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The chapter explicates some significant implications of egalitarian Zionism's advantages over its Zionist and post-Zionist rivals. It also identifies some additional important advantages of egalitarian Zionism. Some of these advantages pertain to the historiography of pre-Zionist Judaism. Others relate to the historiography of Zionism itself. The chapter addresses an internal Zionist accusation commonly made against the supporters of the two-state solution of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict based on the 1967 borders, namely that this solution is inconsistent with Zionist ideology. It is argued that this is the only solution to the conflict consistent with egalitarian Zionism, although, of course, it is not consistent with proprietary Zionism. The chapter then discusses a major advantage of egalitarian Zionism pertaining to the future course of the Jewish/Palestinian conflict. It concerns the stability of the possible end-state solutions to this conflict that Zionists and post-Zionists can offer.

Chapter 4 argues that diplomatic and demographic challenges are almost as dangerous to Israel’s future as military threats. Efforts to isolate and delegitimize Israel and constrain its freedom of military action have had mixed success. Israel has broader ties than ever, sanctions and boycotts have achieved little, and it continues to act militarily. Nevertheless, Israel’s international standing has deteriorated severely, and the nature and outcome of military operations have been affected. No issue has undermined Israel’s standing more than the settlement policy. Inexorable demographic trends, stemming from the control of the West Bank, threaten Israel’s Jewish and democratic character. Already today only a small majority of Israel and the West Bank are Jewish. Ongoing settlement undermines the viability of the “two-state solution” and the point of no return may be nearing. Demography also explains Israel’s reluctance to conduct ground maneuver, undermining its ability to achieve military decision.

This chapter tries to take stock of half a century of activism by the dovish left. The peace camp promised peace but has failed to deliver it. Many Israelis no longer believe it is possible to undo everything that the various governments, right and left alike, have done in terms of building settlements. An analysis of the trajectory of the peace camp since the 1960s shows “however” a more nuanced picture. Peace movements did help to change attitudes. They can take credit for eroding the systematic hostility toward recognizing the Palestinian aspiration to nationhood and bringing around the most moderate Israelis, those unhappy with maintaining the status quo, to the idea of the two-state solution. Recognition of Palestinian nationhood became a reality. The majority of Israelis have come around to supporting the two-state solution. Another achievement to put on the dovish left's scorecard: many Israelis wanted to take charge of their future, “to do something concrete,” and to make themselves useful without waiting for policymakers to get around to reaching a peace agreement. In these respects, the Israeli peace camp has quite a respectable track record.