Jump to ContentJump to Main Navigation

You are looking at 1-8 of 8 items

  • Keywords: truth aptness x
Clear All Modify Search

View:

Truth, Truth-aptness, and Belief

Neil Sinclair

in Practical Expressivism

Published in print:
2021
Published Online:
February 2021
ISBN:
9780198866107
eISBN:
9780191898327
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/oso/9780198866107.003.0007
Subject:
Philosophy, Moral Philosophy

Three of the forms and assumptions of moral practice are that moral judgements are truth-apt, sometimes true, and that they express moral beliefs. Vindicating these assumptions seems inconsistent ... More


Fictions

Jody Azzouni

in Talking About Nothing: Numbers, Hallucinations and Fictions

Published in print:
2010
Published Online:
September 2010
ISBN:
9780199738946
eISBN:
9780199866175
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199738946.003.0003
Subject:
Philosophy, General

Fictional discourse, this chapter shows, is a truth-apt discourse that’s supported on and defers to what may be described as a pretence (or story-telling) practice that isn’t truth-apt. Nevertheless, ... More


A Path into Formal Pragmatics

Stephen J Barker

in Renewing Meaning: A Speech-Act Theoretic Approach

Published in print:
2004
Published Online:
August 2004
ISBN:
9780199263660
eISBN:
9780191601354
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/0199263663.003.0002
Subject:
Philosophy, Philosophy of Language

I develop the theory of proto-assertions, and proto-illocutionary acts, which are sentential speech-acts that can function as sentence meanings. I critique the standard semantic conception of truth. ... More


Are Moral Beliefs Truth‐Apt?

Walter Sinnott-Armstrong

in Moral Skepticisms

Published in print:
2006
Published Online:
February 2006
ISBN:
9780195187724
eISBN:
9780199786121
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/0195187725.003.0002
Subject:
Philosophy, Moral Philosophy

This chapter discusses expressivism as a form of moral skepticism that denies the truth-aptness of moral beliefs and judgments. It focuses on whether expressivists can solve the problem of embedding ... More


The Oxford Handbook of Ethical Theory

David Copp (ed.)

Published in print:
2005
Published Online:
February 2006
ISBN:
9780195147797
eISBN:
9780199785841
Item type:
book
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/0195147790.001.0001
Subject:
Philosophy, Moral Philosophy

The Oxford Handbook of Ethical Theory is a major new reference work in ethical theory, consisting of commissioned essays by leading moral philosophers. The handbook is divided into two parts, ... More


Pure versus Hybrid Expressivism and the Enigma of Conventional Implicature

Stephen Barker

in Having It Both Ways: Hybrid Theories and Modern Metaethics

Published in print:
2014
Published Online:
October 2014
ISBN:
9780199347582
eISBN:
9780199347605
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199347582.003.0009
Subject:
Philosophy, Moral Philosophy, General

One hybrid theory for moral sentences is the implicature theory (IT), according to which, in producing a value utterance, the speaker U says that Jane has F for some natural property F and ... More


Consequences for Deflationism

Keith Simmons

in Semantic Singularities: Paradoxes of Reference, Predication, and Truth

Published in print:
2018
Published Online:
July 2018
ISBN:
9780198791546
eISBN:
9780191852923
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/oso/9780198791546.003.0010
Subject:
Philosophy, Philosophy of Language, Logic/Philosophy of Mathematics

Chapter 10 investigates the consequences of the singularity theory for deflationary theories in general and disquotational theories in particular. The chapter argues that if we accept the singularity ... More


Objectivity and Path-dependence

Henry Richardson

in Articulating the Moral Community: Toward a Constructive Ethical Pragmatism

Published in print:
2018
Published Online:
August 2018
ISBN:
9780190247744
eISBN:
9780190247768
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/oso/9780190247744.003.0011
Subject:
Philosophy, Moral Philosophy, General

The possibility of new moral norms being introduced in the course of history implies differences in the moral truths between different time periods and different possible futures. This chapter argues ... More


View: