Phillip Cary
- Published in print:
- 2008
- Published Online:
- May 2008
- ISBN:
- 9780195336481
- eISBN:
- 9780199868438
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195336481.003.0001
- Subject:
- Religion, Theology
To bring the conceptual structure of Augustine's doctrine of grace into focus one must avoid several common strategies for minimizing his Platonism, such as assuming that no philosophy or religion ...
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To bring the conceptual structure of Augustine's doctrine of grace into focus one must avoid several common strategies for minimizing his Platonism, such as assuming that no philosophy or religion other than Christianity could have a concept of divine grace (which is false); treating faith as deeper and more ultimate than understanding (which is the opposite of Augustine's view); separating intellect from love or head from heart (which Augustine never does); and attributing to Platonism the view that happiness can be achieved by unaided human effort (which is quite contrary to Platonism's ontology of participation in the Good).Less
To bring the conceptual structure of Augustine's doctrine of grace into focus one must avoid several common strategies for minimizing his Platonism, such as assuming that no philosophy or religion other than Christianity could have a concept of divine grace (which is false); treating faith as deeper and more ultimate than understanding (which is the opposite of Augustine's view); separating intellect from love or head from heart (which Augustine never does); and attributing to Platonism the view that happiness can be achieved by unaided human effort (which is quite contrary to Platonism's ontology of participation in the Good).
Garry Hagberg
- Published in print:
- 2008
- Published Online:
- September 2008
- ISBN:
- 9780199234226
- eISBN:
- 9780191715440
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199234226.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind, Philosophy of Language
The voluminous writings of Ludwig Wittgenstein contain some of the most profound reflections of our time on the nature of the human subject and self-understanding — the human condition, ...
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The voluminous writings of Ludwig Wittgenstein contain some of the most profound reflections of our time on the nature of the human subject and self-understanding — the human condition, philosophically speaking. This book mimes those extensive writings for a conception of the self. And more specifically, the book offers a discussion of Wittgenstein's later writings on language and mind as they hold special significance for the understanding and clarification of the distinctive character of self-descriptive or autobiographical language. The book also undertakes a philosophical investigation of selected autobiographical writings — among the best examples we have of human selves exploring themselves — as they cast new and special light on the critique of mind-body dualism and its undercurrents in particular, and on the nature of autobiographical consciousness more generally. The chapters take up in turn the topics of self-consciousness, what Wittgenstein calls ‘the inner picture’; mental privacy and the picture of metaphysical seclusion; the very idea of our observation of the contents of consciousness; first-person expressive speech; reflexive or self-directed thought and competing pictures of introspection; the nuances of retrospective self-understanding, person-perception, and the corollary issues of self-perception (itself an interestingly dangerous phrase); self-defining memory; and the therapeutic conception of philosophical progress as it applies to all of these issues. The cast of characters interwoven throughout the discussion include, in addition to Wittgenstein centrally, Augustine, Goethe, Dostoevsky, Kierkegaard, Iris Murdoch, Donald Davidson, and Stanley Cavell, among others.Less
The voluminous writings of Ludwig Wittgenstein contain some of the most profound reflections of our time on the nature of the human subject and self-understanding — the human condition, philosophically speaking. This book mimes those extensive writings for a conception of the self. And more specifically, the book offers a discussion of Wittgenstein's later writings on language and mind as they hold special significance for the understanding and clarification of the distinctive character of self-descriptive or autobiographical language. The book also undertakes a philosophical investigation of selected autobiographical writings — among the best examples we have of human selves exploring themselves — as they cast new and special light on the critique of mind-body dualism and its undercurrents in particular, and on the nature of autobiographical consciousness more generally. The chapters take up in turn the topics of self-consciousness, what Wittgenstein calls ‘the inner picture’; mental privacy and the picture of metaphysical seclusion; the very idea of our observation of the contents of consciousness; first-person expressive speech; reflexive or self-directed thought and competing pictures of introspection; the nuances of retrospective self-understanding, person-perception, and the corollary issues of self-perception (itself an interestingly dangerous phrase); self-defining memory; and the therapeutic conception of philosophical progress as it applies to all of these issues. The cast of characters interwoven throughout the discussion include, in addition to Wittgenstein centrally, Augustine, Goethe, Dostoevsky, Kierkegaard, Iris Murdoch, Donald Davidson, and Stanley Cavell, among others.
