R. M. Sainsbury
- Published in print:
- 2005
- Published Online:
- July 2005
- ISBN:
- 9780199241804
- eISBN:
- 9780191602696
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0199241805.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Language
This book concerns the nature of reference, and the theory it develops is intermediate between direct reference theories and descriptivist theories. A guiding thought is that just as truth conditions ...
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This book concerns the nature of reference, and the theory it develops is intermediate between direct reference theories and descriptivist theories. A guiding thought is that just as truth conditions (rather than truth values) can throw light on the meaning of sentences so can reference conditions (rather than referents) throw light on the meaning of referring expressions. A reference condition need not be a descriptive condition, and it need not be satisfied. The first of these points marks the divergence from descriptivist theories, and the second, from direct reference theories. This idea is applied to proper names, pronouns, and definite descriptions (singular, plural and mass); problems of existential and fictional sentences are addressed; and, in the final chapter, an analogue of the main idea is applied to mental content.Less
This book concerns the nature of reference, and the theory it develops is intermediate between direct reference theories and descriptivist theories. A guiding thought is that just as truth conditions (rather than truth values) can throw light on the meaning of sentences so can reference conditions (rather than referents) throw light on the meaning of referring expressions. A reference condition need not be a descriptive condition, and it need not be satisfied. The first of these points marks the divergence from descriptivist theories, and the second, from direct reference theories. This idea is applied to proper names, pronouns, and definite descriptions (singular, plural and mass); problems of existential and fictional sentences are addressed; and, in the final chapter, an analogue of the main idea is applied to mental content.
Jeffrey C. King
- Published in print:
- 2007
- Published Online:
- May 2007
- ISBN:
- 9780199226061
- eISBN:
- 9780191710377
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199226061.003.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Language
This introductory chapter begins with a brief analysis of why philosophers believe in propositions. The main purpose of the book is then discussed, which is to formulate and defend a detailed account ...
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This introductory chapter begins with a brief analysis of why philosophers believe in propositions. The main purpose of the book is then discussed, which is to formulate and defend a detailed account of the metaphysical nature of propositions. In so doing, it discusses some oppositions to propositions as well. It is argued that there is no mystery about what propositions are. Given rather minimal assumptions it follows that propostions exist, and we can begin to see how and why they have truth conditions and so represent the world as being a certain way. An overview of the chapters included in the volume is presented.Less
This introductory chapter begins with a brief analysis of why philosophers believe in propositions. The main purpose of the book is then discussed, which is to formulate and defend a detailed account of the metaphysical nature of propositions. In so doing, it discusses some oppositions to propositions as well. It is argued that there is no mystery about what propositions are. Given rather minimal assumptions it follows that propostions exist, and we can begin to see how and why they have truth conditions and so represent the world as being a certain way. An overview of the chapters included in the volume is presented.
Jody Azzouni
- Published in print:
- 2008
- Published Online:
- September 2010
- ISBN:
- 9780199296309
- eISBN:
- 9780191712272
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199296309.003.0015
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Logic/Philosophy of Mathematics
Tarski-style theories of truth are drafted by many semanticists into providing truth-conditional semantic theories for languages. Universally assumed by practitioners in this area of semantics is ...
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Tarski-style theories of truth are drafted by many semanticists into providing truth-conditional semantic theories for languages. Universally assumed by practitioners in this area of semantics is that such theories are to provide necessary and sufficient conditions on the truth of the targeted sentences. This chapter argues that such an assumption inappropriately restricts the empirical possibilities for the languages to be thus studied. In particular, languages based on alternative logics are ill-served by such an assumption. The chapter loosens the requirement that a semantic theory is to provide necessary and sufficient truth conditions by showing that ‘truth-conditional’ semantic theories are possible which provide not necessary and sufficient conditions on the truth (and falsity) of the targeted sentences, but necessary conditions and sufficient conditions that don't amount to necessary and sufficient conditions, except in certain quite restricted circumstances.Less
Tarski-style theories of truth are drafted by many semanticists into providing truth-conditional semantic theories for languages. Universally assumed by practitioners in this area of semantics is that such theories are to provide necessary and sufficient conditions on the truth of the targeted sentences. This chapter argues that such an assumption inappropriately restricts the empirical possibilities for the languages to be thus studied. In particular, languages based on alternative logics are ill-served by such an assumption. The chapter loosens the requirement that a semantic theory is to provide necessary and sufficient truth conditions by showing that ‘truth-conditional’ semantic theories are possible which provide not necessary and sufficient conditions on the truth (and falsity) of the targeted sentences, but necessary conditions and sufficient conditions that don't amount to necessary and sufficient conditions, except in certain quite restricted circumstances.
