priority. He argues that although metaethics and normative ethics are properly ...
More
In How Should Ethics Relate to (the rest of) Philosophy?, Stephen Darwall challenges both the claims of independence and priority. He argues that although metaethics and normative ethics are properly focused on different issues, they need to be brought into a dynamic relation with one another in order to produce a systematic and defensible philosophical ethics. Their mutual dependence, claims Darwall, is owing to the fact that issues of normativity are at the centre of the concerns of both metaethics and normative ethics. In making his case, Darwall examines Moore's doctrine that an irreducible notion of intrinsic value is fundamental in ethics, and argues that although Moore was correct in thinking that ethical notions are irreducible, he was incorrect in thinking that this is because they have a notion of intrinsic value at their core. Rather, according to Darwall, the notion of a normative reason is ethically fundamental, and a proper philosophical ethics that fully accommodates the normativity involved in ethical thought and discourse will require that metaethical issues and normative issues bearing on normativity be ‘pursued interdependently as complementary aspects of a comprehensive philosophical ethics’. He illustrates this claim by explaining how certain debates within normative ethics over consequentialism and over virtue depend upon metaethical issues about the nature of normativity.Less
In How Should Ethics Relate to (the rest of) Philosophy?, Stephen Darwall challenges both the claims of independence and priority. He argues that although metaethics and normative ethics are properly focused on different issues, they need to be brought into a dynamic relation with one another in order to produce a systematic and defensible philosophical ethics. Their mutual dependence, claims Darwall, is owing to the fact that issues of normativity are at the centre of the concerns of both metaethics and normative ethics. In making his case, Darwall examines Moore's doctrine that an irreducible notion of intrinsic value is fundamental in ethics, and argues that although Moore was correct in thinking that ethical notions are irreducible, he was incorrect in thinking that this is because they have a notion of intrinsic value at their core. Rather, according to Darwall, the notion of a normative reason is ethically fundamental, and a proper philosophical ethics that fully accommodates the normativity involved in ethical thought and discourse will require that metaethical issues and normative issues bearing on normativity be ‘pursued interdependently as complementary aspects of a comprehensive philosophical ethics’. He illustrates this claim by explaining how certain debates within normative ethics over consequentialism and over virtue depend upon metaethical issues about the nature of normativity.
Valerie Tiberius
- Published in print:
- 2008
- Published Online:
- May 2008
- ISBN:
- 9780199202867
- eISBN:
- 9780191707988
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199202867.003.0009
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Moral Philosophy
This concluding chapter begins with a discussion of the major aims of the book, which are to explore the contribution to living well made by us, by articulating the nature of reflective wisdom; and ...
More
This concluding chapter begins with a discussion of the major aims of the book, which are to explore the contribution to living well made by us, by articulating the nature of reflective wisdom; and to show by example how Humean naturalists, who are committed to the empirical contingency of any normative theory, can nevertheless construct a genuinely normative theory. It argues that a theory of how to live that takes seriously the person's own point of view must be a theory that recommends ‘from the inside’ rather than imposing external imperatives. The Reflective Wisdom Account is discussed.Less
This concluding chapter begins with a discussion of the major aims of the book, which are to explore the contribution to living well made by us, by articulating the nature of reflective wisdom; and to show by example how Humean naturalists, who are committed to the empirical contingency of any normative theory, can nevertheless construct a genuinely normative theory. It argues that a theory of how to live that takes seriously the person's own point of view must be a theory that recommends ‘from the inside’ rather than imposing external imperatives. The Reflective Wisdom Account is discussed.
Mike W. Martin
- Published in print:
- 2012
- Published Online:
- May 2012
- ISBN:
- 9780199845217
- eISBN:
- 9780199933068
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199845217.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Moral Philosophy, General
Happiness in Good Lives explores happiness as an important dimension of fully desirable lives. Happiness is defined as loving one’s life, valuing it in ways manifested by ample enjoyment ...
