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This chapter discusses two possible solutions to the value-of-knowledge problem. It first discusses the conditional probability solution, which was formulated and defended by Erik Olsson. It then considers the “value autonomization”, which has been developed and defended by the author of this book. The chapter then stresses that the swamping problem is equally problematic for many theories of knowledge and internalist theories. The chapter also introduces the concepts of type instrumentalism and token instrumentalism.

It is widely agreed that knowledge has greater value than mere true belief. This chapter begins by identifying a weak sense of ‘know’ (in which it means ‘believe truly’) under which knowledge cannot have greater value. There is a stronger sense of ‘know’ for which the value superiority thesis is plausible. The chapter offers two solutions to the swamping problem. The conditional probability solution states that reliabilist knowledge is more valuable than true belief because the former is a better indicator than the latter of future true belief. The second solution explains how a reliable process token can bring independent value into the picture. This can happen either because the value of a token process derives from the type it instantiates (type-instrumentalism) or because the value associated with a reliable process acquires independent, not merely derivative, value (value autonomization). The chapter's final section contrasts our approaches with those of virtue epistemology.

According to the ‘value problem’ in epistemology, any plausible analysis of knowledge must imply that knowledge is always more valuable than mere true belief. In this chapter it is argued that the problem thus conceived is not a genuine problem. It is widely held that the value problem is motivated by a certain intuition about the added value of knowledge compared with mere true belief. It is argued here that the intuition in question is neither sufficiently general nor sufficiently formal to play the suggested motivating role. The chapter concludes with a sketch of a very different and more plausible conception of the value problem.

This chapter examines an argument that a number of philosophers have recently employed to show that something ordinarily considered valuable is not, in fact, valuable. The argument begins by emphasizing that the analysis of the concept of the putatively valuable thing is a ‘hodgepodge,’ ‘gerrymandered,’ ‘an ad hoc sprawl,’—in short, ugly. Reflecting upon the ugly analysis, we are supposed to intuitively judge that ‘things like that’ to lack value. The argument concludes that the putatively valuable thing is not valuable. Stephen Stich uses the argument to show true belief lacks value. The argument figures prominently in Jonathan Kvanvig's argument that knowledge has no distinctive value. Timothy Williamson flips the argument: since knowledge is obviously valuable, but its analyses have been forced to become increasingly ugly, knowledge is not analysable. This form of argument is rejected.

This chapter argues that the goal of enquiry is reflective knowledge. Reflective knowledge is knowledge along with knowledge of how we know, or at least knowledge that we know. Recently discussed puzzlement about the value of knowledge is circumvented. The social transmission of knowledge is explored via a discussion of straightforward cases of testimony. An account of those cases is developed, drawing on the account of knowledge from indicators in the previous chapter but also invoking the idea that there is a practice of informing others by telling them things. A practice is taken to be a cluster of essentially rule-governed activities. It is argued that the account of practices does not suffice to explain the straightforward cases. We need to make sense of how we can recognize trustworthiness on the matter in hand.

The themes of the book—the value of knowledge and epistemic appraisal broadly conceived—are introduced in this chapter. The Meno problem is explained and related to the swamping problem as discussed by Jonathan Kvanvig. The stance of virtue epistemologists is outlined. This is followed by a brief discussion of the role of truth in epistemic appraisal. The remainder of the introduction summarises the contributions to the book.

Understanding has a special kind of value that other epistemic states such as knowledge do not, and this fact threatens the justification for the focus on knowledge that the history of epistemology displays. Elsewhere it has been argued that knowledge does not possess this special value. There are a couple of lines of argument, however, that threaten to extend the denial of this special value for knowledge to a denial of a special value for understanding. Underlying all such challenges is the obvious fact that the language of knowing and the language of understanding are closely related. In this discussion it is argued that the kind of understanding that we prize most is immune from the concerns that have plagued the theory of knowledge.

This chapter begins with an argument to the effect that some doxastic goods are surreptitious motivators: in so far as they work to bring about belief, they must do so without the agent herself being aware of their so working. The existence of surreptitious motivators raises two questions. First, ‘Do surreptitious doxastic goods provide us with reasons to believe?’ Recent work in value theory suggests an argument for the following claim: if a good cannot consciously motivate a believer to believe, then that good cannot provide a reason to believe. The second question raised by surreptitious motivators is the following, ‘Is it possible that important values governing our doxastic lives can only motivate surreptitiously?’ Discussion of this second question interrogates the so-called credit account of the value of knowledge, which conceives of the value of knowledge as a surreptitious motivator. The chapter ends with a brief look at an alternative approach towards conceiving of the value of knowledge.

Because of the advent of this knowledge economy, there have been empirical evidences that suggest that there are also corresponding changes to the character of employment. Despite the trend veering away from full-time employment, opportunities for employment are said to be improving. Although the OECD has reported that there is a 7% decline in unemployment, a shift is occurring towards non-standard work arrangements. With this, a large portion of the workforce is working under these arrangements. This chapter attempts to explain how the shift away from traditional employment practices can be attributed to changing workforce demographics, globalization, technological change, and the need from firms for ‘flexible employment’ resulting from the growing economic value of knowledge.