Hartry Field
- Published in print:
- 2001
- Published Online:
- November 2003
- ISBN:
- 9780199242894
- eISBN:
- 9780191597381
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0199242895.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, General
This is a collection of papers, written over many years, with substantial postscripts tying them together and giving an updated perspective on them. The first five are on the notions of truth and ...
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This is a collection of papers, written over many years, with substantial postscripts tying them together and giving an updated perspective on them. The first five are on the notions of truth and truth‐conditions, and their role in a theory of meaning and of the content of our mental states. The next five deal with what I call ‘factually defective discourse’—discourse that gives rise to issues about which, it is tempting to say that, there is no fact of the matter as to the right answer; one particular kind of factually defective discourse is called ‘indeterminacy’, and it gets the bulk of the attention. The final bunch of papers deal with issues about objectivity, closely related to issues about factual defectiveness; two deal with the question of whether the axioms of mathematics are as objective as is often assumed, and one deals with the question of whether our epistemological methods are as objective as they are usually assumed to be.Less
This is a collection of papers, written over many years, with substantial postscripts tying them together and giving an updated perspective on them. The first five are on the notions of truth and truth‐conditions, and their role in a theory of meaning and of the content of our mental states. The next five deal with what I call ‘factually defective discourse’—discourse that gives rise to issues about which, it is tempting to say that, there is no fact of the matter as to the right answer; one particular kind of factually defective discourse is called ‘indeterminacy’, and it gets the bulk of the attention. The final bunch of papers deal with issues about objectivity, closely related to issues about factual defectiveness; two deal with the question of whether the axioms of mathematics are as objective as is often assumed, and one deals with the question of whether our epistemological methods are as objective as they are usually assumed to be.
Jennifer Saul
- Published in print:
- 2007
- Published Online:
- May 2007
- ISBN:
- 9780199219155
- eISBN:
- 9780191711848
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199219155.003.0004
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Language
This chapter begins the diagnosis of The Enlightenment Problem. It argues that theorists have tended to proceed as if they adhere to a principle that this book terms Expressed or Implicated (EOI). ...
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This chapter begins the diagnosis of The Enlightenment Problem. It argues that theorists have tended to proceed as if they adhere to a principle that this book terms Expressed or Implicated (EOI). EOI refers to an utterance of a sentence S in a context C, the truth conditional intuitions of competent, rational speakers who are relevantly well-informed must match the truth conditions of either what is (semantically) expressed or what is implicated by S in C. This chapter argues that EOI is false, and attempts to diagnose why it is that theorists have tended to proceed as though they accepted it.Less
This chapter begins the diagnosis of The Enlightenment Problem. It argues that theorists have tended to proceed as if they adhere to a principle that this book terms Expressed or Implicated (EOI). EOI refers to an utterance of a sentence S in a context C, the truth conditional intuitions of competent, rational speakers who are relevantly well-informed must match the truth conditions of either what is (semantically) expressed or what is implicated by S in C. This chapter argues that EOI is false, and attempts to diagnose why it is that theorists have tended to proceed as though they accepted it.
Charles Travis
- Published in print:
- 2008
- Published Online:
- September 2008
- ISBN:
- 9780199230334
- eISBN:
- 9780191710605
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199230334.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Language
This book presents a series of chapters which develops the author's distinctive view of the relation of thought to language. The key idea is ‘occasion-sensitivity’: what it is for words to express a ...
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This book presents a series of chapters which develops the author's distinctive view of the relation of thought to language. The key idea is ‘occasion-sensitivity’: what it is for words to express a given concept is for them to be apt for contributing to any of many different conditions of correctness (notably truth conditions). Since words mean what they do by expressing a given concept, it follows that meaning does not determine truth conditions. This view ties thoughts less tightly to the linguistic forms which express them than traditional views of the matter, and in two directions: a given linguistic form, meaning fixed, may express an indefinite variety of thoughts; one thought can be expressed in an indefinite number of syntactically and semantically distinct ways. The book highlights the importance of this view for linguistic theory, and shows how it gives new form to a variety of traditional philosophical problems.Less
This book presents a series of chapters which develops the author's distinctive view of the relation of thought to language. The key idea is ‘occasion-sensitivity’: what it is for words to express a given concept is for them to be apt for contributing to any of many different conditions of correctness (notably truth conditions). Since words mean what they do by expressing a given concept, it follows that meaning does not determine truth conditions. This view ties thoughts less tightly to the linguistic forms which express them than traditional views of the matter, and in two directions: a given linguistic form, meaning fixed, may express an indefinite variety of thoughts; one thought can be expressed in an indefinite number of syntactically and semantically distinct ways. The book highlights the importance of this view for linguistic theory, and shows how it gives new form to a variety of traditional philosophical problems.
