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A Theory of Presentism

Craig Bourne

in A Future for Presentism

Published in print:
2006
Published Online:
January 2007
ISBN:
9780199212804
eISBN:
9780191707094
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199212804.003.0003
Subject:
Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology

I begin by laying down three conditions which any theory of time should meet: it should accord with our view that certain statements about the past are true; that the truthmakers for those statements ... More


Intersubstitutivity and the Purpose of Truth

Hartry Field

in Saving Truth From Paradox

Published in print:
2008
Published Online:
May 2008
ISBN:
9780199230747
eISBN:
9780191710933
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199230747.003.0014
Subject:
Philosophy, Logic/Philosophy of Mathematics

This chapter investigates the importance of the intersubstitutivity of True(p) with p, which has to be abandoned in all classical-logic theories. It concedes that minor exceptions to ... More


Kripke's Theory of Truth (Strong Kleene Version)

Hartry Field

in Saving Truth From Paradox

Published in print:
2008
Published Online:
May 2008
ISBN:
9780199230747
eISBN:
9780191710933
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199230747.003.0004
Subject:
Philosophy, Logic/Philosophy of Mathematics

This chapter is an exposition of the strong Kleene version of Kripke's fixed point semantics, and the theories of truth that can be obtained from it. Emphasis is put on the distinction between ... More


Presupposition

Richard Swinburne

in Revelation: From Metaphor to Analogy

Published in print:
2007
Published Online:
September 2007
ISBN:
9780199212460
eISBN:
9780191707193
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199212460.003.0003
Subject:
Philosophy, Philosophy of Religion

Someone may express a claim within a system of presuppositions held by his hearers. The presuppositions are however not part of the claim, and the truth-value of the claim does not depend on the ... More


Indeterminacy and Truth Value Gaps

Mark Richard

in Cuts and Clouds: Vagueness, its Nature, & its Logic

Published in print:
2010
Published Online:
May 2010
ISBN:
9780199570386
eISBN:
9780191722134
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199570386.003.0027
Subject:
Philosophy, Logic/Philosophy of Mathematics, Metaphysics/Epistemology

This chapter argues for the following theses. There are perfectly possible meanings (ones of a sort one would think are possessed by many vague predicates) which would necessitate a predicate's being ... More


Supernumeration: Vagueness and Numbers

Peter Simons

in Cuts and Clouds: Vagueness, its Nature, & its Logic

Published in print:
2010
Published Online:
May 2010
ISBN:
9780199570386
eISBN:
9780191722134
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199570386.003.0028
Subject:
Philosophy, Logic/Philosophy of Mathematics, Metaphysics/Epistemology

There is a notable discrepancy between philosophers and practitioners on approaches to vagueness. Philosophers almost all reject fuzzy logic and a majority accept some form of supervaluational ... More


Degree of Belief is Expected Truth Value

Nicholas J. J. Smith

in Cuts and Clouds: Vagueness, its Nature, & its Logic

Published in print:
2010
Published Online:
May 2010
ISBN:
9780199570386
eISBN:
9780191722134
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199570386.003.0029
Subject:
Philosophy, Logic/Philosophy of Mathematics, Metaphysics/Epistemology

A number of authors have noted that vagueness engenders degrees of belief, but that these degrees of belief do not behave like subjective probabilities. So should we countenance two different kinds ... More


The Legacy of Principia

Judith Jarvis Thomson

in Metaethics after Moore

Published in print:
2006
Published Online:
May 2010
ISBN:
9780199269914
eISBN:
9780191710032
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199269914.003.0012
Subject:
Philosophy, Moral Philosophy, General

This chapter argues that the legacy in question is that the force of the open question argument, together with the rejection of the Moorean idea that there are non-natural properties, motivate two ... More


The ecology and machinery of language

Pieter A. M. Seuren

in Language in Cognition

Published in print:
2009
Published Online:
May 2009
ISBN:
9780199559473
eISBN:
9780191721137
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199559473.003.0007
Subject:
Linguistics, Semantics and Pragmatics, Psycholinguistics / Neurolinguistics / Cognitive Linguistics

Language is positioned in its ecological setting as part of the human mind, intentionally related to the actual and to virtual worlds and functional in a social force field. Grammar defines fully ... More


Semantic Paradoxes

Graham Priest

in In Contradiction

Published in print:
2006
Published Online:
May 2007
ISBN:
9780199263301
eISBN:
9780191718823
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199263301.003.0002
Subject:
Philosophy, Logic/Philosophy of Mathematics

This chapter defends the view that the semantic paradoxes are bona fide sound arguments. It states a set of conditions sufficient for contradiction and then defends the view that natural language ... More