Christopher Peacocke
- Published in print:
- 2008
- Published Online:
- May 2008
- ISBN:
- 9780199239443
- eISBN:
- 9780191717000
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199239443.003.0010
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind
This concluding chapter presents a synthesis of discussions in the preceding chapters. Among these are that fundamental reference rules for concepts can provide a substantive account of ...
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This concluding chapter presents a synthesis of discussions in the preceding chapters. Among these are that fundamental reference rules for concepts can provide a substantive account of understanding. They can support a realistic treatment of truth and reference, and can do so in a way that is superior to justificationist, pragmatist, and pure conceptual-role theories of content. Current issues in philosophy and its adjacent cognitive sciences that require a substantive theory of sense for its resolution are presented.Less
This concluding chapter presents a synthesis of discussions in the preceding chapters. Among these are that fundamental reference rules for concepts can provide a substantive account of understanding. They can support a realistic treatment of truth and reference, and can do so in a way that is superior to justificationist, pragmatist, and pure conceptual-role theories of content. Current issues in philosophy and its adjacent cognitive sciences that require a substantive theory of sense for its resolution are presented.
Daniel Schwartz
- Published in print:
- 2007
- Published Online:
- May 2008
- ISBN:
- 9780199205394
- eISBN:
- 9780191709265
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199205394.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Ancient Philosophy
This book examines the views on friendship of the great medieval philosopher Thomas Aquinas. For Aquinas, friendship is the ideal type of relationship that rational beings should cultivate. The book ...
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This book examines the views on friendship of the great medieval philosopher Thomas Aquinas. For Aquinas, friendship is the ideal type of relationship that rational beings should cultivate. The book argues that Aquinas fundamentally revised some of the main features of Aristotle's paradigmatic account of friendship so as to accommodate the case of friendship between radically unequal beings: man and God. As a result, Aquinas presented a broader view of friendship than Aristotle's, allowing for a higher extent of disagreement, lack of mutual understanding, and inequality between friends.Less
This book examines the views on friendship of the great medieval philosopher Thomas Aquinas. For Aquinas, friendship is the ideal type of relationship that rational beings should cultivate. The book argues that Aquinas fundamentally revised some of the main features of Aristotle's paradigmatic account of friendship so as to accommodate the case of friendship between radically unequal beings: man and God. As a result, Aquinas presented a broader view of friendship than Aristotle's, allowing for a higher extent of disagreement, lack of mutual understanding, and inequality between friends.
G. E. R. Lloyd
- Published in print:
- 2012
- Published Online:
- September 2012
- ISBN:
- 9780199654727
- eISBN:
- 9780191742088
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199654727.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, History of Philosophy, Ancient Philosophy
This book explores the variety of ideas and assumptions that humans have entertained concerning three main topics, first being, or what there is, secondly humanity – what makes a human being a human ...
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This book explores the variety of ideas and assumptions that humans have entertained concerning three main topics, first being, or what there is, secondly humanity – what makes a human being a human – and thirdly understanding, namely both of the world and of one another. Amazingly diverse views have been held on these issues by different individuals and collectivities in both ancient and modern times. The aim is to juxtapose the evidence available from ethnography and from the study of ancient societies, both to describe that diversity and to investigate the problems it poses. Many of the ideas in question are deeply puzzling, even paradoxical, to the point where they have often been described as irrational or frankly unintelligible. Many implicate fundamental moral issues and value judgements, where again we may seem to be faced with an impossible task in attempting to arrive at a fair-minded evaluation. How far does it seem that we are all the prisoners of the conceptual systems of the collectivities to which we happen to belong? To what extent and in what circumstances is it possible to challenge the basic concepts of such systems? This study examines these questions cross‐culturally and seeks to draw out the implications for the revisability of some of our habitual assumptions concerning such topics as ontology, morality, nature, relativism, incommensurability, the philosophy of language, and the pragmatics of communication.Less
This book explores the variety of ideas and assumptions that humans have entertained concerning three main topics, first being, or what there is, secondly humanity – what makes a human being a human – and thirdly understanding, namely both of the world and of one another. Amazingly diverse views have been held on these issues by different individuals and collectivities in both ancient and modern times. The aim is to juxtapose the evidence available from ethnography and from the study of ancient societies, both to describe that diversity and to investigate the problems it poses. Many of the ideas in question are deeply puzzling, even paradoxical, to the point where they have often been described as irrational or frankly unintelligible. Many implicate fundamental moral issues and value judgements, where again we may seem to be faced with an impossible task in attempting to arrive at a fair-minded evaluation. How far does it seem that we are all the prisoners of the conceptual systems of the collectivities to which we happen to belong? To what extent and in what circumstances is it possible to challenge the basic concepts of such systems? This study examines these questions cross‐culturally and seeks to draw out the implications for the revisability of some of our habitual assumptions concerning such topics as ontology, morality, nature, relativism, incommensurability, the philosophy of language, and the pragmatics of communication.