Paul Horwich
- Published in print:
- 2005
- Published Online:
- September 2006
- ISBN:
- 9780199251247
- eISBN:
- 9780191603983
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/019925124X.003.0008
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Language
The meaning of any sentence derives from the meanings of its words and from how those words are syntactically combined with one another. But what explains this ‘principle of compositionality’, and ...
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The meaning of any sentence derives from the meanings of its words and from how those words are syntactically combined with one another. But what explains this ‘principle of compositionality’, and what is its import? The answer is due to Davidson: that since we know (from Tarski) how to deduce the truth conditions of sentences from the referents of their words, we should explain it by identifying (or replacing) sentence-meanings with truth conditions and word-meanings with referents. This chapter offers a deflationary alternative according to which the meaning of a sentence is trivially compositional, since it is constituted by the facts concerning its structure and the meanings of its words. An important implication of this idea is that contrary to the writings of Fodor and Lepore, compositionality can place no constraint whatsoever on how word-meanings are engendered.Less
The meaning of any sentence derives from the meanings of its words and from how those words are syntactically combined with one another. But what explains this ‘principle of compositionality’, and what is its import? The answer is due to Davidson: that since we know (from Tarski) how to deduce the truth conditions of sentences from the referents of their words, we should explain it by identifying (or replacing) sentence-meanings with truth conditions and word-meanings with referents. This chapter offers a deflationary alternative according to which the meaning of a sentence is trivially compositional, since it is constituted by the facts concerning its structure and the meanings of its words. An important implication of this idea is that contrary to the writings of Fodor and Lepore, compositionality can place no constraint whatsoever on how word-meanings are engendered.
Hartry Field
- Published in print:
- 2001
- Published Online:
- November 2003
- ISBN:
- 9780199242894
- eISBN:
- 9780191597381
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0199242895.003.0004
- Subject:
- Philosophy, General
Attempts to motivate and clarify a radically ‘deflationist’ view of the relations of ‘meaning that’ and ‘having the content that’, and to defend it against many of the arguments that are widely ...
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Attempts to motivate and clarify a radically ‘deflationist’ view of the relations of ‘meaning that’ and ‘having the content that’, and to defend it against many of the arguments that are widely viewed as decisive against any such view. One of its claims is that standard work in the theory of reference (for instance, that of Kripke and Putnam) can be reconceived so as not to be primarily about reference at all. Includes a long postscript that, among other things, includes an account of how the degree to which behaviour is successful can be explained within a ‘deflationist’ framework.Less
Attempts to motivate and clarify a radically ‘deflationist’ view of the relations of ‘meaning that’ and ‘having the content that’, and to defend it against many of the arguments that are widely viewed as decisive against any such view. One of its claims is that standard work in the theory of reference (for instance, that of Kripke and Putnam) can be reconceived so as not to be primarily about reference at all. Includes a long postscript that, among other things, includes an account of how the degree to which behaviour is successful can be explained within a ‘deflationist’ framework.
Jody Azzouni
- Published in print:
- 2010
- Published Online:
- September 2010
- ISBN:
- 9780199738946
- eISBN:
- 9780199866175
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199738946.003.0007
- Subject:
- Philosophy, General
The aim of this chapter is to show that allowing languages to have ontologically neutral idioms, both quantificational and singular, poses no problems for semantic theories of such languages. The ...
