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Unless security is established on the ground, none of the political purposes of a transitional administration can be achieved. Nevertheless, as this chapter shows, the response of military authorities to the security vacuum that follows the collapse or defeat of state institutions has been varied. With respect to forces operating under UN command, this reflects an equivocation over the use of force that has run through the history of UN peace operations, persuading some that the organization is simply unsuited to military operations. At the same time, the armed forces of many countries (and their civilian commanders‐in‐chief) have resisted taking on ‘policing’ functions. The military is rightly reluctant to embrace law and order duties that are outside its expertise, but failure to do so may irreparably damage the credibility of the international presence and thus undermine the political goals that justified the original military engagement.

Considers the international law controversy provoked by the NATO campaign in Kosovo. The central question addressed is whether the constraints imposed by international law on the non‐defensive use of force are adequate for the maintenance of peace and security. In response, considers the legality of NATO's forceful humanitarian intervention by reference to both jus ad bellum (recourse to war) and jus in bellum (lawfulness of conduct in war), and argues on behalf of legitimacy by way of an emergent framework of principled humanitarian intervention. A pre‐legal proposal is made to move in the direction of establishing a legal doctrine of humanitarian intervention that balances the clams to protect peoples against the importance of restricting discretion to use force in international relations.

Between 1945 and 1955, Churchill's attitude towards the use of force had undergone a dramatic transformation. In the period of the American nuclear monopoly, Churchill's views were largely consistent with those he held for many years: It was possible to maintain peace through strength, and, more specifically, the bomb could preserve European democracy against the threat of Soviet expansionism. Moreover, in keeping with his lifetime vigour as a soldier and a statesman, Churchill spoke privately about attacking the Soviet Union and forcing a showdown before the Soviets acquired the bomb. With the disappearance of that monopoly, Churchill came to realize that the new bomb could decrease the likelihood of war and perhaps some day eliminate great‐power conflict altogether. Accordingly, the idea of ’peaceful coexistence’ became an integral part of Churchill's approach to international politics.

In this final chapter, The author asks whether the shift from a multipolar to unipolar society of states has led to normative change in international society, using the norm prohibiting the use of force as a case study, and arguing that although material changes in international society do have an impact, the norms that underpin international society are not infinitely malleable and constrain even powerful actors like the USA. He begins his chapter with a discussion of the relationship between power and norms, which reinforces the linkages between English School of International Relations and constructivist approaches identified in Ch. 4 by Reus‐Smit. The author dismisses the realist and materialist arguments that norms play, at most, a peripheral role in international life, by arguing that even powerful states prefer to act in accordance with international rules. In relation to the use of force, he argues that it is very difficult to find a case since 1945 where a state has not sought to justify its use of force with reference to the rules governing that discussion. After charting the evolution of norms pertaining to the use of force and the globalization of international society, he turns to the post‐September 11 era, arguing that although the USA continues to follow the rules to a large extent, its attempt to act as a ‘normative innovator’ by claiming an exceptional right to self‐defence poses a grave danger to both the UN and the system of law that underpins the society of states.

The problems caused by the US‐led response to terrorism addressed in Ch. 13 are looked at in more detail in the last two chapters, with the author offering here a novel reformulation of ‘justice’ as ‘coercively enforceable morality’, by arguing that ideas about international justice, and particularly about the rightness of the use of force in pursuit of the supposedly common interests of international society are intrinsically linked to common ideas about what is right or wrong. This suggests a need to rethink the order versus justice debate, as justice becomes the pursuit of those things that are legitimate to pursue, and rather than seeing order and justice as polar opposites, the author argues that the very concept of international justice implies a basic level of agreement about the legitimacy of particular types of order. He responds to the key question of how international society manages competing ideas about justice by outlining a case for the recognition of a ‘common morality’ that should guide action in international society and has three primary properties: first, unlike other ethical codes it is binding on all individuals; second, it rests on the human capacity for reasoned argument rather than ‘custom, contract, or legislation’; and third, its precepts are obligatory restraints on choice, not mere recommendations. He then moves on to discuss how common morality is applicable in international society: in sum, the creation of a common morality implies a shift to a solidarist international society that binds all its actors to a common moral code of action and shares moral responsibilities between them. The key tension within international society, the author concludes, is not one between order and justice, but one between just and unjust coercive orders.

Develops a cosmopolitan theory of global justice, in critical dialogue with John Rawls’s The Law of Peoples. Kuper argues that Rawls has begged some of the central questions of global justice by adopting a ‘thin statist’ conception of legitimate global order. Thus, Rawls effectively supports a system of unitary nation-states with limited sovereignty, while Kuper rejects this idea in favour of multi-level and multi-type political institutions. Similarly, Rawls disavows free speech and democratic rights at the global level, while Kuper establishes that they are fundamental requirements of global justice. Kuper then proposes a new notion of ‘plurarchic sovereignty’ governed by Principles of Democracy and Subsidiarity. Important practical implications are demonstrated in three areas: economic development, the rules of engagement with illiberal states, and the use of force in humanitarian intervention.

This introductory chapter begins with a discussion of the differences in the use of the term, pre-emption, in particular the different meanings across disciplines for the very same term. It then considers general and American preventive-war thinking, justifications for the use of force, and implications of UN Security Council authorization.

Bajpai begins by examining these four dominant traditions of thought and compares the attitudes of the four traditions towards state sovereignty, the use of force, the utility of rules and institutions, and inequality. The author shows the degree of compatibility between these four perspectives and the Westphalian concept of order and justice as well as with more solidarist approaches. He concludes by outlining what a just world order would look like from the four perspectives, and notes that a three‐way conversation on this topic is taking place between the Nehruvians, the increasingly influential Hindutvas, and the nascent neo‐liberals.

This chapter seeks to address, through the prism of recent debates about the tension between legality and legitimacy, the erosion of the norm of nonproliferation. The legality-legitimacy debate intersects with questions surrounding nonproliferation in two respects. First, arguments for counter-proliferation might employ the logic of legitimacy to justify interventions to prevent weapons proliferation in the absence of clear legal authorization. A second, and distinct, set of arguments point to a gap between legality and legitimacy in the case of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), stemming from the failure of the nuclear weapon states to implement their disarmament obligations. In this chapter, I argue that without a re-linking of the nonproliferation and disarmament components of the NPT and a retreat from the interventionist logic of counter-proliferation, the perceived legitimacy of the nonproliferation regime, and ultimately its enforceability, will be seriously damaged.

This chapter analyses the question of whether self-defence as understood in international law, encompasses the possibility of using extraterritorial force against armed groups abroad. It examines the prohibition on the use of force, and whether the concept of ‘armed attack’ as appears in the rules of self-defence, includes attacks by non-state actors. The chapter also analyses the impact on this issue caused by the potential links between the non-state actor and the state in which the group is located.

This chapter assesses the extent to which reputational concerns shaped President Ronald Reagan's discourse, decision making, and policies during international crises. It focuses on four of these international crises: the escalation in Afghanistan, the intervention in Lebanon, the invasion of Grenada, and the air strikes against Libya. Each posed a challenge, real or perceived, to US reputation for resolve and so are good tests of the dispositional theory. A review of Reagan's self-monitoring tendencies and beliefs about the use of force place him closest to the ideal-type high self-monitor hawk, and thus, one should expect his behavior to be consistent with that of a reputation crusader. However, his behavior and discourse during the crises covered cannot be convincingly explained simply by highlighting his hawkish tendencies. In order to fully appreciate Reagan's policies, rhetoric, and state of mind, one must look at how these hawkish tendencies interacted with his high self-monitoring disposition.

This chapter questions whether extraterritorial use of force against non-state actors might, in certain conditions, not be a breach of international law, even if taken outside the framework of self-defence. The concepts of countermeasures, necessity, hot pursuit, and piracy are examined. In addition, there is an analysis of the possibility of alternative paradigms or interpretations that might be claimed to allow for use of force other than in self-defence, such as ‘extraterritorial law enforcement’.

Chapter 2 explores the obligations to refrain from engaging in or supporting acts of international terrorism as specific instantiations of the general international law prohibitions of aggression and the use of force, and the principle of non-intervention. It further examines the secondary rules of attribution as they apply in the terrorism context (informing the analysis of which prohibition is breached), and critically engages with arguments that the rules of attribution are inadequate to meet the threat of terrorism. In particular, Chapter 2 argues that the ‘effective control’ standard for attribution adopted by the ICJ in Nicaragua was driven by the facts of the case and is ill-suited to determine State involvement in international terrorism. Chapter 2 advocates instead a context-sensitive application of Article 8 of the ILC Articles on State Responsibility and further argues that the ICJ’s jurisprudence and relevant State practice do not support complicity as an emerging basis of attribution for acts of terrorism.

This chapter reviews the way that the ‘global war on terror’ destabilizes legal categories regulating the scope of legitimate violence in international human rights (IHR) law and international humanitarian law (IHL), through the prism of the targeted killings of terrorist suspects who are outside the territory of the state using force. It considers the proposition that IHL applies as lex specialis to IHR during armed conflict and asks how we might understand this. It argues that while lex specialis is theoretically appealing because of its apparent conceptual neatness, it provides no concrete guidance as to the determinate content of the rules governing the targeted killing of terrorist suspects, and attempts at application problematize the notion of a lex specialis relation between IHL and IHR. There are no clear conceptual-logical bases to decide which of these frameworks is properly applied to the targeted killing of terrorist suspects, and thus that transparent political and policy choices must be made.

After considering the development and nature of UN peacekeeping, this chapter focuses on the decision to deploy British troops to Bosnia in 1994–5. The government's decisions to contribute to the UN peacekeeping force (the ineptly named UN Protection Force: UNPROFOR) and to the enforcement of the no-fly zone in a NATO operation are analyzed in political and legal terms. The fact of there being UN authority and its effect on the decision to deploy British troops has to be considered alongside that of the absence of the legal and military conditions for peacekeeping. Was Parliament more willing to accept the decision to deploy British troops to Bosnia because UNPROFOR was seen as a UN-mandated consensual peacekeeping force? Was there any attempt made in Parliament to address the issue of ‘mission creep’ as UNPROFOR's mandate was changed by the Security Council in an attempt to address the deteriorating situation?

The chapter assesses the concepts of legitimacy and legality in the context of three exercises of Western power over the past decade: Kosovo, Afghanistan and Iraq. None of these cases was unambiguously legal under existing international law and international institutions offered little assistance in determining the legality or legitimacy of these coercive actions. Various legal arguments have been offered in support of the military action in each case, including intervention on humanitarian grounds, legal responses to terrorist acts, self-defence, the right to remove an undemocratic regime that commits human rights abuses against its own people and Security Council authorization (implied or transferred). Although different weight has been given to the various legal arguments (and by different protagonists), the justifications have become merged, especially in the context of Iraq. It concludes that language and legal concepts have been hi-jacked and international legality claimed regardless of compliance with formal legal requirements while assessments of legitimacy are conditional.

This chapter outlines the events leading up to US military action against Iraq. It argues that the overall impact of this episode on the international system and the rules on the use of force were, perhaps, rather overstated. There was considerable debate about the reconfiguration of international law in the face of one single super- (or hyper-) power, debate about the Security Council's future credibility, and some soul-searching about the future of the prohibition of the use of force. In fact, the longer-term consequences of this episode have been more limited than might have been expected. The Council has not been precluded from ever again adopting Chapter VII resolutions that might conceivably attract unilateral claims for military enforcement. Instead, the Council has responded pragmatically. It now routinely confirms in resolutions of this kind the specific basis of legal authority used, and reserves expressly the right of the Council to control further steps. Moreover, in addition to refining the substance of any mandate granted, more thought is being devoted to its extension in time.