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This introductory chapter provides an overview of the book's main themes. This book examines one peculiar, but apparently quite popular, means by which pro-democrats in ancient Greece facilitated large-scale mobilization in defense of their democracy: the promulgation of tyrant-killing legislation— the promulgation, that is, of laws and decrees that explicitly encouraged individuals to “kill a tyrant.” The Athenians promulgated the earliest known tyrant-killing law—called the decree of Demophantos—in June 410, immediately after the democracy, which had been overthrown in the coup of the Four Hundred, had been reestablished. That decree required all Athenians to swear an oath both to kill “whoever overthrows the democracy at Athens or holds any office while the democracy is overthrown” and to reward anybody who kills such a man.

This concluding chapter provides a simple conceptual framework within which to interpret the long and complex history of tyrant-killing legislation. The framework has two parts. The first focuses on the dynamics of learning and innovation in Athens. The second briefly explores the likely dynamics of learning and adoption outside Athens. Tyrants, ancient as well as modern, fear the collective power of their people perhaps more than anything else. They have accordingly devised and implemented sophisticated practices that work to atomize the population—to prevent the people from doing what they actually want to do. Over 2,400 years ago, however, the Athenians invented a tool—tyrant-killing law—that enabled pro-democrats to draw upon their collective strength and mobilize against nondemocratic regimes despite whatever anti-mobilization practices they might have implemented. And like great technological innovations throughout history, it spread as the citizens of other poleis adopted it in order to gain control of their own political destiny. That helped secure the world's first democratic age.

This chapter explores how Cicero construes, respectively, ‘the good’ (especially his theory of the vir bonus) and ‘the bad’ (especially his notion of immanes naturae and naturally born tyrants)—as well as those who fall in between, i.e. are neither naturally depraved nor endowed with impeccable goodness. For despite his penchant for portraying the world in black and white, Cicero also acknowledged (or was forced to acknowledge) shades of grey in political ethics. The last section of the chapter accordingly focuses on those moments where he forgoes the terms of his bipolar approach; notably, he was unable to fit Caesar into the stark dichotomy of thoroughly good or utterly evil, and the chapter shows how he uses Plato's conception of the tyrant as a great nature perverted to come to terms with the dictator.

In 6th century BC, the advanced Greek city-states were rapidly and pervasively monetized, largely through the introduction of coinage. It has been suggested that this monetization was a crucial factor in the genesis and in the preoccupations both of Presocratic philosophy and of Athenian tragedy. This chapter relates the monetization of Athens first to the development of polis festivals under the tyrants and then to the form and content of tragedy, which came into being in a polis festival of Dionysos.

The philosopher and the tyrant of the Republic seem worlds apart from one another — the one just, ordered, and harmonious; the other lawless, bestial, and wild. And yet they have one thing in common: both are gripped by an obsessive erōs. At various points in book VI, philosophers are described as lovers, whether of learning, truth, or philosophy itself (485b1, 490b1-7, 499c1-2, and 501d2). According to the channel analogy of 485a-487a, their philosophical erōs is like a flow of water directed into a single stream, drying up their other desires for more worldly goods. But the channel argument also applies very well to the tyrant, described not just as lawless, but also as having an erōs that he pursues with complete single-mindedness, an erōs that informs all aspects of his character, dominating his beliefs, desires, and actions. This chapter begins with a description of the tyrant in book IX, focusing on the exact reason why Plato characterizes him in terms of erōs. It then turns to the philosopher and examines passages from the central books of the Republic that help to reveal the strand linking philosophical and tyrannical erōs.

This chapter accounts for the successful mobilization in defense of Athens' democracy. It begins by exploring the collective response by citizens in Athens to the coup of the Four Hundred (411), an experience that taught the Athenians important lessons about mobilization in defense of their democracy. Two significant points emerge from that discussion. First, individuals in Athens did not respond to the coup initially because they had a so-called “revolutionary coordination problem”: many wanted to oppose the coup, but, because of the great risk that that involved, each individual waited for others to act before he did. Second, the conspicuous assassination of Phrynichos, a prominent figure in the regime of the Four Hundred, set in motion a “revolutionary bandwagon” that enabled previously quiescent individuals to mobilize en masse against the regime of the Four Hundred. The chapter then examines the consequence of the fact that all Athenians swore the oath of Demophantos. The final section demonstrates that the successful mobilization against the Thirty Tyrants should be attributed, in part, to the fact that all Athenians swore the oath of Demophantos.