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The aim of this chapter is to show that allowing languages to have ontologically neutral idioms, both quantificational and singular, poses no problems for semantic theories of such languages. The ontologically neutral idioms in the object language are just replicated (in their resources) in the metalanguage that provides the semantic theory for that object language. A traditional truth-conditional theory of a language is given that illustrates the point. That the same point holds for singular idioms is illustrated by describing various semantic approaches to demonstratives. There is a view, propounded by Lewis, Higginbotham, Ludlow, and others, that disquotation is crucial to semantic theories because such provide the needed language/world connections. This claim is shown to be wrong: even with disquotation, such language-world connections can be absent; and it’s also shown that semantic theories that aren’t disquotational can nevertheless provide language-world connections if such are wanted.Less
The aim of this chapter is to show that allowing languages to have ontologically neutral idioms, both quantificational and singular, poses no problems for semantic theories of such languages. The ontologically neutral idioms in the object language are just replicated (in their resources) in the metalanguage that provides the semantic theory for that object language. A traditional truth-conditional theory of a language is given that illustrates the point. That the same point holds for singular idioms is illustrated by describing various semantic approaches to demonstratives. There is a view, propounded by Lewis, Higginbotham, Ludlow, and others, that disquotation is crucial to semantic theories because such provide the needed language/world connections. This claim is shown to be wrong: even with disquotation, such language-world connections can be absent; and it’s also shown that semantic theories that aren’t disquotational can nevertheless provide language-world connections if such are wanted.
Michael Dummett
- Published in print:
- 1996
- Published Online:
- November 2003
- ISBN:
- 9780198236214
- eISBN:
- 9780191597350
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0198236212.003.0002
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Language
To know the meaning of a sentence is to know its truth‐conditions. Yet, in what does the knowledge of truth‐conditions consist? In many cases, it consists in knowing the way in which the truth of the ...
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To know the meaning of a sentence is to know its truth‐conditions. Yet, in what does the knowledge of truth‐conditions consist? In many cases, it consists in knowing the way in which the truth of the sentence is dependent upon the truth of some other sentences in the language; in some cases, paradigmatically those of the statements of observation. This knowledge consists in the ability to give a report of observation. Then one must know a way. Hence, the notion of truth‐conditions no longer occupies the central place, being replaced by verification and falsification.Less
To know the meaning of a sentence is to know its truth‐conditions. Yet, in what does the knowledge of truth‐conditions consist? In many cases, it consists in knowing the way in which the truth of the sentence is dependent upon the truth of some other sentences in the language; in some cases, paradigmatically those of the statements of observation. This knowledge consists in the ability to give a report of observation. Then one must know a way. Hence, the notion of truth‐conditions no longer occupies the central place, being replaced by verification and falsification.
Jennifer Saul
- Published in print:
- 2007
- Published Online:
- May 2007
- ISBN:
- 9780199219155
- eISBN:
- 9780191711848
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199219155.003.0005
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Language
This chapter begins by exploring what would be needed to evade fully The Enlightenment Problem, arguing for the abandonment not only of EOI but also of some important variants of EOI. It then ...
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This chapter begins by exploring what would be needed to evade fully The Enlightenment Problem, arguing for the abandonment not only of EOI but also of some important variants of EOI. It then considers what is required to avoid The Aspect Problem. By the end of this chapter, it is clear that philosophers of language need to develop theories on which truth conditional intuitions may not be due to any proposition whose truth conditions match those indicated by the intuitions.Less
This chapter begins by exploring what would be needed to evade fully The Enlightenment Problem, arguing for the abandonment not only of EOI but also of some important variants of EOI. It then considers what is required to avoid The Aspect Problem. By the end of this chapter, it is clear that philosophers of language need to develop theories on which truth conditional intuitions may not be due to any proposition whose truth conditions match those indicated by the intuitions.
Scott Soames
- Published in print:
- 1999
- Published Online:
- November 2003
- ISBN:
- 9780195123357
- eISBN:
- 9780199872114
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0195123352.003.0005
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Language
Can Tarski's definition of truth be taken to be an analysis of truth – i.e., a method of defining formal truth predicates that are capable of playing the role of truth in all theoretical contexts in ...
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Can Tarski's definition of truth be taken to be an analysis of truth – i.e., a method of defining formal truth predicates that are capable of playing the role of truth in all theoretical contexts in which that notion is needed? It is argued that although Tarski's truth predicates can play many of the roles demanded of truth, they cannot play the role of truth in theories of meaning and interpretation. Crucial to the argument is the observation that there is a conceptual connection between our ordinary notions of truth and meaning, in virtue of which statements of the truth conditions of sentences provide some information about their meanings. Since there is no corresponding connection between Tarski's notion of truth and the notion of meaning, statements of the Tarski‐truth conditions of sentences provide no information about meaning. The chapter closes with a detailed defense of Tarski's model‐theoretic analysis of logical truth and logical consequence against John Etchemendy's objections to it.Less
Can Tarski's definition of truth be taken to be an analysis of truth – i.e., a method of defining formal truth predicates that are capable of playing the role of truth in all theoretical contexts in which that notion is needed? It is argued that although Tarski's truth predicates can play many of the roles demanded of truth, they cannot play the role of truth in theories of meaning and interpretation. Crucial to the argument is the observation that there is a conceptual connection between our ordinary notions of truth and meaning, in virtue of which statements of the truth conditions of sentences provide some information about their meanings. Since there is no corresponding connection between Tarski's notion of truth and the notion of meaning, statements of the Tarski‐truth conditions of sentences provide no information about meaning. The chapter closes with a detailed defense of Tarski's model‐theoretic analysis of logical truth and logical consequence against John Etchemendy's objections to it.
Gabriel Sandu and Tuomo Aho
- Published in print:
- 2009
- Published Online:
- September 2009
- ISBN:
- 9780195137316
- eISBN:
- 9780199867912
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195137316.003.0040
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Logic/Philosophy of Mathematics
This chapter explores logical semantics, that is, the structural meaning of logical expressions like connectives (it is not the case that, either or, if … then), quantifiers (there is, for all, ...
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This chapter explores logical semantics, that is, the structural meaning of logical expressions like connectives (it is not the case that, either or, if … then), quantifiers (there is, for all, etc.), and modalities (it is necessary that, it is possible that). It focuses on truth-theoretical semantics for formalized languages, a tradition emerging from Carnap's and Tarski's work in the first half of the last century that specifies the meaning of these expressions in terms of the truth-conditions of the sentences in which they occur. It considers Tarski-style definitions of the semantics of a given language in a stronger metalanguage, Tarski's impossibility results, and attempts to overcome them in the post-Tarskian tradition.Less
This chapter explores logical semantics, that is, the structural meaning of logical expressions like connectives (it is not the case that, either or, if … then), quantifiers (there is, for all, etc.), and modalities (it is necessary that, it is possible that). It focuses on truth-theoretical semantics for formalized languages, a tradition emerging from Carnap's and Tarski's work in the first half of the last century that specifies the meaning of these expressions in terms of the truth-conditions of the sentences in which they occur. It considers Tarski-style definitions of the semantics of a given language in a stronger metalanguage, Tarski's impossibility results, and attempts to overcome them in the post-Tarskian tradition.
Herman Cappelen and Ernie Lepore
- Published in print:
- 2005
- Published Online:
- January 2011
- ISBN:
- 9780199251520
- eISBN:
- 9780191719165
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199251520.003.0003
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Language
A central thesis in the philosophy of language, at least since Frege and Russell, is that the meaning of (declarative) sentences determines the conditions under which they are true. Of course, ...
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A central thesis in the philosophy of language, at least since Frege and Russell, is that the meaning of (declarative) sentences determines the conditions under which they are true. Of course, declarative sentences in English divide into two classes — those that have truth conditions tout court, and those that have truth conditions only relative to certain contextual parameters being fixed. With respect to the latter class, identifiable linguistic features determine which contextual parameters go with which parts of the sentence in question. A number of authors have challenged, in varying degrees of scope, the thesis that sentence meaning determines truth conditions. Let's call the extreme critical position ‘radical pragmatics’ (RP). According to RP, sentences lack truth conditions. Sentences have meaning, according to RP, but only utterances have truth conditions. Sentences do not have truth conditions in vacuo, but only in the context of an utterance, only against a background of ‘normal circumstances’. Philosophers who explicitly subscribe to an all out RP are John Searle and Charles Travis. Both these philosophers allude to Wittgenstein and Austin as their chief influences. According to a more moderate pragmatics (MP), the truth conditions of many assertions go beyond anything that a semantics legitimately assigns to the sentences uttered. Many philosophers and linguists (Bach, Sperber/Wilson, Carston, Recanati, Perry, Crimmins, Stich) endorse MP to some degree. If either RP or MP is correct, then semantics is not about truth conditions. The polemical strategy of this chapter is to argue MP is an unstable position. To wit, there is no principled line to draw between MP and its fanatical cousin RP. So if you accept the arguments or intuitions behind MP, you inevitably will wind up endorsing RP. Secondly, it argues that neither RP nor MP has valid arguments against the view that sentence meaning determines truth conditions. And, lastly, it is argued that RP (and so MP) is wrong. Showing that RP and MP, and their collective arguments against truth conditional semantics are flawed is not a defence of truth conditional semantics directly, but it does fend off what has become a rather irksome opponent.Less
