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This chapter discusses the concepts of indistinguishability, individuality, and non-individuality in the quantum context. It is argued that the above view of particles as non-individuals is not a necessary consequence of the physics, and that quantum particles can be taken to be individuals, subject to certain constraints. However, the sense of individuality here cannot be understood in terms of the Identity of Indiscernibles, since on a standard interpretation of quantum theory, Leibniz’s Principle is violated by both fermions and bosons. Criticisms of this argument are reviewed, as is Saunders’ recent attempt to defend a Quinean form of the Principle. The consequences of regarding quantum particles as individuals are considered in detail, and Teller’s account of entanglement in terms of non-supervenient relations is developed in this context. The conclusion is reached that quantum physics supports two alternative metaphysical packages of individuality and non-individuality, yielding a stronger form of underdetermination, which can be used to support a form of structuralism.

This chapter argues that if the universe is governed by laws of nature, then particular laws of nature cannot be discovered by empirical science unless the meta‐theoretic conception of laws is correct. This gives us a powerful reason to embrace the meta‐theoretic conception. The key argument appeals to underdetermination of theory by evidence, but it avoids the pitfalls of familiar underdetermination arguments against realism. Several objections to the argument are considered, including one based on Bayesianism, one based on inference to the best explanation (IBE), one based on contextualist epistemology, and one that alleges that the only way to avoid inductive skepticism is to adopt an epistemology of science that allows for the discovery of laws of nature in spite of radical underdetermination of the laws by the available evidence. All these objections are found wanting.

This chapter responds to some further arguments against analyticity, including the Regress Argument, arguments based on the widespread phenomenon of vagueness, arguments from semantic externalism and scepticism about meaning and arguments based on individual sentences, such as ‘all cats are animals’ and ‘gold is yellow’.

This chapter examines the arguments van Fraassen gives for constructive empiricism. Van Fraassen is often presented as giving some version of the argument from underdetermination: the argument which holds that since theories always have empirically equivalent rivals, empirical evidence can never adjudicate between a theory and its rivals, and hence belief in any theory is unfounded. It is argued that van Fraassen does not give any version of the argument from underdetermination, and that the argument from underdetermination is incompatible with van Fraassen's epistemological views.

This chapter shows that the sceptical empiricist argument, and by extension any argument like it, fails. It considers the concept of evidence, endorsing Williamson's view that all and only knowledge is evidence, (E=K). In particular, it considers the alternative view that only observational knowledge is evidence. Bas van Fraassen's constructive empiricism is then studied. Some commentators employ a caricature of constructive empiricism that takes the same argument. In fact, van Fraassen is careful to distance himself from scepticism about theories and to take constructive empiricism to be a view about the aim of science. It is argued that van Fraassen ought to be committed to the sceptical conclusion, and that constructive empiricism is implicitly committed to the above argument.

This chapter focuses on the question whether the standard closure-based sceptical argument requires the assumption of a second epistemic principle, an ‘underdetermination principle’, which could drive a sceptical argument that does not require closure. The question is raised: Is the underdetermination principle equivalent to closure?

This chapter begins by addressing the question: what is scientific realism? It then considers the most influential arguments for and against scientific realism. The arguments for are the ‘success argument’ and related explanationist arguments. The arguments against are the ‘underdetermination argument’, which starts from the claim that theories always have empirically equivalent rivals; and the ‘pessimistic meta-induction’, which starts from a bleak view of the accuracy of past scientific theories.

This chapter defends commonsense realism from the underdetermination theses of extreme skepticism. If true, these would count against nearly all our knowledge and hence undermine realism about the observable world. The traditional responses to these theses rest on a priori knowledge. The chapter rejects a priori knowledge, but even if there were such knowledge, these traditional responses tend to involve bizarre metaphysics and to be otherwise unsatisfactory. Instead, it offers a Moorean response: realism is much more firmly based than the epistemological theses that are thought to undermine it. The Moorean response is supported by a naturalistic one that appeals to scientific practice. Rather than proceeding form an a priori epistemology to an a priori metaphysics, we should proceed from an empirical metaphysics to an empirical epistemology. We should put metaphysics first.

This chapter argues for scientific realism. Scientific realism is primarily a metaphysical doctrine about the existence and nature of the unobservables of science. There are good explanationist arguments for realism, most famously that from the success of science, provided abduction is allowed. Abduction seems to be on an equal footing, at least, with other ampliative methods of inference. One argument against realism is the argument from underdetermination. It starts from the claim that any theory faces many empirically equivalent rivals. Once we note the role of auxiliary hypotheses in testing theories, and our ability to create evidence in novel experiments, the argument collapses. Another argument against realism is the pessimistic meta-induction argument. The key defense against this is that, over recent centuries, methodological changes have greatly improved our capacity to understand the unobservable world.