This chapter shows how continual re-interpretation, adaptation of, and addition to the biblical text allowed it to be a repertoire for all seasons. Late biblical texts in Greek guise, especially the book of Daniel, and newer parabiblical texts, like the story of Bel and the great snake (also a Daniel story), or the Epistle of Jeremiah or the Wisdom of Solomon, expressed a response to external political authority. They could be markedly subversive. Twists and subtle modifications intensified themes that were already prominent in places in the Hebrew Bible. Only occasionally can a Hebrew original different from the Masoretic (standard) text be suspected as lying behind the changes. The denunciation of ‘idol’ and ‘idol worship’ had new force and point when linked with the vanity of rulers in a period in which manifestations of the imperial cult impinged on everyone. Representations of tyrannical rage united motifs taken from Greek political philosophy with those of oriental wisdom literature. They stood in sharp contrast to the justified wrath of the God of Israel.

This chapter examines Pericles' impact on Athenian democracy, and more specifically whether the stratēgos was an all-powerful figure or an evanescent one, and how his actions interacted with the will of the people. It begins with a discussion of what was perceived by his opponents as Pericles' link to the tyrants of Athens. It then explores Pericles' role in the great building projects that included monuments, along with the ways that comic poetry fulfilled a function of social control over the members of the Athenian elite. It suggests that the notion of a Periclean monarchy is just a myth. Far from ruling Athens as a monarch, Pericles, the “great man,” lived constantly under tension in a context in which the power of the dēmos was relentlessly increasing.

This chapter defends the following thesis: the promulgation of the Eretrian tyrant-killing law played an important role in defending Eretria's newly reinstated democratic regime against internal subversion during the years immediately following the Athenian led liberation of 341. The arguments in support of that thesis are presented in three sections. The first section argues that the Eretrian pro-democrats quite likely would have lost control of their polis shortly after the Athenian-led liberation, if no serious attempt were made to facilitate their efforts to mobilize in defense of their regime (i.e., to solve a revolutionary coordination problem). Next, it argues that, by promulgating their tyrant-killing law, the Eretrian democrats greatly increased the likelihood that they would successfully mobilize in defense of their regime (i.e., overcome a potential revolutionary coordination problem) and thus likely would have deterred anti-democrats from attempting a coup. The final section argues that the Eretrian democrats maintained secure control of their polis, under very difficult circumstances, for several years after they promulgated their tyrant-killing law.

In the spring (or summer) of 336 an Athenian named Eukrates successfully proposed a law against tyranny and subversion of the Athenian democracy. Eukrates's law has two peculiar aspects. The first is the date of its promulgation: the ninth prytany in the archonship of Phrynichos (spring/summer 336). The second is its focus on the council of the Areopagos. This chapter has two related objectives, each of which addresses one of the two aforementioned peculiar aspects of Eukrates' tyrant-killing law. The first is to identify the tyrannical threat that the Athenians faced in the spring of 336. It shows that the nature of the threat largely accounts for the fact that Eukrates proposed his law later than one might have expected. The second objective is to explain how the promulgation of Eukrates' law would neutralize the tyrannical threat that confronted the Athenians. The law's sharp focus on the council of the Areopagos played an important role, but so too did the process by which Eukrates's law was ratified and the placement of the two stelai upon which it was inscribed.

The earliest extant inscriptions from Eresos record punitive actions taken by the Eresian dēmos against tyrants and their descendants. This chapter argues that the “anti-tyranny dossier” documents Eresos's transition from an unstable, nondemocratically governed polis to a stable polis governed by an authoritative dēmos. The argument is presented in three parts. The first part interprets the actions recorded in the first two texts of the dossier. Therein, it argues that Alexander ordered the Eresians to try the two tyrants in order to establish the pro-democrats' threat credibility and thus stabilize the new democratic regime. The second part interprets the actions recorded in the third, fourth, and fifth texts. The argument in that section is that the exiles' attempts to return to Eresos were potentially destabilizing because they suggested that exogenous factors (i.e., events outside of Eresos's new unilateral deterrence game set up by the trial) might undermine the dēmos's threat credibility. The third part interprets the action documented in the sixth text. It argues that the pro-democrats, now confident that the kings would not intervene on behalf of tyrants, proactively ended their potentially destabilizing struggle with tyrants by definitively proclaiming the permanent credibility of their threat.

