Jeff Jordan
- Published in print:
- 2006
- Published Online:
- January 2007
- ISBN:
- 9780199291328
- eISBN:
- 9780191710698
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199291328.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Religion
What if there is no strong evidence that God exists? Is belief in God when faced with a lack of evidence illegitimate and improper? Evidentialism answers yes. According to Evidentialism, it is ...
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What if there is no strong evidence that God exists? Is belief in God when faced with a lack of evidence illegitimate and improper? Evidentialism answers yes. According to Evidentialism, it is impermissible to believe any proposition lacking adequate evidence. And, if any thesis enjoys the status of a dogma among philosophers, it is Evidentialism. Presenting a direct challenge to Evidentialism are pragmatic arguments for theism, which are designed to support belief in the absence of adequate evidence. Pascal's Wager is the most prominent theistic pragmatic argument, and issues in epistemology, the ethics of belief, and decision theory, as well as philosophical theology, all intersect at the Wager. This book explores various theistic pragmatic arguments and the objections employed against them. It presents a new version of the Wager, the so-called ‘Jamesian Wager’, and argues that this survives the objections hurled against theistic pragmatic arguments and provides strong support for theistic belief. Objections found in Voltaire, Hume, and Nietzsche against the Wager are scrutinized, as are objections issued by Richard Swinburne, Richard Gale, and other contemporary philosophers. The ethics of belief, the many-gods objection, the problem of infinite utilities, and the propriety of a hope-based acceptance are also examined.Less
What if there is no strong evidence that God exists? Is belief in God when faced with a lack of evidence illegitimate and improper? Evidentialism answers yes. According to Evidentialism, it is impermissible to believe any proposition lacking adequate evidence. And, if any thesis enjoys the status of a dogma among philosophers, it is Evidentialism. Presenting a direct challenge to Evidentialism are pragmatic arguments for theism, which are designed to support belief in the absence of adequate evidence. Pascal's Wager is the most prominent theistic pragmatic argument, and issues in epistemology, the ethics of belief, and decision theory, as well as philosophical theology, all intersect at the Wager. This book explores various theistic pragmatic arguments and the objections employed against them. It presents a new version of the Wager, the so-called ‘Jamesian Wager’, and argues that this survives the objections hurled against theistic pragmatic arguments and provides strong support for theistic belief. Objections found in Voltaire, Hume, and Nietzsche against the Wager are scrutinized, as are objections issued by Richard Swinburne, Richard Gale, and other contemporary philosophers. The ethics of belief, the many-gods objection, the problem of infinite utilities, and the propriety of a hope-based acceptance are also examined.
James Halteman and Edd Noell
- Published in print:
- 2012
- Published Online:
- May 2012
- ISBN:
- 9780199763702
- eISBN:
- 9780199932252
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199763702.003.0008
- Subject:
- Economics and Finance, Financial Economics
This chapter traces efforts to expand the approach of economic thinking to political, legal, social, and religious institutions. Using rational choice analysis, these efforts move the discussion ...
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This chapter traces efforts to expand the approach of economic thinking to political, legal, social, and religious institutions. Using rational choice analysis, these efforts move the discussion closer to value-laden areas of life. One important concern is the nature of the utility function, how it is formed, and what is utility or happiness?[CE1]Social norms, cooperation models, game theory, behavioral economics, and neuroeconomics all have something to say about human behavior,and they also have important moral ramifications. While some claim that behavioral responses in these cases are merely self-interest disguised, outward behavior seems to work best in the long run if it is heartfelt. Character traits that signal trust are strongest when backed by moral commitments, and there is evidence that human brains are hardwired with some empathetic tendencies. The work of Dan Kahneman and AmartyaSen is highlighted in the closing vignettes.Less
This chapter traces efforts to expand the approach of economic thinking to political, legal, social, and religious institutions. Using rational choice analysis, these efforts move the discussion closer to value-laden areas of life. One important concern is the nature of the utility function, how it is formed, and what is utility or happiness?[CE1]Social norms, cooperation models, game theory, behavioral economics, and neuroeconomics all have something to say about human behavior,and they also have important moral ramifications. While some claim that behavioral responses in these cases are merely self-interest disguised, outward behavior seems to work best in the long run if it is heartfelt. Character traits that signal trust are strongest when backed by moral commitments, and there is evidence that human brains are hardwired with some empathetic tendencies. The work of Dan Kahneman and AmartyaSen is highlighted in the closing vignettes.
Fred Feldman
- Published in print:
- 2010
- Published Online:
- May 2010
- ISBN:
- 9780199571178
- eISBN:
- 9780191722547
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199571178.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Moral Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind
This book is a philosophical study of the nature and value of happiness. Part I is devoted to critical discussion of the most important theories about the nature of happiness, understood as some sort ...
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This book is a philosophical study of the nature and value of happiness. Part I is devoted to critical discussion of the most important theories about the nature of happiness, understood as some sort of psychological state. Views discussed include sensory hedonism, local preferentism, Kahneman's theory, and Whole Life Satisfactionism. Part II of the book contains the exposition and defense of a novel theory about the nature and value of happiness. It is a form of attitudinal hedonism. The idea that a person's welfare, or well‐being, depends essentially on happiness is explained and (with reservations) defended, provided that happiness is understood according to the theory presented here. Part III of the book extends the discussion into some areas that bear on interactions between empirical research concerning happiness and philosophical inquiry into the same phenomenon. Current methods of measuring happiness are criticized and a new method is proposed. Philosophical implications of empirical research concerning happiness are evaluated.Less
This book is a philosophical study of the nature and value of happiness. Part I is devoted to critical discussion of the most important theories about the nature of happiness, understood as some sort of psychological state. Views discussed include sensory hedonism, local preferentism, Kahneman's theory, and Whole Life Satisfactionism. Part II of the book contains the exposition and defense of a novel theory about the nature and value of happiness. It is a form of attitudinal hedonism. The idea that a person's welfare, or well‐being, depends essentially on happiness is explained and (with reservations) defended, provided that happiness is understood according to the theory presented here. Part III of the book extends the discussion into some areas that bear on interactions between empirical research concerning happiness and philosophical inquiry into the same phenomenon. Current methods of measuring happiness are criticized and a new method is proposed. Philosophical implications of empirical research concerning happiness are evaluated.
Bernard Van Praag
- Published in print:
- 2007
- Published Online:
- May 2008
- ISBN:
- 9780199226146
- eISBN:
- 9780191718595
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199226146.003.0017
- Subject:
- Economics and Finance, Behavioural Economics
This chapter synthesizes the findings presented in the book. It highlights the success in developing a methodology that can analyse satisfaction along the lines similar to those used by ...
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This chapter synthesizes the findings presented in the book. It highlights the success in developing a methodology that can analyse satisfaction along the lines similar to those used by econometricians to analyse ‘objective’ variables. Future research should focus on developing methods that can estimate decision-utility functions for other domains. The relevance of the neoclassical equilibrium assumption is put into question. In line with the multi-disciplinary content of this text, the book stress the need for strengthening the collaboration with the sister disciplines.Less
This chapter synthesizes the findings presented in the book. It highlights the success in developing a methodology that can analyse satisfaction along the lines similar to those used by econometricians to analyse ‘objective’ variables. Future research should focus on developing methods that can estimate decision-utility functions for other domains. The relevance of the neoclassical equilibrium assumption is put into question. In line with the multi-disciplinary content of this text, the book stress the need for strengthening the collaboration with the sister disciplines.
Anita M. Superson
- Published in print:
- 2009
- Published Online:
- May 2009
- ISBN:
- 9780195376623
- eISBN:
- 9780199871551
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195376623.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Feminist Philosophy
This book challenges the traditional picture of the skeptic who asks, “Why be moral?” and demands a demonstration that acting in morally required ways is rationally required. It argues that we defeat ...
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This book challenges the traditional picture of the skeptic who asks, “Why be moral?” and demands a demonstration that acting in morally required ways is rationally required. It argues that we defeat the action skeptic, as well as the disposition skeptic, who denies that being morally disposed is rationally required, and the motive skeptic, who believes that merely going through the motions in acting morally is rationally permissible. It argues, against internalism, that we address the amoralist, who is not moved by moral reasons he recognizes. It argues for expanding the skeptic's position from self-interest to privilege, to include morally unjustified behavior typically directed against disenfranchised social groups. It argues for revising the traditional expected utility model of rationality to exclude desires deformed by patriarchy as ones it is not irrational to have. It defends the Interdependency Thesis, which assesses the rationality of moral dispositions and of actions interdependently, and allows us to fine tune the demands of the skeptic by not focusing on acts and dispositions in themselves, but on their interconnection. It defends the view that our rational assessments of agents should reflect the complex connection between the agent's reasons for adopting a moral disposition, and for having and acting from it, whether these cohere with her reasons for acting and for wanting to be a morally good person, and the justification for the moral theory or principles she endorses. Acts come in degrees of rationality, as measured by how they contribute to the agent's consistent life plan.Less
This book challenges the traditional picture of the skeptic who asks, “Why be moral?” and demands a demonstration that acting in morally required ways is rationally required. It argues that we defeat the action skeptic, as well as the disposition skeptic, who denies that being morally disposed is rationally required, and the motive skeptic, who believes that merely going through the motions in acting morally is rationally permissible. It argues, against internalism, that we address the amoralist, who is not moved by moral reasons he recognizes. It argues for expanding the skeptic's position from self-interest to privilege, to include morally unjustified behavior typically directed against disenfranchised social groups. It argues for revising the traditional expected utility model of rationality to exclude desires deformed by patriarchy as ones it is not irrational to have. It defends the Interdependency Thesis, which assesses the rationality of moral dispositions and of actions interdependently, and allows us to fine tune the demands of the skeptic by not focusing on acts and dispositions in themselves, but on their interconnection. It defends the view that our rational assessments of agents should reflect the complex connection between the agent's reasons for adopting a moral disposition, and for having and acting from it, whether these cohere with her reasons for acting and for wanting to be a morally good person, and the justification for the moral theory or principles she endorses. Acts come in degrees of rationality, as measured by how they contribute to the agent's consistent life plan.
José Luis Bermúdez
- Published in print:
- 2009
- Published Online:
- May 2009
- ISBN:
- 9780199548026
- eISBN:
- 9780191720246
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199548026.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind, Philosophy of Science
The concept of rationality is a common thread through the human and social sciences — from political science to philosophy, from economics to sociology, from management science to decision analysis. ...
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The concept of rationality is a common thread through the human and social sciences — from political science to philosophy, from economics to sociology, from management science to decision analysis. But what counts as rational action and rational behavior? This book explores decision theory as a theory of rationality. Decision theory is the mathematical theory of choice and for many social scientists it makes the concept of rationality mathematically tractable and scientifically legitimate. Yet rationality is a concept with several dimensions and the theory of rationality has different roles to play. It plays an action-guiding role (prescribing what counts as a rational solution of a given decision problem). It plays a normative role (giving us the tools to pass judgment not just on how a decision problem was solved, but also on how it was set up in the first place). And it plays a predictive/explanatory role (telling us how rational agents will behave, or why they did what they did). This book shows, first, that decision theory cannot play all of these roles simultaneously and, second, that no theory of rationality can play one role without playing the other two. The conclusion is that there is no hope of taking decision theory as a theory of rationality.Less
The concept of rationality is a common thread through the human and social sciences — from political science to philosophy, from economics to sociology, from management science to decision analysis. But what counts as rational action and rational behavior? This book explores decision theory as a theory of rationality. Decision theory is the mathematical theory of choice and for many social scientists it makes the concept of rationality mathematically tractable and scientifically legitimate. Yet rationality is a concept with several dimensions and the theory of rationality has different roles to play. It plays an action-guiding role (prescribing what counts as a rational solution of a given decision problem). It plays a normative role (giving us the tools to pass judgment not just on how a decision problem was solved, but also on how it was set up in the first place). And it plays a predictive/explanatory role (telling us how rational agents will behave, or why they did what they did). This book shows, first, that decision theory cannot play all of these roles simultaneously and, second, that no theory of rationality can play one role without playing the other two. The conclusion is that there is no hope of taking decision theory as a theory of rationality.
W. M. Gorman
C. Blackorby and A. F. Shorrocks (eds)
- Published in print:
- 1996
- Published Online:
- November 2003
- ISBN:
- 9780198285212
- eISBN:
- 9780191596322
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0198285213.003.0017
- Subject:
- Economics and Finance, Microeconomics
This short note, published in Metroeconomica 13 (1961), begins with the assumption that the preferences of the consumer exhibit linear Engel curves, which were shown in ’Community preference fields’ ...
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This short note, published in Metroeconomica 13 (1961), begins with the assumption that the preferences of the consumer exhibit linear Engel curves, which were shown in ’Community preference fields’ (Ch. 15) to be necessary for the existence of a community indifference map. Engel curves are curves showing the relationship between income level and spending on the consumption of some good, at a given price, and linear Engel curves crop up in several branches of economics. The note explores some of the properties of the preference fields in which linear Engel curves arise, and, in particular, of those in which the marginal propensity to consume each good is an absolute constant. The preference fields are characterized by closed‐form representations in terms of both the indirect utility function and the cost function. An application to international trade theory is discussed.Less
This short note, published in Metroeconomica 13 (1961), begins with the assumption that the preferences of the consumer exhibit linear Engel curves, which were shown in ’Community preference fields’ (Ch. 15) to be necessary for the existence of a community indifference map. Engel curves are curves showing the relationship between income level and spending on the consumption of some good, at a given price, and linear Engel curves crop up in several branches of economics. The note explores some of the properties of the preference fields in which linear Engel curves arise, and, in particular, of those in which the marginal propensity to consume each good is an absolute constant. The preference fields are characterized by closed‐form representations in terms of both the indirect utility function and the cost function. An application to international trade theory is discussed.
W. M. Gorman
C. Blackorby and A. F. Shorrocks (eds)
- Published in print:
- 1996
- Published Online:
- November 2003
- ISBN:
- 9780198285212
- eISBN:
- 9780191596322
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0198285213.003.0022
- Subject:
- Economics and Finance, Microeconomics
The following paper has been constructed from handwritten notes, probably dating from 1976, which contain only an introduction, the beginning of a proof, and a conclusion; the proof of the main ...
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The following paper has been constructed from handwritten notes, probably dating from 1976, which contain only an introduction, the beginning of a proof, and a conclusion; the proof of the main result is missing, although a straightforward application of the main result of Sect. 2 of ’More measures for fixed factors’ (Ch. 21) fills this gap. The problem of the representative consumer is one posed and solved by Muellbauer (1976), but it had already been addressed by Gorman in 1953, when it was conceived of in either of two equivalent ways: either the representative consumer replicates average demand with average total income or it replicates total demand with total income. Muellbauer suggested looking for a representative consumer, the proportional breakdown of whose consumption mirrors that of society as a whole, and who replicates the shares demanded, but not necessarily the levels; furthermore, he permitted the utility level of the representative agent to depend upon prices, as well as upon the incomes of all members of the society. Gorman follows the general lines of Muellbauer's treatment, showing that the solution he gets is not quite the general one, and that this has misled him into believing that his central result is not a direct generalization of that in Gorman (1953). He also discusses the ideas of the ’representative consumer’ underlying the two analyses.Less
The following paper has been constructed from handwritten notes, probably dating from 1976, which contain only an introduction, the beginning of a proof, and a conclusion; the proof of the main result is missing, although a straightforward application of the main result of Sect. 2 of ’More measures for fixed factors’ (Ch. 21) fills this gap. The problem of the representative consumer is one posed and solved by Muellbauer (1976), but it had already been addressed by Gorman in 1953, when it was conceived of in either of two equivalent ways: either the representative consumer replicates average demand with average total income or it replicates total demand with total income. Muellbauer suggested looking for a representative consumer, the proportional breakdown of whose consumption mirrors that of society as a whole, and who replicates the shares demanded, but not necessarily the levels; furthermore, he permitted the utility level of the representative agent to depend upon prices, as well as upon the incomes of all members of the society. Gorman follows the general lines of Muellbauer's treatment, showing that the solution he gets is not quite the general one, and that this has misled him into believing that his central result is not a direct generalization of that in Gorman (1953). He also discusses the ideas of the ’representative consumer’ underlying the two analyses.
Jeff Jordan
- Published in print:
- 2006
- Published Online:
- January 2007
- ISBN:
- 9780199291328
- eISBN:
- 9780191710698
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199291328.003.0004
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Religion
Pascal's Wager employed infinite utilities, but standard decision theory is incompatible with infinite utilities. In this chapter, the consequences of restricting the Wager to finite utilities are ...
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Pascal's Wager employed infinite utilities, but standard decision theory is incompatible with infinite utilities. In this chapter, the consequences of restricting the Wager to finite utilities are explored. The St. Petersburg paradox is also examined.Less
Pascal's Wager employed infinite utilities, but standard decision theory is incompatible with infinite utilities. In this chapter, the consequences of restricting the Wager to finite utilities are explored. The St. Petersburg paradox is also examined.
Mario Mazzocchi, W. Bruce Traill, and Jason F. Shogren
- Published in print:
- 2009
- Published Online:
- October 2011
- ISBN:
- 9780199213856
- eISBN:
- 9780191695902
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199213856.001.0001
- Subject:
- Economics and Finance, Public and Welfare
The obesity epidemic and the growing debate about what, if any, public health policy should be adopted is the subject of endless debates within the media and in governments around the world. Whilst ...