Alison Hills
- Published in print:
- 2010
- Published Online:
- September 2010
- ISBN:
- 9780199213306
- eISBN:
- 9780191594212
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199213306.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Moral Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology
The Beloved Self is about the ‘holy grail’ of moral philosophy: an argument against Egoism, that we all have reasons to be moral. The first part of the book introduces three versions of ...
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The Beloved Self is about the ‘holy grail’ of moral philosophy: an argument against Egoism, that we all have reasons to be moral. The first part of the book introduces three versions of Egoism, each paralleling a different moral theory, and sheds new light on the concept of self-interest in virtue ethics and especially in Kant's moral theory. Part Two looks at attempts to prove that Egoism is false, and shows that even modest arguments against Egoist appear to fail. Part Three discusses the relationship between knowledge and action and defends a new conception of moral epistemology, centred on the importance of moral understanding, which has wide-ranging implications regarding not only moral testimony and moral disagreement but also the nature of virtue and morally worthy action. This final part of the book culminates in a vindication of morality, an argument that it is not epistemically rational to believe the most plausible versions of Egoism.Less
The Beloved Self is about the ‘holy grail’ of moral philosophy: an argument against Egoism, that we all have reasons to be moral. The first part of the book introduces three versions of Egoism, each paralleling a different moral theory, and sheds new light on the concept of self-interest in virtue ethics and especially in Kant's moral theory. Part Two looks at attempts to prove that Egoism is false, and shows that even modest arguments against Egoist appear to fail. Part Three discusses the relationship between knowledge and action and defends a new conception of moral epistemology, centred on the importance of moral understanding, which has wide-ranging implications regarding not only moral testimony and moral disagreement but also the nature of virtue and morally worthy action. This final part of the book culminates in a vindication of morality, an argument that it is not epistemically rational to believe the most plausible versions of Egoism.
Duncan Pritchard, Alan Millar, and Adrian Haddock
- Published in print:
- 2010
- Published Online:
- September 2010
- ISBN:
- 9780199586264
- eISBN:
- 9780191723360
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199586264.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology, General
The three parts of the book comprise three distinct investigations under a common theme: enquiry into inter-relationships between issues about the nature of knowledge and issues about the value of ...
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The three parts of the book comprise three distinct investigations under a common theme: enquiry into inter-relationships between issues about the nature of knowledge and issues about the value of knowledge. The first investigation provides an analysis of problems concerning the value of knowledge and a critical examination of responses to these by virtue epistemologists. The book finds virtue-theoretic accounts wanting and argues that there is a cognitive state — understanding — which is similar to, but different from knowledge, and which has final value. In the second investigation the book presents accounts of perceptual knowledge, knowledge from indicator phenomena, and knowledge from testimony, in each of which recognitional abilities feature prominently. Consideration of these abilities, the book claims, enables us to reach a better understanding of knowledge and its value. The third investigation focuses on the relationship between perceptual knowledge and knowledge of our own intentional actions. The book argues for an account of knowledge and justification to which a certain kind of second-order knowledge is central and applies this both to perceptual knowledge, and knowledge of our own intentional actions, with a view to explaining ways in which knowledge is of value.Less
The three parts of the book comprise three distinct investigations under a common theme: enquiry into inter-relationships between issues about the nature of knowledge and issues about the value of knowledge. The first investigation provides an analysis of problems concerning the value of knowledge and a critical examination of responses to these by virtue epistemologists. The book finds virtue-theoretic accounts wanting and argues that there is a cognitive state — understanding — which is similar to, but different from knowledge, and which has final value. In the second investigation the book presents accounts of perceptual knowledge, knowledge from indicator phenomena, and knowledge from testimony, in each of which recognitional abilities feature prominently. Consideration of these abilities, the book claims, enables us to reach a better understanding of knowledge and its value. The third investigation focuses on the relationship between perceptual knowledge and knowledge of our own intentional actions. The book argues for an account of knowledge and justification to which a certain kind of second-order knowledge is central and applies this both to perceptual knowledge, and knowledge of our own intentional actions, with a view to explaining ways in which knowledge is of value.
