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This is the second of five chapters on good, and starts by making the point that it is around the question of the intrinsically good that the chief controversies about the nature of goodness or value revolve, for most theories of value may be divided into those that treat it as a quality and those that treat it as a relation between that which has value and something else (which is usually some state of mind); Ross says that it seems clear that any view that treats goodness as a relation between that which is good and something else denies that anything is intrinsically good. The chapter first discusses R. B. Perry's relational view of value—in the sense of good, and other theories that also identify goodness with some relation, either as a relation between that which is good and some or all of its elements, or as a relation between some or all of its elements, or as a relation between it or some or all of its elements and something else. Next, the psychological theories of good are discussed; these, as a rule, hold that a thing being good means either that some person or persons have some feelings towards it, or some person or persons think it to be good; this is an objective view of good. The rest of the chapter looks at both R. B. Perry's and G. E. Moore's arguments on these theories, at Ross's own views, at badness as incompatible with goodness or as an element of a good thing, at W. M. Urban's work on the question of values (value often being considered as qualities of goodness or badness), and at B. Croce's arguments on value judgements. Ross concludes that the arguments in favour of thinking of value as an objective are no more successful than those in favour of treating it as a relation, and presents a lengthy validation of his conclusion, based largely on discussion of beauty and goodness.

This chapter explores a specifically twentieth- (and now twenty-first) century conundrum: how to assess the value of nature and natural goods, and to weigh that value against other goods in a moral calculus. The contemporary obsession with nature's value reopens a question that John Locke thought he had solved in the seventeenth century. Indeed, modern economics begins with his all-but-categorical denial of the value of nature's works. The labor theory of value required it: Locke needed to show that human activity was the true source of all value, thereby grounding his theory of property, his liberal version of the social contract, and his arguments on political authority. If the lands untouched by human toil, and their value, had to be sacrificed on the altar of property, that was hardly controversial in an era when “wilderness” was a term of abuse. But ever since the hedonic theory of utilitarianism captured political economy from the dismal scientists, economists have rejected toil in favor of pleasure, and spaces once called wastelands are now more often named wetlands.

This chapter rediscovers use value as an essential category for understanding commodification and capitalism more generally. The distinction between use value and exchange value goes back to ancient Greek philosophy and it played an important role in classical political economy. However, with the invention of marginal utility in the late nineteenth century, use value moved from the center to the fringes of economic thinking. Even where it survived, such as in Marxist scholarship, there was considerable disagreement about the role of use value in a critical political economy. The chapter, furthermore, explores the value of nature and by doing so unveils the shortcomings of the concept of marginal utility. One problem is that marginal utility denies the existence of collective value. Following Polanyi, the chapter argues that products not only have individual value, but also have a social and ecological utility. And social and ecological utility can differ considerably from individual valuation.

This chapter considers whether claims that nature has intrinsic value can be morally justifiable. The Western philosophical tradition largely locates moral value only in various aspects of consciousness, and appeals to the intrinsic value of nature, as found in environmental ethics and sometimes in bioethics (especially in positions articulated by Leon Kass) therefore look to be irrational and emotional. One way of defending concern for nature, which has been proposed by J. B. Callicott, is to draw on Hume’s account of morality and allow that moral value in general is not discovered in the world but is instead projected onto the world. This position has a number of theoretical advantages. Also, although it holds that moral value is a matter of sentiment, it nonetheless leaves ample room for reasoned moral argument.

The paper examines various interpretations of Dworkin’s thesis of the Unity of Value, as expressed and defended in his book Justice for Hedgehogs. Dworkin’s arguments for various aspects of his unity of value thesis are relied on in interpreting the which is then compared with versions of value pluralism.

This chapter introduces the interrelated nexus of ecological crises—imperiled Earth—as a moral crisis that calls for cultural renewal, to which religious traditions are uniquely poised to contribute as sources of moral guidance. The chapter situates the project within the Catholic tradition and notes the ambiguous and contentious history of religions and ecology, especially Christianity. The chapter proposes a twofold conversation: an extension, or a theological and ecological reorientation, of principles of Catholic social thought, centered around the primary theme of the cosmic common good. In general outline, the cosmic common good provides a ground for and solidifies (1) an ethical non-anthropocentrism, in which humans are part of a greater whole; (2) both the instrumental and intrinsic value of nonhuman nature; and (3) an integral connection between the ends of religious practice and the pursuit of this common good. The chapter finishes with an overview of each chapter.