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The obesity epidemic and the growing debate about what, if any, public health policy should be adopted is the subject of endless debates within the media and in governments around the world. Whilst much has been written on the subject, this book takes a unique approach by looking at the obesity epidemic from an economic perspective. Written in a language accessible to non-specialists, the authors provide a timely discussion of evolving nutrition policies in both the developing and developed world, discuss the factors influencing supply and demand of food supply, and review the evidence for various factors which may explain recent trends in diets, weight, and health. The traditional economic model assumes people choose to be overweight as part of a utility maximisation process that involves choices about what to eat and drink, how much time to spend on leisure, food preparation, and exercise, and choices about appearance and health. Market and behavioural failures, however, such as time available to a person, education, costs imposed on the health system and economic productivity provide the economic rationale for government intervention. The authors explore various policy measures designed to deal with the epidemic and examine their effectiveness within a cost-benefit analysis framework. While providing a sound economic basis for analysing policy decisions, the book also aims to show the underlying limits of the economic framework in quantifying changes in public well-being.Less
The obesity epidemic and the growing debate about what, if any, public health policy should be adopted is the subject of endless debates within the media and in governments around the world. Whilst much has been written on the subject, this book takes a unique approach by looking at the obesity epidemic from an economic perspective. Written in a language accessible to non-specialists, the authors provide a timely discussion of evolving nutrition policies in both the developing and developed world, discuss the factors influencing supply and demand of food supply, and review the evidence for various factors which may explain recent trends in diets, weight, and health. The traditional economic model assumes people choose to be overweight as part of a utility maximisation process that involves choices about what to eat and drink, how much time to spend on leisure, food preparation, and exercise, and choices about appearance and health. Market and behavioural failures, however, such as time available to a person, education, costs imposed on the health system and economic productivity provide the economic rationale for government intervention. The authors explore various policy measures designed to deal with the epidemic and examine their effectiveness within a cost-benefit analysis framework. While providing a sound economic basis for analysing policy decisions, the book also aims to show the underlying limits of the economic framework in quantifying changes in public well-being.
Anthony F. Heath, Roger M. Jowell, and John K. Curtice
- Published in print:
- 2001
- Published Online:
- November 2003
- ISBN:
- 9780199245116
- eISBN:
- 9780191599453
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0199245118.003.0009
- Subject:
- Political Science, UK Politics
The authors offer a multiplicative model that provides a comprehensive framework to place the main findings of the volume. The model is based on the standard ‘expected utility maximization’ model of ...
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The authors offer a multiplicative model that provides a comprehensive framework to place the main findings of the volume. The model is based on the standard ‘expected utility maximization’ model of the economists, which can be applied for understanding election outcomes. The idea is that the voter weights the utility of a given policy by the probability of its being implemented, sums this across the different policies, and then votes for whichever party gives the greatest expected utility. However, Heath, Jowell, and Curtice emphasize the fact that the rational choice model needs to be expanded to include some of the ‘non‐rational’ processes observed in their research such as the possibility that voters’ preferences may be shaped by the political parties and should not to be treated only as independent factors. The model should also be modified to take account of other sorts of processes such as social interaction, social conformity and what the authors have termed the ‘forked‐tail’ effect related to the generalization of the disillusionment from a specific party policy into a general disillusion with the party's competence.Less
The authors offer a multiplicative model that provides a comprehensive framework to place the main findings of the volume. The model is based on the standard ‘expected utility maximization’ model of the economists, which can be applied for understanding election outcomes. The idea is that the voter weights the utility of a given policy by the probability of its being implemented, sums this across the different policies, and then votes for whichever party gives the greatest expected utility. However, Heath, Jowell, and Curtice emphasize the fact that the rational choice model needs to be expanded to include some of the ‘non‐rational’ processes observed in their research such as the possibility that voters’ preferences may be shaped by the political parties and should not to be treated only as independent factors. The model should also be modified to take account of other sorts of processes such as social interaction, social conformity and what the authors have termed the ‘forked‐tail’ effect related to the generalization of the disillusionment from a specific party policy into a general disillusion with the party's competence.
Paul Weirich
- Published in print:
- 2004
- Published Online:
- November 2004
- ISBN:
- 9780195171259
- eISBN:
- 9780199834976
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/019517125X.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Logic/Philosophy of Mathematics
Decision theory aims at a general account of rationality covering humans but to begin makes idealizations about decision problems and agents' resources and circumstances. It treats inerrant agents ...
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Decision theory aims at a general account of rationality covering humans but to begin makes idealizations about decision problems and agents' resources and circumstances. It treats inerrant agents with unlimited cognitive power facing tractable decision problems. This book systematically rolls back idealizations and without loss of precision treats errant agents with limited cognitive abilities facing decision problems without a stable top option. It recommends choices that maximize utility using quantizations of beliefs and desires in cases where probabilities and utilities are indeterminate and using higher-order utility analysis in cases of limited access to probabilities and utilities. For agents burdened with mistakes, it advocates reasonable attempts to correct unacceptable mistakes before deciding. In decision problems without a stable top option, a topic of game theory, it proposes maximizing self-conditional utility among self-supporting options. In games of strategy, the new principles lead to solutions that are Pareto optimal among equilibria composed of jointly self-supporting strategies. Offering an account of bounded rationality, the bookmakes large strides toward realism in decision theory.Less
Decision theory aims at a general account of rationality covering humans but to begin makes idealizations about decision problems and agents' resources and circumstances. It treats inerrant agents with unlimited cognitive power facing tractable decision problems. This book systematically rolls back idealizations and without loss of precision treats errant agents with limited cognitive abilities facing decision problems without a stable top option. It recommends choices that maximize utility using quantizations of beliefs and desires in cases where probabilities and utilities are indeterminate and using higher-order utility analysis in cases of limited access to probabilities and utilities. For agents burdened with mistakes, it advocates reasonable attempts to correct unacceptable mistakes before deciding. In decision problems without a stable top option, a topic of game theory, it proposes maximizing self-conditional utility among self-supporting options. In games of strategy, the new principles lead to solutions that are Pareto optimal among equilibria composed of jointly self-supporting strategies. Offering an account of bounded rationality, the bookmakes large strides toward realism in decision theory.
David Lyons
- Published in print:
- 1991
- Published Online:
- October 2011
- ISBN:
- 9780198239642
- eISBN:
- 9780191679971
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198239642.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Political Philosophy, History of Philosophy
Although known as the founder of modern utilitarianism and the source of analytical jurisprudence, Bentham today is infrequently read, but often caricatured. This book, based on a study of Bentham's ...
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Although known as the founder of modern utilitarianism and the source of analytical jurisprudence, Bentham today is infrequently read, but often caricatured. This book, based on a study of Bentham's most important works, offers a reinterpretation of Bentham's main philosophical doctrines, his principle of utility and his analysis of law. The evidence indicates that Bentham was no ‘universalist’ in morals, but embraced a dual standard—in politics the community's interest, in ‘private ethics’ the agent's interest—which may in turn be based on the idea that government should serve the interests of those who are ‘governed’. The argument challenges many common assumptions about Bentham's view of human nature and of political institutions. A new reading is also given to his theory of law, which suggests Bentham's insight, originality, and continued interest for philosophers and legal theorists. This book was first published in 1973. This revised edition contains a new preface, a revised bibliography, and two new indexes, one of names and one of subjects, which together replace the original index.Less
Although known as the founder of modern utilitarianism and the source of analytical jurisprudence, Bentham today is infrequently read, but often caricatured. This book, based on a study of Bentham's most important works, offers a reinterpretation of Bentham's main philosophical doctrines, his principle of utility and his analysis of law. The evidence indicates that Bentham was no ‘universalist’ in morals, but embraced a dual standard—in politics the community's interest, in ‘private ethics’ the agent's interest—which may in turn be based on the idea that government should serve the interests of those who are ‘governed’. The argument challenges many common assumptions about Bentham's view of human nature and of political institutions. A new reading is also given to his theory of law, which suggests Bentham's insight, originality, and continued interest for philosophers and legal theorists. This book was first published in 1973. This revised edition contains a new preface, a revised bibliography, and two new indexes, one of names and one of subjects, which together replace the original index.
Lan Xue and Zheng Liang
- Published in print:
- 2010
- Published Online:
- May 2010
- ISBN:
- 9780199574759
- eISBN:
- 9780191722660
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199574759.003.0010
- Subject:
- Business and Management, Innovation
This chapter discusses the catch‐up process of China post‐1949, especially after the initiative of “Open Doors” since 1978. Domestic firms adapted to the intellectual property right system through ...
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This chapter discusses the catch‐up process of China post‐1949, especially after the initiative of “Open Doors” since 1978. Domestic firms adapted to the intellectual property right system through gradual innovation, especially using utility models, i.e. petty patents. Even though most Chinese firms have not been able to become true innovators, several succeeded in developing innovative capabilities, such as Huawei, a communication equipment manufacturer. The litigation brought by Cisco against Huawei stimulated the formulation and improvement of Huawei's IPR strategy and, gradually, Huawei has developed new collaborative relationships with multinationals. However, this case is rather exceptional and most inventions are carried out by a handful of large firms. China's patent system has played an important role in stimulating innovation for both multinationals and domestic firms even though its net impact on technology transfer and domestic firms' catch‐up is yet unclear.Less
This chapter discusses the catch‐up process of China post‐1949, especially after the initiative of “Open Doors” since 1978. Domestic firms adapted to the intellectual property right system through gradual innovation, especially using utility models, i.e. petty patents. Even though most Chinese firms have not been able to become true innovators, several succeeded in developing innovative capabilities, such as Huawei, a communication equipment manufacturer. The litigation brought by Cisco against Huawei stimulated the formulation and improvement of Huawei's IPR strategy and, gradually, Huawei has developed new collaborative relationships with multinationals. However, this case is rather exceptional and most inventions are carried out by a handful of large firms. China's patent system has played an important role in stimulating innovation for both multinationals and domestic firms even though its net impact on technology transfer and domestic firms' catch‐up is yet unclear.