Talbot Brewer
- Published in print:
- 2009
- Published Online:
- May 2009
- ISBN:
- 9780199557882
- eISBN:
- 9780191720918
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199557882.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Moral Philosophy
The virtue ethics movement in recent philosophical ethics can usefully be divided into two quite separate streams of thought. Some have turned to the texts of Plato and Aristotle for new answers to ...
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The virtue ethics movement in recent philosophical ethics can usefully be divided into two quite separate streams of thought. Some have turned to the texts of Plato and Aristotle for new answers to established questions in philosophical ethics, while others have sought a vantage point from which the basic questions of the field could themselves be put in question. The aim of this book is to elaborate and defend a version of the second, more radical sort of virtue ethics. The book begins with a fundamental reconsideration of the way in which thought makes itself practical in temporally extended activities and lives. This reconsideration yields an alternative picture of the self — a picture with recognizably Aristotelian and Platonic elements — and puts that picture to work in retrieving an unfamiliar conception of the proper task of philosophical ethics, one that provides a suitable home for retrieving the virtue concepts. The critical bite of the book is directed in the first instance at ideas that are prevalent among philosophers. Yet there is reason to think that these philosophical ideas express a conception of the self that shapes contemporary Western culture, and that hinders our capacity to make full sense of our activities, passions, and lives, or to attain full articulacy about the values to which we might hope to answer. The book argues that the rise of the fact/value distinction and of the characteristically modern distinction between person‐relative and impersonal goods are best understood as a story of encroaching confusion and not as the story of progressive discovery that they are often taken to be. The book culminates in an attempt to show that the ethical and epistemic virtues conduce to a single, monistic sort of goodness that fosters intimate relationships as well as healthy political community, and that overcomes the putative opposition between self‐interest and morality.Less
The virtue ethics movement in recent philosophical ethics can usefully be divided into two quite separate streams of thought. Some have turned to the texts of Plato and Aristotle for new answers to established questions in philosophical ethics, while others have sought a vantage point from which the basic questions of the field could themselves be put in question. The aim of this book is to elaborate and defend a version of the second, more radical sort of virtue ethics. The book begins with a fundamental reconsideration of the way in which thought makes itself practical in temporally extended activities and lives. This reconsideration yields an alternative picture of the self — a picture with recognizably Aristotelian and Platonic elements — and puts that picture to work in retrieving an unfamiliar conception of the proper task of philosophical ethics, one that provides a suitable home for retrieving the virtue concepts. The critical bite of the book is directed in the first instance at ideas that are prevalent among philosophers. Yet there is reason to think that these philosophical ideas express a conception of the self that shapes contemporary Western culture, and that hinders our capacity to make full sense of our activities, passions, and lives, or to attain full articulacy about the values to which we might hope to answer. The book argues that the rise of the fact/value distinction and of the characteristically modern distinction between person‐relative and impersonal goods are best understood as a story of encroaching confusion and not as the story of progressive discovery that they are often taken to be. The book culminates in an attempt to show that the ethical and epistemic virtues conduce to a single, monistic sort of goodness that fosters intimate relationships as well as healthy political community, and that overcomes the putative opposition between self‐interest and morality.
Andrew Stewart Skinner
- Published in print:
- 1996
- Published Online:
- October 2011
- ISBN:
- 9780198233343
- eISBN:
- 9780191678974
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198233343.001.0001
- Subject:
- Economics and Finance, Economic History
The second edition of this guide to Adam Smith's system of thought has been fully updated to reflect recent developments in Smith scholarship and the author's experience of teaching Smith to a ...