More
Happiness in Good Lives explores happiness as an important dimension of fully desirable lives. Happiness is defined as loving one’s life, valuing it in ways manifested by ample enjoyment and a robust sense of meaning. As such, it interacts with all other dimensions of good lives, in particular with moral decency and goodness, authenticity, mental health, self-fulfillment, and meaningfulness. The book integrates philosophical issues with topics of broad human interest, and it includes chapters on how happiness connects with the virtues, love, philanthropy, suffering, simplicity, balancing work and leisure, and politics. Happiness is a moral value, as well as a self-interested value, which we have a responsibility as well as a right to pursue. Myriad specific virtues contribute to pursuing happiness, and in turn happiness contributes to or manifests an array of virtues such as love, self-respect, gratitude, and hope. Although happiness is by no means the entirety of good lives, it helps define some additional aspects of good lives, including authenticity, self-fulfillment, meaningfulness, and mental health. It also enters into understanding what it means to live a balanced life, and also a simple life centered on what matters most. The moral status of happiness is a central concern in the history of ethics. Recent “positive psychology” has breathed new life into traditional philosophical issues, and the book draws extensively on psychological studies. It also uses myriad examples from memoirs, novels, and films. One chapter is devoted to assessing the claim of Mary Shelley’s monster in Frankenstein: “Make me happy, and I shall again be virtuous.”Less
Happiness in Good Lives explores happiness as an important dimension of fully desirable lives. Happiness is defined as loving one’s life, valuing it in ways manifested by ample enjoyment and a robust sense of meaning. As such, it interacts with all other dimensions of good lives, in particular with moral decency and goodness, authenticity, mental health, self-fulfillment, and meaningfulness. The book integrates philosophical issues with topics of broad human interest, and it includes chapters on how happiness connects with the virtues, love, philanthropy, suffering, simplicity, balancing work and leisure, and politics. Happiness is a moral value, as well as a self-interested value, which we have a responsibility as well as a right to pursue. Myriad specific virtues contribute to pursuing happiness, and in turn happiness contributes to or manifests an array of virtues such as love, self-respect, gratitude, and hope. Although happiness is by no means the entirety of good lives, it helps define some additional aspects of good lives, including authenticity, self-fulfillment, meaningfulness, and mental health. It also enters into understanding what it means to live a balanced life, and also a simple life centered on what matters most. The moral status of happiness is a central concern in the history of ethics. Recent “positive psychology” has breathed new life into traditional philosophical issues, and the book draws extensively on psychological studies. It also uses myriad examples from memoirs, novels, and films. One chapter is devoted to assessing the claim of Mary Shelley’s monster in Frankenstein: “Make me happy, and I shall again be virtuous.”
- Published in print:
- 2012
- Published Online:
- September 2012
- ISBN:
- 9780195161243
- eISBN:
- 9780199950317
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195161243.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, General, Moral Philosophy
Over the last several decades, advocates have championed a bewildering variety of methods for understanding and resolving difficult ethical problems in medicine, including principlism, wide ...
More
Over the last several decades, advocates have championed a bewildering variety of methods for understanding and resolving difficult ethical problems in medicine, including principlism, wide reflective equilibrium, casuistry, feminism, virtue theory, narrative, and others. Much of this advocacy overlooks the limits of the favored method, and neglects the strengths found in the alternatives. In systematically uncovering and evaluating both the strengths and limits of a variety of ethical tools, Methods in Medical Ethics: Critical Perspectives develops a comprehensive appreciation of the roles that various methods can each play in deepening our understanding of ethical problems in medicine, and in supporting well-grounded judgments about what to do. Each method discussed is critically evaluated to identify both limits and advantages, which are then illustrated through discussion of specific cases or controversies. This review not only demonstrates that there is no single method adequate to the task. More importantly, it develops an informed eclecticism that knows how to pick the right tool for the right job.Less
Over the last several decades, advocates have championed a bewildering variety of methods for understanding and resolving difficult ethical problems in medicine, including principlism, wide reflective equilibrium, casuistry, feminism, virtue theory, narrative, and others. Much of this advocacy overlooks the limits of the favored method, and neglects the strengths found in the alternatives. In systematically uncovering and evaluating both the strengths and limits of a variety of ethical tools, Methods in Medical Ethics: Critical Perspectives develops a comprehensive appreciation of the roles that various methods can each play in deepening our understanding of ethical problems in medicine, and in supporting well-grounded judgments about what to do. Each method discussed is critically evaluated to identify both limits and advantages, which are then illustrated through discussion of specific cases or controversies. This review not only demonstrates that there is no single method adequate to the task. More importantly, it develops an informed eclecticism that knows how to pick the right tool for the right job.