George J. Mailath and Larry Samuelson
- Published in print:
- 2006
- Published Online:
- January 2007
- ISBN:
- 9780195300796
- eISBN:
- 9780199783700
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195300796.003.0003
- Subject:
- Economics and Finance, Behavioural Economics
This chapter presents and proves the folk theorem for games of perfect monitoring. The chapter first proves the folk theorem for two players with public correlation and pure-action individual ...
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This chapter presents and proves the folk theorem for games of perfect monitoring. The chapter first proves the folk theorem for two players with public correlation and pure-action individual rationality. This is then generalized to arbitrary numbers of players, via both a dimensionality assumption on feasible payoffs and the idea of non-equivalent utilities, then to games without public correlation and finally to mixed-action individually rational payoffs.Less
This chapter presents and proves the folk theorem for games of perfect monitoring. The chapter first proves the folk theorem for two players with public correlation and pure-action individual rationality. This is then generalized to arbitrary numbers of players, via both a dimensionality assumption on feasible payoffs and the idea of non-equivalent utilities, then to games without public correlation and finally to mixed-action individually rational payoffs.
Sharan Jagpal
- Published in print:
- 2008
- Published Online:
- September 2008
- ISBN:
- 9780195371055
- eISBN:
- 9780199870745
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195371055.003.0006
- Subject:
- Business and Management, Marketing
This chapter shows how firms should price new products, especially under cost and demand uncertainty. It distinguishes between privately and publicly owned firms and show how the risk attitudes of ...
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This chapter shows how firms should price new products, especially under cost and demand uncertainty. It distinguishes between privately and publicly owned firms and show how the risk attitudes of the firm's owners affect new product prices; in addition, it evaluates the conditions under which the firm should announce or preannounce its new products in the marketplace.Less
This chapter shows how firms should price new products, especially under cost and demand uncertainty. It distinguishes between privately and publicly owned firms and show how the risk attitudes of the firm's owners affect new product prices; in addition, it evaluates the conditions under which the firm should announce or preannounce its new products in the marketplace.
Edmund Cannon and Ian Tonks
- Published in print:
- 2008
- Published Online:
- January 2009
- ISBN:
- 9780199216994
- eISBN:
- 9780191711978
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199216994.003.0007
- Subject:
- Business and Management, Pensions and Pension Management
This chapter discusses Yaari's (19665) annuitization result, which states that a risk-averse individual concerned about longevity risk (uncertain length of life) will always purchase actuarially-fair ...
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This chapter discusses Yaari's (19665) annuitization result, which states that a risk-averse individual concerned about longevity risk (uncertain length of life) will always purchase actuarially-fair annuity contracts, enabling them to smooth consumption in every period of retirement. The chapter explains the assumptions behind this result. It models the demand for annuities in an expected utility framework, and demonstrates the value of annuities under various specifications of preferences.Less
This chapter discusses Yaari's (19665) annuitization result, which states that a risk-averse individual concerned about longevity risk (uncertain length of life) will always purchase actuarially-fair annuity contracts, enabling them to smooth consumption in every period of retirement. The chapter explains the assumptions behind this result. It models the demand for annuities in an expected utility framework, and demonstrates the value of annuities under various specifications of preferences.
David B. Wong
- Published in print:
- 2006
- Published Online:
- September 2006
- ISBN:
- 9780195305395
- eISBN:
- 9780199786657
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0195305396.003.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Moral Philosophy
The case for pluralistic relativism begins with discussing a discomforting kind of moral disagreement that gives rise to moral ambivalence: this is not simply disagreement in which both sides run out ...
