David J. Chalmers and Tim Bayne
- Published in print:
- 2010
- Published Online:
- January 2011
- ISBN:
- 9780195311105
- eISBN:
- 9780199870851
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195311105.003.0014
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind
This chapter addresses another Kantian topic: the unity of consciousness. It looks at certain arguments that have been made against the unity of consciousness to determine whether they are good ...
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This chapter addresses another Kantian topic: the unity of consciousness. It looks at certain arguments that have been made against the unity of consciousness to determine whether they are good arguments against the unity thesis as we understand it. After fleshing out the unity thesis further, it applies the thesis to certain currently popular philosophical theories of consciousness, arguing that the thesis is incompatible with these theories: if the unity thesis is true, then these theories are false. The goal is not to conclusively prove the unity thesis, and indeed it is not certain that it is true. But it is suggested at least that the thesis is plausible, that it captures a strong intuition about the nature of consciousness, and that there are no knockdown arguments against it. If the thesis is true, it is likely to have important consequences for a theory of consciousness.Less
This chapter addresses another Kantian topic: the unity of consciousness. It looks at certain arguments that have been made against the unity of consciousness to determine whether they are good arguments against the unity thesis as we understand it. After fleshing out the unity thesis further, it applies the thesis to certain currently popular philosophical theories of consciousness, arguing that the thesis is incompatible with these theories: if the unity thesis is true, then these theories are false. The goal is not to conclusively prove the unity thesis, and indeed it is not certain that it is true. But it is suggested at least that the thesis is plausible, that it captures a strong intuition about the nature of consciousness, and that there are no knockdown arguments against it. If the thesis is true, it is likely to have important consequences for a theory of consciousness.
Tim Bayne
- Published in print:
- 2010
- Published Online:
- January 2011
- ISBN:
- 9780199215386
- eISBN:
- 9780191594786
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199215386.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind, General
One of the features of consciousness that has been largely overlooked in recent treatments of the topic is its unity. What is the unity of consciousness? To what degree might consciousness be ...
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One of the features of consciousness that has been largely overlooked in recent treatments of the topic is its unity. What is the unity of consciousness? To what degree might consciousness be unified? And what implications might the unity of consciousness have for our conception of consciousness and the self? Drawing on philosophy, psychology and neuroscience, this book presents answers to these questions. The first part of the book develops a conception of the unity of consciousness according to which a subject has a unified conscious if and only if it has a single conscious state that subsumes each and every one of its conscious states. This conception of the unity of consciousness gives rise to the unity thesis—the claim that consciousness in human beings is necessarily unified. The second part of the volume examines the plausibility of the unity thesis. The book develops a model for evaluating the unity thesis and then goes on to apply this model to a wide range of syndromes—such as anosognosia, the hidden observer in hypnosis, and the split‐brain syndrome—in which the unity of consciousness is often said to breakdown. In each case the evidence in favour of disunity models is found wanting. The final third of the volume examines points of contact between the unity of consciousness on the one hand and theories of theories of consciousness, the sense of embodiment, and accounts of the self on the other.Less
One of the features of consciousness that has been largely overlooked in recent treatments of the topic is its unity. What is the unity of consciousness? To what degree might consciousness be unified? And what implications might the unity of consciousness have for our conception of consciousness and the self? Drawing on philosophy, psychology and neuroscience, this book presents answers to these questions. The first part of the book develops a conception of the unity of consciousness according to which a subject has a unified conscious if and only if it has a single conscious state that subsumes each and every one of its conscious states. This conception of the unity of consciousness gives rise to the unity thesis—the claim that consciousness in human beings is necessarily unified. The second part of the volume examines the plausibility of the unity thesis. The book develops a model for evaluating the unity thesis and then goes on to apply this model to a wide range of syndromes—such as anosognosia, the hidden observer in hypnosis, and the split‐brain syndrome—in which the unity of consciousness is often said to breakdown. In each case the evidence in favour of disunity models is found wanting. The final third of the volume examines points of contact between the unity of consciousness on the one hand and theories of theories of consciousness, the sense of embodiment, and accounts of the self on the other.
Tim Bayne
- Published in print:
- 2010
- Published Online:
- January 2011
- ISBN:
- 9780199215386
- eISBN:
- 9780191594786
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199215386.003.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind, General
There are many things that might be meant by ‘the unity of consciousness.’ According to some conceptions of the unity of consciousness the claim that consciousness is necessarily unified is clearly ...
