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THE PROPERTY THEORY, TWIN EARTH, AND BELIEF ABOUT KINDS

Neil Feit

in Belief about the Self: A Defense of the Property Theory of Content

Published in print:
2008
Published Online:
September 2008
ISBN:
9780195341362
eISBN:
9780199866922
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195341362.003.0007
Subject:
Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind

This chapter considers Twin Earth cases of the sort introduced by Hilary Putnam. The goal is to present a collection of answers to various metaphysical and semantic questions raised by these cases. ... More


The Internal and the External

Katalin Farkas

in The Subject's Point of View

Published in print:
2008
Published Online:
January 2009
ISBN:
9780199230327
eISBN:
9780191710629
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199230327.003.0004
Subject:
Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind

This chapter introduces the Twin Earth argument for externalism about content. A precise definition of the external/internal distinction is sought by focusing on the relation between the twin ... More


Reference and Intention

Wayne A. Davis

in Nondescriptive Meaning and Reference: An Ideational Semantics

Published in print:
2005
Published Online:
February 2006
ISBN:
9780199261659
eISBN:
9780191603099
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/0199261652.003.0008
Subject:
Philosophy, Philosophy of Language

This chapter shows that the intentionalist definition of reference presented in chapter 7 is superior to alternative analyses. It defends the implication that speakers can refer to non-existent ... More


Externalist Cases and Internalist Theory

Joseph Mendola

in Anti-Externalism

Published in print:
2008
Published Online:
January 2009
ISBN:
9780199534999
eISBN:
9780191715969
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199534999.003.0002
Subject:
Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind, Metaphysics/Epistemology

The dominant roots of externalism are the Twin Earth and Elm-Beech cases of Hilary Putnam, the Arthritis case of Tyler Burge, and the Feynman-Gell-Mann, Gödel-Schmidt, and Aristotle cases of Saul ... More


Pastist Externalism about Memory Content

Sven Bernecker

in Memory: A Philosophical Study

Published in print:
2009
Published Online:
May 2010
ISBN:
9780199577569
eISBN:
9780191722820
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199577569.003.0007
Subject:
Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind, Metaphysics/Epistemology

Content externalism is the view that the individuation conditions of mental content depend, in part, on external or relational properties of the subject's environment rather than only on internal ... More


Analytical Moral Functionalism Meets Moral Twin Earth

Terry Horgan and Mark Timmons

in Minds, Ethics, and Conditionals: Themes from the Philosophy of Frank Jackson

Published in print:
2009
Published Online:
May 2010
ISBN:
9780199267989
eISBN:
9780191708268
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199267989.003.0010
Subject:
Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind

In chapters 4 and 5 of his 1998 book From Metaphysics to Ethics: A Defence of Conceptual Analysis, Frank Jackson propounds and defends a form of moral realism that he calls both ‘moral functionalism’ ... More


Perspectival Thoughts and Psychological Explanation

Eros Corazza

in Reflecting the Mind: Indexicality and Quasi-Indexicality

Published in print:
2004
Published Online:
November 2004
ISBN:
9780199270187
eISBN:
9780191601484
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/019927018X.003.0007
Subject:
Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind

Deals with the relation between thoughts and the context in which they are entertained. It is argued that thoughts are best viewed as situated. The same thought situated in a different context is ... More


The Puzzles

R. M. Sainsbury and Michael Tye

in Seven Puzzles of Thought and How to Solve Them: And How to Solve Them: An Originalist Theory of Concepts

Published in print:
2012
Published Online:
May 2012
ISBN:
9780199695317
eISBN:
9780191738531
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199695317.003.0001
Subject:
Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind, Philosophy of Language

This chapter lays out seven puzzles of thought: Hesperus and Phosphorus, twins, cats and chats, Paderewski, pure demonstratives, empty thought and thought about the self.


Reference and Natural Kinds

Kent Bach

in Thought and Reference

Published in print:
1994
Published Online:
October 2011
ISBN:
9780198240778
eISBN:
9780191680267
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198240778.003.0014
Subject:
Philosophy, Philosophy of Language, Philosophy of Mind

Burge interprets the thought experiment in a way that is even more radical than rejecting either the Fregean claim that meaning determines extension or the Fregean conception of meaning. Burge holds ... More


Unified Externalism

Michael Morris

in The Good and the True

Published in print:
1992
Published Online:
October 2011
ISBN:
9780198239444
eISBN:
9780191679919
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198239444.003.0008
Subject:
Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology, Moral Philosophy

