Greg Littmann and Keith Simmons
- Published in print:
- 2004
- Published Online:
- May 2010
- ISBN:
- 9780199265176
- eISBN:
- 9780191713989
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199265176.003.0020
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Language, Logic/Philosophy of Mathematics
Dialetheism is the view that there are true contradictions. The strongest argument in favour of dialetheism is that it alone allows us to solve semantic paradoxes like the liar paradox. This chapter ...
More
Dialetheism is the view that there are true contradictions. The strongest argument in favour of dialetheism is that it alone allows us to solve semantic paradoxes like the liar paradox. This chapter presents two main criticisms of dialetheism. First, it argues that semantic pathology spreads to the dialetheist theory itself, putting into question the acceptability of the theory. Second, it argues that, even though dialetheism admits true contradictions, it is nevertheless subject to a revenge liar.Less
Dialetheism is the view that there are true contradictions. The strongest argument in favour of dialetheism is that it alone allows us to solve semantic paradoxes like the liar paradox. This chapter presents two main criticisms of dialetheism. First, it argues that semantic pathology spreads to the dialetheist theory itself, putting into question the acceptability of the theory. Second, it argues that, even though dialetheism admits true contradictions, it is nevertheless subject to a revenge liar.
Graham Priest
- Published in print:
- 2006
- Published Online:
- May 2007
- ISBN:
- 9780199263301
- eISBN:
- 9780191718823
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199263301.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Logic/Philosophy of Mathematics
This book advocates and defends the view that there are true contradictions (dialetheism), a view that has flown in the face of orthodoxy in Western philosophy since Aristotle's time. The book has ...
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This book advocates and defends the view that there are true contradictions (dialetheism), a view that has flown in the face of orthodoxy in Western philosophy since Aristotle's time. The book has been at the centre of the controversies surrounding dialetheism ever since the first edition was published in 1987. This text contains the second edition of the book. It expands upon the original in various ways, and also contains the author's reflections on developments over the last two decades.Less
This book advocates and defends the view that there are true contradictions (dialetheism), a view that has flown in the face of orthodoxy in Western philosophy since Aristotle's time. The book has been at the centre of the controversies surrounding dialetheism ever since the first edition was published in 1987. This text contains the second edition of the book. It expands upon the original in various ways, and also contains the author's reflections on developments over the last two decades.
Alan Weir
- Published in print:
- 2004
- Published Online:
- May 2010
- ISBN:
- 9780199265176
- eISBN:
- 9780191713989
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199265176.003.0023
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Language, Logic/Philosophy of Mathematics
This chapter argues that it is both reasonable and worthwhile for the non-dialetheist to engage in dispute with the dialetheist. From principles acceptable to dialetheists, it can be shown that ...
More
This chapter argues that it is both reasonable and worthwhile for the non-dialetheist to engage in dispute with the dialetheist. From principles acceptable to dialetheists, it can be shown that affirming true contradictions involves the violation of meaning constraints; here, appeal is made to the relationship between Quinean matrices of belief and disbelief, and the voluntary practices of accepting and rejection. It is further argued that dialetheism involves an ad hoc asymmetry between the roles of truth and falsity, that it is unable to give an adequate account of the ‘classical recapture’ of the classical mathematics we need for science, and that it cannot provide a non-subjective characterization of the distinction between good and bad contradictions, this implicating it in a form of irrationalism.Less
This chapter argues that it is both reasonable and worthwhile for the non-dialetheist to engage in dispute with the dialetheist. From principles acceptable to dialetheists, it can be shown that affirming true contradictions involves the violation of meaning constraints; here, appeal is made to the relationship between Quinean matrices of belief and disbelief, and the voluntary practices of accepting and rejection. It is further argued that dialetheism involves an ad hoc asymmetry between the roles of truth and falsity, that it is unable to give an adequate account of the ‘classical recapture’ of the classical mathematics we need for science, and that it cannot provide a non-subjective characterization of the distinction between good and bad contradictions, this implicating it in a form of irrationalism.
Jc Beall
- Published in print:
- 2021
- Published Online:
- February 2021
- ISBN:
- 9780198852360
- eISBN:
- 9780191886829
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/oso/9780198852360.003.0001
- Subject:
- Religion, Philosophy of Religion
This chapter presents the book’s principal thesis in a concise, big-picture way.
This chapter presents the book’s principal thesis in a concise, big-picture way.
