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New Essays on Tarski and Philosophy

Douglas Patterson (ed.)

Published in print:
2008
Published Online:
September 2010
ISBN:
9780199296309
eISBN:
9780191712272
Item type:
book
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199296309.001.0001
Subject:
Philosophy, Logic/Philosophy of Mathematics

This book shows the way to a proper understanding of the philosophical legacy of the great logician, mathematician, and philosopher Alfred Tarski (1902–983). The contributors are an international ... More


Are Supervaluational and Revision Theories Self‐Undermining?

Hartry Field

in Saving Truth From Paradox

Published in print:
2008
Published Online:
May 2008
ISBN:
9780199230747
eISBN:
9780191710933
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199230747.003.0013
Subject:
Philosophy, Logic/Philosophy of Mathematics

This chapter is concerned with the extent to which supervaluation and revision theories can declare that their rules all preserve truth. The extent varies from one such theory to another, but none ... More


Paraconsistent Dialetheism and Soundness

Hartry Field

in Saving Truth From Paradox

Published in print:
2008
Published Online:
May 2008
ISBN:
9780199230747
eISBN:
9780191710933
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199230747.003.0027
Subject:
Philosophy, Logic/Philosophy of Mathematics

Priest has argued that his dialetheic theories declare themselves sound and in this regard are better than non-dialetheic theories. This chapter shows this to be unfounded. Indeed, dialetheic ... More


Validity and the Unprovability of Soundness

Hartry Field

in Saving Truth From Paradox

Published in print:
2008
Published Online:
May 2008
ISBN:
9780199230747
eISBN:
9780191710933
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199230747.003.0003
Subject:
Philosophy, Logic/Philosophy of Mathematics

This chapter gives an initial discussion of the relation between validity and necessary truth-preservation. It argues that the so-called ‘soundness theorems’ of first order logic are misnamed, and ... More


Truth‐Value Gluts in Classical Theories

Hartry Field

in Saving Truth From Paradox

Published in print:
2008
Published Online:
May 2008
ISBN:
9780199230747
eISBN:
9780191710933
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199230747.003.0009
Subject:
Philosophy, Logic/Philosophy of Mathematics

This chapter deals with classical theories that postulate truth value gluts, especially theories that accept the right-to-left half of the Tarski biconditionals. The duality with gap theories is ... More


Relevant Logic

JC Beall

in Logical Pluralism

Published in print:
2005
Published Online:
October 2011
ISBN:
9780199288403
eISBN:
9780191700491
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199288403.003.0005
Subject:
Philosophy, Logic/Philosophy of Mathematics

The Generalised Tarski Thesis (GTT) yields classical consequence when its cases are taken to be possible worlds, where possible worlds are complete and consistent with respect to negation. That ... More


Attributing Emotions to Animals

Mark Rowlands

in Can Animals Be Moral?

Published in print:
2012
Published Online:
January 2013
ISBN:
9780199842001
eISBN:
9780199979844
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199842001.003.0002
Subject:
Philosophy, Moral Philosophy, General

Emotions, in the sense relevant to this book, are identified as intentional states that are individuated by their content. The attribution of such states to animals is thought to be problematic. The ... More


Tracking Belief

Mark Rowlands

in Can Animals Be Persons?

Published in print:
2019
Published Online:
May 2019
ISBN:
9780190846039
eISBN:
9780190846060
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/oso/9780190846039.003.0004
Subject:
Philosophy, Moral Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind

Problems in attributing beliefs to animals stem from the fact that the contents (of beliefs and desires) used in such attribution are anchored to humans. This chapter spells out a de-anchoring ... More


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