John Hicks
- Published in print:
- 1989
- Published Online:
- November 2003
- ISBN:
- 9780198287247
- eISBN:
- 9780191596407
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0198287240.001.0001
- Subject:
- Economics and Finance, Macro- and Monetary Economics
John Hicks's writing on monetary economics spans over fifty years. This book draws together the common threads of his work in a single succinct statement of the basics of monetary theory. It also ...
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John Hicks's writing on monetary economics spans over fifty years. This book draws together the common threads of his work in a single succinct statement of the basics of monetary theory. It also outlines a theory of competitive markets that can be linked to the monetary sector; neither standard classical or neo-classical value theory can, on its own, fill the gap between monetary and non-monetary economics. In reviewing his own work, Hicks explains the way in which economic theory has been adjusted to reflect developments in the real economy. He sees these changes, sometimes quite major, as the discovery of truths which have become more appropriate, rather than the discovery of completely new truths.Less
John Hicks's writing on monetary economics spans over fifty years. This book draws together the common threads of his work in a single succinct statement of the basics of monetary theory. It also outlines a theory of competitive markets that can be linked to the monetary sector; neither standard classical or neo-classical value theory can, on its own, fill the gap between monetary and non-monetary economics. In reviewing his own work, Hicks explains the way in which economic theory has been adjusted to reflect developments in the real economy. He sees these changes, sometimes quite major, as the discovery of truths which have become more appropriate, rather than the discovery of completely new truths.
Russell Hardin
- Published in print:
- 2007
- Published Online:
- September 2007
- ISBN:
- 9780199232567
- eISBN:
- 9780191715976
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199232567.003.0008
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Moral Philosophy
This chapter explores Hume's value theory. It is argued that Hume does not lay out his value theory as a whole apparel for the body of his moral psychology. He makes points about values almost always ...
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This chapter explores Hume's value theory. It is argued that Hume does not lay out his value theory as a whole apparel for the body of his moral psychology. He makes points about values almost always only in the context of whatever argument is at issue.Less
This chapter explores Hume's value theory. It is argued that Hume does not lay out his value theory as a whole apparel for the body of his moral psychology. He makes points about values almost always only in the context of whatever argument is at issue.
Larry S. Temkin
- Published in print:
- 2012
- Published Online:
- May 2012
- ISBN:
- 9780199759446
- eISBN:
- 9780199932214
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199759446.003.0008
- Subject:
- Philosophy, General, Moral Philosophy
The previous chapters offered a number of “impossibility” results. It was argued that certain deeply held views are incompatible, so that, seemingly, at least one of the views in question must be ...
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The previous chapters offered a number of “impossibility” results. It was argued that certain deeply held views are incompatible, so that, seemingly, at least one of the views in question must be rejected. Among the views that might be rejected is the view that “all-things-considered better than” (in my wide reason-implying sense) is a transitive relation. Among those who accept the impossibility results, some are convinced that the transitivity of “better than” cannot be the position we should reject, because of the role that it plays in Expected Utility Theory as such a theory might be applied to the domain of value, a position that we might call Expected Value Theory. This chapter casts doubt on whether we can confidently insist that “all-things-considered better than” must be a transitive relation, because of the role that such a position plays in Expected Value Theory.Less
The previous chapters offered a number of “impossibility” results. It was argued that certain deeply held views are incompatible, so that, seemingly, at least one of the views in question must be rejected. Among the views that might be rejected is the view that “all-things-considered better than” (in my wide reason-implying sense) is a transitive relation. Among those who accept the impossibility results, some are convinced that the transitivity of “better than” cannot be the position we should reject, because of the role that it plays in Expected Utility Theory as such a theory might be applied to the domain of value, a position that we might call Expected Value Theory. This chapter casts doubt on whether we can confidently insist that “all-things-considered better than” must be a transitive relation, because of the role that such a position plays in Expected Value Theory.
