Kevin C. Elliott
- Published in print:
- 2011
- Published Online:
- January 2011
- ISBN:
- 9780199755622
- eISBN:
- 9780199827121
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199755622.003.0003
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Science
This chapter argues that nonepistemic or contextual values should not be systematically excluded from any of the four categories of value judgments considered in Chapter 2. The argument rests on ...
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This chapter argues that nonepistemic or contextual values should not be systematically excluded from any of the four categories of value judgments considered in Chapter 2. The argument rests on three major principles. First, the “ethics” principle is that scientists have ethical responsibilities to consider the major societal consequences of their work and to take reasonable steps to mitigate harmful effects that it might have. Second, the “uncertainty” principle is that those who are researching policy‐relevant topics often face situations in which scientific information is uncertain and incomplete, and they have to decide what standard of proof to demand before drawing conclusions. Third, the “no‐passing‐the‐buck” principle states that it is frequently socially harmful or impracticable for scientists to respond to uncertainty by completely withholding their judgment or providing uninterpreted data to decision makers. Based on this third principle, scientists cannot always leave difficult value judgments about interpreting uncertain evidence up to policy makers. Therefore, there are sometimes ethical reasons for scientists to factor societal considerations into their responses to uncertainty even when they address judgments about choosing scientific language or interpreting evidence. The upshot of this chapter is that administrators and policy makers need to find ways to limit the influences of powerful interest groups without naively trying to seal scientific research off from all societal influences and considerations.Less
This chapter argues that nonepistemic or contextual values should not be systematically excluded from any of the four categories of value judgments considered in Chapter 2. The argument rests on three major principles. First, the “ethics” principle is that scientists have ethical responsibilities to consider the major societal consequences of their work and to take reasonable steps to mitigate harmful effects that it might have. Second, the “uncertainty” principle is that those who are researching policy‐relevant topics often face situations in which scientific information is uncertain and incomplete, and they have to decide what standard of proof to demand before drawing conclusions. Third, the “no‐passing‐the‐buck” principle states that it is frequently socially harmful or impracticable for scientists to respond to uncertainty by completely withholding their judgment or providing uninterpreted data to decision makers. Based on this third principle, scientists cannot always leave difficult value judgments about interpreting uncertain evidence up to policy makers. Therefore, there are sometimes ethical reasons for scientists to factor societal considerations into their responses to uncertainty even when they address judgments about choosing scientific language or interpreting evidence. The upshot of this chapter is that administrators and policy makers need to find ways to limit the influences of powerful interest groups without naively trying to seal scientific research off from all societal influences and considerations.
Michael E. Bratman
- Published in print:
- 2007
- Published Online:
- October 2011
- ISBN:
- 9780195187717
- eISBN:
- 9780199893058
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195187717.003.0011
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Moral Philosophy
This chapter revisits the important exchange between Harry G. Frankfurt and Gary Watson concerning the psychological structures involved in significant forms of free agency. It also aims to deepen ...
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This chapter revisits the important exchange between Harry G. Frankfurt and Gary Watson concerning the psychological structures involved in significant forms of free agency. It also aims to deepen the account of how to be a wholehearted, pluralist, self-governing agent by drawing on Joshua Cohen's interpretation of the Rawlsian “idea of reasonable pluralism.” It also develops further the central—and broadly Frankfurtian—claim that agential authority is a matter of the non-Platonic psychological role in the Lockean organization of our temporally extended agency. This is true even for those evaluative attitudes that both have agential authority and track the good: their agential authority derives from their non-Platonic psychological role. And the normal hierarchical structure of self-governing policies helps them play these Lockean organizing roles. This chapter treats the initial debate about desire, hierarchy, and value judgment as part of the debate about the psychological structures and forms of functioning that are central to human self-governance. Finally, it proposes an intention-based theory.Less
This chapter revisits the important exchange between Harry G. Frankfurt and Gary Watson concerning the psychological structures involved in significant forms of free agency. It also aims to deepen the account of how to be a wholehearted, pluralist, self-governing agent by drawing on Joshua Cohen's interpretation of the Rawlsian “idea of reasonable pluralism.” It also develops further the central—and broadly Frankfurtian—claim that agential authority is a matter of the non-Platonic psychological role in the Lockean organization of our temporally extended agency. This is true even for those evaluative attitudes that both have agential authority and track the good: their agential authority derives from their non-Platonic psychological role. And the normal hierarchical structure of self-governing policies helps them play these Lockean organizing roles. This chapter treats the initial debate about desire, hierarchy, and value judgment as part of the debate about the psychological structures and forms of functioning that are central to human self-governance. Finally, it proposes an intention-based theory.
Michael E. Bratman
- Published in print:
- 2007
- Published Online:
- October 2011
- ISBN:
- 9780195187717
- eISBN:
- 9780199893058
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195187717.003.0007
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Moral Philosophy
In his 1971 article, “Freedom of the Will and the Concept of a Person,” Harry G. Frankfurt pointed to a deep problem in the philosophy of action and sketched an attractive proposal for a solution. ...
