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The central thesis of this chapter is that Theaetetus reinforces the account of knowledge in Republic. Theaetetus does this despite the nominal άπορία at the end of the dialogue. This view seems increasingly to be out of favour, for it has recently been argued that Theaetetus rejects the discontinuity of έπιστήμη and δόξα, strongly implying, on the contrary, that έπιστήμη of the sensible world is possible. If this is so, then presumably there can be έπιστήμη and δόξα of the same objects. And if this is so, then there would seem to be nothing in principle against there being δόξα of the Forms or knowledge of sensibles. Accordingly, the criteria for knowledge, which entail that there is knowledge only of immaterial entities, would have to be revised.

Part II of the Theaetetus discusses the proposal that knowledge is true belief. Contrary to widespread views, the chapter argues that this proposal deserves to be taken seriously, and is taken seriously by Plato. It is argued that Part II of the dialogue addresses belief's relationship to the truth, and the question of whether beliefs are properly evaluated as true and false. The chapter contains detailed analyses of the transition between Part I and II of the dialogue—with focus on the question of whether belief ‘reaches’ the truth—as well as a re-interpretation of the Jury Example at the end of Part II. The chapter prepares the ground for chapter 7, where the Stoic view that beliefs are not bearers of truth-values is explored.

There has been a recent renewal of interest — inspired in part by Jonathan Kvanvig — in questions about whether knowledge is of distinctive epistemic value and, more general, what exactly is of distinctive epistemic value. One implication of the literature is that if knowledge is not of distinctive epistemic value, it doesn't deserve its central place in epistemology. After arguing that what should matter for epistemological attention is the importance, rather than the value, of knowledge, the chapter turns to arguing that conclusions in earlier chapters show a way toward explaining the distinctive importance of knowledge: unless knowledge requires certainty, earlier conclusions can be used to construct a biconditional account of knowledge that explains its distinctive importance better than rival accounts. Along the way the chapter argues that true belief is not particularly valuable.

This chapter gives a distinctive account of the normativity that is constitutive of knowledge. This account is used to throw light on the much discussed value problem that derives from Plato's Meno: how can knowledge (as such) be better than the corresponding true belief?

This chapter explores the problem of what makes knowledge more valuable than mere true belief. Otherwise known as the value problem, it distinguishes four ways a belief can possess value by evaluating its relation to truth: (i) a belief can have value because truth is its consequence; (ii) a belief can have teleological value in the Aristotelian sense — that is, the kind of value attributable to that which is a necessary component of a good natural end; (iii) assuming true beliefs are good, a belief can be valuable in that truth is its end in the sense of an aim; and (iv) a belief can be good in virtue of arising from a good motive — namely, valuing truth or disvaluing falsehood. Ultimately, the fourth way is superior to the first three because a belief that is motivated by valuing truth has the kind of value which makes knowledge better than mere true believing.

This chapter examines an argument that a number of philosophers have recently employed to show that something ordinarily considered valuable is not, in fact, valuable. The argument begins by emphasizing that the analysis of the concept of the putatively valuable thing is a ‘hodgepodge,’ ‘gerrymandered,’ ‘an ad hoc sprawl,’—in short, ugly. Reflecting upon the ugly analysis, we are supposed to intuitively judge that ‘things like that’ to lack value. The argument concludes that the putatively valuable thing is not valuable. Stephen Stich uses the argument to show true belief lacks value. The argument figures prominently in Jonathan Kvanvig's argument that knowledge has no distinctive value. Timothy Williamson flips the argument: since knowledge is obviously valuable, but its analyses have been forced to become increasingly ugly, knowledge is not analysable. This form of argument is rejected.

This chapter takes up how value matters in epistemology, and considers the Meno problem (“In what way is knowledge better than merely true belief?”) as to the content and plausibility of the claim that knowledge is always better than would be the corresponding merely true belief. It first asks whether knowledge is always better—at least in epistemic respects—then explores the relation between knowledge and proper action. The chapter then goes on to show how the value-of-knowledge intuition acquires further interest through its equivalence with the view of knowledge as a norm of assertion. Finally, this chapter steps back to examine what we might mean in saying that to know is always necessarily better than to get it right by luck while remaining in ignorance.

