Graham Bell
- Published in print:
- 2007
- Published Online:
- May 2008
- ISBN:
- 9780198569725
- eISBN:
- 9780191717741
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198569725.003.0003
- Subject:
- Biology, Evolutionary Biology / Genetics
The mechanism of evolutionary change can be studied directly through selection experiments in laboratory microcosms. This chapter begins by describing the experimental approach to evolution, and goes ...
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The mechanism of evolutionary change can be studied directly through selection experiments in laboratory microcosms. This chapter begins by describing the experimental approach to evolution, and goes on to analyse adaptation over different time scales. The first section in this chapter is about microcosmologica. Subsections here concern Dallinger's experiment; the laboratory microcosm; the inhabitants of the microcosm; the selection experiment; fitness and adaptedness; and microcosm genealogy. The second section is all about sorting (in other words selection of pre-existing variation) and includes subsection on a single episode of selection; the sorting of a single type; the mixture of discrete types; the Fundamental Theorem of Natural Selection; the sorting in finite populations; drift and selection; and fluctuating population size. The third section is on purifying selection (defined as maintaining adaptedness despite genetic deterioration) and this section discusses the following: mutation-drift balance; mutation-selection equilibrium; and Muller's Ratchet. The fourth section is about directional selection (this is restoring adaptedness despite environmental deterioration) and details the probability that a beneficial mutation will be fixed; periodic selection; Fisher's geometrical analogy; the variable-mutation model; the extreme-value mode; clonal interference; the distribution of fitness effects; genetic interference; and the genetic basis of adaptation. The fifth section is about successive substitution and includes detail on phenotypic evolution towards the optimum; adaptive walks; transitivity; and clonal interference. The sixth section, Cumulative adaptation, includes the following: the protein matrix; connectance; synthetic beneficial mutations; functional interaction in a protein structure; the evolution of RNA sequences; reversibility; cumulation; cumulative construction of novel amidases; diminishing returns; and contingency. The last section called Successive substitution at several loci explains genetic interactions; the adaptive landscape; the allele matrix; compensatory mutations; compound structures; processing chains; the effect of mutation in a simple processing chain; the pattern of adaptation; the evolution of metabolic pathways; in vitro selection; genetic changes during adaptation; and repeated adaptation.Less
The mechanism of evolutionary change can be studied directly through selection experiments in laboratory microcosms. This chapter begins by describing the experimental approach to evolution, and goes on to analyse adaptation over different time scales. The first section in this chapter is about microcosmologica. Subsections here concern Dallinger's experiment; the laboratory microcosm; the inhabitants of the microcosm; the selection experiment; fitness and adaptedness; and microcosm genealogy. The second section is all about sorting (in other words selection of pre-existing variation) and includes subsection on a single episode of selection; the sorting of a single type; the mixture of discrete types; the Fundamental Theorem of Natural Selection; the sorting in finite populations; drift and selection; and fluctuating population size. The third section is on purifying selection (defined as maintaining adaptedness despite genetic deterioration) and this section discusses the following: mutation-drift balance; mutation-selection equilibrium; and Muller's Ratchet. The fourth section is about directional selection (this is restoring adaptedness despite environmental deterioration) and details the probability that a beneficial mutation will be fixed; periodic selection; Fisher's geometrical analogy; the variable-mutation model; the extreme-value mode; clonal interference; the distribution of fitness effects; genetic interference; and the genetic basis of adaptation. The fifth section is about successive substitution and includes detail on phenotypic evolution towards the optimum; adaptive walks; transitivity; and clonal interference. The sixth section, Cumulative adaptation, includes the following: the protein matrix; connectance; synthetic beneficial mutations; functional interaction in a protein structure; the evolution of RNA sequences; reversibility; cumulation; cumulative construction of novel amidases; diminishing returns; and contingency. The last section called Successive substitution at several loci explains genetic interactions; the adaptive landscape; the allele matrix; compensatory mutations; compound structures; processing chains; the effect of mutation in a simple processing chain; the pattern of adaptation; the evolution of metabolic pathways; in vitro selection; genetic changes during adaptation; and repeated adaptation.
Graham Priest
- Published in print:
- 2010
- Published Online:
- May 2010
- ISBN:
- 9780199570386
- eISBN:
- 9780191722134
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199570386.003.0024
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Logic/Philosophy of Mathematics, Metaphysics/Epistemology
This chapter defines a notion of identity in the second-order paraconsistent logic LP. The notion does not have the properties of transitivity or substitutivity, but these may be regained in ...