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In his 1971 article, “Freedom of the Will and the Concept of a Person,” Harry G. Frankfurt pointed to a deep problem in the philosophy of action and sketched an attractive proposal for a solution. The problem arises when we take seriously the idea that you can sometimes have and be moved by desires that you in some sense disown. As Frankfurt put it, though you do what you want you do not act of your own free will. What we have learned from Frankfurt is that our response to this problem has significant implications for our overall view of human agency and autonomy. This chapter addresses a Platonic challenge to a Frankfurt-type hierarchical theory of desire ownership and identification. It aims to block this challenge by emphasizing important ways in which identification may be underdetermined by value judgment.Less
In his 1971 article, “Freedom of the Will and the Concept of a Person,” Harry G. Frankfurt pointed to a deep problem in the philosophy of action and sketched an attractive proposal for a solution. The problem arises when we take seriously the idea that you can sometimes have and be moved by desires that you in some sense disown. As Frankfurt put it, though you do what you want you do not act of your own free will. What we have learned from Frankfurt is that our response to this problem has significant implications for our overall view of human agency and autonomy. This chapter addresses a Platonic challenge to a Frankfurt-type hierarchical theory of desire ownership and identification. It aims to block this challenge by emphasizing important ways in which identification may be underdetermined by value judgment.
Kevin Elliott
- Published in print:
- 2011
- Published Online:
- January 2011
- ISBN:
- 9780199755622
- eISBN:
- 9780199827121
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199755622.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Science
This book examines a variety of ways in which societal values can be more effectively integrated into the numerous judgments associated with policy‐relevant environmental research. It provides a ...
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This book examines a variety of ways in which societal values can be more effectively integrated into the numerous judgments associated with policy‐relevant environmental research. It provides a detailed analysis of contemporary research on the hypothesis of hormesis (i.e., beneficial biological effects caused by low‐dose exposure to pollutants that are ordinarily toxic). On the basis of this analysis, as well as shorter case studies of endocrine disruption and multiple chemical sensitivity, the book proposes three lessons. First, university conflict‐of‐interest policies are significantly limited in their ability to prevent interest groups from “hijacking” academic research on sensitive policy‐relevant topics. Therefore, alternative strategies are needed to preserve science that serves the public interest. Second, concerned citizens and policy makers need to more carefully determine the most appropriate forms of broadly based deliberation to be employed in response to specific areas of sensitive, policy‐relevant research. Third, the principle of informed consent, which currently provides guidance in the medical field, suggests a promising ethical framework that can help environmental scientists who disseminate debated findings to the public. Throughout, the book highlights many of the crucial ethical and societal questions surrounding research on the hormesis hypothesis. It thereby constitutes the first book‐length manuscript to provide guidance to the concerned citizens, industry groups, scientists, and policy makers who are exploring ways to respond to this phenomenon.Less
This book examines a variety of ways in which societal values can be more effectively integrated into the numerous judgments associated with policy‐relevant environmental research. It provides a detailed analysis of contemporary research on the hypothesis of hormesis (i.e., beneficial biological effects caused by low‐dose exposure to pollutants that are ordinarily toxic). On the basis of this analysis, as well as shorter case studies of endocrine disruption and multiple chemical sensitivity, the book proposes three lessons. First, university conflict‐of‐interest policies are significantly limited in their ability to prevent interest groups from “hijacking” academic research on sensitive policy‐relevant topics. Therefore, alternative strategies are needed to preserve science that serves the public interest. Second, concerned citizens and policy makers need to more carefully determine the most appropriate forms of broadly based deliberation to be employed in response to specific areas of sensitive, policy‐relevant research. Third, the principle of informed consent, which currently provides guidance in the medical field, suggests a promising ethical framework that can help environmental scientists who disseminate debated findings to the public. Throughout, the book highlights many of the crucial ethical and societal questions surrounding research on the hormesis hypothesis. It thereby constitutes the first book‐length manuscript to provide guidance to the concerned citizens, industry groups, scientists, and policy makers who are exploring ways to respond to this phenomenon.
Kevin C. Elliott
- Published in print:
- 2011
- Published Online:
- January 2011
- ISBN:
- 9780199755622
- eISBN:
- 9780199827121
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199755622.003.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Science
This chapter provides an overview of the book and a summary of each subsequent chapter. It highlights the volume's two major goals: to examine the range of methodological decisions and interpretive ...