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The case for pluralistic relativism begins with discussing a discomforting kind of moral disagreement that gives rise to moral ambivalence: this is not simply disagreement in which both sides run out of reasons that are persuasive to the other, but is also a disagreement in which coming to understand the other side brings along an appreciation of its reasons. The root of moral ambivalence is the existence of plural and irreducible moral values (e.g., special duties to particular people and groups, rights, utility, perfectionist ends or values, commitment to one’s own projects and undertakings, and attunement to the world) and our coming to understand how others could have made choices different from the ones we make in the face of conflicts among these values. Moral ambivalence poses difficulties for universalism. A case in point is ambivalence in the face of conflict between personal values (special duties, commitment to one’s own projects) and impersonal values (rights possessed by everyone, utility).Less
The case for pluralistic relativism begins with discussing a discomforting kind of moral disagreement that gives rise to moral ambivalence: this is not simply disagreement in which both sides run out of reasons that are persuasive to the other, but is also a disagreement in which coming to understand the other side brings along an appreciation of its reasons. The root of moral ambivalence is the existence of plural and irreducible moral values (e.g., special duties to particular people and groups, rights, utility, perfectionist ends or values, commitment to one’s own projects and undertakings, and attunement to the world) and our coming to understand how others could have made choices different from the ones we make in the face of conflicts among these values. Moral ambivalence poses difficulties for universalism. A case in point is ambivalence in the face of conflict between personal values (special duties, commitment to one’s own projects) and impersonal values (rights possessed by everyone, utility).
Raimo Tuomela
- Published in print:
- 2007
- Published Online:
- September 2007
- ISBN:
- 9780195313390
- eISBN:
- 9780199870929
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195313390.003.0008
- Subject:
- Philosophy, General
This chapter contains an extensive discussion of cooperation, including accounts of both I-mode and we-mode cooperation. I-mode cooperation concerns the participants relevantly “shifting” their ...
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This chapter contains an extensive discussion of cooperation, including accounts of both I-mode and we-mode cooperation. I-mode cooperation concerns the participants relevantly “shifting” their I-mode goals and actions toward their partnersʼ goals and actions so that a shared goal outcome is reached. We-mode cooperation amounts to we-mode joint action. These two modes are compared and illustrated in terms of a simple game-theoretical public good acquisition model. It is shown that in some situations we-mode cooperation is preferable to both “progroup” and “plain” I-mode cooperation also on grounds of instrumental rationality. We-mode cooperation, by generally being more holistic and ingrained, gives more stability and order, involves respect-based trust, and also allows for more speed, creativity, and flexibility and better applicability to the large-group case. Because of the ingredient of collective commitment we-mode cooperation entails “strong,” group-sanctioned reciprocity, which helps to escape collective action dilemmas. From the group's point of view such dilemmas ideally do not even arise, although in real life people often do not act as proper group members but free-ride.Less
This chapter contains an extensive discussion of cooperation, including accounts of both I-mode and we-mode cooperation. I-mode cooperation concerns the participants relevantly “shifting” their I-mode goals and actions toward their partnersʼ goals and actions so that a shared goal outcome is reached. We-mode cooperation amounts to we-mode joint action. These two modes are compared and illustrated in terms of a simple game-theoretical public good acquisition model. It is shown that in some situations we-mode cooperation is preferable to both “progroup” and “plain” I-mode cooperation also on grounds of instrumental rationality. We-mode cooperation, by generally being more holistic and ingrained, gives more stability and order, involves respect-based trust, and also allows for more speed, creativity, and flexibility and better applicability to the large-group case. Because of the ingredient of collective commitment we-mode cooperation entails “strong,” group-sanctioned reciprocity, which helps to escape collective action dilemmas. From the group's point of view such dilemmas ideally do not even arise, although in real life people often do not act as proper group members but free-ride.
Jie W Weiss and David J Weiss
- Published in print:
- 2008
- Published Online:
- January 2009
- ISBN:
- 9780195322989
- eISBN:
- 9780199869206
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195322989.003.0032
- Subject:
- Psychology, Cognitive Psychology
This chapter focuses on decision technology—the rules and tools that help us make wiser decisions. It begins by reviewing the three rules that are at the heart of most traditional decision ...
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This chapter focuses on decision technology—the rules and tools that help us make wiser decisions. It begins by reviewing the three rules that are at the heart of most traditional decision technology: multiattribute utility, Bayes' theorem, and subjective expected utility maximization. A comprehensive nineteen-step model is presented to show how to make best use of all three rules. The remainder of the chapter explores recently developed tools of decision technology.Less
This chapter focuses on decision technology—the rules and tools that help us make wiser decisions. It begins by reviewing the three rules that are at the heart of most traditional decision technology: multiattribute utility, Bayes' theorem, and subjective expected utility maximization. A comprehensive nineteen-step model is presented to show how to make best use of all three rules. The remainder of the chapter explores recently developed tools of decision technology.
