Linda Trinkaus Zagzebski
- Published in print:
- 2020
- Published Online:
- October 2020
- ISBN:
- 9780197529171
- eISBN:
- 9780197529201
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/oso/9780197529171.003.0007
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology
This chapter offers an account of trust and its relation to the intellectual virtues. It argues that trust has both practical and epistemic forms, but both forms include elements of belief, feeling, ...
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This chapter offers an account of trust and its relation to the intellectual virtues. It argues that trust has both practical and epistemic forms, but both forms include elements of belief, feeling, and behavior. Epistemic self-trust and trust in others is prereflective and rationally inescapable. Epistemic self-trust is not an intellectual virtue, but it is closely connected to a host of such virtues. Many of the intellectual virtues would not be virtues at all were it not for the reasonableness of epistemic self-trust or trust in others. Some virtues are enhancements of epistemic trust and some are constraints on it. The connection also goes in the other direction because there are ways in which intellectual virtues prevent trust from becoming either excessive or deficient.Less
This chapter offers an account of trust and its relation to the intellectual virtues. It argues that trust has both practical and epistemic forms, but both forms include elements of belief, feeling, and behavior. Epistemic self-trust and trust in others is prereflective and rationally inescapable. Epistemic self-trust is not an intellectual virtue, but it is closely connected to a host of such virtues. Many of the intellectual virtues would not be virtues at all were it not for the reasonableness of epistemic self-trust or trust in others. Some virtues are enhancements of epistemic trust and some are constraints on it. The connection also goes in the other direction because there are ways in which intellectual virtues prevent trust from becoming either excessive or deficient.
Linda Zagzebski
- Published in print:
- 2014
- Published Online:
- April 2014
- ISBN:
- 9780199645541
- eISBN:
- 9780191744549
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199645541.003.0013
- Subject:
- Religion, Philosophy of Religion, Theology
This chapter argues that trust is a complex attitude with a component of belief, a component of feeling, and a behavioral component. These components are present in standard cases of epistemic trust ...
More
This chapter argues that trust is a complex attitude with a component of belief, a component of feeling, and a behavioral component. These components are present in standard cases of epistemic trust as well as trust in the practical domain. It is reasonable to have all of the components of basic epistemic self-trust and trust in others. Epistemic self-trust includes the following: (a) we believe that our faculties will get us to the truth and that we can be harmed if they produce falsehoods, (b) we feel trusting towards our faculties for that purpose, and (c) we treat them as if they will get us to the truth. The chapter then argues that basic epistemic trust in others is a commitment of epistemic self-trust. Many of the intellectual virtues are either enhancements of epistemic trust or constraints on it.Less
This chapter argues that trust is a complex attitude with a component of belief, a component of feeling, and a behavioral component. These components are present in standard cases of epistemic trust as well as trust in the practical domain. It is reasonable to have all of the components of basic epistemic self-trust and trust in others. Epistemic self-trust includes the following: (a) we believe that our faculties will get us to the truth and that we can be harmed if they produce falsehoods, (b) we feel trusting towards our faculties for that purpose, and (c) we treat them as if they will get us to the truth. The chapter then argues that basic epistemic trust in others is a commitment of epistemic self-trust. Many of the intellectual virtues are either enhancements of epistemic trust or constraints on it.
