John Hendry
- Published in print:
- 2004
- Published Online:
- September 2007
- ISBN:
- 9780199268634
- eISBN:
- 9780191708381
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199268634.003.0010
- Subject:
- Business and Management, Strategy
This chapter summarizes the thesis of the book and states its main conclusion: that in contemporary society, the moral dimension of business needs to be managed directly by managers through the ...
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This chapter summarizes the thesis of the book and states its main conclusion: that in contemporary society, the moral dimension of business needs to be managed directly by managers through the medium of personal relationships. At the heart of this, in business as in society more widely, is the building of trustworthiness.Less
This chapter summarizes the thesis of the book and states its main conclusion: that in contemporary society, the moral dimension of business needs to be managed directly by managers through the medium of personal relationships. At the heart of this, in business as in society more widely, is the building of trustworthiness.
Shoutir Kishore Chatterjee
- Published in print:
- 2003
- Published Online:
- September 2007
- ISBN:
- 9780198525318
- eISBN:
- 9780191711657
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198525318.003.0004
- Subject:
- Mathematics, Probability / Statistics
Objective statistical induction may be behavioural, instantial, or pro-subjective (Bayesian), depending on the form of judging inferential uncertainty. In the behavioral case, the unknown parameters ...
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Objective statistical induction may be behavioural, instantial, or pro-subjective (Bayesian), depending on the form of judging inferential uncertainty. In the behavioral case, the unknown parameters are fixed and uncertainty is judged by measures of procedural trustworthiness (like significance and confidence levels, power and risk functions), interpreted through repeated conceptual experimentation. Various principles are invoked for optimizing the procedure in different problems. The instantial approach (likelihood inference, P-value testing, and fiducial inference) remains pegged to the instance at hand without visualizing repetition, and weighs uncertainty in non-standard ways, although often like the behavioural approach, it also has to appeal to sampling theory. In the pro-subjective Bayesian approach, the unknown parameters are subjectively random with a known prior distribution, and inference is based on their posterior distribution. Various kinds of priors (improper/proper, impersonal/personal) fit in different tastes and situations. The subjective approach, based on a fully known subjective probability model, ‘previses’ about future observables, conditionally fixing the observations, often assuming exchangeability to simplify the process. Comparison of the different approaches shows that each has a natural setting in which it is advantageous.Less
Objective statistical induction may be behavioural, instantial, or pro-subjective (Bayesian), depending on the form of judging inferential uncertainty. In the behavioral case, the unknown parameters are fixed and uncertainty is judged by measures of procedural trustworthiness (like significance and confidence levels, power and risk functions), interpreted through repeated conceptual experimentation. Various principles are invoked for optimizing the procedure in different problems. The instantial approach (likelihood inference, P-value testing, and fiducial inference) remains pegged to the instance at hand without visualizing repetition, and weighs uncertainty in non-standard ways, although often like the behavioural approach, it also has to appeal to sampling theory. In the pro-subjective Bayesian approach, the unknown parameters are subjectively random with a known prior distribution, and inference is based on their posterior distribution. Various kinds of priors (improper/proper, impersonal/personal) fit in different tastes and situations. The subjective approach, based on a fully known subjective probability model, ‘previses’ about future observables, conditionally fixing the observations, often assuming exchangeability to simplify the process. Comparison of the different approaches shows that each has a natural setting in which it is advantageous.
Onora O’neill
- Published in print:
- 2006
- Published Online:
- January 2012
- ISBN:
- 9780197263839
- eISBN:
- 9780191734915
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- British Academy
- DOI:
- 10.5871/bacad/9780197263839.003.0005
- Subject:
- Political Science, Political Theory
Transparency is widely supposed to make institutions and their officeholders both more trustworthy and more trusted. Yet in the United Kingdom many institutions and office-holders on whom ...