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The second edition of this guide to Adam Smith's system of thought has been fully updated to reflect recent developments in Smith scholarship and the author's experience of teaching Smith to a student audience. The material from the first edition has been extensively rewritten, and four new chapters have been added, covering Smith's essays on the exercise of human understanding, and his relationship to Francis Hutcheson, David Hume, and Sir James Steuart. The book places Smith's system of social, and moral, science firmly within the context of contemporary British and Continental intellectual history, dealing in particular detail with the founders of the Scottish Enlightenment and with the French Physiocrats. The essays explore Smith's own reception among his peers and successors. The chapters in this volume have been developed from a lecture course on ‘The Age and Ideas of Adam Smith’, taught to senior undergraduate and graduate students in political economy.Less
The second edition of this guide to Adam Smith's system of thought has been fully updated to reflect recent developments in Smith scholarship and the author's experience of teaching Smith to a student audience. The material from the first edition has been extensively rewritten, and four new chapters have been added, covering Smith's essays on the exercise of human understanding, and his relationship to Francis Hutcheson, David Hume, and Sir James Steuart. The book places Smith's system of social, and moral, science firmly within the context of contemporary British and Continental intellectual history, dealing in particular detail with the founders of the Scottish Enlightenment and with the French Physiocrats. The essays explore Smith's own reception among his peers and successors. The chapters in this volume have been developed from a lecture course on ‘The Age and Ideas of Adam Smith’, taught to senior undergraduate and graduate students in political economy.
Robert J. Fogelin
- Published in print:
- 2009
- Published Online:
- September 2009
- ISBN:
- 9780195387391
- eISBN:
- 9780199866489
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195387391.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, History of Philosophy
This work is a narrative study of the interactions between Hume's naturalism and his skepticism as they unfold in the Treatise of Human Nature and the Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding. More ...
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This work is a narrative study of the interactions between Hume's naturalism and his skepticism as they unfold in the Treatise of Human Nature and the Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding. More specifically, it examines the way in which the relationship between Hume's naturalism and skepticism shifts dramatically as he delves more deeply into the operations of the human understanding. At first, Hume's skeptical arguments largely play a subservient role of eliminating intellectualist competitors to his naturalistic account of belief formation. This is true, with one minor exception, in the first three parts of book 1 of the Treatise. The situation changes radically in part 4 of book 1, where Hume's investigation of human faculties reveals them to be capricious and unreliable. Hume finds the situation so dire that he comes to question whether anyone, himself included, possesses mental faculties capable of producing a science of human nature. This is Hume's skeptical crisis. The remainder of the book examines Hume's various efforts to extract himself from this difficulty, ending, in the Enquiry, with the claim that a suitable mitigated, or moderate, form of skepticism can arise by bringing radical Pyrrhonian doubts into a proper balance with common instinctive beliefs.Less
This work is a narrative study of the interactions between Hume's naturalism and his skepticism as they unfold in the Treatise of Human Nature and the Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding. More specifically, it examines the way in which the relationship between Hume's naturalism and skepticism shifts dramatically as he delves more deeply into the operations of the human understanding. At first, Hume's skeptical arguments largely play a subservient role of eliminating intellectualist competitors to his naturalistic account of belief formation. This is true, with one minor exception, in the first three parts of book 1 of the Treatise. The situation changes radically in part 4 of book 1, where Hume's investigation of human faculties reveals them to be capricious and unreliable. Hume finds the situation so dire that he comes to question whether anyone, himself included, possesses mental faculties capable of producing a science of human nature. This is Hume's skeptical crisis. The remainder of the book examines Hume's various efforts to extract himself from this difficulty, ending, in the Enquiry, with the claim that a suitable mitigated, or moderate, form of skepticism can arise by bringing radical Pyrrhonian doubts into a proper balance with common instinctive beliefs.
Alison Hills
- Published in print:
- 2010
- Published Online:
- September 2010
- ISBN:
- 9780199213306
- eISBN:
- 9780191594212
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199213306.003.0012
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Moral Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology
Common sense morality is in a better epistemic position than Egoism, for those who accept common sense morality can modestly vindicate it – they can defend it to their own satisfaction – whereas most ...
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Common sense morality is in a better epistemic position than Egoism, for those who accept common sense morality can modestly vindicate it – they can defend it to their own satisfaction – whereas most Egoists cannot defend Egoism, even modestly. The key to this defence of morality is the importance of moral understanding. What are the implications of recognizing that the focus of moral epistemology should be moral understanding rather than moral knowledge? Moral philosophers already act as if they are aiming for moral understanding, but there are many unanswered questions about moral understanding that need to be addressed in the future.Less
Common sense morality is in a better epistemic position than Egoism, for those who accept common sense morality can modestly vindicate it – they can defend it to their own satisfaction – whereas most Egoists cannot defend Egoism, even modestly. The key to this defence of morality is the importance of moral understanding. What are the implications of recognizing that the focus of moral epistemology should be moral understanding rather than moral knowledge? Moral philosophers already act as if they are aiming for moral understanding, but there are many unanswered questions about moral understanding that need to be addressed in the future.
