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Since the early 1990s, the starting point of any discussion of most aspects of child law has invariably been a reference to the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child. One of the few areas in which the Convention is not normally discussed is in relation to the child before birth, for it does not extend its substantive rights to the unborn child. Nevertheless the Convention does recognize, in its Preamble, that ‘the child, by reason of his physical and mental immaturity, needs special safeguards and care, including appropriate legal protection, before as well as after birth’. This chapter explores the special safeguards afforded the unborn child and attempts to identify which forms of legal protection ought appropriately to be extended to such a child within the context of legal systems which accept that, in some circumstances at least, the unborn child may lawfully be aborted. In exploring the protections potentially available to the unborn child, it focuses on only one fact scenario — that of the pregnant drug or alcohol abuser.

This chapter considers the scope of the crime of child destruction, contrary to section 1 of the Infant Life (Preservation) Act 1929. The section punishes the destruction of a child “capable of being born alive”. The chapter considers three competing interpretations of this phrase. The first would protect any unborn child which would be capable after birth of exhibiting any sign of life. The second would protect only viable unborn children. The third would limit protection to the child in the process of delivery. Drawing on the parliamentary debates and contemporary Home Office materials, the chapter suggests that the middle interpretation is the most plausible. It concludes by raising the question, in the light of the relaxation of the law by the Abortion Act 1967 and the Human Fertilisation and Embryology Act 1990, whether the law, by attaching moral significance to viability and birth, is ethically defensible.

This chapter explores and evaluates the idea that a pregnant woman should be the subject of legal regulation in order to protect the welfare of her unborn child. The concept of ‘maternal–foetal conflict’ has to date dominated legal discussion of maternal conduct which poses risks to the unborn child. This concept however can be unhelpful and damaging, and is ultimately unable to reflect the subtle ethical issues raised by pregnancy and the role of the medical profession in monitoring and intervening in pregnancy and childbirth. The main focus of this discussion is the impact that the Human Rights Act 1998 may have on the current legal approach to situations in which the present and future welfare of the foetus is endangered as a result of the conduct of the pregnant woman. It is suggested that human rights jurisprudence may be better able to reflect the complexity of decision-making in pregnancy, and turn the spotlight away from the notion of conflict.

The genesis of this chapter was the decision of the Court of Appeal in St George’s Healthcare NHS Trust v. S; R. v. Collins and Others, ex parte S. The decision under consideration here highlights a number of classic debates in medical ethics: autonomy versus paternalism, consequentialism versus deontological absolutism, and the nature of personhood. The particular factual context was that of refusal of medical and surgical treatment by a woman in a late state of pregnancy, but the decision is of a wider significance. The decision is concerned primarily with the power of the patient against the medical profession, rather than any conflict between mother and unborn child. This interpretation is based on three particular aspects of the judgment: the absolute nature of the autonomy right as framed by the Court of Appeal and its contextualization as a necessary freedom within a democratic society which will brook no erosion; the reasoning technique which denies the foetus the status of personhood, and thus deliberately eschews a conflict of rights analysis; and the issuing by the court of guidelines which are intended, at least procedurally, to tip the balance back in favour of the competent patient in future situations. The decision represents a landmark for patient autonomy generally.

Philippa left Europe after her discovery of the surprise pregnancy. She called her mother's nephew and he gave her a number of someone in California who knew a doctor from Mexico. She flew to the West Coast and spent a restless night in San Diego and the next morning she awoke gripped with apprehension that the Mexican doctor might not help her. Her contact was a Senora Guinar, in Tijuana, and this doctor agreed to carry out the abortion. Afterwards Philippa returned to New York to pick up the pieces of her life and there she met Georges again and told him the story of her unborn child.

This chapter traces the shift in the community conversation from an emphasis on black soldiers who return from fighting overseas and must be defended by white attorneys to the increasing visibility of black lawyers. Crisis magazine coverage notes this shift, and lynching dramas similarly identify the black attorney as a figure embodying the race's faith in truth and justice. The mob's target in A Sunday Morning in the South (of which author Georgia Douglas Johnson wrote white-church and black-church versions) aspires to be a lawyer. In For Unborn Children by Myrtle Smith Livingston, the mob's victim is already an attorney. Placing a spotlight on these men, the scripts preserve community perspectives that are rejected by courts of law and the court of public opinion.

Chapter 1 begins by stressing the severity of climate change (CC) and showing how, contrary to popular belief, atomic energy is not a viable solution to CC. Many scientists and most market proponents agree that renewable energy and energy efficiencies are better options. The chapter also shows that government subsidies for oil and nuclear power are the result of flawed science, poor ethics, short-term thinking, and special-interest influence. The chapter has 7 sections, the first of which surveys four major components of the energy crisis. These are oil addiction, non-CC-related deaths from fossil-fuel pollution, nuclear-weapons proliferation, and catastrophic CC. The second section summarizes some of the powerful evidence for global CC. The third section uses historical, ahistorical, Rawlsian, and utilitarian ethical principles to show how developed nations, especially the US, are most responsible for human-caused CC. The fourth section shows why climate-change skeptics, such as “deniers” who doubt CC is real, and “delayers” who say that it should not yet be addressed, have no valid objections. Instead, they all err scientifically and ethically. The fifth section illustrates that all modern scientific methods—and scientific consensus since at least 1995—confirm the reality of global CC. Essentially all expert-scientific analyses published in refereed, scientific-professional journals confirm the reality of global CC. The sixth section of the chapter shows how fossil-fuel special interests have contributed to the continued CC debate largely by paying non-experts to deny or challenge CC. The seventh section of the chapter provides an outline of each chapter in the book, noting that this book makes use of both scientific and ethical analyses to show why nuclear proponents’ arguments err, why CC deniers are wrong, and how scientific-methodological understanding can advance sound energy policy—including conservation, renewable energy, and energy efficiencies.

This chapter analyzes the marriage of Eugène and Adèle Galles to illustrate a number of ideas about “bourgeois marriage” in nineteenth-century France. Drawing on some 258 letters between Adèle and Eugène and forty-two more from other family members over a span of seven years, it discusses the deep love between the two. It considers the breadth and depth of Eugène’s concern for, involvement in, and knowledge of the life of his unborn child and the ways he connected his love for Adèle with his love for the baby. It also examines Adèle’s role in the family economy and its limits as well as her involvement in public service.

This chapter discusses some interdisciplinary controversies surrounding conception, pregnancy and labour within a broad range of texts and case histories. It focuses on the debates on two issues: the child's inheritance from mother and father, and the effect of the mother's thoughts on the unborn child.