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This chapter provides an overview of the book and a summary of each subsequent chapter. It highlights the volume's two major goals: to examine the range of methodological decisions and interpretive judgments that permeate policy‐relevant scientific research and to explore ways of making these choices more responsive to a range of public values (in addition to those of deep pockets, which have abundant resources to spend on research). It also introduces readers to the book's central case study, hormesis, which involves seemingly beneficial effects produced by low doses of substances that are normally toxic. Chapters 2 and 3 perform two preliminary tasks: (1) They clarify the major categories of value judgments that contribute to differing evaluations of the generalizability and regulatory implications of hormesis; and (2) they argue that societal values should not be completely excluded from influencing any of these categories of judgments. Chapters 4 through 6 develop the book's three primary lessons, corresponding to the three “bodies” that Sheila Jasanoff emphasizes as central to obtaining trustworthy public‐policy guidance from scientific experts. These lessons concern how to safeguard the body of scientific knowledge from interest groups, how to ascertain the best advisory bodies for guiding policy makers and directing the course of future research, and how to provide the bodies of experts themselves with an ethics of expertise. Chapter 7 argues that the lessons drawn in chapters 2 through 6 are applicable not only to the hormesis case but also to other areas of policy‐relevant research, such as endocrine disruption and multiple chemical sensitivity (MCS).Less
This chapter provides an overview of the book and a summary of each subsequent chapter. It highlights the volume's two major goals: to examine the range of methodological decisions and interpretive judgments that permeate policy‐relevant scientific research and to explore ways of making these choices more responsive to a range of public values (in addition to those of deep pockets, which have abundant resources to spend on research). It also introduces readers to the book's central case study, hormesis, which involves seemingly beneficial effects produced by low doses of substances that are normally toxic. Chapters 2 and 3 perform two preliminary tasks: (1) They clarify the major categories of value judgments that contribute to differing evaluations of the generalizability and regulatory implications of hormesis; and (2) they argue that societal values should not be completely excluded from influencing any of these categories of judgments. Chapters 4 through 6 develop the book's three primary lessons, corresponding to the three “bodies” that Sheila Jasanoff emphasizes as central to obtaining trustworthy public‐policy guidance from scientific experts. These lessons concern how to safeguard the body of scientific knowledge from interest groups, how to ascertain the best advisory bodies for guiding policy makers and directing the course of future research, and how to provide the bodies of experts themselves with an ethics of expertise. Chapter 7 argues that the lessons drawn in chapters 2 through 6 are applicable not only to the hormesis case but also to other areas of policy‐relevant research, such as endocrine disruption and multiple chemical sensitivity (MCS).
Kevin C. Elliott
- Published in print:
- 2011
- Published Online:
- January 2011
- ISBN:
- 9780199755622
- eISBN:
- 9780199827121
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199755622.003.0002
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Science
This chapter examines the history of hormesis research as an important case study of the ways in which methodological and interpretive judgments enter scientific practice. It organizes these choices ...
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This chapter examines the history of hormesis research as an important case study of the ways in which methodological and interpretive judgments enter scientific practice. It organizes these choices into four major categories. First, judgments pervade the choice of research projects and the design of studies. One of the important questions in this regard is what kinds of studies to prioritize, given the limited funding available to examine the low‐dose effects of toxicants. Second, crucial decisions are involved in developing scientific language. The hormesis case study (as well as the multiple chemical sensitivity and endocrine disruption cases examined in Chapter 7) provides vivid examples of how the choice of scientific terms and categories can subtly influence policy discussions. Third, judgments play a crucial role in the interpretation and evaluation of studies. This third category of methodological choices is especially important to understand in the hormesis case, because it is largely responsible for the disagreements between proponents and opponents of claims about the generalizability and regulatory implications of hormesis. Fourth, there are important decisions to make about how to apply research results in the context of formulating public policy. For example, efforts to apply hormesis to regulatory policy must come to grips with difficult questions about how to balance potentially beneficial and harmful effects of toxic chemicals.Less
This chapter examines the history of hormesis research as an important case study of the ways in which methodological and interpretive judgments enter scientific practice. It organizes these choices into four major categories. First, judgments pervade the choice of research projects and the design of studies. One of the important questions in this regard is what kinds of studies to prioritize, given the limited funding available to examine the low‐dose effects of toxicants. Second, crucial decisions are involved in developing scientific language. The hormesis case study (as well as the multiple chemical sensitivity and endocrine disruption cases examined in Chapter 7) provides vivid examples of how the choice of scientific terms and categories can subtly influence policy discussions. Third, judgments play a crucial role in the interpretation and evaluation of studies. This third category of methodological choices is especially important to understand in the hormesis case, because it is largely responsible for the disagreements between proponents and opponents of claims about the generalizability and regulatory implications of hormesis. Fourth, there are important decisions to make about how to apply research results in the context of formulating public policy. For example, efforts to apply hormesis to regulatory policy must come to grips with difficult questions about how to balance potentially beneficial and harmful effects of toxic chemicals.
Kevin C. Elliott
- Published in print:
- 2011
- Published Online:
- January 2011
- ISBN:
- 9780199755622
- eISBN:
- 9780199827121
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199755622.003.0004
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Science
This chapter argues that current financial conflict‐of‐interest (COI) policies are severely limited in their ability to prevent powerful interest groups from hijacking university research. It ...