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There are many things that might be meant by ‘the unity of consciousness.’ According to some conceptions of the unity of consciousness the claim that consciousness is necessarily unified is clearly implausible; according to others the claim that consciousness is necessarily unified is well‐night trivial. The main business of this chapter is to identify a conception of the unity of consciousness according to which the claim that consciousness is necessarily unified is substantive, plausible, and of some interest. The conception of the unity of consciousness that is advanced holds that what it is for a subject of experience to have a unified consciousness is for each of their conscious states to be phenomenally unified with each other. This conception of the unity of consciousness gives rise to the unity thesis, according to which any conscious creature must have a unified consciousness.Less
There are many things that might be meant by ‘the unity of consciousness.’ According to some conceptions of the unity of consciousness the claim that consciousness is necessarily unified is clearly implausible; according to others the claim that consciousness is necessarily unified is well‐night trivial. The main business of this chapter is to identify a conception of the unity of consciousness according to which the claim that consciousness is necessarily unified is substantive, plausible, and of some interest. The conception of the unity of consciousness that is advanced holds that what it is for a subject of experience to have a unified consciousness is for each of their conscious states to be phenomenally unified with each other. This conception of the unity of consciousness gives rise to the unity thesis, according to which any conscious creature must have a unified consciousness.
Tim Bayne
- Published in print:
- 2010
- Published Online:
- January 2011
- ISBN:
- 9780199215386
- eISBN:
- 9780191594786
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199215386.003.0004
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind, General
This chapter defends an argument for the unity thesis the centrepiece of which is the introspectively based claim to the effect that all of one's current experiences are unified. This claim is dubbed ...
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This chapter defends an argument for the unity thesis the centrepiece of which is the introspectively based claim to the effect that all of one's current experiences are unified. This claim is dubbed the unity judgment. The first half of the chapter defends the tenability of the unity judgment in the face of three objections: that introspection is unreliable, that it cannot take introspectively inaccessible experiences into account, and that there need be no subject contrast between phenomenal unity on the one hand and phenomenal disunity on the other. The second half of this chapter examines two gaps between the unity judgment and the unity thesis, and argues that both gaps can be plugged.Less
This chapter defends an argument for the unity thesis the centrepiece of which is the introspectively based claim to the effect that all of one's current experiences are unified. This claim is dubbed the unity judgment. The first half of the chapter defends the tenability of the unity judgment in the face of three objections: that introspection is unreliable, that it cannot take introspectively inaccessible experiences into account, and that there need be no subject contrast between phenomenal unity on the one hand and phenomenal disunity on the other. The second half of this chapter examines two gaps between the unity judgment and the unity thesis, and argues that both gaps can be plugged.
Robert B. Louden
- Published in print:
- 2007
- Published Online:
- September 2007
- ISBN:
- 9780195321371
- eISBN:
- 9780199869787
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195321371.003.0002
- Subject:
- Philosophy, History of Philosophy
This chapter seeks to challenge the myth of the antireligious Enlightenment by presenting an account of Enlightenment religiosity, an account anchored by three core ideas shared by a wide number of ...
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This chapter seeks to challenge the myth of the antireligious Enlightenment by presenting an account of Enlightenment religiosity, an account anchored by three core ideas shared by a wide number of Enlightenment intellectuals from different countries. These include the unity thesis, morality thesis, and toleration.Less
This chapter seeks to challenge the myth of the antireligious Enlightenment by presenting an account of Enlightenment religiosity, an account anchored by three core ideas shared by a wide number of Enlightenment intellectuals from different countries. These include the unity thesis, morality thesis, and toleration.
Robert B. Louden
- Published in print:
- 2007
- Published Online:
- September 2007
- ISBN:
- 9780195321371
- eISBN:
- 9780199869787
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195321371.003.0007
- Subject:
- Philosophy, History of Philosophy
This chapter examines the shape of contemporary religiosity with respect to the three identifying characteristics of Enlightenment religiosity: the unity thesis, the morality thesis, and toleration. ...
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This chapter examines the shape of contemporary religiosity with respect to the three identifying characteristics of Enlightenment religiosity: the unity thesis, the morality thesis, and toleration. These observations and comments are then used to support the claim that the spirit of Enlightenment religiosity, suitably tempered by two hundred years' hindsight, has much to offer us.Less
This chapter examines the shape of contemporary religiosity with respect to the three identifying characteristics of Enlightenment religiosity: the unity thesis, the morality thesis, and toleration. These observations and comments are then used to support the claim that the spirit of Enlightenment religiosity, suitably tempered by two hundred years' hindsight, has much to offer us.