Alexander's conquest of western Asia Minor marked a dramatic turning point in Erythraian politics. For the previous fifty-four consecutive years (386–332) and for seventy-two of the previous eighty years (412–394 and 386–332), oligarchs controlled that polis. By the end of the 330s, however, the democrats were in control. What many Erythraians likely considered to be the natural and immutable political order had been completely upended. This chapter analyzes the Erythraian democrats' efforts to maintain control of their polis in the face of efforts by their anti-democratic opponents to reinstate the pre-Alexander status quo. Based on an analysis of the events referred to in the Philites stele and their likely historical contexts, it argues that the creation and subsequent manipulation of the statue of Philites played an important role in the foundation, contestation, and ultimate securement of the democracy that was established in Erythrai in the wake of Alexander's conquest of western Asia Minor.

This chapter focuses on the Ilian tyrant-killing law. The law is long and complex, its extant portions alone contain roughly twice the number of words as the Eretrian tyrant-killing law and 4.5 times as many words as the law of Eukrates (Ilion: 1,078; Eretria: 534; Eukrates: 227). This chapter first examines the provisions in order to ensure that we know what the Ilian pro-democrats actually promulgated. The second section presents the law's likely historical context. It considers both the circumstances within which the law was promulgated and the nature of tyrannical threat that confronted the Ilians at that time. The third and final section determines whether or not the law was effective.

Essex and his followers’ attitudes to classical and historical scholarship are examined. The relationship between arms and letters was idealized in praise for Essex’s militarism, but the study of Tacitus fostered a parallel obsession with the likely repression of virtue, and the decline of states that failed to reward virtuous conduct. Readings of Tacitus by Sir Henry Savile, Essex’s mentor and translator of Tacitus’s Histories and Agricola, indicate the frameworks employed by the earl to interpret his political problems as manifestations of a state governed by a weak tyrant. Connections between Essex’s rising in 1601 and the fascination of writers and dramatists with medieval baronial revolts are also examined, especially the deposition of Richard II by Henry Bullingbrook. Noble revolts were widely condemned in sixteenth-century literature as liable to result in the deposition of monarchs. These were the frameworks invoked by contemporaries to define and interpret Essex’s rising in 1601.

This chapter argues that the people must assert their necessary, salutary role as the guardian of liberty against predatory oligarchs and tyrants. It suggests that once readers appreciate that one of the most frequently quoted passages in the entire Florentine Histories occurs just a mere few paragraphs after Machiavelli has demonstrated this to be a deeply inaccurate assessment of events, they are encouraged to begin rethinking the entire relationship of words and deeds in that book—a reconsideration which reveals that Machiavelli, perhaps more often than not, seems to undermine his own expressly declared evaluative judgments throughout the entire Histories. The chapter also shows how pleasurable, perplexing, and beguiling the careful reading of Machiavelli's political writings can be.

Rarely does the subject of power and abusive power come up for open discussion in social service environments and yet it is a critical component of any organizational setting. As communication breaks down, errors compound and the situation feels increasingly out of control, organizational leaders become more controlling and authoritarian. Under these circumstances, workplace bullying is likely to increase at all levels and organizations may become vulnerable to petty tyrants. As the organization becomes more hierarchical and autocratic there is a progressive and simultaneous isolation of leaders and a “dumbing down” of staff, with an accompanying “learned helplessness” and loss of critical thinking skills. The organization and the individuals in it become highly risk-avoidant. Efforts to empower workers may pay only lip service to true participatory processes. Although the importance of organizational democracy has long been recognized, true efforts to implement workplace democracy have often become forms of bogus empowerment and bullies are given license to intimidate other people.