Jerrold Levinson
- Published in print:
- 2006
- Published Online:
- January 2007
- ISBN:
- 9780199206179
- eISBN:
- 9780191709982
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199206179.003.0025
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Aesthetics
This essay explores the notion of intrinsic value. It is argued thata richly sentient life being a certain wayis the only possible subject of a defensible judgement of intrinsic value. One ...
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This essay explores the notion of intrinsic value. It is argued thata richly sentient life being a certain wayis the only possible subject of a defensible judgement of intrinsic value. One consequence of this thesis is a disagreement with G. E. Moore regarding the intrinsic value of a beautiful world devoid of sentience, a famous thought experiment from hisPrincipia Ethica. But a more important consequence is the underlining of an intimate connection between the notion of a richly sentient life and the very idea of intrinsic value.Less
This essay explores the notion of intrinsic value. It is argued thata richly sentient life being a certain wayis the only possible subject of a defensible judgement of intrinsic value. One consequence of this thesis is a disagreement with G. E. Moore regarding the intrinsic value of a beautiful world devoid of sentience, a famous thought experiment from hisPrincipia Ethica. But a more important consequence is the underlining of an intimate connection between the notion of a richly sentient life and the very idea of intrinsic value.
John Broome
- Published in print:
- 2004
- Published Online:
- October 2005
- ISBN:
- 9780199243761
- eISBN:
- 9780191602900
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/019924376X.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Moral Philosophy
People are often faced with decisions that involve weighing the lives of some people against the lives of others, or weighing lives against other goods. This book aims to develop a moral theory that ...
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People are often faced with decisions that involve weighing the lives of some people against the lives of others, or weighing lives against other goods. This book aims to develop a moral theory that can help with making these practical decisions. It is a theory of value, which includes an account of how good it is to extend a person’s life, and also an account of how good it is to have new lives in the world — of the value of adding a new person to the world’s population. It is a theory about the aggregation of people’s wellbeing: of how the wellbeing that comes to a person at different times in her life comes together to determine the overall value of her life, and of how different people’s wellbeing comes together to determine the overall value of the world. The book pays particular attention to the common intuition that adding people to the population is ethically neutral, but eventually rejects it. The book’s conclusion is a version of utilitarianism. The method is formal, but the presentation is as informal as possible.Less
People are often faced with decisions that involve weighing the lives of some people against the lives of others, or weighing lives against other goods. This book aims to develop a moral theory that can help with making these practical decisions. It is a theory of value, which includes an account of how good it is to extend a person’s life, and also an account of how good it is to have new lives in the world — of the value of adding a new person to the world’s population. It is a theory about the aggregation of people’s wellbeing: of how the wellbeing that comes to a person at different times in her life comes together to determine the overall value of her life, and of how different people’s wellbeing comes together to determine the overall value of the world. The book pays particular attention to the common intuition that adding people to the population is ethically neutral, but eventually rejects it. The book’s conclusion is a version of utilitarianism. The method is formal, but the presentation is as informal as possible.
Russell Hardin
- Published in print:
- 2007
- Published Online:
- September 2007
- ISBN:
- 9780199232567
- eISBN:
- 9780191715976
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199232567.003.0005
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Moral Philosophy
This chapter discusses Hume's political theory. Topics covered include power, social order, government, justificatory theories of the state, contractarianism, public-goods theories, shared-value ...
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This chapter discusses Hume's political theory. Topics covered include power, social order, government, justificatory theories of the state, contractarianism, public-goods theories, shared-value theories, rebellion, and international relations. It is argued that Hume's account is richly grounded in coordination and convention. He thinks that utility or interest is a major part of what motivates us in general and especially with respect to government. This concern may be elevated to the moral theory of utilitarianism.Less
This chapter discusses Hume's political theory. Topics covered include power, social order, government, justificatory theories of the state, contractarianism, public-goods theories, shared-value theories, rebellion, and international relations. It is argued that Hume's account is richly grounded in coordination and convention. He thinks that utility or interest is a major part of what motivates us in general and especially with respect to government. This concern may be elevated to the moral theory of utilitarianism.
Graham Bell
- Published in print:
- 2007
- Published Online:
- May 2008
- ISBN:
- 9780198569725
- eISBN:
- 9780191717741
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198569725.003.0003
- Subject:
- Biology, Evolutionary Biology / Genetics
The mechanism of evolutionary change can be studied directly through selection experiments in laboratory microcosms. This chapter begins by describing the experimental approach to evolution, and goes ...
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The mechanism of evolutionary change can be studied directly through selection experiments in laboratory microcosms. This chapter begins by describing the experimental approach to evolution, and goes on to analyse adaptation over different time scales. The first section in this chapter is about microcosmologica. Subsections here concern Dallinger's experiment; the laboratory microcosm; the inhabitants of the microcosm; the selection experiment; fitness and adaptedness; and microcosm genealogy. The second section is all about sorting (in other words selection of pre-existing variation) and includes subsection on a single episode of selection; the sorting of a single type; the mixture of discrete types; the Fundamental Theorem of Natural Selection; the sorting in finite populations; drift and selection; and fluctuating population size. The third section is on purifying selection (defined as maintaining adaptedness despite genetic deterioration) and this section discusses the following: mutation-drift balance; mutation-selection equilibrium; and Muller's Ratchet. The fourth section is about directional selection (this is restoring adaptedness despite environmental deterioration) and details the probability that a beneficial mutation will be fixed; periodic selection; Fisher's geometrical analogy; the variable-mutation model; the extreme-value mode; clonal interference; the distribution of fitness effects; genetic interference; and the genetic basis of adaptation. The fifth section is about successive substitution and includes detail on phenotypic evolution towards the optimum; adaptive walks; transitivity; and clonal interference. The sixth section, Cumulative adaptation, includes the following: the protein matrix; connectance; synthetic beneficial mutations; functional interaction in a protein structure; the evolution of RNA sequences; reversibility; cumulation; cumulative construction of novel amidases; diminishing returns; and contingency. The last section called Successive substitution at several loci explains genetic interactions; the adaptive landscape; the allele matrix; compensatory mutations; compound structures; processing chains; the effect of mutation in a simple processing chain; the pattern of adaptation; the evolution of metabolic pathways; in vitro selection; genetic changes during adaptation; and repeated adaptation.Less
The mechanism of evolutionary change can be studied directly through selection experiments in laboratory microcosms. This chapter begins by describing the experimental approach to evolution, and goes on to analyse adaptation over different time scales. The first section in this chapter is about microcosmologica. Subsections here concern Dallinger's experiment; the laboratory microcosm; the inhabitants of the microcosm; the selection experiment; fitness and adaptedness; and microcosm genealogy. The second section is all about sorting (in other words selection of pre-existing variation) and includes subsection on a single episode of selection; the sorting of a single type; the mixture of discrete types; the Fundamental Theorem of Natural Selection; the sorting in finite populations; drift and selection; and fluctuating population size. The third section is on purifying selection (defined as maintaining adaptedness despite genetic deterioration) and this section discusses the following: mutation-drift balance; mutation-selection equilibrium; and Muller's Ratchet. The fourth section is about directional selection (this is restoring adaptedness despite environmental deterioration) and details the probability that a beneficial mutation will be fixed; periodic selection; Fisher's geometrical analogy; the variable-mutation model; the extreme-value mode; clonal interference; the distribution of fitness effects; genetic interference; and the genetic basis of adaptation. The fifth section is about successive substitution and includes detail on phenotypic evolution towards the optimum; adaptive walks; transitivity; and clonal interference. The sixth section, Cumulative adaptation, includes the following: the protein matrix; connectance; synthetic beneficial mutations; functional interaction in a protein structure; the evolution of RNA sequences; reversibility; cumulation; cumulative construction of novel amidases; diminishing returns; and contingency. The last section called Successive substitution at several loci explains genetic interactions; the adaptive landscape; the allele matrix; compensatory mutations; compound structures; processing chains; the effect of mutation in a simple processing chain; the pattern of adaptation; the evolution of metabolic pathways; in vitro selection; genetic changes during adaptation; and repeated adaptation.
Athol Fitzgibbons
- Published in print:
- 1997
- Published Online:
- November 2003
- ISBN:
- 9780198292883
- eISBN:
- 9780191596247
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0198292880.003.0012
- Subject:
- Economics and Finance, History of Economic Thought
Laments that many economists are ignorant of Smith's ideas. It explains that Smith's objective was not to increase international trade, and briefly considers his theories of value and money.
Laments that many economists are ignorant of Smith's ideas. It explains that Smith's objective was not to increase international trade, and briefly considers his theories of value and money.
Frederick C. Beiser
- Published in print:
- 2011
- Published Online:
- January 2012
- ISBN:
- 9780199691555
- eISBN:
- 9780191731839
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199691555.003.0011
- Subject:
- Philosophy, History of Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology
This chapter is a close examination of the philosophy of value of Heinrich Rickert (1863–1936). The philosophy of value was an attempt to define and secure an ahistorical realm of values against the ...
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This chapter is a close examination of the philosophy of value of Heinrich Rickert (1863–1936). The philosophy of value was an attempt to define and secure an ahistorical realm of values against the threats of naturalism and historicism. It placed values in an “irreal realm,” one independent of mental or physical reality. The chapter discusses Rickert's attempts to explain the meaning of this realm and its relation to reality. It also considers Rickert's early views regarding historical explanation and the limits of naturalism.Less
This chapter is a close examination of the philosophy of value of Heinrich Rickert (1863–1936). The philosophy of value was an attempt to define and secure an ahistorical realm of values against the threats of naturalism and historicism. It placed values in an “irreal realm,” one independent of mental or physical reality. The chapter discusses Rickert's attempts to explain the meaning of this realm and its relation to reality. It also considers Rickert's early views regarding historical explanation and the limits of naturalism.
W. D. Ross
- Published in print:
- 2002
- Published Online:
- November 2003
- ISBN:
- 9780199252657
- eISBN:
- 9780191598333
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0199252653.003.0004
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Moral Philosophy
This is the second of five chapters on good, and starts by making the point that it is around the question of the intrinsically good that the chief controversies about the nature of goodness or value ...
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This is the second of five chapters on good, and starts by making the point that it is around the question of the intrinsically good that the chief controversies about the nature of goodness or value revolve, for most theories of value may be divided into those that treat it as a quality and those that treat it as a relation between that which has value and something else (which is usually some state of mind); Ross says that it seems clear that any view that treats goodness as a relation between that which is good and something else denies that anything is intrinsically good. The chapter first discusses R. B. Perry's relational view of value—in the sense of good, and other theories that also identify goodness with some relation, either as a relation between that which is good and some or all of its elements, or as a relation between some or all of its elements, or as a relation between it or some or all of its elements and something else. Next, the psychological theories of good are discussed; these, as a rule, hold that a thing being good means either that some person or persons have some feelings towards it, or some person or persons think it to be good; this is an objective view of good. The rest of the chapter looks at both R. B. Perry's and G. E. Moore's arguments on these theories, at Ross's own views, at badness as incompatible with goodness or as an element of a good thing, at W. M. Urban's work on the question of values (value often being considered as qualities of goodness or badness), and at B. Croce's arguments on value judgements. Ross concludes that the arguments in favour of thinking of value as an objective are no more successful than those in favour of treating it as a relation, and presents a lengthy validation of his conclusion, based largely on discussion of beauty and goodness.Less
This is the second of five chapters on good, and starts by making the point that it is around the question of the intrinsically good that the chief controversies about the nature of goodness or value revolve, for most theories of value may be divided into those that treat it as a quality and those that treat it as a relation between that which has value and something else (which is usually some state of mind); Ross says that it seems clear that any view that treats goodness as a relation between that which is good and something else denies that anything is intrinsically good. The chapter first discusses R. B. Perry's relational view of value—in the sense of good, and other theories that also identify goodness with some relation, either as a relation between that which is good and some or all of its elements, or as a relation between some or all of its elements, or as a relation between it or some or all of its elements and something else. Next, the psychological theories of good are discussed; these, as a rule, hold that a thing being good means either that some person or persons have some feelings towards it, or some person or persons think it to be good; this is an objective view of good. The rest of the chapter looks at both R. B. Perry's and G. E. Moore's arguments on these theories, at Ross's own views, at badness as incompatible with goodness or as an element of a good thing, at W. M. Urban's work on the question of values (value often being considered as qualities of goodness or badness), and at B. Croce's arguments on value judgements. Ross concludes that the arguments in favour of thinking of value as an objective are no more successful than those in favour of treating it as a relation, and presents a lengthy validation of his conclusion, based largely on discussion of beauty and goodness.
S. N. Afriat
- Published in print:
- 1987
- Published Online:
- November 2003
- ISBN:
- 9780198284611
- eISBN:
- 9780191595844
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0198284616.003.0007
- Subject:
- Economics and Finance, Microeconomics
This is the first of six chapters in Part II about demand and utility cost, a typical area for what is understood as choice theory. It discusses utility hypothesis and the theory of value. Its five ...
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This is the first of six chapters in Part II about demand and utility cost, a typical area for what is understood as choice theory. It discusses utility hypothesis and the theory of value. Its five sections are: needs of measurement (of utility); common practice and (William) Fleetwood; parallels in theory (as applied to utility construction); revealed preference (as applied to demand functions); and the classical case (of the utility function).Less
This is the first of six chapters in Part II about demand and utility cost, a typical area for what is understood as choice theory. It discusses utility hypothesis and the theory of value. Its five sections are: needs of measurement (of utility); common practice and (William) Fleetwood; parallels in theory (as applied to utility construction); revealed preference (as applied to demand functions); and the classical case (of the utility function).
Elizabeth Anderson
- Published in print:
- 2005
- Published Online:
- March 2012
- ISBN:
- 9780195305104
- eISBN:
- 9780199850556
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195305104.003.0014
- Subject:
- Political Science, Environmental Politics
This chapter examines some of the tensions among animal welfare, animal rights, and environmental protection ethics. It explains that while animal rights advocates object to animal experimentation, ...
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This chapter examines some of the tensions among animal welfare, animal rights, and environmental protection ethics. It explains that while animal rights advocates object to animal experimentation, this practice is acceptable to those who believe in animal welfare. The chapter shows that those who believe in environmental ethics might support the hunting of deer and rabbits when this is necessary to protect ecological well-being. It proposes an alternative approach to understanding the evaluative claims of the three perspectives, called rational attitude theory of value.Less
This chapter examines some of the tensions among animal welfare, animal rights, and environmental protection ethics. It explains that while animal rights advocates object to animal experimentation, this practice is acceptable to those who believe in animal welfare. The chapter shows that those who believe in environmental ethics might support the hunting of deer and rabbits when this is necessary to protect ecological well-being. It proposes an alternative approach to understanding the evaluative claims of the three perspectives, called rational attitude theory of value.
John Child, David Faulkner, and Stephen B. Tallman
- Published in print:
- 2005
- Published Online:
- October 2011
- ISBN:
- 9780199266241
- eISBN:
- 9780191699139
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199266241.003.0002
- Subject:
- Business and Management, Strategy, Organization Studies
The justification attributed to cooperative strategy may be based on several different economic theories and as such, this chapter attempts to take on an economic perspective in examining a company's ...
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The justification attributed to cooperative strategy may be based on several different economic theories and as such, this chapter attempts to take on an economic perspective in examining a company's actions and strategies. Although none of the theories discussed in this chapter are sufficient enough to be able to explain competitive advantage, usefulness, and credibility alone, the chapter is able to look into the features of each theory and how these may contribute to the strategy and operations of a particular organization. It attempts to look into the following economic theories and explains how each of these theories may be applied: market-power theory; transaction-cost analysis; agency theory; resource-based theory; transaction-value theory; real-options theory; and increasing-returns theory.Less
The justification attributed to cooperative strategy may be based on several different economic theories and as such, this chapter attempts to take on an economic perspective in examining a company's actions and strategies. Although none of the theories discussed in this chapter are sufficient enough to be able to explain competitive advantage, usefulness, and credibility alone, the chapter is able to look into the features of each theory and how these may contribute to the strategy and operations of a particular organization. It attempts to look into the following economic theories and explains how each of these theories may be applied: market-power theory; transaction-cost analysis; agency theory; resource-based theory; transaction-value theory; real-options theory; and increasing-returns theory.
Stephen Schiffer
- Published in print:
- 2003
- Published Online:
- April 2005
- ISBN:
- 9780199257768
- eISBN:
- 9780191602313
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0199257760.003.0002
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Language
The face-value theory is that theory of the logical form of belief reports that must be defeated if it is not to be accepted. It holds that ‘A believes that S’ is true just in case A stands in the ...
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The face-value theory is that theory of the logical form of belief reports that must be defeated if it is not to be accepted. It holds that ‘A believes that S’ is true just in case A stands in the belief relation to the proposition that S. The theory constrains, but provides no complete account of, the nature of the propositions we believe. Most face-value theorists hold that the propositions we believe are structured, and the big contest here is between Russellian and Fregean propositions. Both conceptions are problematic.Less
The face-value theory is that theory of the logical form of belief reports that must be defeated if it is not to be accepted. It holds that ‘A believes that S’ is true just in case A stands in the belief relation to the proposition that S. The theory constrains, but provides no complete account of, the nature of the propositions we believe. Most face-value theorists hold that the propositions we believe are structured, and the big contest here is between Russellian and Fregean propositions. Both conceptions are problematic.
GRAHAM ODDIE
- Published in print:
- 2005
- Published Online:
- July 2005
- ISBN:
- 9780199273416
- eISBN:
- 9780191602658
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0199273413.003.0006
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Moral Philosophy
This chapter presents a promising way of defending the determination of value by nature, while resisting reduction. Recent developments in both property theory and value theory help clarify a thesis ...
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This chapter presents a promising way of defending the determination of value by nature, while resisting reduction. Recent developments in both property theory and value theory help clarify a thesis about the relation between irreducibility and multiple realizability which has not been as clearly articulated as it can be. This in turn will help to establish and illustrate the possibility of supervenience without reduction.Less
This chapter presents a promising way of defending the determination of value by nature, while resisting reduction. Recent developments in both property theory and value theory help clarify a thesis about the relation between irreducibility and multiple realizability which has not been as clearly articulated as it can be. This in turn will help to establish and illustrate the possibility of supervenience without reduction.
Jon McGinnis
- Published in print:
- 2010
- Published Online:
- September 2010
- ISBN:
- 9780195331479
- eISBN:
- 9780199868032
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195331479.003.0008
- Subject:
- Religion, Islam
This chapter returns to Avicenna’s theory of the intellect, but now with a focus on the practical intellect and its role in the formation of our moral temperaments. Since Avicenna believes that the ...