A central thesis in the philosophy of language, at least since Frege and Russell, is that the meaning of (declarative) sentences determines the conditions under which they are true. Of course, declarative sentences in English divide into two classes — those that have truth conditions tout court, and those that have truth conditions only relative to certain contextual parameters being fixed. With respect to the latter class, identifiable linguistic features determine which contextual parameters go with which parts of the sentence in question. A number of authors have challenged, in varying degrees of scope, the thesis that sentence meaning determines truth conditions. Let's call the extreme critical position ‘radical pragmatics’ (RP). According to RP, sentences lack truth conditions. Sentences have meaning, according to RP, but only utterances have truth conditions. Sentences do not have truth conditions in vacuo, but only in the context of an utterance, only against a background of ‘normal circumstances’. Philosophers who explicitly subscribe to an all out RP are John Searle and Charles Travis. Both these philosophers allude to Wittgenstein and Austin as their chief influences. According to a more moderate pragmatics (MP), the truth conditions of many assertions go beyond anything that a semantics legitimately assigns to the sentences uttered. Many philosophers and linguists (Bach, Sperber/Wilson, Carston, Recanati, Perry, Crimmins, Stich) endorse MP to some degree. If either RP or MP is correct, then semantics is not about truth conditions. The polemical strategy of this chapter is to argue MP is an unstable position. To wit, there is no principled line to draw between MP and its fanatical cousin RP. So if you accept the arguments or intuitions behind MP, you inevitably will wind up endorsing RP. Secondly, it argues that neither RP nor MP has valid arguments against the view that sentence meaning determines truth conditions. And, lastly, it is argued that RP (and so MP) is wrong. Showing that RP and MP, and their collective arguments against truth conditional semantics are flawed is not a defence of truth conditional semantics directly, but it does fend off what has become a rather irksome opponent.
Emma Borg
- Published in print:
- 2004
- Published Online:
- November 2004
- ISBN:
- 9780199270255
- eISBN:
- 9780191601477
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0199270252.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Language
Seeks to defend a formal (e.g. truth-conditional) approach to semantic theorizing from advocates of so-called ‘dual pragmatics’ (e.g. relevance theorists or contextualists). I argue, first, that ...
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Seeks to defend a formal (e.g. truth-conditional) approach to semantic theorizing from advocates of so-called ‘dual pragmatics’ (e.g. relevance theorists or contextualists). I argue, first, that formal semantics is preferable to pragmatically saturated approaches since only formal accounts are compatible with a modularity view of linguistic understanding (a view which is itself, I suggest, independently well motivated). Secondly, I contend that the arguments currently on the table in favour of dual pragmatics fail to show that formal semantics should be abandoned. These arguments for dual pragmatics stem from the existence of overt context-sensitivity in natural languages (for instance, in the form of indexicals and demonstratives) and the purported existence of covert context-sensitivity (in the form of ‘unarticulated constituents’). I look at these arguments in detail and suggest how the formal theorist can accommodate the apparent intrusion of pragmatics into the semantic realm. My defence of formal semantics holds, however, only given an appreciation of what I deem to be the limits of semantic theorizing. Thus, I argue overall for a minimal conception of the nature of semantic theories.Less
Seeks to defend a formal (e.g. truth-conditional) approach to semantic theorizing from advocates of so-called ‘dual pragmatics’ (e.g. relevance theorists or contextualists). I argue, first, that formal semantics is preferable to pragmatically saturated approaches since only formal accounts are compatible with a modularity view of linguistic understanding (a view which is itself, I suggest, independently well motivated). Secondly, I contend that the arguments currently on the table in favour of dual pragmatics fail to show that formal semantics should be abandoned. These arguments for dual pragmatics stem from the existence of overt context-sensitivity in natural languages (for instance, in the form of indexicals and demonstratives) and the purported existence of covert context-sensitivity (in the form of ‘unarticulated constituents’). I look at these arguments in detail and suggest how the formal theorist can accommodate the apparent intrusion of pragmatics into the semantic realm. My defence of formal semantics holds, however, only given an appreciation of what I deem to be the limits of semantic theorizing. Thus, I argue overall for a minimal conception of the nature of semantic theories.
Charles Travis
- Published in print:
- 2008
- Published Online:
- September 2008
- ISBN:
- 9780199230334
- eISBN:
- 9780191710605
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199230334.003.0004
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Language
There is a widespread view of truth, tracing back at least to Frege, on which we may say all there is to say about what truth is without so much as mentioning words. This chapter shows that this view ...
