M. G. F. Martin
- Published in print:
- 2006
- Published Online:
- May 2010
- ISBN:
- 9780199289769
- eISBN:
- 9780191711046
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199289769.003.0011
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind, Metaphysics/Epistemology
Disjunctivist theories advocate a type of naïve realism about veridical perception in that they support the common understanding that some sensory experiences are relations to mind-independent ...
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Disjunctivist theories advocate a type of naïve realism about veridical perception in that they support the common understanding that some sensory experiences are relations to mind-independent objects. The sceptical argument from hallucination challenges the connection between naïve realism about perceptual experience and disjunctivism. This chapter focuses on identifying and elaborating the fundamental disagreements here. The first part presents the basic commitments of disjunctivism. This is followed by a formulation of the worry about the absence of phenomenal consciousness in relation to older concerns of absent qualia. Opposing models of how phenomenal consciousness and self-awareness fit together are sketched. In the final section, these models are connected to different reactions to external world scepticism.Less
Disjunctivist theories advocate a type of naïve realism about veridical perception in that they support the common understanding that some sensory experiences are relations to mind-independent objects. The sceptical argument from hallucination challenges the connection between naïve realism about perceptual experience and disjunctivism. This chapter focuses on identifying and elaborating the fundamental disagreements here. The first part presents the basic commitments of disjunctivism. This is followed by a formulation of the worry about the absence of phenomenal consciousness in relation to older concerns of absent qualia. Opposing models of how phenomenal consciousness and self-awareness fit together are sketched. In the final section, these models are connected to different reactions to external world scepticism.
Alex Byrne and Heather Logue (eds)
- Published in print:
- 2008
- Published Online:
- August 2013
- ISBN:
- 9780262026550
- eISBN:
- 9780262255219
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- The MIT Press
- DOI:
- 10.7551/mitpress/9780262026550.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, General
A central debate regarding perception in contemporary philosophy concerns the disjunctive theory of perceptual experience. Until the 1960s, philosophers of perception generally assumed that a ...
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A central debate regarding perception in contemporary philosophy concerns the disjunctive theory of perceptual experience. Until the 1960s, philosophers of perception generally assumed that a veridical perception (a perceptual experience that presents the world as it really is) and a subjectively similar hallucination must have significant mental commonalities. Disjunctivists challenge this assumption, contending that the veridical perception and the corresponding hallucination share no mental core. Suppose that while you are looking at a lemon, God suddenly removes it, while keeping your brain activity constant. Although you notice no change, disjunctivists argue that the preremoval and postremoval experiences are radically different. Disjunctivism has gained prominent supporters in recent years, as well as attracting much criticism. This reader collects in one volume classic texts that define and react to disjunctivism. These include an excerpt from a book by the late J. M. Hinton, who was the first to propose an explicitly disjunctivist position, and papers stating a number of important objections.Less
A central debate regarding perception in contemporary philosophy concerns the disjunctive theory of perceptual experience. Until the 1960s, philosophers of perception generally assumed that a veridical perception (a perceptual experience that presents the world as it really is) and a subjectively similar hallucination must have significant mental commonalities. Disjunctivists challenge this assumption, contending that the veridical perception and the corresponding hallucination share no mental core. Suppose that while you are looking at a lemon, God suddenly removes it, while keeping your brain activity constant. Although you notice no change, disjunctivists argue that the preremoval and postremoval experiences are radically different. Disjunctivism has gained prominent supporters in recent years, as well as attracting much criticism. This reader collects in one volume classic texts that define and react to disjunctivism. These include an excerpt from a book by the late J. M. Hinton, who was the first to propose an explicitly disjunctivist position, and papers stating a number of important objections.
István Aranyosi
- Published in print:
- 2013
- Published Online:
- January 2014
- ISBN:
- 9780262019200
- eISBN:
- 9780262315050
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- The MIT Press
- DOI:
- 10.7551/mitpress/9780262019200.003.0011
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind
Most people are realists when it comes to perceptual experience. They take perceiving the environment as a straightforward task. Philosophers see things different. This chapter puts forward the ...
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Most people are realists when it comes to perceptual experience. They take perceiving the environment as a straightforward task. Philosophers see things different. This chapter puts forward the following statements: hallucinations that are subjectively indistinguishable from veridical perceptions are possible; if two subjective states are indistinguishable, then they have a common nature; the contents of hallucinations are mental images, not concrete external objects; and therefore, the contents of veridical perceptions are mental images rather than concrete external objects.Less
Most people are realists when it comes to perceptual experience. They take perceiving the environment as a straightforward task. Philosophers see things different. This chapter puts forward the following statements: hallucinations that are subjectively indistinguishable from veridical perceptions are possible; if two subjective states are indistinguishable, then they have a common nature; the contents of hallucinations are mental images, not concrete external objects; and therefore, the contents of veridical perceptions are mental images rather than concrete external objects.
