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Against Internalism-Parity

Christopher Cowie

in Morality and Epistemic Judgement: The Argument From Analogy

Published in print:
2019
Published Online:
December 2019
ISBN:
9780198842736
eISBN:
9780191878664
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/oso/9780198842736.003.0003
Subject:
Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology, Moral Philosophy

It is argued that the first version of the parity premise—internalism-parity—is false. It is false because epistemic judgements are committed to the existence of ‘merely institutional’ reasons. Moral ... More


Simple Veritism

Christopher Cowie

in Morality and Epistemic Judgement: The Argument From Analogy

Published in print:
2019
Published Online:
December 2019
ISBN:
9780198842736
eISBN:
9780191878664
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/oso/9780198842736.003.0007
Subject:
Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology, Moral Philosophy

In modelling epistemic judgements on normative or evaluative judgements within ‘institutions’—such as sports and games, etiquette, fashion, and the law—as has been done in earlier chapters it has ... More


True Belief as a Non-Ideal Good

Hazlett Allan

in A Luxury of the Understanding: On the Value of True Belief

Published in print:
2013
Published Online:
January 2014
ISBN:
9780199674800
eISBN:
9780191761164
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199674800.003.0004
Subject:
Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology

It is argued that true belief is only sometimes pro tanto valuable vis-à-vis the wellbeing of the believer. First, cases of useless true belief are considered. Second, cases of uninteresting and ... More


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