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This chapter argues that current financial conflict‐of‐interest (COI) policies are severely limited in their ability to prevent powerful interest groups from hijacking university research. It considers the three major elements of these policies (i.e., elimination of conflicts, disclosure, and management) and argues that none of them is likely to be both effective and practical. Given the current economic emphasis on creating links between universities and industry, outright elimination of conflicts will generally not be feasible. Moreover, despite the popularity of disclosure policies, psychologists warn that those who receive information about conflicts are often unable to employ that information effectively. By highlighting the wide array of value judgments that permeate scientific practice, this book strengthens these psychological arguments by highlighting how difficult it would be for the recipients of information to estimate how financial conflicts might be influencing such a diverse array of judgments. Finally, the prevalence of these judgments makes it unlikely that management committees could prevent questionable influences on science without instituting an unreasonable amount of bureaucratic oversight. Chapter 4 suggests that, instead of depending only on COI policies, university administrators and policy makers would do well to consider at least five additional options. These include providing more funding for independent research, preventing particularly egregious institutional conflicts, creating trial registries, and developing both adversarial and consensual deliberative forums.Less
This chapter argues that current financial conflict‐of‐interest (COI) policies are severely limited in their ability to prevent powerful interest groups from hijacking university research. It considers the three major elements of these policies (i.e., elimination of conflicts, disclosure, and management) and argues that none of them is likely to be both effective and practical. Given the current economic emphasis on creating links between universities and industry, outright elimination of conflicts will generally not be feasible. Moreover, despite the popularity of disclosure policies, psychologists warn that those who receive information about conflicts are often unable to employ that information effectively. By highlighting the wide array of value judgments that permeate scientific practice, this book strengthens these psychological arguments by highlighting how difficult it would be for the recipients of information to estimate how financial conflicts might be influencing such a diverse array of judgments. Finally, the prevalence of these judgments makes it unlikely that management committees could prevent questionable influences on science without instituting an unreasonable amount of bureaucratic oversight. Chapter 4 suggests that, instead of depending only on COI policies, university administrators and policy makers would do well to consider at least five additional options. These include providing more funding for independent research, preventing particularly egregious institutional conflicts, creating trial registries, and developing both adversarial and consensual deliberative forums.
Kevin C. Elliott
- Published in print:
- 2011
- Published Online:
- January 2011
- ISBN:
- 9780199755622
- eISBN:
- 9780199827121
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199755622.003.0005
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Science
This chapter explores the last of the options considered in chapter 4 for preventing interest groups' questionable influences on scientific research. It argues that there are normative, substantive, ...
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This chapter explores the last of the options considered in chapter 4 for preventing interest groups' questionable influences on scientific research. It argues that there are normative, substantive, and instrumental reasons for pursuing formal mechanisms for broadly based deliberation to guide the value judgments associated with policy‐relevant science. Nevertheless, because these forums can involve a wide range of mechanisms and strategies for representing affected parties, and because deliberative proceedings have weaknesses as well as strengths, the chapter calls for more careful “diagnosis” of the mechanisms appropriate in response to particular areas of research. It develops a three‐step diagnostic model inspired by the account proposed in the NRC volume Understanding Risk. Applying this diagnostic procedure to the hormesis case, the chapter calls for a mixed deliberative approach. In the near term, it recommends that policy makers examine the hormesis phenomenon in either an existing scientific advisory committee or a special advisory council created to represent the range of important stakeholder perspectives on hormesis. This council could address some of the major judgments identified in Chapter 2, such as prioritizing future areas of research, proposing definitions of key terms under debate, and evaluating the evidence for the generalizability and regulatory implications of hormesis. If the advisory council were to conclude, now or in the future, that the evidence warranted considering regulatory changes in response to hormesis, then a more intensive deliberative proceeding such as a consensus conference might be justified. These formal exercises could serve as a valuable starting point for informal political action by concerned citizens' groups.Less
This chapter explores the last of the options considered in chapter 4 for preventing interest groups' questionable influences on scientific research. It argues that there are normative, substantive, and instrumental reasons for pursuing formal mechanisms for broadly based deliberation to guide the value judgments associated with policy‐relevant science. Nevertheless, because these forums can involve a wide range of mechanisms and strategies for representing affected parties, and because deliberative proceedings have weaknesses as well as strengths, the chapter calls for more careful “diagnosis” of the mechanisms appropriate in response to particular areas of research. It develops a three‐step diagnostic model inspired by the account proposed in the NRC volume Understanding Risk. Applying this diagnostic procedure to the hormesis case, the chapter calls for a mixed deliberative approach. In the near term, it recommends that policy makers examine the hormesis phenomenon in either an existing scientific advisory committee or a special advisory council created to represent the range of important stakeholder perspectives on hormesis. This council could address some of the major judgments identified in Chapter 2, such as prioritizing future areas of research, proposing definitions of key terms under debate, and evaluating the evidence for the generalizability and regulatory implications of hormesis. If the advisory council were to conclude, now or in the future, that the evidence warranted considering regulatory changes in response to hormesis, then a more intensive deliberative proceeding such as a consensus conference might be justified. These formal exercises could serve as a valuable starting point for informal political action by concerned citizens' groups.
Michael E. Bratman
- Published in print:
- 2007
- Published Online:
- October 2011
- ISBN:
- 9780195187717
- eISBN:
- 9780199893058
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195187717.003.0010
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Moral Philosophy
Are there forms of psychological functioning that can be characterized without seeing the agent herself as playing an irreducible role and that are plausible candidates for sufficient conditions for ...