Frank Palmer
- Published in print:
- 1992
- Published Online:
- October 2011
- ISBN:
- 9780198242321
- eISBN:
- 9780191680441
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198242321.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Aesthetics, Moral Philosophy
Recent philosophical discussion about the relation between fiction and reality pays little heed to our moral involvement with literature. This book investigates how our appreciation of literary works ...
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Recent philosophical discussion about the relation between fiction and reality pays little heed to our moral involvement with literature. This book investigates how our appreciation of literary works calls upon and develops our capacity for moral understanding. The book explores a wide range of philosophical questions about the relation of art to morality, and challenges theories which the book regards as incompatible with a humane view of literary art. The book considers, in particular, the extent to which the values and moral concepts involved in our understanding of human beings can be said to enter into our understanding of, and response to, fictional characters. The scope of this discussion encompasses literary aesthetics, ethics, and epistemology, and extensive use is made of reference to literary examples.Less
Recent philosophical discussion about the relation between fiction and reality pays little heed to our moral involvement with literature. This book investigates how our appreciation of literary works calls upon and develops our capacity for moral understanding. The book explores a wide range of philosophical questions about the relation of art to morality, and challenges theories which the book regards as incompatible with a humane view of literary art. The book considers, in particular, the extent to which the values and moral concepts involved in our understanding of human beings can be said to enter into our understanding of, and response to, fictional characters. The scope of this discussion encompasses literary aesthetics, ethics, and epistemology, and extensive use is made of reference to literary examples.
C. D. C. Reeve
- Published in print:
- 1995
- Published Online:
- October 2011
- ISBN:
- 9780198235651
- eISBN:
- 9780191679094
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198235651.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Ancient Philosophy, Moral Philosophy
This book provides an exploration of the epistemological, metaphysical, and psychological foundations of the Nicomachean Ethics. Rejecting current orthodoxy, this book argues that ...
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This book provides an exploration of the epistemological, metaphysical, and psychological foundations of the Nicomachean Ethics. Rejecting current orthodoxy, this book argues that scientific-knowledge (episteme) is possible in ethics, that dialectic and understanding (nous) play essentially the same role in ethics as in an Aristotelian science, and that the distinctive role of practical wisdom (phronēsis) is to use the knowledge of universals provided by science, dialectic, and understanding so as best to promote happiness (eudaimonia) in particular circumstances and to ensure a happy life. Turning to happiness itself, the book develops a new account of Aristotle's views on ends and functions, exposing their twofold nature. It argues that the activation of theoretical wisdom is primary happiness, and that the activation of practical wisdom — when it is for the sake of primary happiness — is happiness of a second kind. He concludes with an account of the virtues of character, external goods, and friends, and their place in the happy life.Less
This book provides an exploration of the epistemological, metaphysical, and psychological foundations of the Nicomachean Ethics. Rejecting current orthodoxy, this book argues that scientific-knowledge (episteme) is possible in ethics, that dialectic and understanding (nous) play essentially the same role in ethics as in an Aristotelian science, and that the distinctive role of practical wisdom (phronēsis) is to use the knowledge of universals provided by science, dialectic, and understanding so as best to promote happiness (eudaimonia) in particular circumstances and to ensure a happy life. Turning to happiness itself, the book develops a new account of Aristotle's views on ends and functions, exposing their twofold nature. It argues that the activation of theoretical wisdom is primary happiness, and that the activation of practical wisdom — when it is for the sake of primary happiness — is happiness of a second kind. He concludes with an account of the virtues of character, external goods, and friends, and their place in the happy life.
Alan Bailey
- Published in print:
- 2002
- Published Online:
- October 2011
- ISBN:
- 9780198238522
- eISBN:
- 9780191679667
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198238522.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Ancient Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology
This book offers an exposition and defence of the philosophy of Sextus Empiricus, one of the most influential of ancient thinkers, the father of philosophical scepticism. The subsequent sceptical ...
