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Although the existence of this tort is implicit in the discussion in Allen v Flood, it has only received its first real analysis in OBG. This chapter maps the history of the tort and its relationship to the tort of inducing breach of contract (the unlawful means tort involving stand-alone, primary liability). It explores its key ingredients: intention and unlawful means. As is revealed, uncertainties remain post-OBG given the orthodox definition of intention for this tort is apparently rejected, and given Lord Hoffmann (speaking for the majority) and Lord Nicholls disagreed on the definition of ‘unlawful means’. The implications for the future of this tort are then debated, centred on a discussion of the possible polices that could shape the definition of unlawful means. In addition, this tort is distinguished from an obscure principle of equity that originates from the decision in Springhead Spinning v Riley.

The classic form of this tort, as featured in Lumley v Gye, involves the defendant persuading the claimant's contract partner to contract breach. Subsequently courts accepted varieties of this tort, some of which focused not on inducement but prevention and one of which focused on interference rather than inducement. This uncertain ambit resulted from the failure to identify the other major general economic tort namely the unlawful means tort. OBG re-asserts the classic scope of this tort, rejecting the modern varieties (most of which would now be covered by the unlawful means tort) and restricting liability to those claimants who have actual knowledge of the contract which they seek to persuade the claimant's partner to breach. This chapter explores the development of this tort, its relationship to the unlawful means tort and its analysis in OBG as a tort of secondary or accessory civil liability.

This chapter explores the history and modern form of this tort. Two key issues surrounding this tort remain controversial as was highlighted by the recent decisions in OBG and Total Network. These are the relationship between this tort and the unlawful means tort, and the scope and implications of the two-party version of this tort (and in particular whether a threatened breach of contract should constitute an unlawful threat for this tort). The chapter, therefore, links into the discussion in Chapter 4 and Chapter 7. It argues that the two-party form of this tort does not provide the seed for a general development of two-party economic torts, but rather that two-party liability in the tort of intimidation is a separate area of tort liability, a necessary supplement to existing tort liability.

This chapter introduces the economic torts, i.e., those torts that have as their name suggests the primary function of protecting claimants' economic interests. They include the general economic torts of inducing breach of contract, the unlawful means tort, intimidation, lawful means conspiracy, unlawful means conspiracy and the misrepresentation economic torts of deceit, malicious falsehood, and passing off. The tort of negligence is also discussed as in exceptional circumstances it may perform the function of an economic tort but it is noted that its rationale is different from the economic torts. Unlike negligence, which looks to dependency, the economic torts look to unlawful acts and offer the common law rules of the economic game. The policy issue for all these torts is whether the courts, in the absence of an action for unfair competition, should adopt an interventionist or abstentionist policy in relation to imposing liability.

This chapter explores the history and ingredients of the tort of malicious falsehood. It would appear that the tort though developed from a group of related torts should now be viewed as unified in principle and application. The key ingredient is malice and the chapter explores the different meanings of this concept, though noting that the typical case will involve denigration or disparagement. This tort is of limited use and is largely overshadowed by statutory provisions relating to ‘threats’ and comparative advertising. The important issue of free speech has shaped this tort and confined its application is also debated. Finally, the relationship of this tort to the unlawful means tort and the torts of defamation and passing off is analysed.

This chapter explores the history and ingredients of this tort. The limited application of the tort of deceit to any allegation centred on unfair competition is assessed (given it is a two-party tort) as is the fact that it is largely overshadowed by liability for negligent misstatement. However, despite this classic view of the tort, the chapter also explores how liability related to the tort may have a role to play in a three-party scenario. So lies told to third parties may constitute the unlawful means in the unlawful means tort and ‘fraud’ may be the focus of liability in two actions related to the tort of deceit: the action for bribery of an agent and the action for dishonest assistance.