Truth and Falsity

Graham Priest

in In Contradiction

Published in print:
2006
Published Online:
May 2007
ISBN:
9780199263301
eISBN:
9780191718823
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199263301.003.0005
Subject:
Philosophy, Logic/Philosophy of Mathematics

This chapter discusses truth and related notions: the T-schema, meaning, assertion, falsity. It defends the T-schema, and argues for a teleological account of truth. It concludes with a discussion ... More


Hume's Morality: Feeling and Fabrication

Rachel Cohon

Published in print:
2008
Published Online:
January 2009
ISBN:
9780199268443
eISBN:
9780191708565
Item type:
book
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199268443.001.0001
Subject:
Philosophy, Moral Philosophy, History of Philosophy

This book interprets the moral philosophy of David Hume, focusing on two areas: his metaethics and the artificial virtues. The book first reinterprets Hume's claim that moral distinctions are not ... More


An Introduction to Paraconsistent Dialetheism

Hartry Field

in Saving Truth From Paradox

Published in print:
2008
Published Online:
May 2008
ISBN:
9780199230747
eISBN:
9780191710933
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199230747.003.0025
Subject:
Philosophy, Logic/Philosophy of Mathematics

This chapter introduces ‘dialetheic’ approaches, according to which Liar sentences are both true and false, indeed both true and not true. (Some contradictions are accepted.) Dialetheism provides ... More


Logic and entailment

Pieter A. M. Seuren

in The Logic of Language: Language From Within Volume II

Published in print:
2009
Published Online:
February 2010
ISBN:
9780199559480
eISBN:
9780191721144
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199559480.003.0001
Subject:
Linguistics, Semantics and Pragmatics, Psycholinguistics / Neurolinguistics / Cognitive Linguistics

This chapter describes the basic notions of logic, entailment, truth value, bivalence and multivalence, truth‐value gap, proposition, logical form. It discusses the distinction between sentence types ... More


‘To Pee and not to Pee?’ Could That Be the Question? (Further Reflections of The Dog) *

Jay Garfield

in The Law of Non-Contradiction

Published in print:
2004
Published Online:
May 2010
ISBN:
9780199265176
eISBN:
9780191713989
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199265176.003.0015
Subject:
Philosophy, Philosophy of Language, Logic/Philosophy of Mathematics

Priest's LP is formulated with truth value gaps, but no gluts. The Dog argues on epistemological grounds that a paraconsistent logic with truth value gaps as well as gluts is better than one with ... More


Hallucinations

Jody Azzouni

in Talking About Nothing: Numbers, Hallucinations and Fictions

Published in print:
2010
Published Online:
September 2010
ISBN:
9780199738946
eISBN:
9780199866175
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199738946.003.0002
Subject:
Philosophy, General

It’s common to think that demonstrations require something (that exists) that’s demonstrated. If, because of hallucination, there is no object, then the demonstration—and what’s said—is seen by some ... More


Truth Conditions and Semantics

Jody Azzouni

in Talking About Nothing: Numbers, Hallucinations and Fictions

Published in print:
2010
Published Online:
September 2010
ISBN:
9780199738946
eISBN:
9780199866175
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199738946.003.0007
Subject:
Philosophy, General

The aim of this chapter is to show that allowing languages to have ontologically neutral idioms, both quantificational and singular, poses no problems for semantic theories of such languages. The ... More


Truth-Value and Pretence

Peter Lamarque and Stein Haugom Olsen

in Truth, Fiction, and Literature: A Philosophical Perspective

Published in print:
1996
Published Online:
October 2011
ISBN:
9780198236818
eISBN:
9780191679377
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198236818.003.0003
Subject:
Philosophy, Aesthetics, Philosophy of Language

This chapter begins with a discussion of falsity thesis, which states that ‘pure fiction’, by definition, consists of false sentences. It then considers an alternative to the falsity thesis, the ... More


Beyond the Limits of Knowledge

Graham Priest

in New Essays on the Knowability Paradox

Published in print:
2009
Published Online:
September 2010
ISBN:
9780199285495
eISBN:
9780191713972
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199285495.003.0008
Subject:
Philosophy, General

This chapter develops the Routley/Beall proposal by countenancing the mere possibility of truth-value gluts and appealing to a paraconsistent logic with excluded middle.


Knowability and Possible Epistemic Oddities

Jc Beall

in New Essays on the Knowability Paradox

Published in print:
2009
Published Online:
September 2010
ISBN:
9780199285495
eISBN:
9780191713972
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199285495.003.0009
Subject:
Philosophy, General

This chapter explores alternatives, some of which avoid the epistemic oddities of the framework presented in Chapter 7. It presents a semantic framework that is paracomplete, but not paraconsistent, ... More


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