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Transparency is widely supposed to make institutions and their officeholders both more trustworthy and more trusted. Yet in the United Kingdom many institutions and office-holders on whom transparency requirements have been imposed across the last fifteen years are now seen as less trustworthy, and are apparently less trusted than they were before the requirements were introduced. Does this suggest that transparency does not improve trustworthiness? Or that it increases trustworthiness without increasing trust? Or is the supposed evidence for declining trustworthiness and declining trust misleading? How confident can we be that transparency supports either trustworthiness or trust? Government, corporations, and their critics seemingly converge in seeing transparency as indispensable for accountability and good governance, for preventing corruption and improving performance, and for increasing trustworthiness and trust. But does transparency have these desirable effects? Transparency requirements may fail to improve either trustworthiness or trust because they set a one-sided standard for public, corporate, or other communication. Although transparency demands too little for effective communication, it is an effective antidote to secrecy.Less
Transparency is widely supposed to make institutions and their officeholders both more trustworthy and more trusted. Yet in the United Kingdom many institutions and office-holders on whom transparency requirements have been imposed across the last fifteen years are now seen as less trustworthy, and are apparently less trusted than they were before the requirements were introduced. Does this suggest that transparency does not improve trustworthiness? Or that it increases trustworthiness without increasing trust? Or is the supposed evidence for declining trustworthiness and declining trust misleading? How confident can we be that transparency supports either trustworthiness or trust? Government, corporations, and their critics seemingly converge in seeing transparency as indispensable for accountability and good governance, for preventing corruption and improving performance, and for increasing trustworthiness and trust. But does transparency have these desirable effects? Transparency requirements may fail to improve either trustworthiness or trust because they set a one-sided standard for public, corporate, or other communication. Although transparency demands too little for effective communication, it is an effective antidote to secrecy.
Christian Smith, Michael O. Emerson, and Patricia Snell
- Published in print:
- 2008
- Published Online:
- May 2009
- ISBN:
- 9780195337112
- eISBN:
- 9780199868414
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195337112.003.0004
- Subject:
- Religion, Religion and Society
This chapter considers nine hypotheses potentially explaining the low levels of financial giving by American Christians. It argues that Most American Christians do not give generously for a ...
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This chapter considers nine hypotheses potentially explaining the low levels of financial giving by American Christians. It argues that Most American Christians do not give generously for a combination of reasons. The first is that many have not seriously confronted and grappled with the theological and moral teachings of their traditions to give generously — they are only vaguely aware of or perhaps even avoid those teachings. Second, most American Christians do not give generously because many of their churches settle for low expectations of financial giving. Third, some American Christians do not give generously in part because they lack a complete confidence in the trustworthiness of the churches and charitable organizations to which they do or would give money. Fourth, most American Christians do not give generously because, due to the total privatization and lack of accountability of such issues, there are few or no real consequences or costs to stingy, intermittent, or no giving. Fifth, most American Christians do not give generously because most tend to practice giving on an occasional and situational basis, not as a disciplined, structured, routine practice.Less
This chapter considers nine hypotheses potentially explaining the low levels of financial giving by American Christians. It argues that Most American Christians do not give generously for a combination of reasons. The first is that many have not seriously confronted and grappled with the theological and moral teachings of their traditions to give generously — they are only vaguely aware of or perhaps even avoid those teachings. Second, most American Christians do not give generously because many of their churches settle for low expectations of financial giving. Third, some American Christians do not give generously in part because they lack a complete confidence in the trustworthiness of the churches and charitable organizations to which they do or would give money. Fourth, most American Christians do not give generously because, due to the total privatization and lack of accountability of such issues, there are few or no real consequences or costs to stingy, intermittent, or no giving. Fifth, most American Christians do not give generously because most tend to practice giving on an occasional and situational basis, not as a disciplined, structured, routine practice.
Keith Lehrer
- Published in print:
- 2006
- Published Online:
- May 2010
- ISBN:
- 9780199276011
- eISBN:
- 9780191706110
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199276011.003.0008
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology, General
This chapter discusses the relationship between testimony, trustworthiness, and reliability. Simply believing the testimony of another, as Reid notes, is a natural inclination. However, a person must ...
