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This chapter begins with extended summary of the main arguments of this book, especially that Israel has missed or refused a number of opportunities to settle the Arab-Israeli conflict. Almost all the wars could have been avoided if Israel had agreed to fair compromises. The second half of this chapter examines possible solutions to the conflict, arguing that the standard two-state solution is dead. Various proposed alternatives, such as a binational single Israeli-Palestine state, are either impractical or undesirable. A mini-Palestinian state is proposed—a “Luxembourg solution”—and the reasons that it could prove acceptable to both sides are examined. If Israel refuses, the United States should employ both pressures and incentives to overcome its opposition. The national interest of the United States in the Middle East is reviewed, in the past and today. The pros and cons of offering Israel a formal mutual defense treaty in the context of a political settlement with the Palestinians are explored.

The chapter explicates some significant implications of egalitarian Zionism's advantages over its Zionist and post-Zionist rivals. It also identifies some additional important advantages of egalitarian Zionism. Some of these advantages pertain to the historiography of pre-Zionist Judaism. Others relate to the historiography of Zionism itself. The chapter addresses an internal Zionist accusation commonly made against the supporters of the two-state solution of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict based on the 1967 borders, namely that this solution is inconsistent with Zionist ideology. It is argued that this is the only solution to the conflict consistent with egalitarian Zionism, although, of course, it is not consistent with proprietary Zionism. The chapter then discusses a major advantage of egalitarian Zionism pertaining to the future course of the Jewish/Palestinian conflict. It concerns the stability of the possible end-state solutions to this conflict that Zionists and post-Zionists can offer.

Chapter 4 argues that diplomatic and demographic challenges are almost as dangerous to Israel’s future as military threats. Efforts to isolate and delegitimize Israel and constrain its freedom of military action have had mixed success. Israel has broader ties than ever, sanctions and boycotts have achieved little, and it continues to act militarily. Nevertheless, Israel’s international standing has deteriorated severely, and the nature and outcome of military operations have been affected. No issue has undermined Israel’s standing more than the settlement policy. Inexorable demographic trends, stemming from the control of the West Bank, threaten Israel’s Jewish and democratic character. Already today only a small majority of Israel and the West Bank are Jewish. Ongoing settlement undermines the viability of the “two-state solution” and the point of no return may be nearing. Demography also explains Israel’s reluctance to conduct ground maneuver, undermining its ability to achieve military decision.

This chapter tries to take stock of half a century of activism by the dovish left. The peace camp promised peace but has failed to deliver it. Many Israelis no longer believe it is possible to undo everything that the various governments, right and left alike, have done in terms of building settlements. An analysis of the trajectory of the peace camp since the 1960s shows “however” a more nuanced picture. Peace movements did help to change attitudes. They can take credit for eroding the systematic hostility toward recognizing the Palestinian aspiration to nationhood and bringing around the most moderate Israelis, those unhappy with maintaining the status quo, to the idea of the two-state solution. Recognition of Palestinian nationhood became a reality. The majority of Israelis have come around to supporting the two-state solution. Another achievement to put on the dovish left's scorecard: many Israelis wanted to take charge of their future, “to do something concrete,” and to make themselves useful without waiting for policymakers to get around to reaching a peace agreement. In these respects, the Israeli peace camp has quite a respectable track record.

The 1947 UN partition plan divided Palestine into Jewish and Arab states, with Jerusalem designated as an international city. The Zionist leaders “accepted” the plan, but only as a temporary tactic, until Israel could later expand and take over all of historical Palestine. The Palestinians rejected the plan, unwilling to compromise their claim to Palestine and aware of the Zionist expansionist plans. American policies toward the creation of a Jewish state in Palestine were mixed. Roosevelt was sympathetic to Zionist goals, but he was unwilling to jeopardize US ties to the Arab states in the Middle East, especially because of their control of oil vital to the US economy. Similarly, Truman was advised by the State and Defense Departments that it was against the national interests for the United States to support the creation of Israel, but for reasons of both morality and domestic politics, he overrode them.