David J. Chalmers
- Published in print:
- 2010
- Published Online:
- January 2011
- ISBN:
- 9780195311105
- eISBN:
- 9780199870851
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195311105.003.0006
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind
This chapter is mainly devoted to the conceivability argument against materialism, viewed through the lens of the two-dimensional semantic framework. The key issue is whether conceivability entails ...
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This chapter is mainly devoted to the conceivability argument against materialism, viewed through the lens of the two-dimensional semantic framework. The key issue is whether conceivability entails metaphysical possibility. The key opponent is the type-B materialist, who denies the entailment. Many objections and putative counterexamples to the conceivability-possibility thesis have been mooted: the chapter discusses fifteen or so putative counterexamples, along with ten or so objections of other sorts to the conceivability argument. It also sketches a positive grounding for the sort of modal rationalism that drives the conceivability argument.Less
This chapter is mainly devoted to the conceivability argument against materialism, viewed through the lens of the two-dimensional semantic framework. The key issue is whether conceivability entails metaphysical possibility. The key opponent is the type-B materialist, who denies the entailment. Many objections and putative counterexamples to the conceivability-possibility thesis have been mooted: the chapter discusses fifteen or so putative counterexamples, along with ten or so objections of other sorts to the conceivability argument. It also sketches a positive grounding for the sort of modal rationalism that drives the conceivability argument.