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This chapter discusses the relationship between testimony, trustworthiness, and reliability. Simply believing the testimony of another, as Reid notes, is a natural inclination. However, a person must evaluate the trustworthiness of others in order to evaluate their testimony and decide whether one is justified in accepting it. Without such evaluation, testimony fails to convert to knowledge. However, there is a problem about the evaluation of trustworthiness of others. Such evaluation depends on accepting that one is trustworthy in evaluating others. But one's evaluation of the trustworthiness of oneself is conditioned on the testimony of others concerning one's very trustworthiness. The way out of the difficulty is to see, contrary to Schmitt's interpretation of Lehrer, that trustworthiness does not entail reliability, and to appreciate the virtue of an explanatory loop of trustworthiness in justification and knowledge.Less
This chapter discusses the relationship between testimony, trustworthiness, and reliability. Simply believing the testimony of another, as Reid notes, is a natural inclination. However, a person must evaluate the trustworthiness of others in order to evaluate their testimony and decide whether one is justified in accepting it. Without such evaluation, testimony fails to convert to knowledge. However, there is a problem about the evaluation of trustworthiness of others. Such evaluation depends on accepting that one is trustworthy in evaluating others. But one's evaluation of the trustworthiness of oneself is conditioned on the testimony of others concerning one's very trustworthiness. The way out of the difficulty is to see, contrary to Schmitt's interpretation of Lehrer, that trustworthiness does not entail reliability, and to appreciate the virtue of an explanatory loop of trustworthiness in justification and knowledge.
Kathleen Wells
- Published in print:
- 2011
- Published Online:
- January 2011
- ISBN:
- 9780195385793
- eISBN:
- 9780199827237
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195385793.003.0008
- Subject:
- Social Work, Research and Evaluation
This chapter discusses how validity has been framed in relation to qualitative research in general and narrative research in particular. Drawing on the work of Hammersley (1992), a framework for ...
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This chapter discusses how validity has been framed in relation to qualitative research in general and narrative research in particular. Drawing on the work of Hammersley (1992), a framework for considering the trustworthiness—validity and relevance—of narrative research is proposed. Validity and relevance are considered complex judgements that are made in response to questions such as these: What were the conditions under which the narrative was produced? Has the full text been subjected for analysis? Have the analytic categories used in the analysis been specified? Why do aspects of the text that do not support the major claims not undermine them? Has the broad context in which the text was produced been discussed? Questions that need to be addressed in order to assess a study's relevance; whether the research has been conducted ethically; and the role of reflexivity are also conceptualized.Less
This chapter discusses how validity has been framed in relation to qualitative research in general and narrative research in particular. Drawing on the work of Hammersley (1992), a framework for considering the trustworthiness—validity and relevance—of narrative research is proposed. Validity and relevance are considered complex judgements that are made in response to questions such as these: What were the conditions under which the narrative was produced? Has the full text been subjected for analysis? Have the analytic categories used in the analysis been specified? Why do aspects of the text that do not support the major claims not undermine them? Has the broad context in which the text was produced been discussed? Questions that need to be addressed in order to assess a study's relevance; whether the research has been conducted ethically; and the role of reflexivity are also conceptualized.
Paul Faulkner
- Published in print:
- 2010
- Published Online:
- January 2011
- ISBN:
- 9780199577477
- eISBN:
- 9780191595189
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199577477.003.0007
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology, Philosophy of Language
Should we tell other people the truth? Should we believe what other people tell us? This chapter argues that something like these norms of truth-telling and belief govern our production and receipt ...
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Should we tell other people the truth? Should we believe what other people tell us? This chapter argues that something like these norms of truth-telling and belief govern our production and receipt of testimony in conversational contexts. It then attempts to articulate these norms and determine their justification. More fully specified these norms prescribe that speakers tell the truth informatively, or be trustworthy, and that audiences presume that speakers do this, or trust. These norms of trust, as norms of conversational cooperation, would then seem to be justified on the basis of the interest that each has in the cooperative outcome. The norms of trust would then be justified as Lewisian conventions. However, the joint outcome prescribed by these norms is not an equilibrium point: a speaker always does better to have an audience's trust and the liberty to tell the truth or not as it suits. In this way, testimony presents a problem of trust. The justification of these norms of trust then starts from the recognition that any society that did not resolve this problem of trust would be stymied as a society. The resolution of this problem then requires securing the motivations characteristic of trusting and being trustworthy, where to have these motivations is to have an ethical outlook defined in terms of internalising these norms of trust. This justification is genealogical and it is one of value.Less
Should we tell other people the truth? Should we believe what other people tell us? This chapter argues that something like these norms of truth-telling and belief govern our production and receipt of testimony in conversational contexts. It then attempts to articulate these norms and determine their justification. More fully specified these norms prescribe that speakers tell the truth informatively, or be trustworthy, and that audiences presume that speakers do this, or trust. These norms of trust, as norms of conversational cooperation, would then seem to be justified on the basis of the interest that each has in the cooperative outcome. The norms of trust would then be justified as Lewisian conventions. However, the joint outcome prescribed by these norms is not an equilibrium point: a speaker always does better to have an audience's trust and the liberty to tell the truth or not as it suits. In this way, testimony presents a problem of trust. The justification of these norms of trust then starts from the recognition that any society that did not resolve this problem of trust would be stymied as a society. The resolution of this problem then requires securing the motivations characteristic of trusting and being trustworthy, where to have these motivations is to have an ethical outlook defined in terms of internalising these norms of trust. This justification is genealogical and it is one of value.