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Are there forms of psychological functioning that can be characterized without seeing the agent herself as playing an irreducible role and that are plausible candidates for sufficient conditions for agential governance? Are certain forms of functioning necessary for self-governance? The basic issue is one about sufficient conditions for autonomy; and we should be alive to the possibility that there are, at bottom, several different forms of functioning, each of which is sufficient, but no one of which is necessary for self-governance. This chapter highlights the basic connection between planning agency, agential authority, and self-government. It also returns to an important practical pressure in the direction of conative hierarchy. It examines two prominent models of relevant forms of psychological functioning: hierarchical models that highlight responsiveness to higher-order conative attitudes and value-judgment-responsive models that highlight responsiveness to judgments about the good. The chapter solves these problems by drawing on planning theory.Less
Are there forms of psychological functioning that can be characterized without seeing the agent herself as playing an irreducible role and that are plausible candidates for sufficient conditions for agential governance? Are certain forms of functioning necessary for self-governance? The basic issue is one about sufficient conditions for autonomy; and we should be alive to the possibility that there are, at bottom, several different forms of functioning, each of which is sufficient, but no one of which is necessary for self-governance. This chapter highlights the basic connection between planning agency, agential authority, and self-government. It also returns to an important practical pressure in the direction of conative hierarchy. It examines two prominent models of relevant forms of psychological functioning: hierarchical models that highlight responsiveness to higher-order conative attitudes and value-judgment-responsive models that highlight responsiveness to judgments about the good. The chapter solves these problems by drawing on planning theory.
Stephen D. Cohen
- Published in print:
- 2007
- Published Online:
- May 2007
- ISBN:
- 9780195179354
- eISBN:
- 9780199783779
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195179354.003.0015
- Subject:
- Economics and Finance, International
By integrating the major themes and arguments of this study, this chapter seeks to make a convincing case for an innovative method of analyzing and evaluating MNCs and FDI, a method that is ...
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By integrating the major themes and arguments of this study, this chapter seeks to make a convincing case for an innovative method of analyzing and evaluating MNCs and FDI, a method that is distinctive as well as more apposite and relevant than the long-standing propensity to generalize that as a whole, they are either good or bad. Emphasis is on the heterogeneity and “it depends” concepts, along with the admonitions to disaggregate and respect the dominance of perceptions over hard facts. The main sections of the chapter argue that the generalized question about the desirability or lack thereof of MNCs and FDI needs to be restated to produce more accurate answers, urge a greater recognition of the limits and frequent ambiguity of the data, and criticize the too-frequently used methodology of selecting a limited number of anecdotes to support preconceived conclusions. A concluding section offers specific criticism of the decades-long, inconclusive public debate over the impact of multinational enterprises, e.g., its failure to recognize that the impact of a newly established foreign subsidiary will reflect where it falls on the continuum between high and low quality investment, and the importance of pre-existing value judgments in influencing the findings of anyone writing on MNCs and FDI.Less
By integrating the major themes and arguments of this study, this chapter seeks to make a convincing case for an innovative method of analyzing and evaluating MNCs and FDI, a method that is distinctive as well as more apposite and relevant than the long-standing propensity to generalize that as a whole, they are either good or bad. Emphasis is on the heterogeneity and “it depends” concepts, along with the admonitions to disaggregate and respect the dominance of perceptions over hard facts. The main sections of the chapter argue that the generalized question about the desirability or lack thereof of MNCs and FDI needs to be restated to produce more accurate answers, urge a greater recognition of the limits and frequent ambiguity of the data, and criticize the too-frequently used methodology of selecting a limited number of anecdotes to support preconceived conclusions. A concluding section offers specific criticism of the decades-long, inconclusive public debate over the impact of multinational enterprises, e.g., its failure to recognize that the impact of a newly established foreign subsidiary will reflect where it falls on the continuum between high and low quality investment, and the importance of pre-existing value judgments in influencing the findings of anyone writing on MNCs and FDI.
Larry S. Temkin
- Published in print:
- 2012
- Published Online:
- May 2012
- ISBN:
- 9780199759446
- eISBN:
- 9780199932214
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199759446.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, General, Moral Philosophy
In choosing between moral alternatives—choosing between various forms of ethical action—we typically make calculations of the following kind: A is better than B; B is better than C; therefore A is ...
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In choosing between moral alternatives—choosing between various forms of ethical action—we typically make calculations of the following kind: A is better than B; B is better than C; therefore A is better than C. These inferences use the principle of transitivity and are fundamental to many forms of practical and theoretical theorizing, not just in moral and ethical theory but in economics. Indeed they are so common as to be almost invisible. What this book shows is that, shockingly, if we want to continue making plausible judgments, we cannot continue to make these assumptions. The book shows that we are committed to various moral ideals that are, surprisingly, fundamentally incompatible with the idea that “better than” can be transitive. The book develops many examples where value judgments that we accept and find attractive, are incompatible with transitivity. While this might seem to leave two options—reject transitivity, or reject some of our normative commitments in order to keep it—the book's position is neutral on which path to follow, only making the case that a choice is necessary, and that the cost either way will be high. The book is a deeply unsettling work of skeptical philosophy that mounts an important new challenge to contemporary ethics.Less
In choosing between moral alternatives—choosing between various forms of ethical action—we typically make calculations of the following kind: A is better than B; B is better than C; therefore A is better than C. These inferences use the principle of transitivity and are fundamental to many forms of practical and theoretical theorizing, not just in moral and ethical theory but in economics. Indeed they are so common as to be almost invisible. What this book shows is that, shockingly, if we want to continue making plausible judgments, we cannot continue to make these assumptions. The book shows that we are committed to various moral ideals that are, surprisingly, fundamentally incompatible with the idea that “better than” can be transitive. The book develops many examples where value judgments that we accept and find attractive, are incompatible with transitivity. While this might seem to leave two options—reject transitivity, or reject some of our normative commitments in order to keep it—the book's position is neutral on which path to follow, only making the case that a choice is necessary, and that the cost either way will be high. The book is a deeply unsettling work of skeptical philosophy that mounts an important new challenge to contemporary ethics.