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There is a widespread view of truth, tracing back at least to Frege, on which we may say all there is to say about what truth is without so much as mentioning words. This chapter shows that this view is wrong. It argues that what words mean plays a role in fixing when they would be true; but not an exhaustive one. Meaning leaves room for variation in truth conditions from one speaking to another. What that non-exhaustive role is depends on what it is to have said what is true. Identification of the aspect of truth which fixes this role will collapse the widespread view.Less
There is a widespread view of truth, tracing back at least to Frege, on which we may say all there is to say about what truth is without so much as mentioning words. This chapter shows that this view is wrong. It argues that what words mean plays a role in fixing when they would be true; but not an exhaustive one. Meaning leaves room for variation in truth conditions from one speaking to another. What that non-exhaustive role is depends on what it is to have said what is true. Identification of the aspect of truth which fixes this role will collapse the widespread view.
Wayne A. Davis
- Published in print:
- 2005
- Published Online:
- February 2006
- ISBN:
- 9780199261659
- eISBN:
- 9780191603099
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0199261652.003.0009
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Language
This chapter focuses on word reference, and shows that the meaning of an expression cannot be identified with its reference to things in the world, rather than its expression of ideas in the mind. It ...
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This chapter focuses on word reference, and shows that the meaning of an expression cannot be identified with its reference to things in the world, rather than its expression of ideas in the mind. It looks at extensionalist versions of the referential theory that focus on objects in the actual world and sets thereof, as well as intensionalist versions that consider other possible worlds and/or properties and relations. It examines the Davidsonian theory, which used a Tarski-style axiomatization for languages to describe the compositionality of language. Truth-theoretic properties can be systematized in an ideational theory using a generative theory of thought, with phrase structure rules and Tarskian reference rules.Less
This chapter focuses on word reference, and shows that the meaning of an expression cannot be identified with its reference to things in the world, rather than its expression of ideas in the mind. It looks at extensionalist versions of the referential theory that focus on objects in the actual world and sets thereof, as well as intensionalist versions that consider other possible worlds and/or properties and relations. It examines the Davidsonian theory, which used a Tarski-style axiomatization for languages to describe the compositionality of language. Truth-theoretic properties can be systematized in an ideational theory using a generative theory of thought, with phrase structure rules and Tarskian reference rules.
Dorothy Edgington
- Published in print:
- 2009
- Published Online:
- May 2010
- ISBN:
- 9780199267989
- eISBN:
- 9780191708268
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199267989.003.0013
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind
This chapter argues that the conditional probability of the consequent given the antecedent is crucial to understanding indicative conditionals. However, unlike Jackson, it denies that the truth ...
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This chapter argues that the conditional probability of the consequent given the antecedent is crucial to understanding indicative conditionals. However, unlike Jackson, it denies that the truth value of an indicative conditional is given by the corresponding material conditional. To begin with are the difficulties that embedded conditionals (i.e. conditionals which have conditional antecedents and/or consequents) present to Jackson. Jackson is aware that embedded conditionals present problems to his approach, and argues that ‘If A then (if B then C)’ is regarded by English users as interchangeable with ‘If (A and B) then C’. Since the latter contains no embedded conditionals, the problem is avoided. However, the proposed solution fails to generalize in satisfactory ways to connectives like ‘but’ and ‘even’. In addition, Jackson's approach to conditionals is restricted to conditionals used to make assertions, and does not readily generalize to conditionals used in other kinds of speech acts. The response to the difficulties with taking the material conditional as giving the truth conditions for the indicative conditional is not to seek an alternative, more satisfactory account of the truth conditions of indicative conditionals; rather, the chapter endorses the ‘no truth conditions’ position originally proposed by Ernest Adams.Less
This chapter argues that the conditional probability of the consequent given the antecedent is crucial to understanding indicative conditionals. However, unlike Jackson, it denies that the truth value of an indicative conditional is given by the corresponding material conditional. To begin with are the difficulties that embedded conditionals (i.e. conditionals which have conditional antecedents and/or consequents) present to Jackson. Jackson is aware that embedded conditionals present problems to his approach, and argues that ‘If A then (if B then C)’ is regarded by English users as interchangeable with ‘If (A and B) then C’. Since the latter contains no embedded conditionals, the problem is avoided. However, the proposed solution fails to generalize in satisfactory ways to connectives like ‘but’ and ‘even’. In addition, Jackson's approach to conditionals is restricted to conditionals used to make assertions, and does not readily generalize to conditionals used in other kinds of speech acts. The response to the difficulties with taking the material conditional as giving the truth conditions for the indicative conditional is not to seek an alternative, more satisfactory account of the truth conditions of indicative conditionals; rather, the chapter endorses the ‘no truth conditions’ position originally proposed by Ernest Adams.