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This chapter defines a notion of identity in the second-order paraconsistent logic LP. The notion does not have the properties of transitivity or substitutivity, but these may be regained in consistent contexts. The chapter then discusses applications of this notion of identity, especially to entities involved in change. Soritical changes come in for special consideration.Less
This chapter defines a notion of identity in the second-order paraconsistent logic LP. The notion does not have the properties of transitivity or substitutivity, but these may be regained in consistent contexts. The chapter then discusses applications of this notion of identity, especially to entities involved in change. Soritical changes come in for special consideration.
Mark Donohue
- Published in print:
- 2008
- Published Online:
- January 2009
- ISBN:
- 9780199238385
- eISBN:
- 9780191716768
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199238385.003.0002
- Subject:
- Linguistics, Semantics and Pragmatics
Semantic alignment involves a split in the coding of Ss according to the verb's lexical semantics, and is related to the fact that most languages have more than one way to code the arguments of ...
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Semantic alignment involves a split in the coding of Ss according to the verb's lexical semantics, and is related to the fact that most languages have more than one way to code the arguments of bivalent predicates. Contrasts that rely on syntactic categories are not considered to represent semantic alignment.Less
Semantic alignment involves a split in the coding of Ss according to the verb's lexical semantics, and is related to the fact that most languages have more than one way to code the arguments of bivalent predicates. Contrasts that rely on syntactic categories are not considered to represent semantic alignment.
Maura Velázquez‐castillo
- Published in print:
- 2008
- Published Online:
- January 2009
- ISBN:
- 9780199238385
- eISBN:
- 9780191716768
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199238385.003.0015
- Subject:
- Linguistics, Semantics and Pragmatics
This chapter shows that the closest equivalents to voice alternations in Guarani cut across the transitive divide and respond to spatial relations between events and event participants. The ...
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This chapter shows that the closest equivalents to voice alternations in Guarani cut across the transitive divide and respond to spatial relations between events and event participants. The constructions at issue, previously labeled ‘reflexive/passive’ and ‘inverse’, are sensitive to viewpoint and levels of proximity between the predicate and its arguments within inactive situations, and to deviations from the default outward directionality of active events.Less
This chapter shows that the closest equivalents to voice alternations in Guarani cut across the transitive divide and respond to spatial relations between events and event participants. The constructions at issue, previously labeled ‘reflexive/passive’ and ‘inverse’, are sensitive to viewpoint and levels of proximity between the predicate and its arguments within inactive situations, and to deviations from the default outward directionality of active events.
Nils Holtug
- Published in print:
- 2010
- Published Online:
- May 2010
- ISBN:
- 9780199580170
- eISBN:
- 9780191722707
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199580170.003.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Moral Philosophy, Political Philosophy
This chapter introduces some key concepts, including prudence and justice and the relations between them, and gives an overview of the book. It also provides an account of the methodology employed. ...
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This chapter introduces some key concepts, including prudence and justice and the relations between them, and gives an overview of the book. It also provides an account of the methodology employed. More precisely, it is shown that the types of arguments used are compatible with a wide variety of more particular epistemic and ontological views about ethics. Furthermore, the role of thought experiments, contrast arguments and arguments that rely on the notion that ‘betterness’ is a transitive relation are clarified.Less
This chapter introduces some key concepts, including prudence and justice and the relations between them, and gives an overview of the book. It also provides an account of the methodology employed. More precisely, it is shown that the types of arguments used are compatible with a wide variety of more particular epistemic and ontological views about ethics. Furthermore, the role of thought experiments, contrast arguments and arguments that rely on the notion that ‘betterness’ is a transitive relation are clarified.
Larry S. Temkin
- Published in print:
- 2012
- Published Online:
- May 2012
- ISBN:
- 9780199759446
- eISBN:
- 9780199932214
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199759446.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, General, Moral Philosophy
In choosing between moral alternatives—choosing between various forms of ethical action—we typically make calculations of the following kind: A is better than B; B is better than C; therefore A is ...
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In choosing between moral alternatives—choosing between various forms of ethical action—we typically make calculations of the following kind: A is better than B; B is better than C; therefore A is better than C. These inferences use the principle of transitivity and are fundamental to many forms of practical and theoretical theorizing, not just in moral and ethical theory but in economics. Indeed they are so common as to be almost invisible. What this book shows is that, shockingly, if we want to continue making plausible judgments, we cannot continue to make these assumptions. The book shows that we are committed to various moral ideals that are, surprisingly, fundamentally incompatible with the idea that “better than” can be transitive. The book develops many examples where value judgments that we accept and find attractive, are incompatible with transitivity. While this might seem to leave two options—reject transitivity, or reject some of our normative commitments in order to keep it—the book's position is neutral on which path to follow, only making the case that a choice is necessary, and that the cost either way will be high. The book is a deeply unsettling work of skeptical philosophy that mounts an important new challenge to contemporary ethics.Less
In choosing between moral alternatives—choosing between various forms of ethical action—we typically make calculations of the following kind: A is better than B; B is better than C; therefore A is better than C. These inferences use the principle of transitivity and are fundamental to many forms of practical and theoretical theorizing, not just in moral and ethical theory but in economics. Indeed they are so common as to be almost invisible. What this book shows is that, shockingly, if we want to continue making plausible judgments, we cannot continue to make these assumptions. The book shows that we are committed to various moral ideals that are, surprisingly, fundamentally incompatible with the idea that “better than” can be transitive. The book develops many examples where value judgments that we accept and find attractive, are incompatible with transitivity. While this might seem to leave two options—reject transitivity, or reject some of our normative commitments in order to keep it—the book's position is neutral on which path to follow, only making the case that a choice is necessary, and that the cost either way will be high. The book is a deeply unsettling work of skeptical philosophy that mounts an important new challenge to contemporary ethics.
Satish K. Jain
- Published in print:
- 2008
- Published Online:
- May 2009
- ISBN:
- 9780199239115
- eISBN:
- 9780191716935
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199239115.003.0011
- Subject:
- Economics and Finance, Development, Growth, and Environmental
This chapter extends the earlier work on domain conditions for social rationality under the method of majority decision (MMD) by deriving Inada-type necessary and sufficient conditions for ...
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This chapter extends the earlier work on domain conditions for social rationality under the method of majority decision (MMD) by deriving Inada-type necessary and sufficient conditions for transitivity and quasi-transitivity for cases which were not covered by the earlier results. It presents a unified approach to the problem of obtaining domain conditions by formulating all conditions in terms of Latin Squares. Also, each characterization is obtained in terms of a single condition. These two together result in considerable simplification of proofs. The chapter also provides new proofs for the earlier results. Regarding acyclicity, it is shown that for any non-trivial set of binary relations containing intransitive binary relations, no condition defined only over triples can be an Inada-type necessary and sufficient condition for acyclicity under the MMD.Less
This chapter extends the earlier work on domain conditions for social rationality under the method of majority decision (MMD) by deriving Inada-type necessary and sufficient conditions for transitivity and quasi-transitivity for cases which were not covered by the earlier results. It presents a unified approach to the problem of obtaining domain conditions by formulating all conditions in terms of Latin Squares. Also, each characterization is obtained in terms of a single condition. These two together result in considerable simplification of proofs. The chapter also provides new proofs for the earlier results. Regarding acyclicity, it is shown that for any non-trivial set of binary relations containing intransitive binary relations, no condition defined only over triples can be an Inada-type necessary and sufficient condition for acyclicity under the MMD.
Larry S. Temkin
- Published in print:
- 2012
- Published Online:
- May 2012
- ISBN:
- 9780199759446
- eISBN:
- 9780199932214
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199759446.003.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, General, Moral Philosophy
This introductory chapter first sets out the purpose of the book, which is to illuminate some of the key assumptions to which many are firmly committed regarding the nature of the good, moral ideals, ...
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This introductory chapter first sets out the purpose of the book, which is to illuminate some of the key assumptions to which many are firmly committed regarding the nature of the good, moral ideals, and practical reasoning. These assumptions have a central role to play in the development of an adequate account for ranking outcomes. It then presents an overview of the central topics addressed in the book including aggregation, the nature and significance of various Spectrum Arguments, the Axiom of Transitivity, and nature of ideals and, in particular. The discussion then turns to intuitions, impossibility arguments and juggling, and terminologies.Less
This introductory chapter first sets out the purpose of the book, which is to illuminate some of the key assumptions to which many are firmly committed regarding the nature of the good, moral ideals, and practical reasoning. These assumptions have a central role to play in the development of an adequate account for ranking outcomes. It then presents an overview of the central topics addressed in the book including aggregation, the nature and significance of various Spectrum Arguments, the Axiom of Transitivity, and nature of ideals and, in particular. The discussion then turns to intuitions, impossibility arguments and juggling, and terminologies.
Larry S. Temkin
- Published in print:
- 2012
- Published Online:
- May 2012
- ISBN:
- 9780199759446
- eISBN:
- 9780199932214
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199759446.003.0009
- Subject:
- Philosophy, General, Moral Philosophy
Chapters 2 through 5 presented various Spectrum Arguments which revealed an inconsistency between certain standard views regarding how to make trade-offs between different alternatives along a ...
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Chapters 2 through 5 presented various Spectrum Arguments which revealed an inconsistency between certain standard views regarding how to make trade-offs between different alternatives along a spectrum, certain factual premises, and the transitivity of the “better than” relation (in this book's wide reason-implying sense). Many people are suspicious of Spectrum Arguments, and many objections have been raised to such arguments. Some of these have already been addressed. But others have not. This chapter presents and responds to the most serious of the remaining objections, of which there are three main types. It considers a representative example of each type. Type one responds to this book's arguments by appealing to the significance of there being different kinds of alternatives along these spectrums. Type two claims that these arguments are versions of the Standard Sorites Paradox. Type three suggests that these arguments elicit well-known heuristics and similarity-based reasoning schemes that are leading our intuitions astray. It is argued that none of these objections is compelling.Less
Chapters 2 through 5 presented various Spectrum Arguments which revealed an inconsistency between certain standard views regarding how to make trade-offs between different alternatives along a spectrum, certain factual premises, and the transitivity of the “better than” relation (in this book's wide reason-implying sense). Many people are suspicious of Spectrum Arguments, and many objections have been raised to such arguments. Some of these have already been addressed. But others have not. This chapter presents and responds to the most serious of the remaining objections, of which there are three main types. It considers a representative example of each type. Type one responds to this book's arguments by appealing to the significance of there being different kinds of alternatives along these spectrums. Type two claims that these arguments are versions of the Standard Sorites Paradox. Type three suggests that these arguments elicit well-known heuristics and similarity-based reasoning schemes that are leading our intuitions astray. It is argued that none of these objections is compelling.
Larry S. Temkin
- Published in print:
- 2012
- Published Online:
- May 2012
- ISBN:
- 9780199759446
- eISBN:
- 9780199932214
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199759446.003.0011
- Subject:
- Philosophy, General, Moral Philosophy
A fundamentally important question for practical reasoning is how best to understand the goodness of outcomes and the nature of moral ideals: Is the Internal Aspects View correct, is the Essentially ...
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A fundamentally important question for practical reasoning is how best to understand the goodness of outcomes and the nature of moral ideals: Is the Internal Aspects View correct, is the Essentially Comparative View correct, or is, perhaps, some other view correct? This chapter distinguishes between the Internal Aspects View and the Essentially Comparative View, and illustrates some of the implications of adopting one or the other. In doing this, it begins by exploring an important example that illuminates the appeal of the Essentially Comparative View, Derek Parfit's Mere Addition Paradox. Analyzing the Mere Addition Paradox, its implications, and various possible responses to it provides a much better understanding of a number of important views that stand or fall together. One of these views, called the Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives Principle, is also, along with the transitivity of “better than,” widely regarded as a fundamental principle of practical rationality.Less
A fundamentally important question for practical reasoning is how best to understand the goodness of outcomes and the nature of moral ideals: Is the Internal Aspects View correct, is the Essentially Comparative View correct, or is, perhaps, some other view correct? This chapter distinguishes between the Internal Aspects View and the Essentially Comparative View, and illustrates some of the implications of adopting one or the other. In doing this, it begins by exploring an important example that illuminates the appeal of the Essentially Comparative View, Derek Parfit's Mere Addition Paradox. Analyzing the Mere Addition Paradox, its implications, and various possible responses to it provides a much better understanding of a number of important views that stand or fall together. One of these views, called the Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives Principle, is also, along with the transitivity of “better than,” widely regarded as a fundamental principle of practical rationality.
