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Scepticism and Reliable Belief

José L. Zalabardo

Published in print:
2012
Published Online:
September 2012
ISBN:
9780199656073
eISBN:
9780191742132
Item type:
book
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199656073.001.0001
Subject:
Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology, Philosophy of Science

Reliabilist accounts of knowledge are widely seen as having the resources for blocking sceptical arguments, since these arguments appear to rely on assumptions about the nature of knowledge that are ... More


Knowledge Without Evidence

José L. Zalabardo

in Scepticism and Reliable Belief

Published in print:
2012
Published Online:
September 2012
ISBN:
9780199656073
eISBN:
9780191742132
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199656073.003.0006
Subject:
Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology, Philosophy of Science

This chapter presents an account of non-inferential knowledge. It argues that non-inferential knowledge can take two forms. The first is truth tracking. The chapter follows Sherrilyn Roush in using a ... More


Democracy as a Condorcet Truth‐Tracker

Robert E. Goodin

in Reflective Democracy

Published in print:
2003
Published Online:
November 2003
ISBN:
9780199256174
eISBN:
9780191599354
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/0199256179.003.0005
Subject:
Political Science, Political Theory

It is a long‐standing debate within political philosophy generally whether we want our political outcomes to be right or whether we want them to be fair; while democratic theory has traditionally ... More


Knowledge and Truth Tracking

José L. Zalabardo

in Scepticism and Reliable Belief

Published in print:
2012
Published Online:
September 2012
ISBN:
9780199656073
eISBN:
9780191742132
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199656073.003.0003
Subject:
Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology, Philosophy of Science

This chapter argues that there are three main respects in which Robert Nozick’s account of knowledge needs to be revised. First, a plausible theory of knowledge must attach much more importance to ... More


The Epistemic Desideratum

Christian List and Philip Pettit

in Group Agency: The Possibility, Design, and Status of Corporate Agents

Published in print:
2011
Published Online:
May 2011
ISBN:
9780199591565
eISBN:
9780191725494
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199591565.003.0005
Subject:
Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology

This is the first of three chapters devoted to how group agents can be designed to satisfy various intuitive desiderata. It presents an epistemic desideratum, understood as the requirement that the ... More


Making Sense of Skepticism

Richard Feldman and Earl Conee

in Evidentialism: Essays in Epistemology

Published in print:
2004
Published Online:
August 2004
ISBN:
9780199253722
eISBN:
9780191601361
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/0199253722.003.0013
Subject:
Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology

Criticizes non‐evidentialist theories of knowledge as they bear on external world skeptical arguments. The theories are held to provide no good way to understand the intuitive appeal of the arguments ... More


Need for third condition. Discussion of the Nozick‐Dretske analysis

Edward Craig

in Knowledge and the State of Nature: An Essay in Conceptual Synthesis

Published in print:
1999
Published Online:
November 2003
ISBN:
9780198238799
eISBN:
9780191597237
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/0198238797.003.0003
Subject:
Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology

The author contends that in the state of nature we need some detectable property of informants that correlates well with their being right about p. This yields a twofold criticism of Robert Nozick's ... More


Evolution, Truth-Tracking, and Moral Skepticism

Richard Joyce

in Essays in Moral Skepticism

Published in print:
2016
Published Online:
March 2016
ISBN:
9780198754879
eISBN:
9780191819865
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198754879.003.0008
Subject:
Philosophy, Moral Philosophy

Evolutionary debunking arguments seek to undermine morality by highlighting facts about its genealogy. This chapter delineates several quite different versions of this kind of argument, including ... More


Post-Gettier Accounts of Knowledge

Richard Foley

in When Is True Belief Knowledge?

Published in print:
2012
Published Online:
October 2017
ISBN:
9780691154725
eISBN:
9781400842308
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Princeton University Press
DOI:
10.23943/princeton/9780691154725.003.0002
Subject:
Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology

This chapter considers accounts of identifying what has to be added to true belief in order to get knowledge. One tradition says that what is needed is something like an argument in defense of the ... More


The Relation between Truth and Politics, Once Again

Robert E. Goodin and Kai Spiekermann

in An Epistemic Theory of Democracy

Published in print:
2018
Published Online:
June 2018
ISBN:
9780198823452
eISBN:
9780191862137
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/oso/9780198823452.003.0019
Subject:
Political Science, Democratization, Political Theory

This chapter returns to the question whether there are truths that politics ought to track. We argue, first, that while there may occasionally be reasons to practise ‘epistemic abstinence’, there are ... More


An Epistemic Theory of Democracy

Robert E. Goodin and Kai Spiekermann

Published in print:
2018
Published Online:
June 2018
ISBN:
9780198823452
eISBN:
9780191862137
Item type:
book
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/oso/9780198823452.001.0001
Subject:
Political Science, Democratization, Political Theory

One attractive feature of democracy is its ability to track the truth by information aggregation. The formal support for this claim goes back to Condorcet’s famous jury theorem. However, the theorem ... More


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