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Accuracy and the Laws of Credence

Richard Pettigrew

Published in print:
2016
Published Online:
May 2016
ISBN:
9780198732716
eISBN:
9780191797019
Item type:
book
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198732716.001.0001
Subject:
Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology, Philosophy of Science

This book explores a particular way of justifying the rational principles that govern credences (or degrees of belief). The main principles that the book justifies are the central tenets of Bayesian ... More


From No Drop to Probabilism

Richard Pettigrew

in Accuracy and the Laws of Credence

Published in print:
2016
Published Online:
May 2016
ISBN:
9780198732716
eISBN:
9780191797019
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198732716.003.0002
Subject:
Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology, Philosophy of Science

This chapter begins Part I of the book, which treats the accuracy argument for Probabilism. This chapter generalizes the argument given in the Introduction in favour of the principle No Drop. It ... More


Simple Veritism

Christopher Cowie

in Morality and Epistemic Judgement: The Argument From Analogy

Published in print:
2019
Published Online:
December 2019
ISBN:
9780198842736
eISBN:
9780191878664
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/oso/9780198842736.003.0007
Subject:
Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology, Moral Philosophy

In modelling epistemic judgements on normative or evaluative judgements within ‘institutions’—such as sports and games, etiquette, fashion, and the law—as has been done in earlier chapters it has ... More


Dominance and chance

Richard Pettigrew

in Accuracy and the Laws of Credence

Published in print:
2016
Published Online:
May 2016
ISBN:
9780198732716
eISBN:
9780191797019
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198732716.003.0011
Subject:
Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology, Philosophy of Science

This chapter introduces a second attempt at an accuracy-based argument for chance-credence principles. In this attempt, the veritist account of vindication, on which the accuracy-based argument for ... More


The Right in the Good: A Defense of Teleological Non-Consequentialism

Clayton Littlejohn

in Epistemic Consequentialism

Published in print:
2018
Published Online:
June 2018
ISBN:
9780198779681
eISBN:
9780191824739
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/oso/9780198779681.003.0002
Subject:
Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology

Littlejohn considers and criticizes the value theory that underlies epistemic consequentialism. He first casts doubt on veritism, the view according to which accuracy and only accuracy is the final ... More


Defeaters as Indicators of Ignorance

Julien Dutant and Clayton Littlejohn

in Reasons, Justification, and Defeat

Published in print:
2021
Published Online:
April 2021
ISBN:
9780198847205
eISBN:
9780191882111
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/oso/9780198847205.003.0010
Subject:
Philosophy, General

In this paper, we propose a new theory of rationality defeat. We propose that defeaters are indicators of ignorance, evidence that we’re not in a position to know some target proposition. When the ... More


Dispositional Evaluations and Defeat

Maria Lasonen-Aarnio

in Reasons, Justification, and Defeat

Published in print:
2021
Published Online:
April 2021
ISBN:
9780198847205
eISBN:
9780191882111
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/oso/9780198847205.003.0005
Subject:
Philosophy, General

Subjects who retain their beliefs in the face of higher-order evidence that those very beliefs are outputs of flawed cognitive processes are at least very often criticizable. Many think that this is ... More


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