Larry S. Temkin
- Published in print:
- 2012
- Published Online:
- May 2012
- ISBN:
- 9780199759446
- eISBN:
- 9780199932214
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199759446.003.0013
- Subject:
- Philosophy, General, Moral Philosophy
Numerous arguments have been presented illustrating that a number of beliefs that people hold about ideals and the nature of the good are incompatible. Among these beliefs are various Axioms of ...
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Numerous arguments have been presented illustrating that a number of beliefs that people hold about ideals and the nature of the good are incompatible. Among these beliefs are various Axioms of Transitivity, which hold that “equally as good as,” “at least as good as,” and “all-things-considered better than” are transitive relations. Given the central role that the Axioms of Transitivity play in practical reasoning, including the role that they play in Expected Value Theory, and that their analogues play in Expected Utility Theory, many suggestions have been made as to how we might preserve the Axioms of Transitivity even in the face of various arguments. This chapter considers the plausibility and implications of these suggestions. In doing this, it focuses on the view that “all-things-considered better than” is a transitive relation and, for simplicity, refer to that view as the Axiom of Transitivity.Less
Numerous arguments have been presented illustrating that a number of beliefs that people hold about ideals and the nature of the good are incompatible. Among these beliefs are various Axioms of Transitivity, which hold that “equally as good as,” “at least as good as,” and “all-things-considered better than” are transitive relations. Given the central role that the Axioms of Transitivity play in practical reasoning, including the role that they play in Expected Value Theory, and that their analogues play in Expected Utility Theory, many suggestions have been made as to how we might preserve the Axioms of Transitivity even in the face of various arguments. This chapter considers the plausibility and implications of these suggestions. In doing this, it focuses on the view that “all-things-considered better than” is a transitive relation and, for simplicity, refer to that view as the Axiom of Transitivity.
Wolfgang Spohn
- Published in print:
- 2012
- Published Online:
- September 2012
- ISBN:
- 9780199697502
- eISBN:
- 9780191739323
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199697502.003.0014
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology, Philosophy of Science
This is by far the longest chapter of the book. It deals with the most important and mysterious natural modality: causation. It proceeds from the basic idea underlying all deterministic and ...
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This is by far the longest chapter of the book. It deals with the most important and mysterious natural modality: causation. It proceeds from the basic idea underlying all deterministic and probabilistic theories of causation that a cause raises the metaphysical or epistemic status of the effect given the obtaining circumstances. For direct causes the circumstances can be explained in a non-circular way. Thus, the basic idea immediately yields a precise explication of deterministic direct causes in ranking-theoretic terms. The explication is extended to direct causal dependence between variables and allows proving all basic principles such as the common cause principle and the causal Markov condition. Hence, causal theorizing in terms of Bayesian nets works here equally well. These definitions of causal relations are frame-relative, but they allow inferring what causation is in absolute terms. Moreover, a way is shown of how not to deny, but to accommodate so-called interactive forks, which prima facie violate the common cause principle. Finally, the analysis is extended to indirect causation by a detailed argument for the transitivity of causation, which, however, entails the transitivity of causal dependence between variables only under additional assumptions. All this is done with a continuous look at many examples and many other accounts of causation. An appendix briefly extends the analysis to causal explanation. And a final appendix argues that inference to the best explanation is basically the ranking analogue of Bayes’ theorem and, moreover, that there is no problem of the catch-all hypothesis within the ranking-theoretic framework.Less
This is by far the longest chapter of the book. It deals with the most important and mysterious natural modality: causation. It proceeds from the basic idea underlying all deterministic and probabilistic theories of causation that a cause raises the metaphysical or epistemic status of the effect given the obtaining circumstances. For direct causes the circumstances can be explained in a non-circular way. Thus, the basic idea immediately yields a precise explication of deterministic direct causes in ranking-theoretic terms. The explication is extended to direct causal dependence between variables and allows proving all basic principles such as the common cause principle and the causal Markov condition. Hence, causal theorizing in terms of Bayesian nets works here equally well. These definitions of causal relations are frame-relative, but they allow inferring what causation is in absolute terms. Moreover, a way is shown of how not to deny, but to accommodate so-called interactive forks, which prima facie violate the common cause principle. Finally, the analysis is extended to indirect causation by a detailed argument for the transitivity of causation, which, however, entails the transitivity of causal dependence between variables only under additional assumptions. All this is done with a continuous look at many examples and many other accounts of causation. An appendix briefly extends the analysis to causal explanation. And a final appendix argues that inference to the best explanation is basically the ranking analogue of Bayes’ theorem and, moreover, that there is no problem of the catch-all hypothesis within the ranking-theoretic framework.