This chapter argues that by attending to the illocutionary force of knowledge attributions — specifically, that they serve to give credit to the believer for getting things right — fallibilists can assuage two problems plaguing their concept of knowledge: namely, the lottery problem and the Gettier problem. Borrowing work from Joel Fienberg on blaming, an account of credit attribution is developed that stresses the relationship between causal salience and causal responsibility. Because causal salience is context sensitive, resolutions to the lottery problem and the Gettier problem contain a significant contextual element. Just as an agent must be causally responsible in order to receive credit for athletic feats, so too must an agent's cognitive character or intellectual virtue be a necessary element to explain why an agent is deserving of credit for obtaining a true belief. This account is tested against cases relative to the above problems and ends with how this account can explain the value of knowledge.

In ”Virtues in Epistemology,” John Greco presents and evaluates two main notions of intellectual virtue. The first concerns Ernest Sosa's development of this concept as a disposition to grasp truth and avoid falsehood. Greco contrasts this with moral models of intellectual virtue that include a motivational component in their definition, namely a desire for truth. Instead, Greco argues that a minimalist reliabilist account of intellectual virtue “in which the virtues are conceived as reliable cognitive abilities or powers,” can be illuminating in an account of knowledge. He sets out to support this on the grounds that his approach to intellectual virtue can adequately address three major problems on the theory of knowledge: Humean skepticism, the Gettier problem, and the problem of showing that knowledge is more valuable than mere true belief.

This chapter examines arguments saying that the rationality thesis is an empirical truth. The general argument, based on evolutionary theory, is initially quite appealing, and many philosophers have (at least implicitly) endorsed it. This evolutionary argument involves two parts. The first is the claim that evolution, through natural selection, will select for cognitive mechanisms that generate true beliefs. The second part posits a connection between rationality and the use of mechanisms that produce true beliefs. The chapter argues that the evolutionary argument fails to provide support for human rationality. First, it considers an intuitive argument in favour of this step of the evolutionary argument. This argument tries to establish the connection between evolution and truth by way of natural selection and optimality: evolution is driven by natural selection and natural selection will select for optimal principles, namely, those principles that select true beliefs. Also discussed in the chapter are the Garcia effect and the link between rationality and reproductive success.

This chapter turns to the value of knowledge. If the primary aim of inquiry is the acquisition of true beliefs, where does this leave knowledge? Is not it more valuable than mere true belief? The chapter considers why this is so, and asks that if knowledge is really more valuable than true belief, should it rather than true belief be the primary aim of inquiry. On some accounts of knowledge, it is surprisingly difficult to deal with such questions. This chapter introduces an approach to address these issues, and goes on to explain that it is more important to have true beliefs about some issues than others, and that the standards of importance are not solely intellectual.

Addresses the classical ‘justified true belief’ account of knowledge. Examines Robert Fogelin's reinterpretation of the traditional analysis as conjoining assessments of epistemic propriety and truth‐determinativeness, and the diagnosis of Gettier problems suggested by it. A perspectivalist revision of Fogelin's account is advanced, defended, and distinguished from widespread ‘contextualist’ views. Concludes with a demonstration that the revised analysis avoids various forms of scepticism.

Presents Nietzsche's critical reflections directed at traditional metaphysical categories such as the external world, substance, causation, and self. Targeted theories include the doctrine of substance qua substratum for properties; the Lockean ontology of powers inherent in external objects; the construal of the self as either mental substance or transcendental subjects; atomism; and the belief in the explanatory powers of Newtonian force. It is argued that there is a pervasive general line of scepticism in Nietzsche's later thought concerning the possibility of knowledge as rationally justified true belief. The chapter concludes with a defence of Nietzsche's general scepticism against a variety of countervailing arguments.