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This book offers an exposition and defence of the philosophy of Sextus Empiricus, one of the most influential of ancient thinkers, the father of philosophical scepticism. The subsequent sceptical tradition in philosophy has not done justice to Sextus: his views stand up today as remarkably insightful, offering a fruitful way to approach issues of knowledge, understanding, belief, and rationality. It is widely supposed that any form of scepticism that arrives at a global denial of the availability of rationally justified beliefs is self-refuting and unliveable. The author shows that the former objection can be disarmed by distinguishing between the mature Pyrrhonean sceptic's assessment of his negative epistemological arguments and the assessment forced upon his philosophical opponents by their own rationalistic code. The latter objection overlooks the role Sextus allocates to beliefs that are necessitated by the Pyrrhonist's psychological and biological constitution.Less
This book offers an exposition and defence of the philosophy of Sextus Empiricus, one of the most influential of ancient thinkers, the father of philosophical scepticism. The subsequent sceptical tradition in philosophy has not done justice to Sextus: his views stand up today as remarkably insightful, offering a fruitful way to approach issues of knowledge, understanding, belief, and rationality. It is widely supposed that any form of scepticism that arrives at a global denial of the availability of rationally justified beliefs is self-refuting and unliveable. The author shows that the former objection can be disarmed by distinguishing between the mature Pyrrhonean sceptic's assessment of his negative epistemological arguments and the assessment forced upon his philosophical opponents by their own rationalistic code. The latter objection overlooks the role Sextus allocates to beliefs that are necessitated by the Pyrrhonist's psychological and biological constitution.
Hubert Schwyzer
- Published in print:
- 1990
- Published Online:
- October 2011
- ISBN:
- 9780198248293
- eISBN:
- 9780191681110
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198248293.003.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, History of Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology
This chapter discusses an introduction to Kant and is views on understanding. The chapter also provides an outline of Kant's account of the nature of understanding, which includes being autonomous, ...
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This chapter discusses an introduction to Kant and is views on understanding. The chapter also provides an outline of Kant's account of the nature of understanding, which includes being autonomous, spontaneous, and expressible. The purposes of the book are also provided in this chapter.Less
This chapter discusses an introduction to Kant and is views on understanding. The chapter also provides an outline of Kant's account of the nature of understanding, which includes being autonomous, spontaneous, and expressible. The purposes of the book are also provided in this chapter.
Nikolas Rose and Joelle M. Abi-Rached
- Published in print:
- 2013
- Published Online:
- October 2017
- ISBN:
- 9780691149608
- eISBN:
- 9781400846337
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Princeton University Press
- DOI:
- 10.23943/princeton/9780691149608.003.0008
- Subject:
- Neuroscience, Development
This chapter explores the neurobiological self. It argues that the emerging neuroscientific understandings of selfhood are unlikely to efface modern human beings' understanding of themselves as ...
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This chapter explores the neurobiological self. It argues that the emerging neuroscientific understandings of selfhood are unlikely to efface modern human beings' understanding of themselves as persons equipped with a deep interior world of mental states that have a causal relation to their action. Rather, they are likely to add a neurobiological dimension to human beings' self-understanding and their practices of self-management. In this sense, the “somatic individuality” which was once the province of the psy- sciences, is spreading to the neuro- sciences. Yet psy is not being displaced by neuro: neurobiological conceptions of the self are being construed alongside psychological ones.Less
This chapter explores the neurobiological self. It argues that the emerging neuroscientific understandings of selfhood are unlikely to efface modern human beings' understanding of themselves as persons equipped with a deep interior world of mental states that have a causal relation to their action. Rather, they are likely to add a neurobiological dimension to human beings' self-understanding and their practices of self-management. In this sense, the “somatic individuality” which was once the province of the psy- sciences, is spreading to the neuro- sciences. Yet psy is not being displaced by neuro: neurobiological conceptions of the self are being construed alongside psychological ones.
Hubert Schwyzer
- Published in print:
- 1990
- Published Online:
- October 2011
- ISBN:
- 9780198248293
- eISBN:
- 9780191681110
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198248293.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, History of Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology
This book is about Kant's account of human understanding, of our capacity to form concepts of, and to be conscious of, things in the world. It argues that the conditions which Kant lays down for ...