Alan Millar
- Published in print:
- 2010
- Published Online:
- January 2011
- ISBN:
- 9780199577477
- eISBN:
- 9780191595189
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199577477.003.0009
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology, Philosophy of Language
This chapter's discussion focuses on the transmission of knowledge through testimony in straightforward cases. These are cases in which subjects gain knowledge from the say so of a speaker without in ...
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This chapter's discussion focuses on the transmission of knowledge through testimony in straightforward cases. These are cases in which subjects gain knowledge from the say so of a speaker without in any obvious way engaging in reasoning over the trustworthiness of the speaker. The account here accords a central role to the practice of informing through telling, but while practice-theoretic considerations explain how it is that people who rely on testimony will so often acquire true beliefs, they do not explain how testimony can yield knowledge. For that we need to show that testimony that something is so can settle that it is so. The suggested account treats knowledge from testimony as a special case of knowledge through recognition of the significance of an indicator, for instance, a reading on a fuel gauge, or the presence of tracks on a path. To account for such knowledge we need to bring into play the notion of an ability to recognize the significance of an indicator—an ability that is honed by experience. These considerations are applied to the case of recognizing a person to be trustworthy in respect of an act of telling.Less
This chapter's discussion focuses on the transmission of knowledge through testimony in straightforward cases. These are cases in which subjects gain knowledge from the say so of a speaker without in any obvious way engaging in reasoning over the trustworthiness of the speaker. The account here accords a central role to the practice of informing through telling, but while practice-theoretic considerations explain how it is that people who rely on testimony will so often acquire true beliefs, they do not explain how testimony can yield knowledge. For that we need to show that testimony that something is so can settle that it is so. The suggested account treats knowledge from testimony as a special case of knowledge through recognition of the significance of an indicator, for instance, a reading on a fuel gauge, or the presence of tracks on a path. To account for such knowledge we need to bring into play the notion of an ability to recognize the significance of an indicator—an ability that is honed by experience. These considerations are applied to the case of recognizing a person to be trustworthy in respect of an act of telling.
Alan Millar
- Published in print:
- 2010
- Published Online:
- September 2010
- ISBN:
- 9780199586264
- eISBN:
- 9780191723360
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199586264.003.0008
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology, General
This chapter argues that the goal of enquiry is reflective knowledge. Reflective knowledge is knowledge along with knowledge of how we know, or at least knowledge that we know. Recently discussed ...
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This chapter argues that the goal of enquiry is reflective knowledge. Reflective knowledge is knowledge along with knowledge of how we know, or at least knowledge that we know. Recently discussed puzzlement about the value of knowledge is circumvented. The social transmission of knowledge is explored via a discussion of straightforward cases of testimony. An account of those cases is developed, drawing on the account of knowledge from indicators in the previous chapter but also invoking the idea that there is a practice of informing others by telling them things. A practice is taken to be a cluster of essentially rule-governed activities. It is argued that the account of practices does not suffice to explain the straightforward cases. We need to make sense of how we can recognize trustworthiness on the matter in hand.Less
This chapter argues that the goal of enquiry is reflective knowledge. Reflective knowledge is knowledge along with knowledge of how we know, or at least knowledge that we know. Recently discussed puzzlement about the value of knowledge is circumvented. The social transmission of knowledge is explored via a discussion of straightforward cases of testimony. An account of those cases is developed, drawing on the account of knowledge from indicators in the previous chapter but also invoking the idea that there is a practice of informing others by telling them things. A practice is taken to be a cluster of essentially rule-governed activities. It is argued that the account of practices does not suffice to explain the straightforward cases. We need to make sense of how we can recognize trustworthiness on the matter in hand.