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This chapter returns to Avicenna’s theory of the intellect, but now with a focus on the practical intellect and its role in the formation of our moral temperaments. Since Avicenna believes that the proper formation of these temperaments and the life of the human species require communal association, there is a discussion of Avicenna’s political theory, which at its core has the Avicennan counterpart to the Platonic “Philosopher-King,” namely, Avicenna’s “Prophet-Lawgiver.” Once completing this background, Avicenna’s conception of the return or afterlife is taken up, along with a discussion of Avicenna’s vision of the pleasures and pains that one might expect to experience there depending upon the life one has lived here. The chapter concludes with Avicenna’s views about providence and his general account of why evil exists in a world created by a wholly good God.Less
This chapter returns to Avicenna’s theory of the intellect, but now with a focus on the practical intellect and its role in the formation of our moral temperaments. Since Avicenna believes that the proper formation of these temperaments and the life of the human species require communal association, there is a discussion of Avicenna’s political theory, which at its core has the Avicennan counterpart to the Platonic “Philosopher-King,” namely, Avicenna’s “Prophet-Lawgiver.” Once completing this background, Avicenna’s conception of the return or afterlife is taken up, along with a discussion of Avicenna’s vision of the pleasures and pains that one might expect to experience there depending upon the life one has lived here. The chapter concludes with Avicenna’s views about providence and his general account of why evil exists in a world created by a wholly good God.
John L. Bell
- Published in print:
- 2005
- Published Online:
- September 2007
- ISBN:
- 9780198568520
- eISBN:
- 9780191717581
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198568520.003.0005
- Subject:
- Mathematics, Logic / Computer Science / Mathematical Philosophy
The construction of V(B) is relativized to transitive models of ZFC and shown to give rise to actual models of ZFC, in which various set-theoretic assertions are falsified. Boolean-valued set theory ...
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The construction of V(B) is relativized to transitive models of ZFC and shown to give rise to actual models of ZFC, in which various set-theoretic assertions are falsified. Boolean-valued set theory is thereby transformed into a valuable model-theoretic tool. The notion of a generic ultrafilter in a Boolean-valued model is introduced in this chapter and shown to play a key role in the discussion.Less
The construction of V(B) is relativized to transitive models of ZFC and shown to give rise to actual models of ZFC, in which various set-theoretic assertions are falsified. Boolean-valued set theory is thereby transformed into a valuable model-theoretic tool. The notion of a generic ultrafilter in a Boolean-valued model is introduced in this chapter and shown to play a key role in the discussion.
Chris Heathwood
- Published in print:
- 2011
- Published Online:
- September 2011
- ISBN:
- 9780199606375
- eISBN:
- 9780191729478
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199606375.003.0004
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology
One of the most important disputes in the foundations of ethics concerns the source of practical reasons. On the desire-based view, only one's desires (broadly construed) provide one with reasons to ...
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One of the most important disputes in the foundations of ethics concerns the source of practical reasons. On the desire-based view, only one's desires (broadly construed) provide one with reasons to act. On the value-based view, reasons are instead provided by the objective evaluative facts, and never by our desires. Similarly, there are desire-based and non-desired-based theories of two other phenomena: pleasure and welfare. It has been argued, and is natural to think, that holding a desire-based theory about either pleasure or welfare commits one to recognizing that desires do provide reasons for action – i.e., commits one to abandoning the value-based theory of reasons. The purpose of this chapter is to show that this is not so. All of the following can be true: pleasure and welfare provide reasons; pleasure and welfare are to be understood in terms of desire; desires never provide reasons, in the relevant way.Less
One of the most important disputes in the foundations of ethics concerns the source of practical reasons. On the desire-based view, only one's desires (broadly construed) provide one with reasons to act. On the value-based view, reasons are instead provided by the objective evaluative facts, and never by our desires. Similarly, there are desire-based and non-desired-based theories of two other phenomena: pleasure and welfare. It has been argued, and is natural to think, that holding a desire-based theory about either pleasure or welfare commits one to recognizing that desires do provide reasons for action – i.e., commits one to abandoning the value-based theory of reasons. The purpose of this chapter is to show that this is not so. All of the following can be true: pleasure and welfare provide reasons; pleasure and welfare are to be understood in terms of desire; desires never provide reasons, in the relevant way.
