Richard Pettigrew
- Published in print:
- 2016
- Published Online:
- May 2016
- ISBN:
- 9780198732716
- eISBN:
- 9780191797019
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198732716.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology, Philosophy of Science
This book explores a particular way of justifying the rational principles that govern credences (or degrees of belief). The main principles that the book justifies are the central tenets of Bayesian ...
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This book explores a particular way of justifying the rational principles that govern credences (or degrees of belief). The main principles that the book justifies are the central tenets of Bayesian epistemology, though many other related principles are met along the way. These are: Probabilism, the claims that credences should obey the laws of probability; the Principal Principle, which says how credences in hypotheses about the objective chances should relate to credences in other propositions; the Principle of Indifference, which says that, in the absence of evidence, credences should be distributed equally over all possibilities that are entertained; and Conditionalization, the Bayesian account of how responses are planned when new evidence is received. Ultimately, then, the book is a study in the foundations of Bayesianism. To justify these principles, the book looks to decision theory. An agent’s credences are treated as if they were a choice she makes. The book appeals to the principles of decision theory to show that, when epistemic utility is measured in this way, the credences that violate the principles listed above are ruled out as irrational. The account of epistemic utility given is the veritist’s: the sole fundamental source of epistemic utility for credences is their accuracy. Thus, this is an investigation of the version of epistemic utility theory known as accuracy-first epistemology.Less
This book explores a particular way of justifying the rational principles that govern credences (or degrees of belief). The main principles that the book justifies are the central tenets of Bayesian epistemology, though many other related principles are met along the way. These are: Probabilism, the claims that credences should obey the laws of probability; the Principal Principle, which says how credences in hypotheses about the objective chances should relate to credences in other propositions; the Principle of Indifference, which says that, in the absence of evidence, credences should be distributed equally over all possibilities that are entertained; and Conditionalization, the Bayesian account of how responses are planned when new evidence is received. Ultimately, then, the book is a study in the foundations of Bayesianism. To justify these principles, the book looks to decision theory. An agent’s credences are treated as if they were a choice she makes. The book appeals to the principles of decision theory to show that, when epistemic utility is measured in this way, the credences that violate the principles listed above are ruled out as irrational. The account of epistemic utility given is the veritist’s: the sole fundamental source of epistemic utility for credences is their accuracy. Thus, this is an investigation of the version of epistemic utility theory known as accuracy-first epistemology.
Richard Pettigrew
- Published in print:
- 2016
- Published Online:
- May 2016
- ISBN:
- 9780198732716
- eISBN:
- 9780191797019
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198732716.003.0002
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology, Philosophy of Science
This chapter begins Part I of the book, which treats the accuracy argument for Probabilism. This chapter generalizes the argument given in the Introduction in favour of the principle No Drop. It ...
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This chapter begins Part I of the book, which treats the accuracy argument for Probabilism. This chapter generalizes the argument given in the Introduction in favour of the principle No Drop. It shows that a similar argument can be given for Probabilism, the principle that says that a rational agent’s credences will satisfy the laws of probability.Less
This chapter begins Part I of the book, which treats the accuracy argument for Probabilism. This chapter generalizes the argument given in the Introduction in favour of the principle No Drop. It shows that a similar argument can be given for Probabilism, the principle that says that a rational agent’s credences will satisfy the laws of probability.
Richard Pettigrew
- Published in print:
- 2016
- Published Online:
- May 2016
- ISBN:
- 9780198732716
- eISBN:
- 9780191797019
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198732716.003.0011
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology, Philosophy of Science
This chapter introduces a second attempt at an accuracy-based argument for chance-credence principles. In this attempt, the veritist account of vindication, on which the accuracy-based argument for ...
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This chapter introduces a second attempt at an accuracy-based argument for chance-credence principles. In this attempt, the veritist account of vindication, on which the accuracy-based argument for Probabilism depends, is retained. What is changed instead is the decision-theoretic principle: it is changed from a pure dominance principle to what is called a chance dominance principle. The chapter shows how the argument thus adapted can be used to establish various chance-credence principles and answers an objection that the justification it provides is circular.Less
This chapter introduces a second attempt at an accuracy-based argument for chance-credence principles. In this attempt, the veritist account of vindication, on which the accuracy-based argument for Probabilism depends, is retained. What is changed instead is the decision-theoretic principle: it is changed from a pure dominance principle to what is called a chance dominance principle. The chapter shows how the argument thus adapted can be used to establish various chance-credence principles and answers an objection that the justification it provides is circular.
Clayton Littlejohn
- Published in print:
- 2018
- Published Online:
- June 2018
- ISBN:
- 9780198779681
- eISBN:
- 9780191824739
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/oso/9780198779681.003.0002
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology
Littlejohn considers and criticizes the value theory that underlies epistemic consequentialism. He first casts doubt on veritism, the view according to which accuracy and only accuracy is the final ...
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Littlejohn considers and criticizes the value theory that underlies epistemic consequentialism. He first casts doubt on veritism, the view according to which accuracy and only accuracy is the final epistemic good. One might think that the consequentialist is unscathed by this: simply put in something else as the epistemic good. But Littlejohn argues that this fails, too. For whatever it is that the consequentialist says is the epistemic good, she cannot make sense of why such a good should be promoted.Less
Littlejohn considers and criticizes the value theory that underlies epistemic consequentialism. He first casts doubt on veritism, the view according to which accuracy and only accuracy is the final epistemic good. One might think that the consequentialist is unscathed by this: simply put in something else as the epistemic good. But Littlejohn argues that this fails, too. For whatever it is that the consequentialist says is the epistemic good, she cannot make sense of why such a good should be promoted.