Zygmunt Pizlo, Yunfeng Li, Tadamasa Sawada, and Robert M. Steinman
- Published in print:
- 2014
- Published Online:
- August 2014
- ISBN:
- 9780199922543
- eISBN:
- 9780190228385
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199922543.001.0001
- Subject:
- Psychology, Cognitive Neuroscience, Vision
This book explains why and how our visual perceptions are veridical; how they can provide us with an accurate representation of the world “out there.” It explains how this computationally difficult ...
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This book explains why and how our visual perceptions are veridical; how they can provide us with an accurate representation of the world “out there.” It explains how this computationally difficult problem was solved by describing how the authors built a machine (a computational model) that sees very much as we do. This has never been done before and nothing remotely like it is available anywhere else. Doing it required a “paradigm shift,” an entirely new way of thinking about visual perception, one that is quite unlike any that has been considered up to now. The book, despite its scientific sophistication, is accessible to a very wide audience because each issue covered in the text is discussed twice, once for the “intuitive” reader and once for the “technical” reader. No equations are included in this book, but technical readers can find them in the authors’ published papers. The book, which contains many helpful demos, tells the story of how the machine was developed and what drove the ideas needed to make it work. This makes it an interesting, even gripping, read. The machine, explained clearly in this book, could have enormous practical and scientific, as well as social/artistic consequences. This book combines a new computational theory of shape perception with an account of the history of the theory's discovery. It tells this story together with all relevant background information including criticisms of it and of opposing theories. This mixture is an unusual way to present a major scientific achievement, but it not only works, it also makes for an exciting read.Less
This book explains why and how our visual perceptions are veridical; how they can provide us with an accurate representation of the world “out there.” It explains how this computationally difficult problem was solved by describing how the authors built a machine (a computational model) that sees very much as we do. This has never been done before and nothing remotely like it is available anywhere else. Doing it required a “paradigm shift,” an entirely new way of thinking about visual perception, one that is quite unlike any that has been considered up to now. The book, despite its scientific sophistication, is accessible to a very wide audience because each issue covered in the text is discussed twice, once for the “intuitive” reader and once for the “technical” reader. No equations are included in this book, but technical readers can find them in the authors’ published papers. The book, which contains many helpful demos, tells the story of how the machine was developed and what drove the ideas needed to make it work. This makes it an interesting, even gripping, read. The machine, explained clearly in this book, could have enormous practical and scientific, as well as social/artistic consequences. This book combines a new computational theory of shape perception with an account of the history of the theory's discovery. It tells this story together with all relevant background information including criticisms of it and of opposing theories. This mixture is an unusual way to present a major scientific achievement, but it not only works, it also makes for an exciting read.
Michael Sollberger
- Published in print:
- 2017
- Published Online:
- May 2017
- ISBN:
- 9780199688289
- eISBN:
- 9780191767609
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/oso/9780199688289.003.0010
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind, Metaphysics/Epistemology
Can some synaesthetic experiences be treated as veridical perceptual experiences, i.e. as conscious mental states in which worldly objects and their features perceptually appear as they really are? ...
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Can some synaesthetic experiences be treated as veridical perceptual experiences, i.e. as conscious mental states in which worldly objects and their features perceptually appear as they really are? Most empirical scientists and philosophers working on synaesthesia answer this question in the negative. Contrary to this prevailing opinion, Mohan Matthen’s ‘When is Synaesthesia Perception?’ (Chapter 8, this volume) argues that such a dismissive approach to the epistemic properties of synaesthetic experiences is not mandatory. Matthen claims that there is conceptual room for a more tolerant approach according to which at least one variety of synaesthesia, which he calls ‘direct synaesthesia’, is epistemically on a par with everyday non-synaesthetic perception. The aim of this chapter is to evaluate the idea of ‘direct synaesthesia’ and to assess whether the accepted dogma that synaesthesia is always prone to error has to go.Less
Can some synaesthetic experiences be treated as veridical perceptual experiences, i.e. as conscious mental states in which worldly objects and their features perceptually appear as they really are? Most empirical scientists and philosophers working on synaesthesia answer this question in the negative. Contrary to this prevailing opinion, Mohan Matthen’s ‘When is Synaesthesia Perception?’ (Chapter 8, this volume) argues that such a dismissive approach to the epistemic properties of synaesthetic experiences is not mandatory. Matthen claims that there is conceptual room for a more tolerant approach according to which at least one variety of synaesthesia, which he calls ‘direct synaesthesia’, is epistemically on a par with everyday non-synaesthetic perception. The aim of this chapter is to evaluate the idea of ‘direct synaesthesia’ and to assess whether the accepted dogma that synaesthesia is always prone to error has to go.