Kathleen Blake
- Published in print:
- 2009
- Published Online:
- February 2010
- ISBN:
- 9780199563265
- eISBN:
- 9780191721809
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199563265.003.0003
- Subject:
- Literature, 19th-century and Victorian Literature
Benthamites and economists acknowledge a principle of pain in work. But there is to be no self‐sacrifice that outruns self‐interest. Indeed in contemplating work, these writers communicate an element ...
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Benthamites and economists acknowledge a principle of pain in work. But there is to be no self‐sacrifice that outruns self‐interest. Indeed in contemplating work, these writers communicate an element of gratification. Heeding German Romantic influences on Carlyle, which have received much attention, the chapter explores overlooked Utilitarian‐economic influences as well. It shows how the labor theory of value comes together with Romantic ideas on creation, vocation, and everyday work (in this era encompassing industrial production) to form Carlyle's Gospel of Work. The chapter treats Sartor Resartus, Carlyle's annotations of Mill's Principles of Political Economy, and the application of a new‐forged work ethic to the topical cause of work‐reform in the Church of England, as represented in Anthony Trollope's novel The Warden. Thematically and by means of their styles, Carlyle and Trollope affirm work‐as‐pain but only so far as it serves and eventuates in pleasure.Less
Benthamites and economists acknowledge a principle of pain in work. But there is to be no self‐sacrifice that outruns self‐interest. Indeed in contemplating work, these writers communicate an element of gratification. Heeding German Romantic influences on Carlyle, which have received much attention, the chapter explores overlooked Utilitarian‐economic influences as well. It shows how the labor theory of value comes together with Romantic ideas on creation, vocation, and everyday work (in this era encompassing industrial production) to form Carlyle's Gospel of Work. The chapter treats Sartor Resartus, Carlyle's annotations of Mill's Principles of Political Economy, and the application of a new‐forged work ethic to the topical cause of work‐reform in the Church of England, as represented in Anthony Trollope's novel The Warden. Thematically and by means of their styles, Carlyle and Trollope affirm work‐as‐pain but only so far as it serves and eventuates in pleasure.
Alan Thomas
- Published in print:
- 2012
- Published Online:
- January 2013
- ISBN:
- 9780199583676
- eISBN:
- 9780191745294
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199583676.003.0006
- Subject:
- Philosophy, History of Philosophy, Moral Philosophy
This chapter assesses Nadeem Hussain's well-known moral fictionalist interpretation of Nietzsche. It also evaluates moral fictionalism as a free standing meta-ethical view. It distinguishes different ...
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This chapter assesses Nadeem Hussain's well-known moral fictionalist interpretation of Nietzsche. It also evaluates moral fictionalism as a free standing meta-ethical view. It distinguishes different forms of subjective realism about the truth conditions of moral statements. It is argued that Nietzsche's influence on contemporary meta-ethics is not that of a pioneer of a novel meta-ethical approach to our ethical commitments such as fictionalism. Instead he defends a plausible form of subjective realism in a way that connects with his primarily normative interests. Nietzsche is interested in the subjective conditions for valuation, not necessarily scepticism about value as a whole, with the ultimate aim of diagnosing a nihilism that fails to take any existing values as worthwhile ends.Less
This chapter assesses Nadeem Hussain's well-known moral fictionalist interpretation of Nietzsche. It also evaluates moral fictionalism as a free standing meta-ethical view. It distinguishes different forms of subjective realism about the truth conditions of moral statements. It is argued that Nietzsche's influence on contemporary meta-ethics is not that of a pioneer of a novel meta-ethical approach to our ethical commitments such as fictionalism. Instead he defends a plausible form of subjective realism in a way that connects with his primarily normative interests. Nietzsche is interested in the subjective conditions for valuation, not necessarily scepticism about value as a whole, with the ultimate aim of diagnosing a nihilism that fails to take any existing values as worthwhile ends.