Jennifer Radden and John Z. Sadler
- Published in print:
- 2009
- Published Online:
- February 2010
- ISBN:
- 9780195389371
- eISBN:
- 9780199866328
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195389371.003.0006
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Moral Philosophy, General
Some of the virtues called for by the psychiatric setting are enumerated in Chapter 5. Several different kinds of character traits are included here: some are traits as essential in everyday as in ...
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Some of the virtues called for by the psychiatric setting are enumerated in Chapter 5. Several different kinds of character traits are included here: some are traits as essential in everyday as in professional life but demanded to a greater degree in practice setting than in most other settings. Others, while elsewhere merely prudential or intellectual virtues, become role-constituted virtues for the practitioner in psychiatry. Yet other traits are closely role-constituted virtues, without universally recognized moral value beyond the professional setting. Not intended to be a complete portrait of the character of the virtuous psychiatrist, Chapter 5's discussion rather serves as a template for identifying that character by appeal to particular aspects of the psychiatry setting. The virtues selected for discussion are each analyzed in an effort to demonstrate their link to demands determined by that setting.Less
Some of the virtues called for by the psychiatric setting are enumerated in Chapter 5. Several different kinds of character traits are included here: some are traits as essential in everyday as in professional life but demanded to a greater degree in practice setting than in most other settings. Others, while elsewhere merely prudential or intellectual virtues, become role-constituted virtues for the practitioner in psychiatry. Yet other traits are closely role-constituted virtues, without universally recognized moral value beyond the professional setting. Not intended to be a complete portrait of the character of the virtuous psychiatrist, Chapter 5's discussion rather serves as a template for identifying that character by appeal to particular aspects of the psychiatry setting. The virtues selected for discussion are each analyzed in an effort to demonstrate their link to demands determined by that setting.
Keith Lehrer
- Published in print:
- 1997
- Published Online:
- October 2011
- ISBN:
- 9780198236658
- eISBN:
- 9780191679322
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198236658.003.0003
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology
This chapter is concerned with the nature of trustworthiness, that which makes a person worthy of his or her own trust concerning acceptance, preference, and reasoning. If focuses on the question of ...
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This chapter is concerned with the nature of trustworthiness, that which makes a person worthy of his or her own trust concerning acceptance, preference, and reasoning. If focuses on the question of whether trustworthiness concerning acceptance supervenes on naturalistic or non-epistemic features of agents.Less
This chapter is concerned with the nature of trustworthiness, that which makes a person worthy of his or her own trust concerning acceptance, preference, and reasoning. If focuses on the question of whether trustworthiness concerning acceptance supervenes on naturalistic or non-epistemic features of agents.
Keith Lehrer
- Published in print:
- 1997
- Published Online:
- October 2011
- ISBN:
- 9780198236658
- eISBN:
- 9780191679322
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198236658.003.0006
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology
This chapter turns to a more general consideration of the relationships between the self and others, with the purpose of enclosing ourselves and others within the keystone loop of trust and ...
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This chapter turns to a more general consideration of the relationships between the self and others, with the purpose of enclosing ourselves and others within the keystone loop of trust and trustworthiness. The question of whether a person is worthy of trust or is trustworthy arises most naturally concerning others. As we trust others and evaluate whether they are worthy of our trust, however, we trust ourselves and accept that we are worthy of our trust in making that judgement. Finally, as a result of considering others worthy of our trust, we modify ourselves and become more worthy of our own trust as a result of trusting them. Consideration of our relations to others, in addition to its intrinsic interest, has special implications for the keystone loop of self-trust, trust of others, and the trustworthiness of ourselves and others for ourselves and others. We then enclose the trust of others and the trustworthiness of others within the keystone loop.Less
This chapter turns to a more general consideration of the relationships between the self and others, with the purpose of enclosing ourselves and others within the keystone loop of trust and trustworthiness. The question of whether a person is worthy of trust or is trustworthy arises most naturally concerning others. As we trust others and evaluate whether they are worthy of our trust, however, we trust ourselves and accept that we are worthy of our trust in making that judgement. Finally, as a result of considering others worthy of our trust, we modify ourselves and become more worthy of our own trust as a result of trusting them. Consideration of our relations to others, in addition to its intrinsic interest, has special implications for the keystone loop of self-trust, trust of others, and the trustworthiness of ourselves and others for ourselves and others. We then enclose the trust of others and the trustworthiness of others within the keystone loop.