This chapter defines externalism and argues that it will count unified if there is no division within content. It also cites McGinn's ‘matching problem’. It argues that conceptualism requires ... More


Reference and Sense

Katalin Farkas

in The Subject's Point of View

Published in print:
2008
Published Online:
January 2009
ISBN:
9780199230327
eISBN:
9780191710629
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199230327.003.0007
Subject:
Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind

Even philosophers who are sympathetic to internalism believe that a full account of intentionality or representation requires two kinds of intentionality: phenomenal and externalistic; or two kinds ... More


Conceptual Causation: Some Elementary Reflections

Colin McGinn

in Knowledge and Reality: Selected Essays

Published in print:
2002
Published Online:
November 2003
ISBN:
9780199251582
eISBN:
9780191598012
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/0199251584.003.0008
Subject:
Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology

Building on the ‘weak externalist’ position suggested in ‘The Structure of Content’ and developed in Mental Content, McGinn considers the topic of conceptual causation: in particular, the ... More


Anti-Individualism, Self-Knowledge, and Epistemic Possibility: Further Reflections on a Puzzle about Doubt

Gary Ebbs

in Self-Knowledge

Published in print:
2011
Published Online:
May 2011
ISBN:
9780199590728
eISBN:
9780191725456
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199590728.003.0004
Subject:
Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind

This chapter argues that we cannot have any justification for believing that a given description of a possible world w that is subjectively indistinguishable to us from the actual world supports ... More


Realist Semantics and Content‐Ascription

Colin McGinn

in Knowledge and Reality: Selected Essays

Published in print:
2002
Published Online:
November 2003
ISBN:
9780199251582
eISBN:
9780191598012
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/0199251584.003.0015
Subject:
Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology

McGinn's target is again Dummettian anti‐realism; this time he argues that Dummett's criticism of realist semantics rests on a questionable theory of content‐ascription. McGinn develops four Twin ... More


Disagreement, Semantics, and Meta-Semantics

Billy Dunaway

in Reality and Morality

Published in print:
2020
Published Online:
August 2020
ISBN:
9780198858256
eISBN:
9780191890628
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/oso/9780198858256.003.0002
Subject:
Philosophy, Moral Philosophy

Moral Twin Earth thought experiments appear to show that practical language is highly stable, and that many possible users of practical language are capable of having genuine disagreements with each ... More


Semantic Externalism

István Aranyosi

in The Peripheral Mind: Philosophy of Mind and the Peripheral Nervous System

Published in print:
2013
Published Online:
September 2013
ISBN:
9780199989607
eISBN:
9780199346349
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199989607.003.0005
Subject:
Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind

Hilary Putnam’s “twin-earth” thought experiment is presented and analyzed. Arguments are presented both against internalism and against externalism as currently understood, namely, as a commitment to ... More


Failures of Stability

Billy Dunaway

in Reality and Morality

Published in print:
2020
Published Online:
August 2020
ISBN:
9780198858256
eISBN:
9780191890628
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/oso/9780198858256.003.0003
Subject:
Philosophy, Moral Philosophy

This chapter argues against the Universal Disagreement thesis. Some possible communities use moral language, but do not have substantive disagreements with others who use their moral language ... More


Moral Language: The “Good” Rules

Paul Bloomfield

in Moral Reality

Published in print:
2001
Published Online:
November 2003
ISBN:
9780195137132
eISBN:
9780199833092
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/0195137132.003.0004
Subject:
Philosophy, Moral Philosophy

The semantics of “health” are discussed by way of Aquinas’ theory of analogical predication: “health” and “good” have the tripartite semantic structure in terms of a base use, causes, and signs. This ... More


Knowing What One is Thinking

Robert C. Stalnaker

in Our Knowledge of the Internal World

Published in print:
2008
Published Online:
May 2009
ISBN:
9780199545995
eISBN:
9780191719929
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199545995.003.0006
Subject:
Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind, Metaphysics/Epistemology

The rejection of the thesis that we stand in an intimate relation of acquaintance to the contents of our thought leaves us with a familiar problem: to explain the sense in which we know what we are ... More


Nondescriptive Meaning and Reference: An Ideational Semantics

Wayne A. Davis

Published in print:
2005
Published Online:
February 2006
ISBN:
9780199261659
eISBN:
9780191603099
Item type:
book
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/0199261652.001.0001
Subject:
Philosophy, Philosophy of Language

Part I of this book is a concise exposition of the expression theory of meaning, according to which meaning consists in the expression of thoughts, their component ideas, or other mental states. The ... More


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