Michael S. Moore
- Published in print:
- 2009
- Published Online:
- May 2009
- ISBN:
- 9780199256860
- eISBN:
- 9780191719653
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199256860.003.0005
- Subject:
- Law, Philosophy of Law
This chapter takes the law pretty much at face value in describing the presuppositions about causation made by that law. It examines the cause/correlation distinction, the cause/condition ...
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This chapter takes the law pretty much at face value in describing the presuppositions about causation made by that law. It examines the cause/correlation distinction, the cause/condition distinction, overdetermining and pre-emptive causes; the scalarity, transitivity, and temporal asymmetry of causation; intervening causes breaking causal chains, omissions as causes, preventions as effects, the extensionality of causal contexts of speech; and the aphrodisiac effect of culpability on causation.Less
This chapter takes the law pretty much at face value in describing the presuppositions about causation made by that law. It examines the cause/correlation distinction, the cause/condition distinction, overdetermining and pre-emptive causes; the scalarity, transitivity, and temporal asymmetry of causation; intervening causes breaking causal chains, omissions as causes, preventions as effects, the extensionality of causal contexts of speech; and the aphrodisiac effect of culpability on causation.
Udo Thiel
- Published in print:
- 2011
- Published Online:
- January 2012
- ISBN:
- 9780199542499
- eISBN:
- 9780191730917
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199542499.003.0007
- Subject:
- Philosophy, History of Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind
The two most prominent criticisms of Locke’s account are the charge of circularity and the argument from the transitivity of identity. These are arguments, moreover, that any account that bases ...
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The two most prominent criticisms of Locke’s account are the charge of circularity and the argument from the transitivity of identity. These are arguments, moreover, that any account that bases personal identity on consciousness would need to answer, and are thus still discussed in present-day debates about personal identity. As far as Locke’s own theory is concerned, if Locke’s text is considered carefully, then the charge of circularity can be rejected in a straightforward way. The argument from the transitivity of identity, however, appears to pose more serious problems for his theory. Different versions of the charge of circularity are discussed (Sergeant, Lee, Butler). Although some of Locke’s eighteenth-century defenders fail to do his account justice (Perronet), Edmund Law’s defence provides one of the best accounts of Locke’s theory to this day.The argument from transitivity (that Locke’s account in terms of consciousness is inconsistent with the transitivity of identity, as consciousness is not transitive) was first formulated by Berkeley, taken up by the anonymous author of the Essay on Personal Identity (1769) and then made famous by Thomas Reid (1785). The chapter examines present-day attempts at defending Locke against this argument and argues that these attempts, although may be commendable in many ways, have not been successful.Less
The two most prominent criticisms of Locke’s account are the charge of circularity and the argument from the transitivity of identity. These are arguments, moreover, that any account that bases personal identity on consciousness would need to answer, and are thus still discussed in present-day debates about personal identity. As far as Locke’s own theory is concerned, if Locke’s text is considered carefully, then the charge of circularity can be rejected in a straightforward way. The argument from the transitivity of identity, however, appears to pose more serious problems for his theory. Different versions of the charge of circularity are discussed (Sergeant, Lee, Butler). Although some of Locke’s eighteenth-century defenders fail to do his account justice (Perronet), Edmund Law’s defence provides one of the best accounts of Locke’s theory to this day.The argument from transitivity (that Locke’s account in terms of consciousness is inconsistent with the transitivity of identity, as consciousness is not transitive) was first formulated by Berkeley, taken up by the anonymous author of the Essay on Personal Identity (1769) and then made famous by Thomas Reid (1785). The chapter examines present-day attempts at defending Locke against this argument and argues that these attempts, although may be commendable in many ways, have not been successful.
Sherrilyn Roush
- Published in print:
- 2005
- Published Online:
- February 2006
- ISBN:
- 9780199274734
- eISBN:
- 9780191603228
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0199274738.003.0005
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology
This chapter explains the motivations behind a tracking view of what evidence is, and formulates such a view in terms of conditional probability. This view is a likelihood ratio confirmation theory, ...