Stephen Gorard
- Published in print:
- 2018
- Published Online:
- May 2019
- ISBN:
- 9781447342144
- eISBN:
- 9781447342212
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Policy Press
- DOI:
- 10.1332/policypress/9781447342144.003.0002
- Subject:
- Education, Educational Policy and Politics
This chapter discusses the conduct of education research, as well as some methodological innovations that have been proposed and used. A simple general approach to research is described; including a ...
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This chapter discusses the conduct of education research, as well as some methodological innovations that have been proposed and used. A simple general approach to research is described; including a ‘sieve’, or a set of criteria, used to assist in the estimation of trustworthiness of any research study and the number of counterfactual cases needed to disturb a finding (NNTD). The chapter describes these and other innovations to generate evidence used in the following chapters; such as the mean absolute deviation and the Gorard segregation index. Furthermore, it presents an outline of additional research methods used in the following chapters.Less
This chapter discusses the conduct of education research, as well as some methodological innovations that have been proposed and used. A simple general approach to research is described; including a ‘sieve’, or a set of criteria, used to assist in the estimation of trustworthiness of any research study and the number of counterfactual cases needed to disturb a finding (NNTD). The chapter describes these and other innovations to generate evidence used in the following chapters; such as the mean absolute deviation and the Gorard segregation index. Furthermore, it presents an outline of additional research methods used in the following chapters.
Claudia Card
- Published in print:
- 2002
- Published Online:
- November 2003
- ISBN:
- 9780195145083
- eISBN:
- 9780199833115
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0195145089.003.0009
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Aesthetics
Perpetrators of atrocities carry burdens of guilt and incur obligations to apologize and repair harm. Mercy from victims is not only a power to relieve punishment or blame but also a compassionate ...
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Perpetrators of atrocities carry burdens of guilt and incur obligations to apologize and repair harm. Mercy from victims is not only a power to relieve punishment or blame but also a compassionate response that allows perpetrators to carry out responsibilities of reparation and apology, which in turn enable them to manifest goodwill and develop trustworthiness. Mercy and the gratitude that it naturally evokes thus have the potential to substitute mutually reinforcing goodwill for past ill will, provided that mercy can be shown compatibly with justice and self‐respect. As a response to one's own evildoing, guilt has an advantage over shame in that although shame can motivate achievements that restore self‐esteem, guilt can also motivate rectification of wrongs to others, which not only supports the rectifier's self‐esteem but also can alleviate victims’ resentment. Contrary to the popular view of guilt as simply negative (and thereby perverse), guilt can manifest itself in such constructive responses as confession, contrition, apology, restitution, and reparation, which actually relieve negative self‐judgment.Less
Perpetrators of atrocities carry burdens of guilt and incur obligations to apologize and repair harm. Mercy from victims is not only a power to relieve punishment or blame but also a compassionate response that allows perpetrators to carry out responsibilities of reparation and apology, which in turn enable them to manifest goodwill and develop trustworthiness. Mercy and the gratitude that it naturally evokes thus have the potential to substitute mutually reinforcing goodwill for past ill will, provided that mercy can be shown compatibly with justice and self‐respect. As a response to one's own evildoing, guilt has an advantage over shame in that although shame can motivate achievements that restore self‐esteem, guilt can also motivate rectification of wrongs to others, which not only supports the rectifier's self‐esteem but also can alleviate victims’ resentment. Contrary to the popular view of guilt as simply negative (and thereby perverse), guilt can manifest itself in such constructive responses as confession, contrition, apology, restitution, and reparation, which actually relieve negative self‐judgment.
Michael Saini and Aron Shlonsky
- Published in print:
- 2012
- Published Online:
- May 2012
- ISBN:
- 9780195387216
- eISBN:
- 9780199932092
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195387216.003.0007
- Subject:
- Social Work, Research and Evaluation
While acknowledging the long-standing debate regarding the appraisal of qualitative studies, we introduce a study appraisal form that has been created to assess methodological rigor, credibility, ...
