Christopher Cowie
- Published in print:
- 2019
- Published Online:
- December 2019
- ISBN:
- 9780198842736
- eISBN:
- 9780191878664
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/oso/9780198842736.003.0003
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology, Moral Philosophy
It is argued that the first version of the parity premise—internalism-parity—is false. It is false because epistemic judgements are committed to the existence of ‘merely institutional’ reasons. Moral ...
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It is argued that the first version of the parity premise—internalism-parity—is false. It is false because epistemic judgements are committed to the existence of ‘merely institutional’ reasons. Moral judgements, by contrast, are committed to the existence of genuinely normative reasons. This claim is defended by appeal to the basic rationale that epistemic judgements are normative or evaluative only in the sense of normative or evaluative judgements within ‘institutions’ such as sports and games, etiquette, fashion, and the law, but moral judgements are not. It is argued that this does not render epistemic norms merely conventional in an objectionable sense.Less
It is argued that the first version of the parity premise—internalism-parity—is false. It is false because epistemic judgements are committed to the existence of ‘merely institutional’ reasons. Moral judgements, by contrast, are committed to the existence of genuinely normative reasons. This claim is defended by appeal to the basic rationale that epistemic judgements are normative or evaluative only in the sense of normative or evaluative judgements within ‘institutions’ such as sports and games, etiquette, fashion, and the law, but moral judgements are not. It is argued that this does not render epistemic norms merely conventional in an objectionable sense.
Christopher Cowie
- Published in print:
- 2019
- Published Online:
- December 2019
- ISBN:
- 9780198842736
- eISBN:
- 9780191878664
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/oso/9780198842736.003.0007
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology, Moral Philosophy
In modelling epistemic judgements on normative or evaluative judgements within ‘institutions’—such as sports and games, etiquette, fashion, and the law—as has been done in earlier chapters it has ...
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In modelling epistemic judgements on normative or evaluative judgements within ‘institutions’—such as sports and games, etiquette, fashion, and the law—as has been done in earlier chapters it has been assumed that the final or basic epistemic value is true belief. This chapter considers objections to this from knowledge-first and anti-consequentialist conceptions of epistemic norms. It presents reasons for scepticism about these views and claims that these alternatives are still compatible with the basic view in the book of the contrast between epistemic norms and moral norms and so with its rejection of the parity premise.Less
In modelling epistemic judgements on normative or evaluative judgements within ‘institutions’—such as sports and games, etiquette, fashion, and the law—as has been done in earlier chapters it has been assumed that the final or basic epistemic value is true belief. This chapter considers objections to this from knowledge-first and anti-consequentialist conceptions of epistemic norms. It presents reasons for scepticism about these views and claims that these alternatives are still compatible with the basic view in the book of the contrast between epistemic norms and moral norms and so with its rejection of the parity premise.
Hazlett Allan
- Published in print:
- 2013
- Published Online:
- January 2014
- ISBN:
- 9780199674800
- eISBN:
- 9780191761164
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199674800.003.0004
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology
It is argued that true belief is only sometimes pro tanto valuable vis-à-vis the wellbeing of the believer. First, cases of useless true belief are considered. Second, cases of uninteresting and ...
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It is argued that true belief is only sometimes pro tanto valuable vis-à-vis the wellbeing of the believer. First, cases of useless true belief are considered. Second, cases of uninteresting and insignificant true belief are considered. Third, the social value of true belief is discussed, and it is argued that true belief is only sometimes socially valuable. Finally, the idea that true belief is necessary for wellbeing is criticized.Less
It is argued that true belief is only sometimes pro tanto valuable vis-à-vis the wellbeing of the believer. First, cases of useless true belief are considered. Second, cases of uninteresting and insignificant true belief are considered. Third, the social value of true belief is discussed, and it is argued that true belief is only sometimes socially valuable. Finally, the idea that true belief is necessary for wellbeing is criticized.