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This chapter explains the motivations behind a tracking view of what evidence is, and formulates such a view in terms of conditional probability. This view is a likelihood ratio confirmation theory, which is considered superior to approaches using other measures of confirmation. Beyond confirmational support, a new constraint is formulated to put a lower bound on the posterior probability of the hypothesis. It is shown that knowledge, on the new tracking view, has a sufficiently strong transitivity property to explain why better evidence makes one more likely to know when to conjoin the tracking view of evidence with the tracking view of knowledge.Less
This chapter explains the motivations behind a tracking view of what evidence is, and formulates such a view in terms of conditional probability. This view is a likelihood ratio confirmation theory, which is considered superior to approaches using other measures of confirmation. Beyond confirmational support, a new constraint is formulated to put a lower bound on the posterior probability of the hypothesis. It is shown that knowledge, on the new tracking view, has a sufficiently strong transitivity property to explain why better evidence makes one more likely to know when to conjoin the tracking view of evidence with the tracking view of knowledge.
Mary Anne Warren
- Published in print:
- 2000
- Published Online:
- October 2011
- ISBN:
- 9780198250401
- eISBN:
- 9780191681295
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198250401.003.0008
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Moral Philosophy
This chapter explores the moral permissibility of euthanasia, under various controversial circumstances. It begins by distinguishing several forms of euthanasia. It argues that the human right to ...
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This chapter explores the moral permissibility of euthanasia, under various controversial circumstances. It begins by distinguishing several forms of euthanasia. It argues that the human right to life is consistent in some cases with a decision to hasten or not to delay one's own death, or that of another human being. It also argues that there are cases in which the moral right to life does not fully obtain, because the individual has suffered either whole-brain death or irreversible brain damage that precludes any future return to consciousness. In these cases, the Transitivity of Respect principle assumes a more central role in shaping our moral obligations.Less
This chapter explores the moral permissibility of euthanasia, under various controversial circumstances. It begins by distinguishing several forms of euthanasia. It argues that the human right to life is consistent in some cases with a decision to hasten or not to delay one's own death, or that of another human being. It also argues that there are cases in which the moral right to life does not fully obtain, because the individual has suffered either whole-brain death or irreversible brain damage that precludes any future return to consciousness. In these cases, the Transitivity of Respect principle assumes a more central role in shaping our moral obligations.
Paul Anand
- Published in print:
- 2009
- Published Online:
- May 2009
- ISBN:
- 9780199290420
- eISBN:
- 9780191710506
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199290420.003.0007
- Subject:
- Economics and Finance, Public and Welfare
This chapter provides an overview of what has been called by philosophers the “modern view“ of formal rational choice by focussing on the arguments relating to rational agency and transitive ...
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This chapter provides an overview of what has been called by philosophers the “modern view“ of formal rational choice by focussing on the arguments relating to rational agency and transitive (intransitive) preference. In particular it demonstrates that the logical and semantic arguments are either question‐begging or incomplete. Suggesting that static and dynamic justifications of transitivity are essentially distinct, it identifies a number of problems with the standard money‐pump argument that purports to show why rational agents' preferences are necessarily constrained to have the transitivity property. Subsequently, constructive examples indicating how and when rational agents would want to exhibit intransitive preferences are discussed and finally some of the more recent explicitly game‐theoretic treatments of the argument are discussed. It concludes by suggesting that expected utility should be regarded as a model of context‐free choice, and that a wide range of more general models with the ability to reflect the structure of preference should be seen as modelling rational phenomena.Less
This chapter provides an overview of what has been called by philosophers the “modern view“ of formal rational choice by focussing on the arguments relating to rational agency and transitive (intransitive) preference. In particular it demonstrates that the logical and semantic arguments are either question‐begging or incomplete. Suggesting that static and dynamic justifications of transitivity are essentially distinct, it identifies a number of problems with the standard money‐pump argument that purports to show why rational agents' preferences are necessarily constrained to have the transitivity property. Subsequently, constructive examples indicating how and when rational agents would want to exhibit intransitive preferences are discussed and finally some of the more recent explicitly game‐theoretic treatments of the argument are discussed. It concludes by suggesting that expected utility should be regarded as a model of context‐free choice, and that a wide range of more general models with the ability to reflect the structure of preference should be seen as modelling rational phenomena.