Thomas Hurka's Virtue, Vice, and Value presents a version of consequentialism that can be called ‘intrinsic consequentialism.’ Traditional forms of consequentialism like utilitarianism hold that motives are deontically relevant only because of their effects. These can be called versions of extrinsic consequentialism. Hurka agrees that motives can be extrinsically valuable, but he claims that motives can also be intrinsically valuable. He focuses on the intrinsic value of character traits, but his theory also entails that certain desires (and hence motives) have intrinsic value and badness. Hurka's abstract argument for the claim that certain desires are intrinsically valuable is flawed. The ‘desire to produce new knowledge as an end’ is then considered as a test case. It is shown that all the value judgments we are inclined to make about it can be explained by assuming that it is only extrinsically valuable. Extrinsic consequentialism is more plausible than intrinsic consequentialism.

This chapter develops an intellectualist view of practical freedom according to which practical freedom is a capacity to act on our view of what we ought to do. It argues that this view is embodied in our judgements rather than our beliefs. Practical judgement is distinguished both from other truth directed phenomena like believing and guessing and also from non-truth directed states like imagining and intending. We make practical judgements where we are ignorant of what to do. We can also make and act on such judgements where we think we know what to do. This fact suggests a non-standard view of the value of knowledge. It also enables us to defend intellectualist accounts of practical freedom against voluntaristic alternatives.

Introducing a distinction between standard and non-standard reasons, based on the ability to directly follow them, the chapter uses it to solve the ‘right kind of reason’ and the Toxin Puzzle, and to explain the difference between practical reasons and adaptive reasons, of which epistemic reasons are an instance. It then argues that normativity cannot be explained by its relationship to value because epistemic reasons are not related to value at all.

This chapter considers some questions arising out of reflection on Finnis' writings about value, exemplifying them by a consideration of the putative value of knowledge. They include the role of harmony, and of self-evidence, in identifying or constituting values, and the ways in which values can provide reasons.

This chapter argues that among those whom we are committed to trusting epistemically by a consistent exercise of conscientious self-trust are some who satisfy principles of authority modeled on the well-known principles of authority defended by Joseph Raz. The basic idea is that epistemic authority is justified by my conscientious judgment that I am more likely to form a true belief (or a belief that will satisfy conscientious self-reflection) if I believe what the authority believes than if I try to figure out what to believe myself. This principle shows that the value of getting the truth can conflict with the value of self-reliance.

How does satisfying the epistemic autonomy condition on propositional knowledge add value to an otherwise unknown belief (including a justified, true, non-Gettiered but epistemically heteronomous belief)? This question isn’t some kind of afterthought. As work on the value of knowledge would suggest, lacking a good answer here actually counts as a mark against the adequacy of the JTAB+X template account. Several strategies are canvassed for attempting to vindicate the idea that epistemic autonomy adds value to an otherwise unknown justified, true non-Gettiered belief. Pragmatic and instrumentalist arguments are considered and shown to fail. A variation on a recent non-instrumentalist argument strategy is given special attention, but it also is shown to come up short. Finally, and by cobbling together some new twists on some ideas in value theory and action theory, I outline an answer that works. Key to the answer I defend is that knowledge makes us the knowers we are in a way that equally justified and anti-Gettiered true beliefs that lack epistemic autonomy do not and cannot.

‘High road’ approaches explain the value of self-knowledge by reference to high-sounding ideals such as rationality and authenticity. ‘Low road’ approaches explain the value of self-knowledge in pragmatic terms by reference to its contribution to human well-being. There is little to be said for high road approaches. Intentional self-knowledge is not essential for rationality, and substantial self-knowledge is not a condition of authenticity. In order to be true to yourself it is not necessary to know yourself, and it is possible to live a unified life without self-knowledge. However, there remains the fallback position that authenticity and unity are easier to achieve with the backing of self-knowledge. It does not devalue the value of self-knowledge to explain it in pragmatic terms, and there is empirical evidence that the positive contribution of substantial self-knowledge to well-being outweighs the benefits of self-ignorance.

Most philosophers assume that more matters for well-being than simply mental states. However, there is an important distinction that is routinely overlooked. When it is said that more matters than mental states, this could mean either that certain mind-independent events countwhen it comes to assessing the prudential value of a life (the mind-independent events thesis or MIE), or it could mean that it is prudentially important for individuals to have the right kind of epistemic relation to life events (the positive value of knowledge thesis or PVK). This chapter aims to convince theorists of the importance of the distinction between MIE and PVK, or more precisely, the importance of distinguishing questions about which non-mental objects (or events or facts) have intrinsic welfare value (if any do) and questions about which epistemic relations (knowledge, justified true belief, true belief) have intrinsic welfare value (if any do). This chapter also raises serious doubts about the way in which contemporary desire theories handle the extra-mental components of welfare, and offers some tentative answers to the question: what should a theorist of welfare say about these matters?

I characterize Gettier cases as failures of understanding, and give a theory of what it is to understand why proposition p is true. This view is based on the concept of probabilistic relevance matching, having one’s dispositions to believe p mirror the probabilistic relations that p has to all other matters. Based in probability, the view yields a clear relationship, and also distinction, between the concept of understanding and the concept of knowledge defined in terms of probabilistic tracking. With these tools we are able to see that gettierization avoidance has a value independent of the value of knowledge, viz. understanding, but that it is also in the nature of tracking-type knowledge to discourage gettierization quite specifically. The concept of understanding here captures several key features of this phenomenon, such as breadth, depth, and appreciation of connections, and allows us to see understanding as simulation.