Tim Bayne
- Published in print:
- 2010
- Published Online:
- January 2011
- ISBN:
- 9780199215386
- eISBN:
- 9780191594786
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199215386.003.0010
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind, General
This chapter explores ways in which the unity of consciousness might constrain theories of consciousness. A distinction is made between two broad accounts of consciousness: atomistic accounts, ...
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This chapter explores ways in which the unity of consciousness might constrain theories of consciousness. A distinction is made between two broad accounts of consciousness: atomistic accounts, according to which the phenomenal field is built up out of independent phenomenal states, and holistic accounts, according to which the phenomenal field is the basic unit of consciousness. This chapter argues that the unity of consciousness supports holistic approaches to consciousness in favour of atomistic approaches. Feature binding and inter-modal integration put pressure on certain radical forms of atomism, while the unity thesis puts pressure on the atomistic approach more generally. In place of atomism it is argued that consciousness is fundamentally holistic, and that the unity of consciousness is ensured by the very mechanisms that generate consciousness in the first place. Drawing on Tononi's notion of the ‘dynamic core,’ a model of consciousness is sketched that aims to capture its ‘unity in multiplicity.’Less
This chapter explores ways in which the unity of consciousness might constrain theories of consciousness. A distinction is made between two broad accounts of consciousness: atomistic accounts, according to which the phenomenal field is built up out of independent phenomenal states, and holistic accounts, according to which the phenomenal field is the basic unit of consciousness. This chapter argues that the unity of consciousness supports holistic approaches to consciousness in favour of atomistic approaches. Feature binding and inter-modal integration put pressure on certain radical forms of atomism, while the unity thesis puts pressure on the atomistic approach more generally. In place of atomism it is argued that consciousness is fundamentally holistic, and that the unity of consciousness is ensured by the very mechanisms that generate consciousness in the first place. Drawing on Tononi's notion of the ‘dynamic core,’ a model of consciousness is sketched that aims to capture its ‘unity in multiplicity.’
Terence Irwin
- Published in print:
- 1995
- Published Online:
- November 2003
- ISBN:
- 9780195086454
- eISBN:
- 9780199833306
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0195086457.003.0006
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Ancient Philosophy
Chapter 6 offers a detailed analysis of the Protagoras conceived as the first dialogue in which Plato starts to reflect on the failure of the early dialogues and to provide definitive solutions to ...
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Chapter 6 offers a detailed analysis of the Protagoras conceived as the first dialogue in which Plato starts to reflect on the failure of the early dialogues and to provide definitive solutions to moral problems. Although the dialogue is labelled as aporetic, one part of it--the discussion of hedonism--is considered dialectal. How the hedonism of the Protagoras tries to be an advancement of the one of the early dialogues is examined. Then the two theories of virtues are presented: the “unity thesis” and the “reciprocity thesis.” The former holds that all the virtues are the same, while the latter holds that all the virtues imply each other. Finally, it is emphasised that despite their differences, Plato does not dismiss any of the views.Less
Chapter 6 offers a detailed analysis of the Protagoras conceived as the first dialogue in which Plato starts to reflect on the failure of the early dialogues and to provide definitive solutions to moral problems. Although the dialogue is labelled as aporetic, one part of it--the discussion of hedonism--is considered dialectal. How the hedonism of the Protagoras tries to be an advancement of the one of the early dialogues is examined. Then the two theories of virtues are presented: the “unity thesis” and the “reciprocity thesis.” The former holds that all the virtues are the same, while the latter holds that all the virtues imply each other. Finally, it is emphasised that despite their differences, Plato does not dismiss any of the views.
Micheal Slote
- Published in print:
- 2011
- Published Online:
- January 2012
- ISBN:
- 9780199790821
- eISBN:
- 9780199919185
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199790821.003.0004
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Moral Philosophy
There are at least four main views about the structure of the virtues. Aristotle holds that the virtues are a unity and that perfection is possible; Peter Geach claims that they don't form a unity, ...