M. E. J. Newman
- Published in print:
- 2010
- Published Online:
- September 2010
- ISBN:
- 9780199206650
- eISBN:
- 9780191594175
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199206650.003.0007
- Subject:
- Physics, Theoretical, Computational, and Statistical Physics
If we know the structure of a network we can calculate from it a variety of useful quantities or measures that capture particular features of the network topology. This chapter looks at some of these ...
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If we know the structure of a network we can calculate from it a variety of useful quantities or measures that capture particular features of the network topology. This chapter looks at some of these measures, including degree centrality, eigenvector centrality, Katz centrality, transitivity, reciprocity, and similarity. Exercises are provided at the end of the chapter.Less
If we know the structure of a network we can calculate from it a variety of useful quantities or measures that capture particular features of the network topology. This chapter looks at some of these measures, including degree centrality, eigenvector centrality, Katz centrality, transitivity, reciprocity, and similarity. Exercises are provided at the end of the chapter.
JC Beall
- Published in print:
- 2005
- Published Online:
- October 2011
- ISBN:
- 9780199288403
- eISBN:
- 9780191700491
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199288403.003.0008
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Logic/Philosophy of Mathematics
By way of further clarifying logical pluralism, this chapter turns to some general objections. One objection is to argue for a pluralism about logical consequence which is wide enough to encompass ...
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By way of further clarifying logical pluralism, this chapter turns to some general objections. One objection is to argue for a pluralism about logical consequence which is wide enough to encompass classical, relevant, and intuitionistic logic. In doing so, this chapter proposes a view which the adherents of relevant and intuitionistic logic by and large would find repugnant. In order to endorse classical logic all instances of the law of the excluded middle should be taken to be necessary. But intuitionists take the law of excluded middle to have counterexamples. The premises of this objection are correct, but the conclusion, that pluralism is uninteresting, should be resisted. Other objections discussed in this chapter relate to cases, transitivity and reflexivity, warrant and entitlement, warrant and disjunctive syllogism, meaning theory, logical truth, Carnapian pluralism, and logical form.Less
By way of further clarifying logical pluralism, this chapter turns to some general objections. One objection is to argue for a pluralism about logical consequence which is wide enough to encompass classical, relevant, and intuitionistic logic. In doing so, this chapter proposes a view which the adherents of relevant and intuitionistic logic by and large would find repugnant. In order to endorse classical logic all instances of the law of the excluded middle should be taken to be necessary. But intuitionists take the law of excluded middle to have counterexamples. The premises of this objection are correct, but the conclusion, that pluralism is uninteresting, should be resisted. Other objections discussed in this chapter relate to cases, transitivity and reflexivity, warrant and entitlement, warrant and disjunctive syllogism, meaning theory, logical truth, Carnapian pluralism, and logical form.
Walter Bossert and Kotaro Suzumura
- Published in print:
- 2008
- Published Online:
- May 2009
- ISBN:
- 9780199239115
- eISBN:
- 9780191716935
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199239115.003.0008
- Subject:
- Economics and Finance, Development, Growth, and Environmental
The rationalizability of a choice function on general domains by means of an ordering has been analyzed thoroughly by Richter (1966; 1971), Hansson (1968), and Suzumura (1977). Moreover, ...
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The rationalizability of a choice function on general domains by means of an ordering has been analyzed thoroughly by Richter (1966; 1971), Hansson (1968), and Suzumura (1977). Moreover, characterizations of various versions of consistent rationalizability have appeared in Bossert, Sprumont, and Suzumura (2005a). However, not much seems to be known when the coherence property of quasi-transitivity or that of P-acyclicity is imposed on a rationalization. This chapter develops a unified approach in order to characterize all forms of rationalizability on general domains.Less
The rationalizability of a choice function on general domains by means of an ordering has been analyzed thoroughly by Richter (1966; 1971), Hansson (1968), and Suzumura (1977). Moreover, characterizations of various versions of consistent rationalizability have appeared in Bossert, Sprumont, and Suzumura (2005a). However, not much seems to be known when the coherence property of quasi-transitivity or that of P-acyclicity is imposed on a rationalization. This chapter develops a unified approach in order to characterize all forms of rationalizability on general domains.