Alan Montefiore
- Published in print:
- 2011
- Published Online:
- November 2015
- ISBN:
- 9780231153003
- eISBN:
- 9780231526791
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Columbia University Press
- DOI:
- 10.7312/columbia/9780231153003.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Religion
This book looks at the conflict between two very different understandings of identity: the more traditional view that an identity carries with it certain duties and obligations, and an opposing view ...
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This book looks at the conflict between two very different understandings of identity: the more traditional view that an identity carries with it certain duties and obligations, and an opposing view in which there can be no rationally compelling move from statements of fact to “judgments of value.” According to this second view, individuals must take responsibility for determining their own values and obligations. The book illustrates through personal experience the practical implications of this characteristically philosophical debate. It finally settles on the following answer: both the “traditional” assumption that individuals must recognize certain values and obligations, and the contrary view that individuals are ultimately responsible for determining their own values, are deeply embedded in differing conceptions of society and its relation to its members. The book also examines the misunderstandings between those for whom identity constitutes a conceptual bridge connecting the facts of who and what a person may be to the value commitments incumbent upon them, and those for whom the very idea of such a bridge can be nothing but a confusion. Using key examples from the notoriously vexed case of Jewish identity, the book depicts the practical significance of the differences between these worldviews, particularly for those who have to negotiate them.Less
This book looks at the conflict between two very different understandings of identity: the more traditional view that an identity carries with it certain duties and obligations, and an opposing view in which there can be no rationally compelling move from statements of fact to “judgments of value.” According to this second view, individuals must take responsibility for determining their own values and obligations. The book illustrates through personal experience the practical implications of this characteristically philosophical debate. It finally settles on the following answer: both the “traditional” assumption that individuals must recognize certain values and obligations, and the contrary view that individuals are ultimately responsible for determining their own values, are deeply embedded in differing conceptions of society and its relation to its members. The book also examines the misunderstandings between those for whom identity constitutes a conceptual bridge connecting the facts of who and what a person may be to the value commitments incumbent upon them, and those for whom the very idea of such a bridge can be nothing but a confusion. Using key examples from the notoriously vexed case of Jewish identity, the book depicts the practical significance of the differences between these worldviews, particularly for those who have to negotiate them.
Michael E. Bratman
- Published in print:
- 2007
- Published Online:
- October 2011
- ISBN:
- 9780195187717
- eISBN:
- 9780199893058
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195187717.003.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Moral Philosophy
We are planning agents; our agency extends over time; and, sometimes at least, we govern our own actions. These chapters aim at understanding important interrelations between these basic features of ...
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We are planning agents; our agency extends over time; and, sometimes at least, we govern our own actions. These chapters aim at understanding important interrelations between these basic features of our agency— interrelations between our planning agency, our temporally extended agency, and our self-governance. A conjecture that underlies these chapters is that we can better understand at least one basic case of self-governed agency by reflecting on the roles of relevant planning attitudes in the cross-temporal organization of our action and practical thinking. This conjecture ties together earlier work on the planning theory of intention and the present foray into debates about autonomy and self-governance. Taken together, these chapters are a preliminary effort to see whether this link between the planning theory and issues of autonomy and self-governance can yield philosophical insight. Topics range from autonomy and self-governance to agential authority, subjective normative authority, temporally extended agency, intentions and the planning theory, policies, self-governing policies, conative hierarchy, identification and hierarchy, valuing and value judgment, metaphysics, will, and stability of intention.Less
We are planning agents; our agency extends over time; and, sometimes at least, we govern our own actions. These chapters aim at understanding important interrelations between these basic features of our agency— interrelations between our planning agency, our temporally extended agency, and our self-governance. A conjecture that underlies these chapters is that we can better understand at least one basic case of self-governed agency by reflecting on the roles of relevant planning attitudes in the cross-temporal organization of our action and practical thinking. This conjecture ties together earlier work on the planning theory of intention and the present foray into debates about autonomy and self-governance. Taken together, these chapters are a preliminary effort to see whether this link between the planning theory and issues of autonomy and self-governance can yield philosophical insight. Topics range from autonomy and self-governance to agential authority, subjective normative authority, temporally extended agency, intentions and the planning theory, policies, self-governing policies, conative hierarchy, identification and hierarchy, valuing and value judgment, metaphysics, will, and stability of intention.
Hans Kelsen
- Published in print:
- 1991
- Published Online:
- March 2012
- ISBN:
- 9780198252177
- eISBN:
- 9780191681363
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198252177.003.0030
- Subject:
- Law, Philosophy of Law
When a norm decrees behaviour to be obligatory, the actual behaviour which agrees with the norm can be judged (i.e. evaluated) as valuable or good, and the behaviour which does not agree with the ...