Takes up the question of the indeterminacy of interpretation, according to which there is no unique correct interpretation theory for another speaker. Argues that indeterminacy cannot be made sense of from the standpoint of the radical interpreter, and that Davidson’s analogy between measurement theory and interpretation breaks down when applied to the interpreter’s own language.

I maintain that the neo-Moorean response to scepticism is unable, by itself at any rate, to completely resolve the sceptical problem. The reason for this is that the contemporary discussion of scepticism has misunderstood what the source of this problem is, and thus even the most plausible of the main anti-sceptical theories in the literature misses its intended target. To illustrate this, I contrast the closure-based template sceptical argument with its analogue argument expressed in terms of the ‘underdetermination’ principle that can be found in ancient Pyrrhonian sceptical writings, and which merely demands that one’s evidence should favour one’s beliefs over incompatible alternatives. I show how the latter argument brings to the fore just what is wrong with the contemporary debate regarding scepticism, which is its failure to respond to the specifically internalist and evidentialist character of the sceptical doubt.

The problem of underdetermination involves the questions: (1) Can incompatible total theories have the same testable questions? (2) If so, could there ever be a reason to choose between them? This essay develops an approach to this problem. It argues that there are many instances of underdetermination for which inductivism is inadequate. In such cases, it may be known which, or if any, of the incompatible theories is true without appealing to the positivistic doctrine of analytic bridge statements. The problem of underdetermination can be solved even if the observation/theory is discarded.

This chapter discusses the achievements of W. V. O. Quine and his place in analytic philosophy. It begins with Carnap’s logical empiricism, which set the context for Quine’s first major article in philosophy, “Truth by Convention” (1935). It explains both Quine’s largely effective critique of analyticity and the problems that plagued his combination of holistic verificationism with an underdetermination thesis that paired each consistent empirical theory T with alternative theories logically incompatible with, but empirically equivalent to, T. It discusses the impetus for Quine’s movement from his critique of analyticity to his later doctrines of the Indeterminacy of Translation and the Inscrutability of Reference. The chapter closes with an explication of these radical doctrines, the role played by Quine’s physicalism, and his ineluctable march to a so-called radical and self-undermining semantic eliminativism.

This chapter reveals a more nuanced way to conceive of the radical skeptical paradox—one that makes no essential appeal to a closure-style principle for knowledge. It discusses the skeptical challenge presented by, on the one hand, underdetermination_RK/rational ground-based radical skepticism and, on the other hand, closure_RK-based radical skepticism. Then, in light of these general reflections about these two forms of radical skeptical challenge, the chapter sets out what, both minimally and ideally, we would want from an intellectually satisfying response to the problem of radical skepticism, where this is a response to this problem that deals with both kinds of skeptical challenge.

This chapter demonstrates that epistemological disjunctivism represents a viable theoretical option when it comes to our understanding of perceptual knowledge. It also shows that this proposal has direct application to the underdetermination_RK-based radical skeptical paradox. In particular, epistemological disjunctivism rejects the new evil demon intuition and the insularity of reasons thesis that underlies it, and hence is in a position to deny one of the claims that makes up this paradox. Moreover, epistemological disjunctivism can also lay claim to being an undercutting anti-skeptical proposal. Finally, the chapter discusses how epistemological disjunctivism is able to trade on the general epistemological distinction that has been drawn between favoring and discriminating epistemic support.

This chapter explains that the Achilles' heel of epistemological disjunctivism as an anti-skeptical strategy lies in the response that it offers to the closure_RK-based radical skeptical paradox. In particular, whereas the epistemological disjunctivist's claim that one can possess a rational grounding for one's everyday beliefs that favors those beliefs over radical skeptical alternatives is well motivated, such that epistemological disjunctivism can evade the problem posed by underdetermination_RK-based radical skepticism, a stronger epistemological thesis is required to deal with closure_RK-based radical skepticism, and this thesis is not well motivated. In particular, what is required is the idea that one can have rationally grounded knowledge of the denials of radical skeptical hypotheses, and such a claim appears epistemically immodest in the extreme.

Various underdetermination arguments against selective realism are explored and rebutted. The role of abstraction and idealization in templates is explored. The fact that most computational processes are epistemically opaque is emphasized, and the effect that opacity has on scientific knowledge is explained using the Ising model as an example. Arguments are given for emphasizing mathematical form over logical form in the philosophy of science, and for emphasizing methods applicable in practice over those applicable only in principle.