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While acknowledging the long-standing debate regarding the appraisal of qualitative studies, we introduce a study appraisal form that has been created to assess methodological rigor, credibility, dependability, confirmability, transferability, and relevance within and across qualitative studies. We also provide an illustration regarding the applicability of the appraisal form. To illustrate the inclusion of qualitative studies within the family of systematic reviews, we present a working systematic review that includes both intervention studies and qualitative studies to assess family group decision making within a child welfare context.Less
While acknowledging the long-standing debate regarding the appraisal of qualitative studies, we introduce a study appraisal form that has been created to assess methodological rigor, credibility, dependability, confirmability, transferability, and relevance within and across qualitative studies. We also provide an illustration regarding the applicability of the appraisal form. To illustrate the inclusion of qualitative studies within the family of systematic reviews, we present a working systematic review that includes both intervention studies and qualitative studies to assess family group decision making within a child welfare context.
Denise E. Bronson and Tamara S. Davis
- Published in print:
- 2011
- Published Online:
- January 2012
- ISBN:
- 9780195337365
- eISBN:
- 9780199918201
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195337365.003.0025
- Subject:
- Social Work, Research and Evaluation
This chapter discusses systematic reviews based on qualitative studies. Challenges and benefits unique to qualitative reviews are considered. The questions guiding these reviews will differ from ...
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This chapter discusses systematic reviews based on qualitative studies. Challenges and benefits unique to qualitative reviews are considered. The questions guiding these reviews will differ from those employing quantitative research, and different methods for critically appraising and synthesizing the research are required.Less
This chapter discusses systematic reviews based on qualitative studies. Challenges and benefits unique to qualitative reviews are considered. The questions guiding these reviews will differ from those employing quantitative research, and different methods for critically appraising and synthesizing the research are required.
Margaret Rundle, Carrie James, Katie Davis, Jennifer O. Ryan, John M. Francis, and Howard Gardner
- Published in print:
- 2012
- Published Online:
- May 2012
- ISBN:
- 9780199756087
- eISBN:
- 9780199949571
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199756087.003.0003
- Subject:
- Business and Management, Organization Studies, Corporate Governance and Accountability
This chapter explores the “mental models” of trust that youth utilize in assessing the trustworthiness of others and the implications of such mental models for the future of democratic life. Findings ...
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This chapter explores the “mental models” of trust that youth utilize in assessing the trustworthiness of others and the implications of such mental models for the future of democratic life. Findings from in depth, semi structured interviews suggest that many youth rely predominately on an earned-through-performance model of trust when assessing the trustworthiness of others. However, a substantial number of youth favor models based on interactions evidence – particularly earned-through-interactions or evolves-through-interactions models – when assessing the trustworthiness of distant figures such as politicians and others in public life, where such interactions are improbable. The use of interactions evidence to assess trustworthiness is related to a passive withholding trust stance which has troubling implications for youth democratic participation; by disengaging from trustworthiness assessments of political figures, youth may be unmotivated to engage in related civic and political spheres.Less
This chapter explores the “mental models” of trust that youth utilize in assessing the trustworthiness of others and the implications of such mental models for the future of democratic life. Findings from in depth, semi structured interviews suggest that many youth rely predominately on an earned-through-performance model of trust when assessing the trustworthiness of others. However, a substantial number of youth favor models based on interactions evidence – particularly earned-through-interactions or evolves-through-interactions models – when assessing the trustworthiness of distant figures such as politicians and others in public life, where such interactions are improbable. The use of interactions evidence to assess trustworthiness is related to a passive withholding trust stance which has troubling implications for youth democratic participation; by disengaging from trustworthiness assessments of political figures, youth may be unmotivated to engage in related civic and political spheres.
Kimberly D. Elsbach and Steven C. Currall
- Published in print:
- 2012
- Published Online:
- May 2012
- ISBN:
- 9780199756087
- eISBN:
- 9780199949571
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199756087.003.0011
- Subject:
- Business and Management, Organization Studies, Corporate Governance and Accountability
In this chapter, we use research on both spontaneous trait inferences (i.e., perceptions of individual characteristics based on the mere observation of behavior) and motivated ...