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This book is about Kant's account of human understanding, of our capacity to form concepts of, and to be conscious of, things in the world. It argues that the conditions which Kant lays down for understanding — conditions about the autonomy of thought, and about the relation of concepts to objects and of language to experience — cannot be satisfied within his overall picture of understanding as ‘representing something to oneself.’ The argument proceeds through a discussion of the nature of concept-possession and the relation of concepts to objects, to what it is to be conscious of anything, and what it is to follow a rule. Wittgenstein's insights on these issues have a direct bearing on Kant's problems. If Kant's conditions are to be satisfied, understanding must be seen, not as a capacity for mental representation, for having ideas, but as a capacity for action.Less
This book is about Kant's account of human understanding, of our capacity to form concepts of, and to be conscious of, things in the world. It argues that the conditions which Kant lays down for understanding — conditions about the autonomy of thought, and about the relation of concepts to objects and of language to experience — cannot be satisfied within his overall picture of understanding as ‘representing something to oneself.’ The argument proceeds through a discussion of the nature of concept-possession and the relation of concepts to objects, to what it is to be conscious of anything, and what it is to follow a rule. Wittgenstein's insights on these issues have a direct bearing on Kant's problems. If Kant's conditions are to be satisfied, understanding must be seen, not as a capacity for mental representation, for having ideas, but as a capacity for action.
Robert W. Batterman
- Published in print:
- 2001
- Published Online:
- November 2003
- ISBN:
- 9780195146479
- eISBN:
- 9780199833078
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0195146476.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Science
This book focuses on a form of reasoning in science that I call “asymptotic reasoning.” At base, this type of reasoning involves methods that eliminate details and, in some sense, precision. ...
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This book focuses on a form of reasoning in science that I call “asymptotic reasoning.” At base, this type of reasoning involves methods that eliminate details and, in some sense, precision. Asymptotic reasoning has received systematic treatment in physics and applied mathematics, but virtually no attention has been paid to it by philosophers of science. I argue that once one understands the role played by asymptotic reasoning in explanatory arguments of scientists, our philosophical conceptions of explanation, reduction, and emergence require significant modification.Less
This book focuses on a form of reasoning in science that I call “asymptotic reasoning.” At base, this type of reasoning involves methods that eliminate details and, in some sense, precision. Asymptotic reasoning has received systematic treatment in physics and applied mathematics, but virtually no attention has been paid to it by philosophers of science. I argue that once one understands the role played by asymptotic reasoning in explanatory arguments of scientists, our philosophical conceptions of explanation, reduction, and emergence require significant modification.
Jerrold Levinson
- Published in print:
- 2006
- Published Online:
- January 2007
- ISBN:
- 9780199206179
- eISBN:
- 9780191709982
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199206179.003.0012
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Aesthetics
This essay, which begins with a commentary on Wittgenstein's scattered remarks on musical understanding, poses the question of whether there is a distinctive, non-verbal form of thinking that music, ...
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This essay, which begins with a commentary on Wittgenstein's scattered remarks on musical understanding, poses the question of whether there is a distinctive, non-verbal form of thinking that music, or alternatively, the composing or performing of music, might be said to exemplify. A positive answer is returned, and three candidates for such distinctively ‘musical’ thinking are sketched. These are illustrated with a number of musical examples, most notably, Beethoven's ‘Tempest’ Sonata and Stan Getz's rendition of ‘The Girl from Ipanema’.Less
This essay, which begins with a commentary on Wittgenstein's scattered remarks on musical understanding, poses the question of whether there is a distinctive, non-verbal form of thinking that music, or alternatively, the composing or performing of music, might be said to exemplify. A positive answer is returned, and three candidates for such distinctively ‘musical’ thinking are sketched. These are illustrated with a number of musical examples, most notably, Beethoven's ‘Tempest’ Sonata and Stan Getz's rendition of ‘The Girl from Ipanema’.
Jan Olof Bengtsson
- Published in print:
- 2006
- Published Online:
- January 2007
- ISBN:
- 9780199297191
- eISBN:
- 9780191711374
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199297191.003.0003
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Religion
This chapter begins a thematic exposition of the emerging worldview of personalism, drawing on representative thinkers from the whole of the period covered. It focuses on the central epistemological ...
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This chapter begins a thematic exposition of the emerging worldview of personalism, drawing on representative thinkers from the whole of the period covered. It focuses on the central epistemological aspects of the personalist criticism of modern rationalism, absolute idealism, and pantheism, and on the personalist alternative’s reinterpretation of the concept of the subject in terms of the concept of the person.Less
This chapter begins a thematic exposition of the emerging worldview of personalism, drawing on representative thinkers from the whole of the period covered. It focuses on the central epistemological aspects of the personalist criticism of modern rationalism, absolute idealism, and pantheism, and on the personalist alternative’s reinterpretation of the concept of the subject in terms of the concept of the person.