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When a norm decrees behaviour to be obligatory, the actual behaviour which agrees with the norm can be judged (i.e. evaluated) as valuable or good, and the behaviour which does not agree with the norm as ‘disvaluable’ or bad. As was indicated previously, this norm institutes a value, if we mean by ‘value’ agreement with a norm and by ‘disvalue’ failure to agree with a norm. When a certain behaviour is objectively — i.e. purely cognitively — asserted to agree or not with a norm presupposed to be valid (and in this sense is evaluated), the norm serves as a standard of value. To that extent, ‘serving-as-a-standard-of-value’ can be called a function of a norm. But it should be noted that this ‘evaluation’ is an act of judgment and not directly a function of the norm itself, which is simply presupposed in the value-judgment.Less
When a norm decrees behaviour to be obligatory, the actual behaviour which agrees with the norm can be judged (i.e. evaluated) as valuable or good, and the behaviour which does not agree with the norm as ‘disvaluable’ or bad. As was indicated previously, this norm institutes a value, if we mean by ‘value’ agreement with a norm and by ‘disvalue’ failure to agree with a norm. When a certain behaviour is objectively — i.e. purely cognitively — asserted to agree or not with a norm presupposed to be valid (and in this sense is evaluated), the norm serves as a standard of value. To that extent, ‘serving-as-a-standard-of-value’ can be called a function of a norm. But it should be noted that this ‘evaluation’ is an act of judgment and not directly a function of the norm itself, which is simply presupposed in the value-judgment.
Alan Peacock and Ilde Rizzo
- Published in print:
- 2008
- Published Online:
- May 2008
- ISBN:
- 9780199213177
- eISBN:
- 9780191707124
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199213177.003.0002
- Subject:
- Economics and Finance, Public and Welfare
Deciding on the resources devoted to the maintenance and development of heritage artefacts entails making value judgments. There is a presumption that heritage services should be designed to benefit ...
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Deciding on the resources devoted to the maintenance and development of heritage artefacts entails making value judgments. There is a presumption that heritage services should be designed to benefit those who enjoy and pay for them. However, consumers of heritage services may not possess the knowledge or opportunity fully to enjoy them, throwing in doubt what their role should be in deciding on their scope and form. A common solution assumes that it is the state's role — advised by those in charge of heritage services — to run them and finance them out of taxation. Economists are critical of this approach because it assumes that the public interest in heritage services must necessarily entail public provision and those who enjoy them can only express their choices through the ballot box. This chapter argues that it is unnecessary to take a paternalistic stance for the very fulfillment of the principle of consumer sovereignty requires public intervention, notably in order to ensure that consumers know what their choices entail.Less
Deciding on the resources devoted to the maintenance and development of heritage artefacts entails making value judgments. There is a presumption that heritage services should be designed to benefit those who enjoy and pay for them. However, consumers of heritage services may not possess the knowledge or opportunity fully to enjoy them, throwing in doubt what their role should be in deciding on their scope and form. A common solution assumes that it is the state's role — advised by those in charge of heritage services — to run them and finance them out of taxation. Economists are critical of this approach because it assumes that the public interest in heritage services must necessarily entail public provision and those who enjoy them can only express their choices through the ballot box. This chapter argues that it is unnecessary to take a paternalistic stance for the very fulfillment of the principle of consumer sovereignty requires public intervention, notably in order to ensure that consumers know what their choices entail.
Alan Montefiore
- Published in print:
- 2011
- Published Online:
- November 2015
- ISBN:
- 9780231153003
- eISBN:
- 9780231526791
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Columbia University Press
- DOI:
- 10.7312/columbia/9780231153003.003.0002
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Religion
This chapter explores the notion of identity, in particular that of role identity, and its relation to belonging and responsibility. It is a very general condition of social life that nearly ...
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This chapter explores the notion of identity, in particular that of role identity, and its relation to belonging and responsibility. It is a very general condition of social life that nearly everybody should find themselves wearing at different times a number of different hats—very often at one and the same time and with varying degrees of comfort or discomfort. If we are to be considered as free to dissent from or to make other value judgments than those to which we may be committed by virtue of the hats which belong to our heads, or to which perhaps our heads may be said to belong, we need to be free to remove those hats at least for the time and context of our evaluation of our obligations. The question is whether the very facts of who or what we are need to be understood as including a commitment to the making or to the endorsing of value judgments of any sort.Less
This chapter explores the notion of identity, in particular that of role identity, and its relation to belonging and responsibility. It is a very general condition of social life that nearly everybody should find themselves wearing at different times a number of different hats—very often at one and the same time and with varying degrees of comfort or discomfort. If we are to be considered as free to dissent from or to make other value judgments than those to which we may be committed by virtue of the hats which belong to our heads, or to which perhaps our heads may be said to belong, we need to be free to remove those hats at least for the time and context of our evaluation of our obligations. The question is whether the very facts of who or what we are need to be understood as including a commitment to the making or to the endorsing of value judgments of any sort.
Sigrún Svavarsdóttir
- Published in print:
- 2015
- Published Online:
- January 2015
- ISBN:
- 9780199367955
- eISBN:
- 9780199367979
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199367955.003.0011
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Moral Philosophy, General
This chapter advances a judgment externalist explanation of the close connection that is drawn between value judgment and motivation. The explanation relies on the thesis that the canonical method ...
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This chapter advances a judgment externalist explanation of the close connection that is drawn between value judgment and motivation. The explanation relies on the thesis that the canonical method for ascertaining that something has value is to get clear on what the object is like and see whether one either values it for its own sake or at least empathizes with those who do, where valuing is a conative attitude distinct from the attitude of judging to have value. This thesis is defended against several objections, including objections that Mark Johnston has raised against a similar characterization of the canonical method of value inquiry offered by David Lewis.Less
This chapter advances a judgment externalist explanation of the close connection that is drawn between value judgment and motivation. The explanation relies on the thesis that the canonical method for ascertaining that something has value is to get clear on what the object is like and see whether one either values it for its own sake or at least empathizes with those who do, where valuing is a conative attitude distinct from the attitude of judging to have value. This thesis is defended against several objections, including objections that Mark Johnston has raised against a similar characterization of the canonical method of value inquiry offered by David Lewis.
John Finnis
- Published in print:
- 2011
- Published Online:
- September 2011
- ISBN:
- 9780199580088
- eISBN:
- 9780191729409
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199580088.003.0010
- Subject:
- Law, Philosophy of Law
This chapter makes a fundamental examination of Weber's method and results in their bearing on the understanding of law and legal authority. It takes off from a critique of Anthony Kronman's 1983 ...
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This chapter makes a fundamental examination of Weber's method and results in their bearing on the understanding of law and legal authority. It takes off from a critique of Anthony Kronman's 1983 book on Weber as a sociologist of law (and economy, authority, and religion), but shows with textual detail why Weber concluded that the ideal-type or central form of social authority is legal-rational authority, and the central form of that, in turn, is the value-rationality encapsulated in natural law theory. Weber's arguments for denying the rationality or objectivity of value judgments are critiqued, as well as Kronman's attempted supplementation of them.Less
This chapter makes a fundamental examination of Weber's method and results in their bearing on the understanding of law and legal authority. It takes off from a critique of Anthony Kronman's 1983 book on Weber as a sociologist of law (and economy, authority, and religion), but shows with textual detail why Weber concluded that the ideal-type or central form of social authority is legal-rational authority, and the central form of that, in turn, is the value-rationality encapsulated in natural law theory. Weber's arguments for denying the rationality or objectivity of value judgments are critiqued, as well as Kronman's attempted supplementation of them.
Julien A. Deonna and Fabrice Teroni
- Published in print:
- 2015
- Published Online:
- December 2015
- ISBN:
- 9780198716600
- eISBN:
- 9780191807572
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198716600.003.0008
- Subject:
- Psychology, Social Psychology, Developmental Psychology
There are close links between emotions and values. This chapter pursues the task of uncovering the nature of these links. It proceeds to do that by answering three questions. First, what is the role ...
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There are close links between emotions and values. This chapter pursues the task of uncovering the nature of these links. It proceeds to do that by answering three questions. First, what is the role of emotions in elucidating the nature of value? For example, is beauty to be understood in term of admiration? Second, what is the role of emotions in our gaining access to values? For example, what is the role of indignation in our awareness of injustice? Third, what value do emotions have? For example, is anger of value because it promotes aggressive behavior? Answering the first question amounts to surveying theories according to which there is an ontological relation between values and emotions. Addressing the second question, theories are reviewed according to which there is an intentional relation between emotions and values. Finally, while responding to the third question, some reasons for thinking that emotions can exemplify values are explored.Less
There are close links between emotions and values. This chapter pursues the task of uncovering the nature of these links. It proceeds to do that by answering three questions. First, what is the role of emotions in elucidating the nature of value? For example, is beauty to be understood in term of admiration? Second, what is the role of emotions in our gaining access to values? For example, what is the role of indignation in our awareness of injustice? Third, what value do emotions have? For example, is anger of value because it promotes aggressive behavior? Answering the first question amounts to surveying theories according to which there is an ontological relation between values and emotions. Addressing the second question, theories are reviewed according to which there is an intentional relation between emotions and values. Finally, while responding to the third question, some reasons for thinking that emotions can exemplify values are explored.
Alan Montefiore
- Published in print:
- 2011
- Published Online:
- November 2015
- ISBN:
- 9780231153003
- eISBN:
- 9780231526791
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Columbia University Press
- DOI:
- 10.7312/columbia/9780231153003.003.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Religion
This chapter explores the notions of fact and value, first by recalling the relevant aspects of what presented itself as a given personal identity at the time of setting out on a university career. ...
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This chapter explores the notions of fact and value, first by recalling the relevant aspects of what presented itself as a given personal identity at the time of setting out on a university career. The chapter then considers what exactly is to be counted as coming under the head of “values” and the extent of what may reasonably be counted as value judgments. It also discusses the more specific case of judgements of obligatory behavior and the related question of whether concepts of personal identity may not, in their own way, also function as conceptual bridges, resistant to all would-be analytic disentangling, between what has to be recognized and accepted as given personal and social facts and judgments of where obligations may properly lie.Less
This chapter explores the notions of fact and value, first by recalling the relevant aspects of what presented itself as a given personal identity at the time of setting out on a university career. The chapter then considers what exactly is to be counted as coming under the head of “values” and the extent of what may reasonably be counted as value judgments. It also discusses the more specific case of judgements of obligatory behavior and the related question of whether concepts of personal identity may not, in their own way, also function as conceptual bridges, resistant to all would-be analytic disentangling, between what has to be recognized and accepted as given personal and social facts and judgments of where obligations may properly lie.