Mark Schroeder
- Published in print:
- 2008
- Published Online:
- September 2008
- ISBN:
- 9780199534654
- eISBN:
- 9780191715938
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199534654.003.0010
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Language
This chapter offers an alternative approach to assigning truth conditions to complex descriptive sentences. Truth conditions are first motivated as a kind of composite of the assertability conditions ...
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This chapter offers an alternative approach to assigning truth conditions to complex descriptive sentences. Truth conditions are first motivated as a kind of composite of the assertability conditions on sentences and mistake conditions on mental states. It is then suggested that given biforcated attitude semantics, plausible assumptions about what mistake conditions will involve can be used to assign the right truth conditions to complex descriptive sentences — a result which is proven in an appendix to the chapter. It is further suggested that given an appropriate semantics for ‘believes that’, the expressivist can go on to maintain that the states expressed by complex descriptive sentences really are beliefs, after all.Less
This chapter offers an alternative approach to assigning truth conditions to complex descriptive sentences. Truth conditions are first motivated as a kind of composite of the assertability conditions on sentences and mistake conditions on mental states. It is then suggested that given biforcated attitude semantics, plausible assumptions about what mistake conditions will involve can be used to assign the right truth conditions to complex descriptive sentences — a result which is proven in an appendix to the chapter. It is further suggested that given an appropriate semantics for ‘believes that’, the expressivist can go on to maintain that the states expressed by complex descriptive sentences really are beliefs, after all.
Christopher Peacocke
- Published in print:
- 1999
- Published Online:
- November 2003
- ISBN:
- 9780198238607
- eISBN:
- 9780191598197
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0198238606.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology
The Integration Challenge is the task of reconciling a plausible account of what is involved in the truth of statements of a given kind with a credible account of how we can know those statements, ...
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The Integration Challenge is the task of reconciling a plausible account of what is involved in the truth of statements of a given kind with a credible account of how we can know those statements, when we do know them. In any domain for which the challenge is difficult, we may revise either our conception of the epistemology of that domain, or our conception of its metaphysics, or both. Successfully meeting the Integration Challenge involves the development of a theory of understanding with both metaphysical and epistemological dimensions. Understanding involves an integrated grasp both of truth conditions, and, via a theory of possession conditions, and of circumstances in which one can come to know that certain of those conditions obtain. Two different models for meeting the Integration Challenge can be developed: the model of constitutive causal sensitivity and the model of implicitly known principles. A model of the first kind is developed for a realistic account of our understanding of past‐tense contents. A model of the second kind is developed for our understanding of contents involving metaphysical necessity; an account that treats modal statements as not mind‐dependent, but not as involving Lewisian modal realism. The Integration Challenge is also addressed for various classical and recent problems of philosophy: the nature of one's knowledge of the contents of one's own mental states; the distinctive nature of first‐person knowledge; and the classical problem of the freedom of the will.Less
The Integration Challenge is the task of reconciling a plausible account of what is involved in the truth of statements of a given kind with a credible account of how we can know those statements, when we do know them. In any domain for which the challenge is difficult, we may revise either our conception of the epistemology of that domain, or our conception of its metaphysics, or both. Successfully meeting the Integration Challenge involves the development of a theory of understanding with both metaphysical and epistemological dimensions. Understanding involves an integrated grasp both of truth conditions, and, via a theory of possession conditions, and of circumstances in which one can come to know that certain of those conditions obtain. Two different models for meeting the Integration Challenge can be developed: the model of constitutive causal sensitivity and the model of implicitly known principles. A model of the first kind is developed for a realistic account of our understanding of past‐tense contents. A model of the second kind is developed for our understanding of contents involving metaphysical necessity; an account that treats modal statements as not mind‐dependent, but not as involving Lewisian modal realism. The Integration Challenge is also addressed for various classical and recent problems of philosophy: the nature of one's knowledge of the contents of one's own mental states; the distinctive nature of first‐person knowledge; and the classical problem of the freedom of the will.