Uwe Steinhoff
- Published in print:
- 2009
- Published Online:
- September 2009
- ISBN:
- 9780199547807
- eISBN:
- 9780191720758
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199547807.003.0003
- Subject:
- Political Science, Comparative Politics, Political Theory
In his preliminary considerations Habermas tries to demonstrate the initial plausibility of his programme of moral justification. He then uses Karl-Otto Apel's “transcendental pragmatics” for ...
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In his preliminary considerations Habermas tries to demonstrate the initial plausibility of his programme of moral justification. He then uses Karl-Otto Apel's “transcendental pragmatics” for identifying rules of discourse. According to transcendental pragmatics, rules or presuppositions of discourse cannot be denied without so-called “performative self-contradictions”. The next step is to derive the fundamental discourse-ethical justification principles U and D from these discovered rules of discourse. According to U and D, only those norms are valid that in an ideal discourse situation would meet with the acceptance of each speaker affected by the norm. An alternative way of justifying U and D would appeal to Habermas' consensus theory of truth and validity. Finally, Habermas tries to show how norms that are justified with help of the principles U and D can reasonably be applied to real situations. The chapter explains and critically discusses each step in Habermas' line of reasoning.Less
In his preliminary considerations Habermas tries to demonstrate the initial plausibility of his programme of moral justification. He then uses Karl-Otto Apel's “transcendental pragmatics” for identifying rules of discourse. According to transcendental pragmatics, rules or presuppositions of discourse cannot be denied without so-called “performative self-contradictions”. The next step is to derive the fundamental discourse-ethical justification principles U and D from these discovered rules of discourse. According to U and D, only those norms are valid that in an ideal discourse situation would meet with the acceptance of each speaker affected by the norm. An alternative way of justifying U and D would appeal to Habermas' consensus theory of truth and validity. Finally, Habermas tries to show how norms that are justified with help of the principles U and D can reasonably be applied to real situations. The chapter explains and critically discusses each step in Habermas' line of reasoning.