Alvin I. Goldman
- Published in print:
- 2012
- Published Online:
- May 2012
- ISBN:
- 9780199812875
- eISBN:
- 9780199933150
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199812875.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology, General
This is a collection of chapters by the leading proponent of process reliabilism, explaining its relation to rival and/or neighboring theories including evidentialism, other forms of reliabilism, and ...
More
This is a collection of chapters by the leading proponent of process reliabilism, explaining its relation to rival and/or neighboring theories including evidentialism, other forms of reliabilism, and virtue epistemology. It addresses other prominent themes in contemporary epistemology, such as the internalism/externalism debate, the epistemological upshots of experimental challenges to intuitional methodology, the source of epistemic value, and social epistemology. The Introduction addresses late-breaking responses to ongoing exchanges with friends, rivals, and critics of reliabilism.Less
This is a collection of chapters by the leading proponent of process reliabilism, explaining its relation to rival and/or neighboring theories including evidentialism, other forms of reliabilism, and virtue epistemology. It addresses other prominent themes in contemporary epistemology, such as the internalism/externalism debate, the epistemological upshots of experimental challenges to intuitional methodology, the source of epistemic value, and social epistemology. The Introduction addresses late-breaking responses to ongoing exchanges with friends, rivals, and critics of reliabilism.
Lisa Tessman
- Published in print:
- 2005
- Published Online:
- October 2005
- ISBN:
- 9780195179149
- eISBN:
- 9780199835782
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0195179145.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Feminist Philosophy
Lisa Tessman’s Burdened Virtues: Virtue Ethics for Liberatory Struggles engages questions central to feminist theory and practice, from the perspective of Aristotelian ethics. Focused primarily on ...
More
Lisa Tessman’s Burdened Virtues: Virtue Ethics for Liberatory Struggles engages questions central to feminist theory and practice, from the perspective of Aristotelian ethics. Focused primarily on selves who endure and resist oppression, the book addresses the ways in which the devastating conditions confronted by these selves both limit and burden their moral goodness, and affect their possibilities for flourishing. The book describes two different forms of “moral trouble” prevalent under oppression. The first is that the oppressed self may be morally damaged, prevented from developing or exercising some of the virtues; the second is that the very conditions of oppression require the oppressed to develop a set of virtues that carry a moral cost to those who practice them, and that are referred to as “burdened virtues.” These virtues have the unusual feature of being disjoined from their bearer’s own well being. It is suggested that eudaimonistic theories should be able to account for virtues of this sort.Less
Lisa Tessman’s Burdened Virtues: Virtue Ethics for Liberatory Struggles engages questions central to feminist theory and practice, from the perspective of Aristotelian ethics. Focused primarily on selves who endure and resist oppression, the book addresses the ways in which the devastating conditions confronted by these selves both limit and burden their moral goodness, and affect their possibilities for flourishing. The book describes two different forms of “moral trouble” prevalent under oppression. The first is that the oppressed self may be morally damaged, prevented from developing or exercising some of the virtues; the second is that the very conditions of oppression require the oppressed to develop a set of virtues that carry a moral cost to those who practice them, and that are referred to as “burdened virtues.” These virtues have the unusual feature of being disjoined from their bearer’s own well being. It is suggested that eudaimonistic theories should be able to account for virtues of this sort.
Christine Swanton
- Published in print:
- 2003
- Published Online:
- November 2003
- ISBN:
- 9780199253883
- eISBN:
- 9780191598517
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0199253889.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Moral Philosophy
This book offers a comprehensive virtue ethics that breaks from the tradition of eudaimonistic virtue ethics. In developing a pluralistic view, it shows how different ’modes of moral response’ such ...
More
This book offers a comprehensive virtue ethics that breaks from the tradition of eudaimonistic virtue ethics. In developing a pluralistic view, it shows how different ’modes of moral response’ such as love, respect, appreciation, and creativity are all central to the virtuous response and thereby to ethics. It offers virtue ethical accounts of the good life, objectivity, rightness, demandingness, and moral epistemology.Less
This book offers a comprehensive virtue ethics that breaks from the tradition of eudaimonistic virtue ethics. In developing a pluralistic view, it shows how different ’modes of moral response’ such as love, respect, appreciation, and creativity are all central to the virtuous response and thereby to ethics. It offers virtue ethical accounts of the good life, objectivity, rightness, demandingness, and moral epistemology.