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In this chapter, we use research on both spontaneous trait inferences (i.e., perceptions of individual characteristics based on the mere observation of behavior) and motivated person-perception (i.e., perceptions of others that are influenced by perceiver needs and emotions) to develop a model explaining the differing effects of incompetent vs. immoral acts on leader trustworthiness. This model suggests that the initial labeling of leader actions as “immoral” triggers different cognitive processes in observers than does the labeling of these actions as “incompetent”. We illustrate these differences through case illustrations of two relatively successful leaders who found their trustworthiness threatened; one by actions that were labeled as immoral, and one by actions that were labeled as incompetent. We discuss the implications of our model for leaders and their followers.Less
In this chapter, we use research on both spontaneous trait inferences (i.e., perceptions of individual characteristics based on the mere observation of behavior) and motivated person-perception (i.e., perceptions of others that are influenced by perceiver needs and emotions) to develop a model explaining the differing effects of incompetent vs. immoral acts on leader trustworthiness. This model suggests that the initial labeling of leader actions as “immoral” triggers different cognitive processes in observers than does the labeling of these actions as “incompetent”. We illustrate these differences through case illustrations of two relatively successful leaders who found their trustworthiness threatened; one by actions that were labeled as immoral, and one by actions that were labeled as incompetent. We discuss the implications of our model for leaders and their followers.
Jannie Lilja
- Published in print:
- 2012
- Published Online:
- January 2012
- ISBN:
- 9780199791743
- eISBN:
- 9780199919222
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199791743.003.0007
- Subject:
- Psychology, Social Psychology
During an ongoing identity conflict, who decides whether or not to negotiate, and who represents the nonstate side in negotiations, are rarely obvious. A logic of outbidding predicts that the most ...
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During an ongoing identity conflict, who decides whether or not to negotiate, and who represents the nonstate side in negotiations, are rarely obvious. A logic of outbidding predicts that the most extreme faction in the nonstate camp will prevail. Outbidding, in short, means that nonconciliatory deeds and discourse are used by actors with the objective of leading and representing the identity group. The question is thus how it is possible for a nonstate party to initiate negotiations and achieve agreement, and what external diplomatic interventions could assist this process. The chapter distinguishes theoretically between different aspects of outbidding. On this basis, expected outbidding strategies are formulated and explored in relation to actual strategies used by nonstate negotiators in three identity conflicts: Sri Lanka, Indonesian Aceh, and Senegalese Casamance. The findings suggest that the extensive use of violent outbidding appears to be associated with negotiation breakdown. Moreover, the findings underscore that outbidding at its core is about the signaling of trustworthiness. Outbidding may thus far have been overly correlated with terrorist violence and political extremism at the expense of more subtle nonviolent measures. In terms of policy, the results suggest the fruitfulness of diplomatic involvement. Merely inviting groups to formal talks may trigger change on the nonstate side in the direction of a political settlement. During negotiations, third parties can help to enhance transparency, facilitate communication, and control information.Less
During an ongoing identity conflict, who decides whether or not to negotiate, and who represents the nonstate side in negotiations, are rarely obvious. A logic of outbidding predicts that the most extreme faction in the nonstate camp will prevail. Outbidding, in short, means that nonconciliatory deeds and discourse are used by actors with the objective of leading and representing the identity group. The question is thus how it is possible for a nonstate party to initiate negotiations and achieve agreement, and what external diplomatic interventions could assist this process. The chapter distinguishes theoretically between different aspects of outbidding. On this basis, expected outbidding strategies are formulated and explored in relation to actual strategies used by nonstate negotiators in three identity conflicts: Sri Lanka, Indonesian Aceh, and Senegalese Casamance. The findings suggest that the extensive use of violent outbidding appears to be associated with negotiation breakdown. Moreover, the findings underscore that outbidding at its core is about the signaling of trustworthiness. Outbidding may thus far have been overly correlated with terrorist violence and political extremism at the expense of more subtle nonviolent measures. In terms of policy, the results suggest the fruitfulness of diplomatic involvement. Merely inviting groups to formal talks may trigger change on the nonstate side in the direction of a political settlement. During negotiations, third parties can help to enhance transparency, facilitate communication, and control information.
George A. Aragon
- Published in print:
- 2010
- Published Online:
- January 2011
- ISBN:
- 9780195305968
- eISBN:
- 9780199867844
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195305968.003.0006
- Subject:
- Economics and Finance, Financial Economics
This chapter examines trust in the context of ethics and economic anomalies. The purpose is to demonstrate how ethical considerations can describe and predict behavior which is inconsistent with ...
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This chapter examines trust in the context of ethics and economic anomalies. The purpose is to demonstrate how ethical considerations can describe and predict behavior which is inconsistent with “economic rationality”.Less
This chapter examines trust in the context of ethics and economic anomalies. The purpose is to demonstrate how ethical considerations can describe and predict behavior which is inconsistent with “economic rationality”.