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There are at least four main views about the structure of the virtues. Aristotle holds that the virtues are a unity and that perfection is possible; Peter Geach claims that they don't form a unity, but that they are mutually compatible and allow for perfection; A. D. M. Walker says that the virtues neither form a unity nor are mutually compatible, but appears to hold, nonetheless, that perfect virtue is possible; and Isaiah Berlin and I think that the virtues aren't a unity and that they conflict in ways that make perfect virtue impossible. Berlin's views and my own stand diametrically opposed to Aristotle's in this ethical spectrum. But it is also important to see that the examples that were used to support our view aren't open to certain obvious objections. One can’t, for example, ensure the possibility of perfection by assigning conflicting goods or virtues to different periods of life or by making it (too) easy to possess them.Less
There are at least four main views about the structure of the virtues. Aristotle holds that the virtues are a unity and that perfection is possible; Peter Geach claims that they don't form a unity, but that they are mutually compatible and allow for perfection; A. D. M. Walker says that the virtues neither form a unity nor are mutually compatible, but appears to hold, nonetheless, that perfect virtue is possible; and Isaiah Berlin and I think that the virtues aren't a unity and that they conflict in ways that make perfect virtue impossible. Berlin's views and my own stand diametrically opposed to Aristotle's in this ethical spectrum. But it is also important to see that the examples that were used to support our view aren't open to certain obvious objections. One can’t, for example, ensure the possibility of perfection by assigning conflicting goods or virtues to different periods of life or by making it (too) easy to possess them.
Gopal Sreenivasan
- Published in print:
- 2020
- Published Online:
- May 2021
- ISBN:
- 9780691134550
- eISBN:
- 9780691208701
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Princeton University Press
- DOI:
- 10.23943/princeton/9780691134550.003.0004
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Moral Philosophy
This chapter contains the argument against the unity of the virtues, which presupposes that the virtues are not unified and vindicates anti-imperialism about virtue. It describes the unity of the ...
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This chapter contains the argument against the unity of the virtues, which presupposes that the virtues are not unified and vindicates anti-imperialism about virtue. It describes the unity of the virtues that was more or less universally affirmed in ancient ethics and notes that the dominant tendency in contemporary moral philosophy is to reject it. It also sketches a position on the interrelation of the virtues that avoids the falsity of the unity thesis, while still salvaging some of its more attractive aspects. The chapter focuses on the thesis that one cannot have one virtue without having all of the others. It elaborates that if there is any one virtue that a person lacks, then it follows that this person does not have any of the other virtues.Less
This chapter contains the argument against the unity of the virtues, which presupposes that the virtues are not unified and vindicates anti-imperialism about virtue. It describes the unity of the virtues that was more or less universally affirmed in ancient ethics and notes that the dominant tendency in contemporary moral philosophy is to reject it. It also sketches a position on the interrelation of the virtues that avoids the falsity of the unity thesis, while still salvaging some of its more attractive aspects. The chapter focuses on the thesis that one cannot have one virtue without having all of the others. It elaborates that if there is any one virtue that a person lacks, then it follows that this person does not have any of the other virtues.
Micheal Slote
- Published in print:
- 2011
- Published Online:
- January 2012
- ISBN:
- 9780199790821
- eISBN:
- 9780199919185
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199790821.003.0003
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Moral Philosophy
This chapter homes in on Aristotle and recent Aristotelianism, which have mainly assumed that the virtues are unified, that in order to have one virtue one must have them all. What can be said about ...
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This chapter homes in on Aristotle and recent Aristotelianism, which have mainly assumed that the virtues are unified, that in order to have one virtue one must have them all. What can be said about partial values and the inevitability of imperfection stands diametrically opposed to the Aristotelian picture of human good and virtue, and our examples—together with the complexities and richness of modern life that they illustrate—offer us some reason to finally reject the simpler Aristotelian ethical picture. The notion of partial values on which so much in the more complex account depends also turns out to have interesting parallels in what Freud said about “partial instincts” and what Hartry Field has more recently said about “partial signification.”Less
This chapter homes in on Aristotle and recent Aristotelianism, which have mainly assumed that the virtues are unified, that in order to have one virtue one must have them all. What can be said about partial values and the inevitability of imperfection stands diametrically opposed to the Aristotelian picture of human good and virtue, and our examples—together with the complexities and richness of modern life that they illustrate—offer us some reason to finally reject the simpler Aristotelian ethical picture. The notion of partial values on which so much in the more complex account depends also turns out to have interesting parallels in what Freud said about “partial instincts” and what Hartry Field has more recently said about “partial signification.”